

The Routledge History of Emotions in Europe

1100–1700



Edited by Andrew Lynch and Susan Broomhall

THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF EMOTIONS IN EUROPE

The Routledge History of Emotions in Europe: 1100–1700 presents the state of the field of pre-modern emotions during this period, placing particular emphasis on theoretical and methodological aspects of current research.

This book serves as a reference to existing research practices in emotions history and advances studies in the field across a range of scholarly approaches. It brings together the work of recognized experts and new voices, and represents a wide range of international and interdisciplinary perspectives from different schools of research practice, including art history, literature and culture, philosophy, linguistics, archaeology and music. Throughout the book, central and recurrent themes in emotional culture within medieval and early modern Europe are highlighted from different angles, and each chapter pays specialist attention to illustrative examples showing theory and method in application.

Exploring topics such as love, war, sex and sexuality, death, time, the body and the family in the context of emotional culture, *The Routledge History of Emotions in Europe: 1100–1700* reflects the sharp rise in scholarship relating to the history of emotions in recent years and is an essential resource for students and researchers of the history of pre-modern emotions.

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EMOTIONS IN EUROPE, 1100–1700

Conversations across methodologies

Andrew Lynch and Susan Broomhall

The aim of the present collection is to focus attention on new and emerging methodologies for emotions study in the medieval and early modern period. As just about every recent work or review on emotions has observed, the field broadly known as ‘the history of emotions’ is growing rapidly. Its corpus includes a wide variety of types of interventions. Monographs have produced detailed analyses of feeling cultures in specific time periods, many captured within book series dedicated to study of historical emotions.¹ There are equally broad-ranging studies and multi-volume series that place emphasis on the historical trajectory of emotional experience and expression.² Alongside these, other scholars are interested in documenting the kinds of theories and perspectives that have enabled the growth of the field, and in comparing and contrasting different approaches.³ The rapid explosion of engagement with this field has led yet other researchers to produce short introductions that synthesize the field’s many complicated debates, approaches and intersections with other lines of humanities enquiry.⁴ Increasingly, researchers are also seeking ways to meld humanities approaches to emotions history with those taken from the social sciences – especially anthropology and psychology – and the life sciences, including neurology.⁵

What then do we mean in this volume by new and emerging methodologies? Methodology can mean quite different things across humanities disciplines. Our aim here is to be inclusive of, and even to foreground, these substantial differences and to be explicitly explanatory about their aims, strengths and weaknesses for conducting emotions research. Method here, therefore, includes consideration of the kinds of questions scholars want to ask about emotions, the theoretical literature, terms and conceptualizations that inform these enquiries, their selection of suitable sources to help them do so, and their approaches to interpretation of these materials. This volume certainly does not claim superiority of one method over another; it rather exposes the reader to a range of choices and intellectual rationales for these. Its studies are intended to be accessible to readers from other disciplines, interested in other topics and engaged with other time periods who wish to grasp how work on emotion for this period might be conducted. We argue that humanities scholars of the emotions can advance the field most fully, in building on, comparing and contrasting new findings with prior research, only if we are clear and explicit about our methodological choices.

Within the timeframe 1100 to 1700 CE we examine themes and topics of particular importance to emotional life from multiple angles. A topic such as ‘religion’, for example, so pervasive in everyday life and with so many dimensions for consideration, is here addressed in several ways by scholars with different sources, investigative emphases and disciplinary expertise. Breaking down such meta-topics for what their different aspects can meaningfully tell us about emotions is one thing we hope this collection can offer. Of course, this is by no means the first volume to concentrate its interest in the medieval and early modern period. Indeed, the scholarship produced with regard to Europe at this time is rich and the field highly dynamic. Many recent monographs and edited collections have focused on specific themes in affect and emotions within the medieval and/or early modern period.⁶ These generally consist of detailed case study work, whereas this collection functions in part as a guide to how, where and by whom work across the medieval and early modern period is being conducted in relevant disciplines, and in a range of international scholarly communities. This volume, therefore, both reflects the sharp rise in scholarship over the last ten years on the history of emotions in the period 1100 to 1700, and examines its emerging topics, questions, approaches and sources. It provides a range of scholarly commentaries on relevant theories, concepts, terms and source materials around particular themes specific to the medieval and early modern period, and captures some of the nuances of European emotional history over six hundred years. We hope that its essay-length analyses of topics will assist readers new to the field as well as those already working in it.

Each chapter not only presents its methodological choices but also demonstrates the kinds of outcomes that can be produced by these decisions. The attention given to theoretical and methodological aspects of current research is combined in each chapter with specialist attention to one or more illustrative examples from each author’s field of expertise, showing theory and method in application. As such, the collection also presents the state of the field on a range of topics that are the focus of increasing attention from scholars of emotions in medieval and early modern Europe. We trust the volume will both act as a reference to existing research practices in emotions history and advance studies in the area across a range of scholarly approaches. Our contributors represent both experienced researchers and emerging new voices in this scholarly space. Of course, the collection is not exhaustive or representative of all the many possible topics of current interest that could be included here. It is also quite firmly focused on the geographical domain of Western Europe. This region is a major focus of present research but by no means the boundary of potential, or, we hope, future interest.

Emotions histories: conversations across time

The time period covered by this volume deserves particular discussion. We deliberately draw together periods frequently separated as ‘medieval’ and ‘early modern’. A substantial body of research now demonstrates that there are a series of affective ideas, tropes and behaviours that by no means begin or end in the year 1500, and also that there are other forms of expression for which it would be valuable to note the shifts in meaning over this extended time period. We want to highlight methodologies

suitable for application across the period and its evolving contexts and source production. When we refer to different conversations across chronology, we mean this in two senses. Firstly, we want to place attention on this – already long – phase of European experience, medieval and early modern, rather than a wider remit from antiquity to the present. Secondly, we want to move from an emphasis on continuities and changes across 1100 to 1700 to imagine multiple kinds of conversations about emotions within the same long period.

Another aim of this collection is to show that approaches to emotions from the humanities resist the traditional norms of historical periodization. Every chapter in this volume tells a story of persistence and changeability in emotional culture, but the scholarly interest here falls on the sources and methods we use to understand past emotions. In this respect, this collection's attention to imaginative outputs in art, material culture and literature provides a cross-temporal influence. While these cultural products can be understood as characteristic of emotional regimes in their particular moments of creation, they also have a life beyond those moments, so their meaning cannot be tied to the affective responses of just one era. This is as true of the works of antiquity re-framed and admired in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries under the influence of humanism, as it is for cultural products of the Middle Ages in the early modern era, and beyond. The student of emotions history sometimes needs to look below the accretions of later ages to reimagine the affective power of an object or event at its inception, and sometimes to observe the long-term layering of feeling responses around the object, as over time material once emotive loses power, and then, in a new context, may re-find it. In examining these historical processes, and adding to them, scholars of emotions are themselves never operating outside the sphere of the emotional.⁷

Thinking of history as a record of conversations is in itself often a feature of the Western medieval and early modern cultures this book surveys. In the pages of scriptural exegesis – in the *Glossa Ordinaria* for instance – interpretations gathered over a millennium surround the sacred word, while the margins of medieval manuscripts and early modern printed books cite their classical sources and parallels. Long-running secular narrative traditions – Thebes, Troy, Alexander, Charlemagne, Arthur – connect time through consciously cross-referential literary formations in many languages. Such conversations take on differing emotional casts. In the *Divina Commedia*, for instance, they range from loving gratitude – Dante's Statius addresses Virgil as 'you who first lit my way towards God' (*Purgatorio*, 22:66)⁸ – to domination: 'Let Lucan now fall silent'; 'Let Ovid not speak' (*Inferno*, 25:94, 97).⁹ Scipio Africanus from Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* (c. 54 BCE) bosses Chaucer's persona in *The Parlement of Foules* (c. 1385), with a wry reference to Macrobius's weighty early-fifth-century *Commentary*. And in a preface addressed to Socrates, Petrarch explains that he was personally angry and upset with Cicero after reading his Letters:

I could not restrain myself, and, indignation prompting me, I wrote to him as to a friend of my own years and time, regardless of the ages which separated us. Indeed, I wrote with a familiarity acquired through an intimate knowledge of the works of his genius, and I pointed out to him what it was that offended me in his writings.¹⁰

In conducting his emotional colloquy with the past, Petrarch was contributing to a long and lively tradition, one that runs throughout our period in literature, art, architecture, philosophy and theology, medicine and the sciences. Inputs from these and other areas, and continually exchanged between them, provided prompts, discourses and talking points of emotion for continuing generations, but as conversational resources, not blueprints, as the parole of emotions, not the langue. Our collection highlights central and recurrent themes in the stream of feeling culture – love, war, sex and sexuality, death, the body – yet also shows how the opportunities for emotional performance and experience taken up, combined and re-developed within the conversation are virtually limitless.

From history of emotions to humanities approaches to past emotions

A significant contribution of this collection to the field is its inclusion of analyses by scholars in many disciplines in the humanities as well as some in the social sciences. Scholars working in the period 1100 to 1700 are used to drawing upon a wide range of source types to produce their analyses, working with different kinds of disciplinary interpretive frameworks. Here, interventions by specialists in art history, literature and culture, philosophy and music, as well as by historians, are included since these disciplines all have emotions at their core of expression. Work on emotions in the past is produced not only by historians but by a wide range of humanities scholars, yet historians have dominated existing handbooks in the field of emotions. We might, however, consider whether a more inclusive term – a *humanities approach to the emotions* – might be a more appropriate reflection of the disciplines that engage with it, at least for the medieval and early modern period.

General histories of emotion often remain rather shy of looking in detail at the expressive forms of historical sources for their source material. When the emphasis is on intellectual history, and in terms of what past ages have ‘thought’ about emotions, there is less interest in how emotion narratives are formally framed and uttered, and less emphasis on sources that do not foreground systems of thought. Jan Plamper, who has written eloquently on literature and art elsewhere, mentions Sterne, Tolstoy, Whitman and Proust only in passing in his *History of Emotions*.¹¹ Literature, art, music and drama are not on his short list of ‘perspectives in the history of emotions’.¹² After a survey of historical and intellectual commentaries on emotion, Plamper’s text strongly foregrounds the modern life-sciences and anthropology, giving the impression that these make a more accountable contribution to judgement. The approach of our collection is broader: we treat the emotions of the European period 1100 to 1700 as a subject with manifold sources, and amenable to discussion within many disciplinary and cross-disciplinary frameworks. In our view, to say that emotions have a history means that they exist as things made visible and constructed as meaningful through analytical methodologies that look at the different forms and traces of their historical expression.

Similarly, Rob Boddice’s recent *The History of Emotions*, with whose approach our own volume would find many points of agreement, rarely mentions literature or the arts as sources for his project of ‘getting at the emotional experience of past actors, to find their motivations and reactions according to *how they felt*’.¹³ In part this is because

his work is primarily a history of science, more interested in shifting ideas about emotion than in its place within the dynamic of historical action. Our collection includes discussion of intellectual traditions, but its tendency is to view them, and in large part to *understand* them, through their links to social and cultural practice: the connections of theology with war, preaching and liturgy, humoral science with art and music, economics with family and exploration, and politics with diplomacy and letters. Another difference of emphasis is seen in Boddice's distinction between forms of 'emotional expression' and of 'emotional experience'.¹⁴ The distinction makes obvious sense in terms of the standard difficulty, past and present, of knowing the nature of a 'real' emotional experience, or of any experience, by studying the form of its expression. Yet to view the case from another angle, the existence of 'real' human emotions is not conceivable without the humans that feel them, and their feelings will occur through and within particular historical forms. In Barbara H. Rosenwein's words, 'we must interpret even our own feelings according to our own emotional community's norms and vocabularies'.¹⁵ In any context in which we imagine a historical actor feeling emotion, the attendant forms of expression – both in the prompts to emotion and its enactment – will be an integral part of how the experience is generated and 'performed' (in the sense of 'achieved'). The traces of these forms – broadly understood – provide the sources of emotions history, what the past leaves behind that lets us study its feelings. Attention to *how* they structure and articulate the performance of emotions is therefore a crucial matter.

Our collection tries directly to survey and exemplify the varied methodologies that modern scholarship uses to make the past 'speak' of its emotions – to display and examine what might be called the disciplinary 'languages' in which contemporary scholars of emotions history converse with their sources. These sources are by no means exclusively verbal. They range from formal expositions in theological, philosophical and scientific treatises – the 'normal' stuff of intellectual history – to the evidence archaeology finds in the layout of human habitations. In between come sources that speak more or less directly or obliquely of emotion: religious treatments; narratives of all kinds, whether offered as historically true or fictional; lyric poems; private letters; official correspondence; artworks; theatrical performances; liturgy; public rituals; music theory and reception; the record of linguistic history. Many of these sources are from the 'creative' or 'imaginative' arts rather than documents originally offered as veridical. Throughout our period, the creative arts acted as powerful emotive devices; they were ways of allowing or encouraging readers, listeners and viewers to feel, and of modelling for them what feelings were. Through their formative marshalling of emotions, through their 'expression', they were both agents of feeling and an array of resources *for* feeling, and hence of prime importance for our project in this collection.

In this volume, we look at sources tied to particular institutions and their practices: church preaching, music and spiritual direction; inquisitorial proceedings; household businesses; missions; diplomacy; colonization; trade. And we analyse how the sources articulate the emotions that clung to major life concerns throughout our period: love; war; religion; the supernatural; death; sexuality; the body; pain; happiness; race; time; and natural phenomena. Our contributors reflect on the strengths and limitations of their particular methods, and on the wider historiographical traditions and practices – such as traditional period divisions – which still often structure

understanding of the historical time-span we examine here. We speak of how ‘medieval’ or ‘early modern’ people felt, but always remain conscious that the very notion of a break between what we now call the ‘medieval’ and its aftermath has been created and maintained by imaginative (and labile) discourses of feeling. In surveying a wide range of imaginative sources, we pose the question: what might emotions history look like if, rather than seeing emotional life occurring in particular temporal periods in direct relation to widespread socio-economic, environmental, technological or even ideological factors, we thought of emotional capacities as variously potentiated by forms and genres of representation and mediation?

The analytical methodologies we speak of may or may not usefully interact. Whether they can do so will depend on the nature of the available sources, and on where the parameters of the analytical method are drawn. Many of our contributors direct attention to the limitations imposed by critical discourse – when, for example, the ‘emotions’ and ‘senses’ are kept conceptually separate, or histories of ideas neglect forms of cultural practice and mediation. In many cases the evidence itself is skewed: whose accounts of just war, public enemies or popular ‘riot’ are we reading, and in what terms? In other cases, it is scant: in archaeological enquiries, for example, little or no documentary sources may exist, and it may be necessary to speculate that later practices for which such sources do exist can shed light on the subject. By contrast, researchers on emotions in theatre may be able to align analysis of dramatic texts with contemporary evidence of the social, legal, gendered, spatial, auditory and even olfactory properties of the arena where they were performed and viewed. Yet, in all cases, what seems vital to us is that each method, whether cross-disciplinary or not, should be conscious of what it can and cannot do, of what possibilities it enables and what it precludes in the study of emotions. It is only right that humanities scholars, who routinely critique universalist approaches to emotions and the sweeping designations of emotional eras made by earlier historians, should acknowledge the limitations of their own specialist methods and case studies. A good part of what we hope to achieve in this collection, where each chapter relates to the same period of 600 years, is to test the strength of existing methodologies against a variety of sources and source types across a broad historical range.

Because emotions are ubiquitous and have no fixed home, disciplinary approaches to their history can reveal surprising interactions that take understanding beyond generalized conceptions of specific topics, such as economic history, religious history or the history of sexuality. So, for example, Michael B. Barbezat finds an intimate connection between medieval scriptural exegesis and views on the emotional orientation of bodies: reading rightly and loving ‘correctly’ – that is, ‘spiritually’, not ‘carnally’ – go together. Umberto Grassi’s chapter on emotions and transgressive sexuality finds early support for the concept of affectionate marriage in the testimony of ‘deviant’ subjects brought before inquisitorial courts. Katie Barclay sees family affection and economic motivations as closely interdependent across a period where the household was the main economic unit. She emphasizes Sara Ahmed’s view that ‘it is through the circulation of emotion across domains – through their social and economic engagements – that value and meaning inhere in them’. Matthew S. Champion’s chapter on time and emotions brings a third party – narrative – into the conversation, turning to liturgical tradition to ‘examine . . . how the narrative unfolding of emotional change generates both our perception of time, and our culturally normative and anormative experiences and practices of affect’.

The authors of this volume's chapters are aware that such analytical 'narratives' and 'histories' of emotion necessarily incorporate within themselves the time and place of their retrospective construction, and so involve present, situated emotions. This reflexivity is seen by our authors as particularly relevant to the subject of emotions. Clare Monagle writes that 'working in the history of emotions has taught me that if I want to encounter the past, in the way that the field seems to want to do, I have to attend to the texts, without trying to wrestle a narrative out of them. To do this, I cannot pretend I am not there'. Giovanni Tarantino, writing on race, argues that 'taking responsibility for one's whiteness might reflect a willingness to address unpalatable emotions and, as a result of an enhanced understanding of the racial world and one's position in it, to feel in new and perhaps disconcerting ways'. In a related move, Robin Macdonald cites Eugenia Lean's 'concern over emotions scholars' focus on "change over time" as a strategy that 'fails to consider place, and often results in the creation of "Western" emotional genealogies that situate the "West" as *the* normative space of investigation'.¹⁶ A further consequence of perceptions like these is that our authors tend to work provisionally: they hesitate to 'apply' any method to elucidate emotions as if it were the only one, but rather, as Jette Linnaa's chapter puts it, consider that 'theory and methodologies must be adapted to the specific topics on which we want to shed light'.

Two features that our authors largely have in common are a wariness of projecting onto the past modern scientific ideas of what 'emotions' are, and a reluctance to accept generalizations about emotional change that are tied to a narrative of historical watersheds and epochs. These two are related strategies, in the respect that they operate similarly, by treating either 'emotions' or 'history' as a fixed term, so making one a yardstick to measure the other. In current discussions both tendencies are losing traction. Universalist views of emotion have come under fire within several disciplines – including anthropology, psychology and linguistics as well as history. In the life sciences, as Plamper notes, confidence that 'emotions' can be known through observing isolated regions of brain function has waned, along with a consensus that concepts like 'cognition' and 'emotion' (and 'affect') belong to separate operations of the brain, and that we can identify such a thing as 'feeling in itself'. Neuroscientific views are now understood to have a history also, and may be seen to reflect the contemporary conditions of their creation.¹⁷ Similarly, contemporary cognitive philosophy argues that cognition also has a history, and suggests that the 'work' of emotion and memory at any point in history is never restricted to the brain and body but widely 'distributed'. As John Sutton and Nicholas Keene remark:

[O]bjects, technologies, places and other people can in certain circumstances, in interaction of many kinds with embodied individuals, be full and complementary components in cognitive processes. . . . It is not that a private, inner, subjective realm – the province of psychologists or novelists, perhaps – is suddenly transformed, freed, or constrained by novel external material resources. Rather, the history of the mind just is the array and trajectory of distributed, hybrid cognitive systems.¹⁸

In a similar spirit, but with the history of emotions specifically in mind, this collection aims at addressing the broad 'array' of processes and systems by which the work of

feeling in our period was created through interactions of intellectual, bodily, social, cultural and material kinds, and at showing how it might be recoverable through attention to their multiple, continuing forms of conversation – with each other and with the present time.

Each of the chapters makes connections to others in the volume in many different ways. We have grouped them together according to what we felt were particularly significant areas of intersection, dialogue and entanglement. Nevertheless, these groupings by no means represent the boundaries of the chapters' conversations with each other and indeed, we hope, with further work beyond their scope. In dividing chapters in this volume under separate categories – time and space, spirit and intellect, bodies, communities, encounters and excursions, and cultural expressions – we are conscious of the impossibility of restricting either the phenomena of emotional experience or their historical interpretation within boundaries of inner and outer, individual and collective, people and things, emotion and cognition. The separate titles of the work's parts relate to thematic, disciplinary and source-based methods of emotions study, but the chapters display a consciousness that their methodologies select the locations and shape the perceptions of the emotions in question.

These parts also represent key areas for discovery for current researchers of emotion. Barbara H. Rosenwein's analysis of the meaning of periodization over this time period in relation to emotions places in the foreground issues of change, continuity and conversation across the period that are present in all the volume's chapters. By contrast, the environmental and temporal, in the ways explored by Helen M. Hickey and Stephanie Trigg as well as Matthew S. Champion, are relatively new areas of investigation for scholars of emotion in this period, where a focus on emotions is making a difference to earlier ideas of historical periodization based on changing consciousness of space and time.

The three chapters grouped together in Part 2, Spirit and Intellect, re-consider the period's pivotal spiritual and theological discourses and practices through the lens of emotions. While we have linked the chapters of Clare Monagle, Paul Megna and Kirk Essary together because of their particular analysis of disparate sources as part of an intellectual tradition of the mind, it is clear that they inevitably interact in crucial and complex ways with the topics treated in the following section concerned with bodies, and with the final group of chapters on cultural expressions of emotion.

In Part 3, Bodies, the chapters cover a wide range of topics, and interact with a burgeoning literature of the senses, from pleasure to pain. They explore emotional entanglements of, and with, punitive regimes, and changing aesthetic vocabularies for particular bodily experiences and motivations. Again, bodies and senses are not in themselves new topics – it is now quite some time since history studies took a corporeal and sensory turn – but these new contributions do more than survey recent scholarship. Looking beyond the place of sense, affect and emotion in the historical development of the sciences – medicine, anatomy and physiology – they examine their workings *in situ*, in a variety of institutional and cultural contexts across our period. In so doing they call into question analytical traditions which presume the presence of boundaries between senses and emotions, or between human bodies, emotions and material culture.

Chapters in Part 4, Communities, look at social experiences of emotions as they are expressed and recoverable through analysis of material culture, household

economies, the rituals of death and dying, crowd behaviours, acts of exclusion and letter-writing practices. Taken as a whole they ground the relation of emotion to community in detailed accounts of changing cultural practices that cross the boundaries between histories of art and architecture, society, literature, economics, religion and cities. Charles Zika shows how the ‘emotional dynamics’ of exclusion are both resilient and adaptable across the period: the imaginative construction of heretics, Jews or witches as fearful and disgusting alternative communities gives the majority feelings of belonging, acceptance and cohesion; the circulation and transferability of visual images plays a vital part in these processes. Zika’s study is diachronic, but as Una McIlvenna shows, new technology allows scholars to consider the synchronic spatial and aural emotional opportunities in individual public places and events, ranging from cathedrals to barber shops, and from carnivals to executions. The innovative use of traditional source materials to recreate the urban fabric of the medieval and early modern past is drawing new attention to the physical habitats where its emotions were born and bred. Katie Barclay, as noted above, stresses the close interconnectedness of affective and economic regimes. Taken together, chapters in this section, along with several others in the book, articulate the vast potential that new ‘community’ studies hold for the future of emotions history.

Part 5, Encounters and Excursions, groups chapters that explore the emotions of Western Europeans’ engagement with each other and with peoples beyond Europe’s geographical and cultural boundaries, as they can be critically analyzed in diplomatic, missionary, trade and colonizing practices that include their textual accounts of these experiences. These chapters, providing careful insights into emotions performed in sources generally produced by and for Europeans, contribute to the growing scholarly interest in global history and the circulation of peoples, objects and ideas that took dynamic new forms over this period. One emphasis they have in common is an attempt to understand ‘encounters’ with Europe’s ‘others’ from all sides of the emotional experience, and so to continue the process of de-centralizing Europe, or whiteness, as the place from which everywhere else is viewed, or as the norm by which it is measured. Thus Robin Macdonald’s chapter notes the laughter of the Innu at a missionary’s attempt to speak their language, and that Jean de Brébeuf’s conduct in his death satisfied Iroquoian emotion rules, as well as Christian. Nicholas Dean Brodie notes the ‘masking’ of indigenous emotions by the one-sided nature of European reports and by the generic conventions of forms such as sagas and romances. And Giovanni Tarantino’s survey of the history of ‘race’ in our period traces how it became a ‘feeling’ and argues that both to understand the history and to work for the possibility of greater racial inclusivity, acknowledgement of the emotions surrounding racial status, ‘black’ and ‘white’, is a vital step. The historian is not outside the subject of study.

Finally, in Part 6, the name Cultural Expressions recognizes these chapters’ attention to sources that cross the entire period 1100 to 1700 and include enduring forms of artistic endeavor – music, literature, theatre, the visual arts – as well as conceptual metaphors and metonymies, and these sources’ expression of experiences such as melancholy, happiness, wonder and desire. These contributions do not limit their view to a notional sphere of the ‘artistic’ or ‘creative’ that did not formerly exist in those terms. Rather, their analyses take insights from contemporary sciences, philosophy, religious doctrine and politics, and acknowledge the origin of their sources

and objects of study in particular contexts of power. Nevertheless, they find evidence of resilient tropes and techniques within these expressive forms over the period 1100 to 1700 that variously structured the emotional responses of audiences, and popularized new models of human sentience: the righteous warrior, the melancholy genius and the awestruck witness of divine grace are all creations within this tradition, along with the ethical listener to music and the reader of literature ‘committed to emotional experience’ (as Peter Holbrook puts it). All these identities could be claimed or shared by audiences. Forms of cultural expression from 1100 to 1700, as today, did not only teach people what and how to feel, but also who they were, or could become, as feeling subjects.

In one way or another, all the chapters in the book necessarily examine such processes of emotional formation: we take the view that there are no past emotions accessible except through forms of cultural mediation, broadly understood, and that these forms are a vital factor for understanding emotional performance and experience. The big question is how to select, access and interpret the array of historical materials that potentially illustrate the subject. The contributions in this volume respond to that challenge.

Notes

- 1 These include ‘Palgrave History of Emotions’ series edited by David Lemmings and W.M. Reddy; Oxford University Press’s ‘Emotions in History’, edited by Thomas Dixon and Ute Frevert; and the University of Illinois Press’s ‘History of Emotions’, edited by Peter Stearns and Susan Matt.
- 2 W.M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of the Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; W.M. Reddy, *The Making of Romantic Love: Longing and Sexuality in Europe, South Asia, and Japan*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012; Ute Frevert, Christian Bailey, Pascal Eitler, Benno Gammerl, Bettina Hitzer, Margrit Pernau, Monique Scheer *et al*, *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling 1700–2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; B.H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling: A History of the Emotions, 600–1700*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015; A. Corbin, J.-J. Courtine and G. Vigarello (eds), *Histoire des émotions*, 3 vols, Paris: Seuil, 2016; S. Broomhall, A. Lynch and J. Davidson (eds), *A Cultural History of the Emotions*, 6 vols, London: Bloomsbury, 2019.
- 3 J. Plamper, ‘The history of the emotions: an interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns’, *History and Theory* 49, 2010, 237–65; J. Plamper, ‘Forum: history of emotions’, *German History* 28:1, 2010, 67–80; S.J. Matt, ‘Current emotion research in history: or, doing history from the inside out’, *Emotion Review* 3:1, 2011, 117–24; N. Eustace, E. Lean, J. Livingston, J. Plamper, W.M. Reddy and B.H. Rosenwein, ‘AHR conversation: the historical study of emotions’, *American Historical Review* 117:5, 2012, 1487–531; S.J. Matt and P.N. Stearns (eds), *Doing Emotions History*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2014; J. Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, trans. K. Tribe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- 4 R. Boddice, *The History of Emotions*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018; B.H. Rosenwein and R. Cristiani, *What is the History of Emotions?*, Cambridge: Polity, 2017.
- 5 See the new Elements series from Cambridge University Press, *Emotions and Senses*, edited by Jan Plamper and Monique Scheer.
- 6 Some examples of collections contributing to this literature from 2015 to 2018, for example, include C. McLisky, K. Vållgård and D. Midená (eds), *Emotions and Christian Missions*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; S. Broomhall (ed.), *Ordering Emotions in Europe, 1100–1800*, Leiden: Brill, 2015; M.S. Champion and A. Lynch (eds), *Understanding Emotions in Early Europe*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2015; S. Broomhall (ed.), *Spaces for Feeling*:

- Emotions and Sociabilities in Britain, 1650–1850*, London: Routledge, 2015; F. Ricciardelli and A. Zorzi (eds), *Emotions, Passions, and Power in Renaissance Italy*, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2015; S. Broomhall (ed), *Destroying Order, Structuring Disorder: Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2015; S. Downes, A. Lynch and K. O’Loughlin (eds), *Emotions and War: Medieval to Romantic Literature*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; R. Meek and E. Sullivan (eds), *The Renaissance of Emotions*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2015; S. Broomhall (ed.), *Authority, Gender and Emotions in Late Medieval and Early Modern England*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2015; R.S. White, M. Houlihan and K. O’Loughlin (eds), *Shakespeare and Emotions – Inheritances, Enactments, Legacies*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2015; K. Barclay and M.L. Bailey (eds), *Emotion, Ritual and Power in Europe: 1200 to the Present*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2016; J. Spinks and C. Zika (eds), *Disaster, Death and the Emotions in the Shadow of the Apocalypse, 1400–1700*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; K. Barclay, C. Rawnsley and K. Reynolds (eds), *Small Graves: Death, Emotion and Childhood in the Early Modern Period*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2016; M.J. Braddick and J. Innes (eds), *Suffering and Happiness in Early Modern England*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016; R. Garrod and Y. Haskell (eds), *Changing Hearts: Performing Jesuit Emotions Between Europe, Asia and the Americas*, Leiden: Brill, 2016; L. Kounine and M. Ostling (eds), *Emotions in the History of Witchcraft: Unbridled Passions* Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2016; E. Kuijpers and C. van der Haven (eds), *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1850: Practices, Experience, Imagination*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; P. Maddern, J. McEwan and A.M. Scott (eds), *Performing Emotions in the Medieval and Early Modern World*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2016; A. Marchant (ed.), *Historicising Heritage and Emotions: The Affective Histories of Blood, Stone and Land from Medieval Britain to Colonial Australia*, London: Routledge, 2018.
- 7 T. Prendergast and S. Trigg, *Affective Medievalism: Love, Abjection, and Discontent*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2018.
 - 8 D. Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, trans. J. Hollander and R. Hollander, New York: Anchor, 2004, p. 4899.
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 - 10 F. Petrarca, *Petrarch’s Letters to Classical Authors*, trans. M.E. Cosenza, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1910, pp. x–xi.
 - 11 Plamper, *The History of Emotions*, p. 29.
 - 12 Ibid., pp. 276–90.
 - 13 Boddice, *History of Emotions*, pp. 75–6.
 - 14 Ibid., p. 209.
 - 15 Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*, p. 5.
 - 16 Eustace *et al.*, ‘AHR conversation’, pp. 1517–18.
 - 17 Plamper, *History*, pp. 246–7.
 - 18 J. Sutton and N. Keene, ‘Cognitive history and material culture’, in C. Richardson, T. Hamling and D. Gaimster (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Material Culture in Early Modern Europe*, London: Routledge, 2016, pp. 44–56 (pp. 46–7).



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PART 1

TIME AND SPACE



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PERIODIZATION? AN ANSWER FROM THE HISTORY OF EMOTIONS

Barbara H. Rosenwein

The theory of ‘basic emotions’ postulates that emotions do not change over time. Tied to particular, posed facial expressions, those emotions – anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise – were long ago proposed by Paul Ekman and are now widely used in experiments by psychologists. The proposition that those six emotions are ‘hard-wired’, universal and constant is thus generally accepted.¹ If this theory is true, there can be no history of emotions, and the topic of this chapter is moot.

Nevertheless, some scientists argue that emotions are variable, depending – for both their conceptualization and subjective experience – on culture, individual upbringing and even the particular contexts in which an emotion is felt at any given time.² This makes emotions historically contingent. However, few of these scientists think much about how emotions may change.³

Historians of emotion are thus challenged by a contemporary science of emotion that, if not wedded to the notion of universality, is at least comfortable with a theory of constantly reproduced emotions. Unlike scientists, however, historians think that emotions change over time. But they differ profoundly regarding what sorts of changes are involved. In his classic *American Cool*, Peter Stearns took emotions one by one and investigated how attitudes about them changed.⁴ He did not problematize whether, for example, ‘anger’ was indeed always ‘an emotion’ in the past, but he did note that anger was evaluated and expressed differently before *c.* 1920 than it was thereafter. Before 1920, anger at home was condemned, but anger in the workplace was seen as manly; afterward, as the ‘cool’ attitude took hold, anger was condemned in every venue. These observations grew out of Stearns’s study of ‘emotionology’: ‘the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expressions’.⁵ Note here the acceptance of the idea of ‘basic emotions’, although (as we see in *American Cool*) Stearns went far beyond the Ekmanian six to include, for example, jealousy and love.

At the other end of the universality scale is historian Ute Frevert, whose book on emotions ‘lost and found’ offers an image of flux, with emotions both coming to the fore and dying away.⁶ Thus, for example, ‘honour’ lost its purchase after the nineteenth century, while ‘compassion’ was ‘found’ around the same time.

Even more extreme is the view, largely inspired by Norbert Elias's notion of the 'civilizing process', that sees whole societies as either 'emotional' or not.⁷ According to adherents to this thesis, the late Middle Ages was highly emotional, while the early modern period introduced new controls over behaviour, institutions and emotions. Extended further, Elias's schema makes 'modernity' the catchword for everything not medieval.⁸

All of these theories have one point in common: they deal with each emotion in isolation or with a single 'off or on' sort of 'emotionality'. This is clearest, to be sure, with Ekmanian facial expressions, each of which is tied to one emotion. But it is also true of Stearns, who takes up each emotion in turn, and of Frevert, who considers emotions one by one. These theories do not take into account the fact that feelings often change not just over historical time but often hour by hour. Lived emotions do not come in singletons. When I learned that my friend was divorcing her husband, I felt sad at the news, hopeful for her future, angry at him for causing the rift. These emotions work together, forming a sort of script that may be described sequentially.

How universal are such scripts? To explore how emotions change over time, I propose to consider them not individually but rather in their sequential contexts.⁹ Since most Western historians agree on a periodization that separates the medieval from the early modern period, I ask what the study of emotional sequences may contribute to ratifying or challenging that paradigm. I suggest that they offer a fruitful way to rethink the topic.

Since many historians have claimed that religious emotions, in particular, changed dramatically from extravagant expression in late medieval devotion to their near obliteration in Protestant worship, I take as my case study two religious emotional communities across the medieval/early modern divide.¹⁰ My cases are both from England, and both employ the vernacular of their eras. This allows me to anchor my discussion in one language, although I am aware that the Middle English of the late Middle Ages often differed in meaning from the English of the seventeenth century.¹¹

I find these two communities in two specific texts. For the late medieval era, I use the fifteenth-century *Book of Margery Kempe* as evidence of some characteristic emotional sequences of affective devotion. The text attesting to the Protestant community is a publication entitled *Spirituell Experiences*, which offers testimonials by members of a gathered (Puritan) church in London in the 1650s.

Margery Kempe

Expressions of religious feeling became newly passionate in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and still more intense in the late Middle Ages. That has led medievalists to speak of 'affective piety' as the 'dominant note in the religious writing of the period'.¹² God became above all identified with the Christ who took human form. The Beguine Marie d'Oignies (d. 1213) spoke of holding the Christ child 'close to her so that He nestled between her breasts like a baby'.¹³ The Dominican mystic Henry Suso (d. 1366) 'had a heart filled with love' for the eternal Wisdom of Christ.¹⁴ After carving the name of Jesus on his chest, he not only spoke with God but also attempted, by 'conforming himself to Christ', to feel 'sympathy for everything his Lord and God, Christ, had suffered before him'.¹⁵ The Pseudo-Bonaventuran lives of Christ, extremely popular in England, offered 'a corpus of writings where

English audiences . . . [were] invited to imagine themselves emotionally present at the Gospel events described'.¹⁶

In the fifteenth century, Margery Kempe (d. 1439) illustrates the importance of affective piety in the life of a well-to-do layperson. A townswoman from Bishop's Lynn (later King's Lynn, in Norfolk, England), she married John Kempe, had many children, and never became a nun or a recluse.¹⁷ In the course of her life, she dictated a treatise – today called her *Book* – about how God 'moved and stirred' her 'unto his love'.¹⁸ The single extant manuscript is the hybrid product of at least three fifteenth-century scribes.¹⁹ Scholars continue to debate the role of Margery Kempe and her scribes in the production of the text that we have.²⁰ I here assume that the work is more or less the product of the Lynn matron named Margery Kempe.

The *Book* presents Margery (as I will call her here) as the object of much vilification and ridicule by most of the people who came into contact with her. What it does not say explicitly, but is nevertheless attested to by the text itself, is that she also had many supporters. It is from this internal evidence that I derive her emotional community. By 'emotional community', I mean the group of people who shared her norms of emotional expression and valuation. For example, in Rome she found a priest who could not understand English, but 'desiring to please God', he prayed to understand her, enlisting the prayers of others as well.²¹ In the end he understood her English (but only hers), and she revealed to him all her secrets. 'Then this priest received her full meekly and reverently, like his mother and his sister, and said he would support her against her enemies'.²² He was reviled for standing by her; he even forsook his priestly office in order to 'support her in her sobbing and in her crying'.²³ When she was ready to leave Rome for England, the two said their good-byes in tears. Then 'she, falling on her knees, received the favor of his blessing, and so parted asunder those whom charity joined both in one'.²⁴

By Margery's own telling, this priest and other like-minded people constituted a small and marginal group, disliked by many.²⁵ There is no question that very different emotional communities existed at the same time. The Paston family, who lived not far from Margery at about the same time, are a good example: they did not practise anything like affective piety. They hardly expressed religious emotions and, indeed, rarely expressed any emotions at all.²⁶ The Lollards are no doubt another example, practising their own brand of emotional expression.²⁷

If Margery belonged to an emotional community – one that was, in fact, quite supportive – nevertheless, she presented herself as continually persecuted and vilified by others. She did so, it seems, because ridicule and vituperation were the essential counterparts to Margery's special, loving relationship with Christ. By being persecuted, as Christ had been, Margery not only followed in Christ's footsteps but also earned his love.²⁸

What were the norms of Margery's community? To discover this, I analyse three emotional sequences that occur in the *Book*. The first such sequence occurs after Margery had her first child. Then, 'what for the labor she had in childing and for the sickness going before, she despaired of her life (*dyspered of hyr lyfe*), thinking she might not live'.²⁹ She called a priest, wanting to confess a 'thing in conscience (*thyng in conscyens*) which she had never shown before that time in all her life'.³⁰ For, tempted by the devil, she had previously imagined that she could do without confession and had assigned penances to herself, thinking that 'all should be forgiven, for God is merciful enough'.³¹ Now, her life on the line, the devil changed his tune and

told her that she would be damned. Hence her call for the priest. But this confessor frightened her before she had a chance to tell him her sin: he ‘was a little too hasty and began sharply to reprove her before she had fully said her intent’. Thus she kept silent, and ‘for the dread she had of damnation (*dreed sche had of dampnacyon*) on the one side and his sharp reproving on that other side, this creature went out of her mind’.³² Devils assailed her, telling her to ‘forsake her Christianity, her faith, and deny her God, his mother, and all the saints in heaven, her good works and all good virtues, her father, her mother, and all her friends. And so she did’.³³ She ‘slandered’ (*slawndred*) her husband, her friends, and herself . . . as the spirits tempted her to say and do’.³⁴ She would have killed herself had she been free to do so (she was tied down, so she could not), but she was able to gnaw at her own hand and tear at her skin. Then, after more than half a year of these temptations (*temptacyons*), Jesus appeared to her ‘in likeness of a man, most seemly, most beautiful’, and posed a question that echoed Christ’s agonized cry on the Cross. ‘Daughter, why have you forsaken me, and I forsook never you?’ At this, Margery was ‘strengthened in all her spirits (*strengthyd in alle hir spyritys*)’ and returned to her senses.³⁵

This episode involves a sequence of emotions. First in time, though not in the order in the text, is her sense of sin: Margery’s sinful feeling of self-sufficiency that assumed God’s forgiveness without need of a priest, and also her secret sin. Next is despair: despair of life and, above all, of salvation. Confession did nothing to salve this feeling and, indeed, brought on dread. That, in turn, led to violence: verbal attacks, suicidal thoughts and self-destructive acts. The sequence ended with ‘strengthened spirits’, a feeling of emboldened relief that Jesus had not forsaken her (see Table 1.1).

Before continuing with the second sequence, let us take a moment to ask about continuities and discontinuities in the emotions expressed here, for we need to see that no element in this table was ‘new’. The torment of a ‘thing in conscience’ was theorized at least as early as the thirteenth century, when canonist and liturgical scholar William Durand the Elder explained in his *Rationale divinorum officiorum* that the Church prayed for four things: ‘the elimination of uncleanness and the bestowal of cleanness; the elimination of the sorrow that stems from the bite of conscience (*ex morsu conscientie*) and the bestowal of happiness’.³⁶ This ‘bite of conscience’ was understood as part of lived experience, as for example in a *Vita* of Avignon Pope Benedict XII, where a marshal of the papal court, accused of perpetrating an armed attack against a nobleman visiting the curia, was ‘bitten by his own evil conscience (*nequissima propria conscientia morsus*)’.³⁷ The fact that the marshal committed suicide thereafter shows the close association of bad conscience with self-destruction. Even more closely associated with suicide was despair, which was linked to Judas Iscariot.³⁸ In the sequence shown in Table 1.1, Margery’s ‘dread of damnation’ followed

Table 1.1 Sequence of emotions in Margery’s first emotional episode

-
- | | |
|----|---|
| 1. | a thing in conscience (<i>thyng in conscyens</i>) |
| 2. | despair (<i>dyspered</i>) |
| 3. | dread of damnation (<i>dreed of dampnacyon</i>) |
| 4. | violent and suicidal temptations (<i>temptacyons</i>) |
| 5. | strengthened (<i>strengthyd</i>) spirits |
-

despair, but that dread was in fact implicit in the unforgivable nature of despair (*desperatio*) – the one sin God could not absolve because it denied hope (*sperare* is the Latin verb, the *de-* its negation) and therefore faith. Thus, the very grouping of these four – bad conscience, despair, dread of damnation, suicide – was commonplace in the Christian tradition.³⁹ Finally, Margery’s ‘strengthened spirits’ were yet again unremarkable, whether in the form of *robore spirituali* (spiritual strength), as in Augustine’s *De vera religione*, or as the *armatus spiritualibus telis* (armed with spiritual weapons) of Jerome.⁴⁰ To be sure, Margery read none of these sources – rather, their sentiments were *topoi* by her time. The continuities between the medieval and early modern period that I argue here were not an artefact of the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries but rather were deeply rooted in centuries of religious thought and experience.

In a second sequence Margery was overwhelmed by sexual temptations. When a man ‘whom she loved well (*which sche louyd wel*)’ asked her to sleep with him, she became so ‘laboured (*labowrd*)’ with his proposition that she could pay attention to nothing else – not the evening prayer, not the Pater Noster. She thought (at the instance of the devil) ‘that God had forsaken her (*pat God had forsake hir*)’, and she consented to the man’s lust. But in the end, he did not consent to hers, and she ‘went away all shamed and confused (*schamyd & confusyd*) within herself’.⁴¹ She remembered how, previously, she had repented of her sin and cried ‘bitter tears of compunction’. Now ‘she fell half in despair (*half in dyspeyr*). . . . She thought she was worthy of no mercy [from God]’.⁴² Indeed, she *knew* (*wend*) that God had forsaken her, since for more than a year afterward she was beset by temptations of lechery and despair.⁴³

During that period, however, she had moments of grace every day: ‘two hours of compunction for her sins with many bitter tears (*too owerys of compunccon for hir synnys wyth many byttyr teerys*)’.⁴⁴ Then, a few days before Christmas, as she knelt, wept and asked for mercy in church, Jesus ‘ravished her spirit (*rauysched hir spyryt*)’, reassuring her that he had suffered on the cross for her, that he forgave her sins, and that she would ascend directly to heaven. He commanded her, ‘Boldly call me Jesus, your love (*bi loue*), for I am your love and shall be your love without end’.⁴⁵ This was the first in a series of godly commands, the last of which was to tell her revelations to an anchorite at Lynn. The *Book* does not record Margery’s emotions at this point, but it does record the anchorite’s, who, ‘with great reverence and weeping [and] thanking God’ told her to continue to bring him her secrets.⁴⁶ He would tell her if they were from the Holy Spirit or the Devil.

This was a transformative episode. God had at last ‘moved [her] unto his love (*meued . . . vn-to hys love*)’.⁴⁷ In detail, the sequence of emotions involved was long and complicated. Nevertheless, it contained many of the same emotional elements and sequences as the first: fear of God’s abandonment and despair were followed by reassurance. New, however, were the respites: the moments of compunction and weeping that gave Margery relief (see Table 1.2).

Weeping soon became essential to Margery’s religious life. Shortly after she came to terms with her own lechery and despair, she discovered a monk guilty of exactly these same sins. When he asked her for advice, she told him to ‘sorrow for your sin, and I shall help you to sorrow’.⁴⁸ The sequences of her emotional life would work for him as well.

Table 1.2 Sequence of emotions in Margery's second episode (simplified)

-
- | | |
|----|--|
| 1. | sinful thoughts, sense of abandonment by God (<i>God had forsake hir</i>) and despair (<i>dyspeyr</i>) |
| 2. | grace of compunction and tears (<i>compunccon & teerys</i>) |
| 3. | ravishment of spirit and love |
-

Margery's tears have seemed to many commentators to be the key element of her affective spirituality.⁴⁹ But shedding tears to express religious feeling was practised right across the entire medieval period, as Piroska Nagy has shown.⁵⁰ To be sure, the precise significance of such tears changed over time, but they were hardly a peculiar characteristic of late medieval affect. What is really important about Margery's tears is their transformative role in her emotional sequences. The third sequence that I wish to examine bears this out. In the text, it occurs right after the story of the lecherous monk. Margery was at Canterbury, where she 'was greatly despised and reprovved because she wept so hard, both by the monks and the priests and by secular men, nearly all day . . . so much that her husband went away from her as if he had not known her and left her alone among them'.⁵¹ Here her tears led to public scorn.

Although Margery responded to this scorn by thanking her persecutors, the intensity of the reaction against her left her 'trembling and quaking full sorely in her flesh, without any earthly comfort (*tremelyng & whakyng ful sor in hir flesch wythowtyn ony erdly comfort*)'.⁵² She prayed, and then 'two fair young men (*tweyn fayr 3ong men*) – surely the implication is that they were angels – came and led her to her inn, giving her 'great cheer (*gret cher*)'.⁵³ After this she experienced 'great rest of soul (*gret rest of sowle*) . . . with many sweet tears of high devotion (*swet terys of hy deuocyon*) so plenteously and continually that it was a marvel . . . her heart . . . was not consumed with the ardor of love (*ardowr of lofe*)'.⁵⁴ She 'thought it was full merry (*ful mery*) to be reprovved for God's love. It was to her great solace and comfort (*solas & cownmfort*)'.⁵⁵ 'Merry' seems an odd word here, more suited to carousing than to a sense of comfort. But Philippa Maddern has recently shown that in the late Middle Ages 'merry' often meant salutary 'in the sense of mental and spiritual health'.⁵⁶ For the sequence, see Table 1.3.

We have seen three emotional sequences in the *Book of Margery Kempe*. They are similar in trajectory, each going (to simplify) from sorrow to happiness. The main difference is the role of tears: they have no place in the first sequence but have a key intermediary function in the second and third. How do these sequences compare – if at all – to the emotional lives of English Protestants two centuries later?

Table 1.3 Sequence of emotions in Margery's third episode (simplified)

-
- | | |
|----|---|
| 1. | sin and fear without comfort (<i>tremelyng & whakyng . . . wythowtyn ony erdly comfort</i>) |
| 2. | cheer (<i>cher</i>); rest of soul and sweet tears (<i>swet terys</i>) |
| 3. | love, merriment, solace, comfort (<i>lofe, mery, solas & cownmfort</i>) |
-

Puritan affectivity

The many forms of Protestantism flourishing in seventeenth-century England may nevertheless be divided into two groups, one ‘hotter’ than the other. The latter sort nurtured a reformist agenda, anxious to eliminate all Catholic elements – ornaments, vestments and ceremonies – and to foster a more active, fervent faith.⁵⁷ After Charles I came to the throne in 1625 and Laud became archbishop in 1633, the two sorts of Protestantism increasingly went their separate ways, the ‘Anglican’ affirming hierarchy and liturgy, the ‘Puritan’ focusing on predestination and godliness. The rift culminated in the 1640s, when a largely Puritan Parliament ended up challenging the Anglican Church, organizing an army and fighting royalist forces. In the next phase, Parliament organized the New Model Army (1645), won the civil war, and (now shrunken to a Rump) put the king to death. The Commonwealth, which lasted from 1649 to 1660, was dominated by men like Oliver Cromwell (d. 1658), who identified with the Puritans, tolerated (but barely) the Anglicans, and prohibited Catholics from worshipping in public.⁵⁸

This is the context in which *Spirituell Experiences*, published in 1653, was produced. It was quite popular, as it was issued in two editions (I here use the second) and was read and commented on by at least two divines.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, I derive the emotional community that it suggests from the text itself rather than from its audience of readers.

The text consists of sixty-one short spiritual autobiographies designed to qualify worshippers to join an Independent Puritan church.⁶⁰ Several of these accounts mention the sermons of Henry Walker, and the best guess is that he served as the minister of the church to which the contributors belonged.⁶¹ This was certainly a church in or near London.⁶²

The sixty-one accounts were very likely based on first-hand oral or written testimonies. Nevertheless, they were clearly reworked. For example, the editor, whether Henry Walker or someone else, provided citations for many of the quotations from scripture. Then, too, the narratives tend to have a similar shape and trajectory. However, that particular manipulation is useful for our purposes, since it helps to reveal the normative sequence of Puritan religious feeling. At the same time, individual voices remain, as we shall see.

Individual voices; but not individual names. Every narrative is attributed only to a set of initials. Further, many are shorn of identifying details. We often cannot tell if the narrative belongs to a man or to a woman. Of the sixty-one accounts, twenty-four represent the experience of a female, eighteen of a male, leaving nineteen as indeterminable.⁶³

Let us begin with the experiences of F.P.⁶⁴ For no reason other than ease of exposition, let us call this believer a man. His narrative has a number of features characteristic of the others, suggesting the contours of lay Protestant affective spirituality. F.P. began his account with his sins and evil thoughts. These led him to fear that he was damned. He was ‘tempted to make away’ with himself but considered ‘that that would not give me ease or comfort, but be the way to enter into endlesse miseries’. He dreamt he saw Jesus lying in a grave and then rising from the dead. This gave him some comfort. Nevertheless, tempted by the Devil, he again doubted that he was saved and was ‘ready to despaire’. His doubts, he said, ‘caused me to

weep much, and I was exceedingly troubled, . . . [and] from the thoughts of the wrath that I feared, I could have wished my self a beast, a Dog, or any thing; because their misery would have an end'. Comforted by friends and godly books, he was delivered from his former temptations, 'to the great joy of my heart', although he continued to be plagued by some backsliding. At this point the narrative quoted various words of scripture, ending with proofs that F.P. had had a change of heart, for example that 'I do love God more than any thing else, and desire him above all' and 'I have sometimes such sweet comforts and enlargements in my soul, by Gods blessed Spirit, that I finde much peace with God thereby'.

The sequence, then, was from sin and fear of damnation to despair and suicidal impulses and thence to joy and God's comfort. In between were moments of tears. Schematically, it closely tracks the emotional sequences that we outlined for Margery Kempe, with the exception that the tears here were not comforting but rather expressions of despair.

In another account, D.M. became aware of her sins because of external afflictions.⁶⁵ Her husband, whom (she said) she loved excessively, 'went away' from her (probably abandoning her rather than dying). When she recognized her sinfulness, she was 'terrified', certain that she was damned. 'I feared', she said, 'that God did not love me'. She realized that she 'had loved the world too much', and 'this wrought upon me great troubles, and despaire; that I cryed until I was almost blinde: And I had great feare and trembling upon me, that I could not pray, nor heare with profit, but thought it was in vaine for me to pray, whom God loved not'. The Devil tempted her to commit suicide, but she was stopped 'by the providence of God, having a great love to a young infant I had then'. The Devil continued to rage, 'But me thought at last, I heard the Lord saying to my soule, as he did to Paul, *Trust in me, my grace is sufficient for thee*. And then I found some comfort'. She was further helped by the words of a godly woman who lived near Leeds and by a minister at York. 'And then, and since I have had much joy in the Promises of God'. For proofs of her change of heart and 'union with Jesus Christ', she spoke of her 'great love to God', her delight to mingle with other godly folk, and the chief desire of her heart: 'that God would keep me close by his side; and I have abundance of joy in communion with the Lord, which is more sweet to me, then my joy in any thing'.

Thus, guilty of sin, D.M. feared God's abandonment – indeed, she was certain of it – and that led her to despair and the temptation to commit suicide. Then came the Lord's direct intervention, speaking to her soul words of reassurance. Again, this follows Margery's emotional scripts, and again the tears are the exception, for D.M.'s 'crying until she was almost blinde' signalled not respite but rather sorrow and fear.

Henry Walker himself (assuming he is the H.W. of the text) began with his 'dark soul' cursed 'by nature'.⁶⁶ He 'sate up a great part of many nights, when all the family, where I then lived, was in bed, and with an heavy heart, and floods of tears gushing from my sorrowfull eyes'. At such times he begged mercy of God. Eventually, God brought his 'heart to a frame to resolve seriously never to delay with God a moment more', and from then on he 'found much of the love, grace, spirit and power of my dear Saviour', and got 'much comfort from divers promises of the Lord'.

Most of the narratives in *Spirituell Experiences* repeat these sequences in one way or another. Thus, for example, A.O. was very sensible of his or her sins (let us imagine, for ease of exposition, that A.O. was a woman).⁶⁷ These 'were so great a burden' to

her that, in her words, ‘they made mee almost to despaire, in so much that I could scarce either eate or drink, but had my spirits dryed up with the anguish thereof’. She was sure she had sinned against the Holy Ghost and therefore ‘should never go to heaven, but was cast off to be damned’. She prayed ‘and often cryed to God’ and gained a bit of comfort, only to give way again to fear. Then, after hearing the sermons of a Mr. W., minister at B., and reading a book called *The New Birth*, she found comfort.⁶⁸

Or consider E.C., who ‘ponder[ed] how to be rich or fine as others’, and then repented, with tears and weeping, sometimes ‘day and night’.⁶⁹ Later, however, when she again came to envy the prosperity of her neighbours and had doubts about her election (even though she was a faithful churchgoer), she was tempted by despair. As she lay in bed with her husband, she ‘had strange temptations upon me, to put God out of my mind, and I could not speake a word, nor scarce think of God’. Was she a ‘hypocrite’? She thought so. But an incident with the Devil allowed her to repudiate him once for all, for ‘the Lorde put it into my minde, that Christ Jesus hath not given so much for soules, as he hath done, to let the Devill have them for nothing . . . And with a mixture of teares and joy, I had sweete comforts from the Lord’. Here we see that tears were sometimes associated with respite even in Protestant accounts.

Finally, let us turn to A.A., who was reminded of her sins when her husband was wounded and her children died.⁷⁰ Near despair, she feared God’s abandonment. Comfort came from the words of St Paul and sermons from a minister. She found one proof of her conversion in her ‘weeping for my infirmities, or at prayer, or duties, in publique or private, me thinks I find such joy in them, that I could dwel there’. Here, once again, weeping was sweet and consoling. There are many other similar examples. Table 1.4 sums up the emotional sequences in these accounts.

The similarities with Margery’s emotional sequences are striking, but let us not forget that they are the result of radical simplification and abstraction. Even Margery’s three sequences were not exactly the same: it is not as though she always experienced (or, at any rate, narrated) the same set of feelings. Consider her tears: at first, they were private; but soon (as with the priest at Rome), they became public; and later, when her tears provoked such scorn that she feared for her life, they were sources of both pain and (in hindsight) merriment. In the Protestant accounts, tears often were expressions of sorrow and less often of comfort. But they were never sources of scorn. Indeed, to the contrary, when the believers wept, the people around them offered them comfort.⁷¹ Thus *their* feelings of comfort were rooted at least partly in the earthly community, whereas Margery’s were generally, though not entirely, experienced with Christ.

What other differences separate Margery’s *Book* from the testimonials in *Spirituell Experiences*? While the Puritans occasionally reported that Jesus or God spoke to their souls, those incidents were normally brief, and they melded seamlessly into

Table 1.4 General sequence of emotions in *Spirituell Experiences*

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|----|--|
| 1. | sinfulness, fear of damnation; despair; suicidal temptations |
| 2. | tears (often as sign of sorrow but sometimes of comfort) |
| 3. | love, comfort, joy |
-

quotations from scripture. Indeed, one might say that among the Puritans scripture took the place of Margery's colloquies with Christ.

Using the technique of comparing sequences of emotions demonstrates major continuities across the medieval/early modern divide. Indeed, it suggests that there was rather little change from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century in the emotional lives of at least some groups – religious groups in this case. The few differences had to do with context. In Margery's case, tears elicited the scorn of others and thus brought with them excruciating – if salvific – pain. In the case of the Protestant believers, tears elicited the compassion of others, who wished to comfort the remorseful sinner.

But the context is crucial. We cannot look at sequences in isolation. We must put them together with everything else that we know. And we know that church practices and theologies radically separated late medieval from early Protestant religious sensibilities. Christ promised Margery that she would skip Purgatory and go directly to Heaven.⁷² But there was no Purgatory for the Puritan believers to await or to avoid. Their religious 'reassurance' was less certain than Margery's, and this may account for the various reports of 'backsliding' in *Spirituell Experiences*. Then, too, Margery confessed continually. The seventeenth-century believers heard sermons and sought guidance, but they had no sacrament of confession as such. Margery's tears of compunction were consoling; indeed, they were essential to her emotional transformation from despair to joy. Protestant tears were generally bitter; they were signs of despair rather than of conversion.

Thus, the context was different; because of that, the emotions were differently used, expressed and – here we must take a leap – felt. It would be foolish to conclude that religious emotions had not changed at all just because we can find commonalities in the sequences involving despair, tears and comfort. But those similarities should nevertheless matter to us. They suggest that emotions are neither universal nor lost nor found. Rather, at least within Western culture, they are repurposed. That repurposing suggests that the history of emotions may offer a new and less abrupt way to view the transition from the Middle Ages to the early modern era than is evident in the current insistence on 'modernity'.

The deep divide between the medieval and early modern periods is a historiographical, not a historical, fact. On both sides of the divide, people felt sinful, despairing and fearful. They shed tears. Ultimately, they found love and comfort in God. But the theologies and social organizations fostering those emotions were not the same and because of that, we are right to see a shift.

In sum, historical periods do not come in discrete units, as if people exited the Middle Ages, entered the modern era and closed the door behind them. But how can we envisage both continuity and change at the same time? The history of emotions suggests that rather than working with metaphors of entrance and exit, we should imagine people walking through gradually changing landscapes even as they continue to wear their old clothes and carry with them valises packed with their old artefacts. The historian's task is to show precisely what they took with them and how those things were repurposed for their new conditions. This may entail rethinking some cherished historiographical concepts, such as 'roots', 'modernity', 'revolution'

and ‘the rise’ of this or that – individuality, capitalism, the nation state.⁷³ Emotional sequences are particularly apt for suggesting areas of both discontinuity and stasis. They show considerable staying power, with words and patterns stable over the long haul. At the same time, they respond flexibly to new values and goals. The history of emotions suggests a new way for historians to think about change over time.

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Notes

- 1 The original study that used those six emotions, connected them to particular facial expressions and found them to be universal is P. Ekman and W.V. Friesen, ‘Constants across cultures in the face and emotion’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 17, 1971, 124–9. Here one recent study must stand for all that have followed Ekman and Friesen: S. Jongen, N. Axmacher, N.A.W. Kremers, H. Hoffmann, K. Limbrecht-Ecklundt, H.C. Traue *et al.*, ‘An investigation of facial emotion recognition impairments in alexithymia and its neural correlates’, *Behavioural Brain Research* 271, 2014, 129–39, which attempts to locate the neural correlates of incorrect ‘facial emotion recognition’ in people with alexithymia, defined as those in whom such recognition is ‘impaired’. Here the researchers used a FEEL (Facially Expressed Emotion Labeling) test, which is based on the photographs developed by Ekman and his associates ‘of each basic emotion (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise)’ (p. 131).
- 2 See, for example, L.F. Barrett, C.D. Wilson-Mendenhall and L.W. Barsalou, ‘The conceptual act theory: a roadmap’, in L.F. Barrett and J.A. Russell (eds), *Psychological Construction of Emotion*, New York: Guilford Press, 2015, pp. 83–110.
- 3 For an exception, see L.F. Barrett, *How Emotions are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. By focusing on how the brain formulates what we construe as emotions from a process of prediction and categorization of stimuli, Barrett allows for us to reformulate our emotions. See esp. Ch. 9: ‘Mastering Your Emotions’.
- 4 P.N. Stearns, *American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style*, New York: New York University Press, 1994.
- 5 P.N. Stearns with C.Z. Stearns, ‘Emotionology: clarifying the history of emotions and emotional standards’, *American Historical Review* 90, 1985, 813–36 (p. 813).
- 6 U. Frevert, *Emotions in History – Lost and Found*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011.
- 7 N. Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, trans. E. Jephcott, ed. E. Dunning, J. Goudblom and S. Mennell, rev. edn, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
- 8 The argument is that the early modern church and state instituted new forms of social control. See P. Spierenburg, ‘Social control and history: an introduction’, in H. Roodenburg and P. Spierenburg (eds), *Social Control in Europe*, vol. 1: 1500–1800, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2004, pp. 1–22. On Elias’s influence on

- these ideas, see H.R. Schmidt, 'Sozialdisziplinierung? Ein Plädoyer für das Ende des Etatismus in der Konfessionalisierungsforschung', *Historische Zeitschrift* 265, 1997, 639–82, esp. pp. 639–40; G. Alessi, 'Discipline: i nuovi orizzonti del disciplinamento sociale', *Storica* 4, 1996, 7–37, who (esp. pp. 16–25) traces the *idea* of social discipline – though not the term – from Max Weber to Norbert Elias and Michel Foucault. On modernity in the history of emotions see B.H. Rosenwein, 'Modernity: a problematic category in the history of emotions', *History and Theory* 53, 2014, 69–78.
- 9 Psychologists frequently speak of emotion 'scripts', by which they mean the circumstances that give rise to one emotion and the actions and expressions that accompany it. See, for example, P.M. Niedenthal, 'Emotion concepts', in M. Lewis, J.M. Haviland-Jones and L.F. Barrett (eds), *Handbook of Emotions*, 3rd edn, New York: Guilford Press, 2008, p. 593, Table 36.2: 'An Anger Script'. This is not what I mean by an emotional sequence in which one emotion follows another. S.D. White, 'The politics of anger', in B.H. Rosenwein (ed.), *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of An Emotion in the Middle Ages*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp. 127–52, uses the word 'script' to mean what I here call a 'sequence'.
 - 10 For the notion of 'emotional communities' see Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*, pp. 3–10. The characterization of Protestantism as 'unemotional' is slowly being revised, and I express my debt here to some of the pioneers of that re-evaluation: S.C. Karant-Nunn, "'Christians' mourning and lament should not be like the heathens": the suppression of religious emotion in the Reformation', in J.M. Headley, H.J. Hillerbrand and A.J. Papalas (eds), *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555–1700: Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan*, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004, pp. 107–29, emphasizes the 'shaping' rather than the suppression of all feeling in early Protestantism. S.C. Karant-Nunn, *The Reformation of Feeling: Shaping the Religious Emotions in Early Modern Germany*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, makes the point still more boldly. See also T.A. Campbell, *The Religion of the Heart: A Study of European Religious Life in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. For English Protestantism, see A. Ryrie, *Being Protestant in Reformation Britain*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; and P. Marshall, *Religious Identities in Henry VIII's England*, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006; and now A. Ryrie and T. Schwanda, *Puritanism and Emotion in the Early Modern World*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
 - 11 By using two vernacular texts, I attempt to avoid the 'watershed' transformation that seems to occur when terms – including emotion terms – pass from the Latin into the vernacular. For, as P. Withington, *Society in Early Modern England: The Vernacular Origins of Some Powerful Ideas*, Cambridge: Polity, 2010, suggests, new terms in and of themselves imply new meanings and shades of meaning. On paying attention to emotion words to get at emotions, see B.H. Rosenwein, 'Emotion words', in P. Nagy and D. Boquet (eds), *Le Sujet des émotions au Moyen Âge*, Paris: Beauchesne, 2008, pp. 93–106.
 - 12 C.W. Bynum, *Jesus as Mother. Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982, p. 4.
 - 13 Jacques de Vitry, *The Life of Marie d'Oignies*, trans. M. King, in E.A. Petroff (ed.), *Medieval Women's Visionary Literature*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 182.
 - 14 H. Suso, 'The Life of the Servant', in *Henry Suso: The Exemplar, with Two German Sermons*, trans. F. Tobin, New York: Paulist Press, 1989, p. 67.
 - 15 Ibid., p. 84.
 - 16 See the Geographies of Orthodoxy website, available at: <www.qub.ac.uk/geographies-of-orthodoxy/discuss/about-the-project>.
 - 17 For background, see K. Parker, 'Lynn and the making of a mystic', in J.H. Arnold and K.J. Lewis (eds), *A Companion to The Book of Margery Kempe*, Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2004, pp. 55–73; and A. Goodman, *Margery Kempe and Her World*, London: Longman, 2002, pp. 15–55.
 - 18 *The Book of Margery Kempe*, ed. S. Brown Meech and H.E. Allen, Oxford: Early English Text Society, 1940 [henceforth BMK], p. 1, line 15. I take my translations of the Middle English of BMK from *The Book of Margery Kempe*, ed. and trans. L. Staley, New York: Norton, 2001 [henceforth Staley], except where noted. Here the quote is from p. 3.

- 19 On the final scribe, Saltows, see B. Windeatt (ed.), *The Book of Margery Kempe*, Harlow: Longman, 2000, p. xvi. On the fate of the manuscript, see J.A. Chappell, *Perilous Passages: The Book of Margery Kempe, 1534–1934*, New York: Palgrave, 2013.
- 20 Goodman, *Margery Kempe*, p. 1, takes the position that the *Book* is ‘an account . . . of the life in devotion of . . . Margery Kempe’. L. Staley, *Margery Kempe’s Dissenting Fictions*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994, argues that the ‘Margery’ of the *Book* is a well-honed fiction created by ‘Kempe’. F. Riddy, ‘Text and self in *The Book of Margery Kempe*’, in L. Olson and K. Kerby-Fulton (eds), *Voices in Dialogue: Reading Women in the Middle Ages*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005, pp. 435–53 (p. 438) settles for ‘a text, produced I do not know how’.
- 21 Staley, p. 60; BMK, p. 82, line 30.
- 22 Staley, p. 61; BMK, p. 83, lines 28–9.
- 23 Staley, p. 61; BMK, p. 83, lines 33–4.
- 24 Staley, p. 73; BMK, p. 100, lines 25–7.
- 25 However, see R.A. Powell, ‘Margery Kempe: an exemplar of late Medieval English piety’, *Catholic Historical Review* 89:1, 2003, 1–23.
- 26 See Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*, pp. 210–24.
- 27 F. Somerset, *Feeling Like Saints: Lollard Writings after Wyclif*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. Margery was accused of Lollardy, but *The Book* presents her as quite different from the Lollards, and she does not seem to have known any .
- 28 There are other interpretations of the *Book*’s emphasis on persecution. Powell, ‘Margery Kempe’, p. 22, says that ‘the *Book* was written to promote the cult of St Margery of Lynne’. For R. Krug, ‘The idea of sanctity and the uncanonized Life of Margery Kempe’, in A. Galloway (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval English Culture*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 129–45, the *Book* is not about Margery’s sanctity but rather about her ‘sanctified life’, which (unlike sanctity) involves dealing with the world. For the role of suffering in late medieval meditative practices, which, as Powell shows, were closely followed by Margery, see H. Johnson, ‘“The hard bed of the cross”: Good Friday preaching and the Seven Deadly Sins’, in R. Newhauser (ed.), *The Seven Deadly Sins: From Communities to Individuals*, Leiden: Brill, 2007, pp. 129–44, esp. pp. 140–2.
- 29 Staley, p. 6; BMK, p. 6, lines 29–31.
- 30 Staley, pp. 6–7; BMK, pp. 6–7.
- 31 Staley, p. 7; BMK, p. 7, line 4.
- 32 Staley, pp. 6–8; BMK, p. 7, lines 16–21.
- 33 Staley, p. 7; BMK, p. 7, lines 29–33.
- 34 Staley, p. 7; BMK, p. 7, line 33–7.
- 35 Staley, pp. 7–8; BMK, p. 8, lines 15–21.
- 36 Guillelmus Durantus, *Rationale divinarum officiorum* (V–VI), 5.5.13, ed. A. Davril and T.M. Thibodeau, in *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis* 140A, Turnhout: Brepols, 1998, p. 96: ‘Rursus, in hiis precibus Ecclesia orat pro peccatis, et presertim pro quatuor rogat, scilicet pro immunditia remouenda et pro munditia conferenda; pro tristitia que ex morsu conscientie remouenda et pro letitia conferenda’.
- 37 *Vitae paparum avenionensium*, ed. É. Baluze and (new ed.) G. Mollat, vol. 1, Paris: Letouzey, 1914, p. 214; discussed in A. Murray, *Suicide in the Middle Ages*, vol. 1: *The Violent against Themselves*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 75–6.
- 38 On despair’s association with Judas Iscariot see Murray, *Suicide*, vol. 2: *The Curse on Self-Murder*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 386–7; and M. Barasch, ‘Despair in the medieval imagination’, *Social Research* 66:2, 1999, 565–76.
- 39 Murray, *Suicide*, vol. 2, Ch. 11 is essential here.
- 40 Augustine, *De vera religione*, 26, ed. K.-D. Daur, in *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, 32, Turnhout: Brepols, 1962, p. 218; Jerome, *Epistulae*, 53, in *Saint Jérôme, Lettres*, ed. J. Labourt, vol. 3, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1953, p. 11.
- 41 Staley, p. 13; BMK, p. 14, line 27; p. 15, lines 4, 11, 29
- 42 Staley, p. 13; BMK, p. 16, lines 4–6.
- 43 BMK, p. 16, line 14.
- 44 Staley, p. 13; BMK, p. 16, lines 18–20.

- 45 Staley, p. 14; BMK, p. 17, lines 4–6.
- 46 Staley, p. 14; BMK, p. 18, lines 1–2.
- 47 Staley, p. 3; BMK, p. 1, line 15.
- 48 Staley, p. 21; BMK, p. 27, line 5.
- 49 See, for example, K. Lochrie, *Margery Kempe and Translations of the Flesh*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991, Ch. 2; S. Bhattacharji, ‘Tears and screaming: weeping in the spirituality of Margery Kempe’, in K.C. Patton and J. Stratton Hawley (eds), *Holy Tears: Weeping in the Religious Imagination*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 229–41; J.J. Cohen, *Medieval Identity Machines*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, Ch. 5.
- 50 P. Nagy, *Le don des larmes au Moyen Âge. Un instrument spirituel en quête d’institution (V^e–XIII^e siècle)*, Paris: Albin Michel, 2000.
- 51 Staley, p. 21; BMK, p. 21, lines 19–24.
- 52 Staley, p. 22; BMK, p. 28, lines 34–5.
- 53 Staley, p. 23, translates *cher* as ‘comfort’ but BMK, p. 388 translates it as ‘cheer’; BMK, p. 29, line 7.
- 54 Staley, p. 23; BMK, p. 29, lines 14–17.
- 55 Staley, p. 23; BMK, p. 29, lines 27–8.
- 56 P.C. Maddern, ‘“It is full merry in Heaven”: the pleasurable connotations of ‘merriment’ in late Medieval England’, in N. Cohen-Hanegbi and P. Nagy (eds), *Pleasure in the Middle Ages*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2018, pp. 21–38 (p. 31). I thank Andrew Lynch for the reference.
- 57 See P. Marshall, *Reformation England, 1480–1642*, London: Arnold, 2003.
- 58 For an introduction to the main historiographical debates concerning the English Reformation, see P. Lake, ‘The historiography of Puritanism’, in J. Coffey (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Puritanism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 360–5.
- 59 *Spirituell experiences, of sundry beleevers. Held forth by them at severall solemne meetings, and Conferences to that end. With the recommendation of the sound, spiritual, and savoury worth of them, to the sober and spirituell Reader, By Vavasor Powel, Minister of the Gospel*, 2nd edn, London, 1653 (henceforth SE). Accessed through Early English Books Online. See Rosenwein, ‘Transmitting despair’, p. 259.
- 60 K. Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography in the Seventeenth-Century Anglophone World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 131–40 discusses Powell and his role in SE, noting (pp. 121–2) that in the very year of its publication, 1653, two other such collections were published. G.F. Nuttall, *Visible Saints: The Congregational Way, 1640–1660*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1957, p. 111, n. 2, lists other examples of this genre from around the same time. On the proliferation of spiritual autobiographies in England, most, however, written by members of the clergy rather than laity, see e.g. O.C. Watkins, *The Puritan Experience: Studies in Spiritual Autobiography*, New York: Schocken, 1972; K. von Greyerz, *Vorsehungsglaube und Kosmologie. Studien zu englischen Selbstzeugnissen des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990; and Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography*.
- 61 Watkins, *The Puritan Experience*, p. 41, makes Walker minister at Martins Vintry, London; Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography*, p. 136, demurs: ‘there is no clear evidence that Walker had ever fully taken on that role’.
- 62 Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography*, p. 139, follows Walker from an unspecified parish to another in Wood Street, Cheapside; to a third, in 1650, in Knightsbridge. But she cautions (p. 140) that ‘it is doubtful that the publication [of SE] represented any single fully gathered church’. T. Liu, *Puritan London: A Study of Religion and Society in the City Parishes*, Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1986, p. 106, points out that gathered churches might draw their clientele and pastors from many different parishes.
- 63 Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography*, p. 133, gives different statistics: ‘When gender can be determined, women outnumber men by fifty percent’. Two narratives belong to the same man, H.W. (SE, pp. 103–10; 286–90), the only person with two testimonials, one in the original edition and the second in the augmented version. This was very likely Henry Walker himself. See N. Smith, *Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English*

Radical Religion, 1640–1660, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 43; and Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography*, p. 136, who (pp. 130–1) outlines the book’s organization. The testimonials range in length from 2 to 32 pages, counting fractions of a page as a page.

64 SE, pp. 234–40.

65 Ibid., pp. 33–43.

66 Ibid., pp. 103–10.

67 Ibid., pp. 87–93.

68 It seems possible that ‘Mr. W.’ was Henry Walker and fairly likely that *The New Birth* referred to John Andrewes, *The Conuerted Mans New Birth describing the direct way to go to Heauen: wherein all men may clearely see, whether they shall be saued or damned. Shewing the Principall care, and vehement desire, which euery one ought to take, in seeking their saluation. With the Spirituall battle betweene the regenerate man and Sathan*, London, 1629, which (p. 26) calls the sin against the Holy Ghost ‘veniall by Christ his mercy’ rather than mortal, and thus holds out hope of redemption even in that instance.

69 SE, pp. 77–87.

70 Ibid., pp. 68–76. Lynch, *Protestant Autobiography*, p. 134, discusses the impact of the Civil War in these accounts.

71 See above for the experience of F.P. True, W.F. (SE, p. 304) speaks of the ‘persecution, shame, reproach, or scorne of the world’, but this seems theoretical rather than personal. Two testimonies speak of the pain of being called a ‘Puritan’: M.H. (SE, p. 217) and J.H. (SE, p. 376).

72 BMK, p. 16, line 36.

73 Indeed, Withington, *Society*, argues this.

2

EMOTIONS, TIME AND NARRATIVE

A liturgical frame

Matthew S. Champion

Historians of emotion have rarely discussed the history of time. This is in part due to a general emphasis on measurement in the historiography on time. In such histories, the hero is the clock – and the story told is one of advances in technical reliability and precision.¹ This is not the most obviously fertile ground for historians of emotion to till. But alongside this history of time, there is another, one more focused on time as perceived and experienced by historical agents, and on the interactions between habits, social rhythms, cultural production and systems of time measurement. This can be called the history of temporalities, and along with the history of emotions it is one of the most dynamic fields of current historical research. This chapter suggests that a fruitful conversation can be opened up between the history of temporalities and the history of emotions, and proposes two particular spaces for dialogue. The first is theories of the narrative self – selves constructed through the telling of stories. Narrative is a crucial site for the generation of emotions, constructing normative and normativizing arcs of emotional change while allowing for creative reinterpretations and performances of emotions by historical agents. The second is the new history of liturgy, which has opened up rich strata of sources, once confined to highly specialized study, to wider historical questions.² Across the period 1100 to 1700, and across Europe, liturgical practices provided room for variegated emotional experiences, and the building blocks for emotions well beyond the obvious spaces of the church and the monastery.

The period 1100 to 1700 involves two episodes in standard histories of time. The first, the ‘medieval’ moment, is styled as having a vague sense of time, with little desire for precision. There is only a ‘weak sense of anachronism’, and social order is static: *sub specie aeternitatis* nothing can change.³ The second, the ‘Renaissance’, ‘Reformation’, or ‘early modern’ moment, involves a shift towards the ‘discovery of history’, personal accountability for time, and the temporal precision and technological advances of the new science.⁴ Depending on the scholar, the line between these two opposing temporal regimes will be drawn in different centuries. For the great French medievalist Jacques Le Goff, the line was the emergence of a mercantile class in the cities of the fourteenth century with the accompanying spread of the fixed twenty-four hours of the mechanical clock. This was opposed to an older measurement system of liturgical time and hours which varied their

lengths according to the seasons.⁵ For the German historian Reinhart Koselleck, even as late as the sixteenth century, time had not yet been placed in a properly historical setting, freed from the static prison of medieval time.⁶ For the *Annaliste* Lucien Febvre, the peasant of the sixteenth century still wandered in a world without time: ‘we find fancifulness, imprecision, inexactness everywhere, the doing of men who did not even know their ages precisely’.⁷

This story is a working out of the standard narratives of modernity which have their corollaries in the history of emotions. Witness, for example, Norbert Elias’s narrative of the civilizing process, or Johan Huizinga’s account of the childish intensity of affective life in the late Middle Ages, set against a more regulated and measured emotional palette of later centuries.⁸ More recent histories of emotion have, of course, revised these accounts.⁹ Similarly, if we turn to an alternative genealogy of the history of time, we can find a history of plural and diverse temporalities. Critical for this other history, and for a history of time and emotions across the period 1100 to 1700, is the famous wrestling with time in Augustine’s *Confessions*.

In the *Confessions*, Augustine develops an account of human experiences of time as the stretching out of the soul (*distentio animi*).¹⁰ Throughout the *Confessions* and in the less well-known *De musica*, the hymn *Deus Creator omnium* (‘God, Creator of All Things’), is a continual presence, reappearing as a prompt for Augustine’s reflections on how subjects come to inhabit time. The presence of this liturgical text as the trigger to reflect on the personal relationship between the soul and time alerts us to liturgy’s role as a critical resource for Western cultures from antiquity to the present. Particularly important to the powerful impact of liturgical practices was their deployment of narratives which sanctioned normative emotional experiences at the level of the liturgical service, hour, day, week, season and year, and in life cycle events such as baptisms, churchings and funerals. I wish to highlight two characteristics of liturgy which heighten its potential as a resource for framing emotional experience. The first is that liturgy is repeated, making it a structure that could become familiar and habitual, embedding the structures of liturgical time and affect in the souls, minds and bodies of historical agents. The second is its explicitly performative function in effecting changes for subjects – in liturgy, sins could actually be forgiven when the priest said ‘your sins are forgiven’, Christ could actually be experienced as becoming present in the bread and wine of the Eucharist, and so on. These performances of transformation involve the saturation of emotions in time, driving the potential for emotional change. For if the liturgy was the great architecture of sacred time, it was also an intricate and interwoven network of sanctioned and performed emotions.

But to return for a moment to Augustine’s explicit reflections on time in the *Confessions*: in its being in time, the soul perceives the past as memory, gives attention to the present and expects the future. It is this stretching out of time, and its location as an interior property of the soul (though not exactly in the more closed modern sense of interiority, given the soul’s open and complex relation to eternity for Augustine), which is reflected in and shaped by the narrative arcs of the liturgy. There is a paradox here of the present: human subjects are always temporally situated, they live in the present – but what is the present? When is the now? Is it now? Or now? Or now? The fleeting nature of time – its flow, or *cursus*, to use the liquid metaphors elsewhere developed by Augustine – makes time already the subject

of repeated emotional engagements.¹¹ Time could be positioned across the period 1100 to 1700 as an object of disgust, as causing weariness or as the space within which the soul endures the purging of its affects, and a refining of its desire for eternity. At times, time is given far more positive emotional charge, as when Christ's presence in time becomes a spur to love, hope and devotional ascent. An influential late medieval example of the complex affective dynamics of time is the *De spiritualibus ascensionibus* by the fourteenth-century Dutch mystic, Gerard Zerbolt van Zutphen (1367–1398).¹² In Gerard's work, spiritual ascent commences in the vale of tears of Psalm 83/84, and charts a course through fear, remorse, hope and desire for heaven, and love working continually towards virtuous adherence to God's will – a narrative is written for the devout soul, one which is never possible to bring to perfection in this world given the temporal frailty of humankind. More work remains to be done by scholars to chart the changing affective charge of time itself across the period 1100 to 1700. As we undertake this work, strong continuities between the earlier and later parts of the period will emerge alongside shifts of emphasis: continuities based, for example, on religious orders and reforming identities, or, later in the period, changes grounded in landscapes of multiple, often conflicting, confessions.

As one might expect, the liturgy is itself a rich source for investigating these poles of change and continuity. The liturgy was a capacious emotional resource for Europeans in part because of its multisensory and embodied qualities, and in part because of the kinds of emotional narratives that it performed and could make habitual.¹³ The liturgy, including both the performance of the church's rituals and the liturgical calendar, was an embodied, rhythmic order of time that played important roles in the organization of European social and cultural life.¹⁴ Everywhere across the continent, from cathedrals to fish markets, from the work calendar of a cloth worker to the devotions of an agricultural labourer, liturgy was a central factor in shaping temporal horizons. This is true both for the devout and for the doubters. In an example from the inquisitorial records of thirteenth-century Languedoc, discussed by John Arnold and Caroline Goodson, workers in the vineyard of Bernard de Souillac of Montauban reported kneeling at the ringing of the Sanctus bell, the marker of the liturgical moment of the consecration of the Eucharist. But according to their testimony, their employer Bernard displayed contempt for this liturgical moment, a moment which transgressed the physical and social boundaries of space and work time: 'if you believe [the host is the body of Christ] you are fools, I don't want any share in that credulity of yours'.¹⁵

Such liturgical moments were repeated daily, as the church progressed through the wider arcs of the liturgical year, arcs which involved the re-performance of sacred narratives. Most obviously, these narratives were those of Christ's life, from his birth at Christmas, to his death and resurrection at Easter. But other important narratives played critical roles – the story of the Exodus, or of the Babylonian captivity, and the lives of the saints, who were commemorated in the yearly cycle called the *sanctorale*. And numerous other narrative episodes from the Old and New Testaments could be re-performed by medieval and early modern people as ways of making and explaining emotional change over time.

In emphasizing narration, this chapter responds to a particular form of modern scholarly temporality which is increasingly coming under critique. For many years, scholars have adopted a language of 'turns' – the interpretive turn, the linguistic

turn, the spatial turn, the material turn, the affective turn.¹⁶ Recently, the language of a ‘temporal turn’ has again been gaining traction.¹⁷ Across the humanities, the words of the old Shaker song seem to have been realized: ‘to turn, turn, will be my delight, till by turning, turning, we come round right’. In the humanities at present, however, ‘coming round right’ – arrival – is constantly and deliberately deferred. The purpose of the turn is to participate in rhizomatic rejection of linearity, where there is no conclusion to the turning. This is an important scholarly project, and the various turns have contributed to a significant ‘thickening’ of our descriptions and interpretations of the past. But once temporality is taken into account we can see in the language of turns also an often uncritical devotion to what François Hartog has analysed as the ‘thin’ presentism of our current temporal horizons.¹⁸ Each ‘turn’ happens with extraordinary rapidity, being swallowed by the next before its interpretive potential has had time to be explored. This is in part driven by the temporalities of modern academic funding regimes where novelty is *the* major currency, and where claiming to be leading a ‘new direction’ or surfing the crest of a new wave of scholarship is a powerful strategy (compare my opening to this chapter!). So in ‘returning’ to narrative, the point is not a nostalgic return to the age of the linguistic turn of the 1980s, but to highlight the fact that if we turn too quickly away from narrative we will miss one of the most critical forms through which humans make meaning and situate themselves in time.

Yet the emotional ‘turn’ can also be good news for the study of narrative. Thanks to the emotional or affective turn, we can thicken our theorization and understanding of narrative time by thinking carefully about how emotions shape narrative temporalities. We can examine the subtle ways in which narratives make emotions, and emotions make narratives, and therefore how the narrative unfolding of emotional change generates both our perception of time, and our culturally normative and anormative experiences and practices of affect. A central example of normative past practices of affect, discussed further below, is the way that the narrative of Christ’s Passion structured Holy Week (the week before Easter Sunday) as a time of communal suffering and longing, but also offered individuals a narrative about the transformation of sorrow into joy, modelled on the joy of the Resurrection, and applicable as a source of hope or comfort to sorrows that spill beyond each Easter and that might be practically irremediable in this life. In this case, the narrative played out in the liturgical year (but also in each Mass) generates a perception of time as a space of longing ending in joy, and can further train individuals to imagine our time-bound lives as oriented towards a heavenly liturgy and heavenly joy that exceeds our current experience of time.

In attending to the interaction of narrative and emotion, we must also give careful attention to the way emotional narratives shape our own historical practice, in much the same way that Benno Gammerl has advocated a more self-reflexive awareness of the emotional styles of our historical practice.¹⁹ The fruitful connection of emotion and narrative in historical method is worth emphasizing because the emotional turn not infrequently seems to come after and *against* the linguistic turn. Monique Scheer’s adaptation of Bourdieu’s theory of *habitus* to the history of emotions rightly stresses the importance of the body as the site of emotional practices. Yet the body is used to decentre the importance of language. Indeed, Scheer’s article is a clear example of the ‘turn’ against the ‘linguistic turn’. Scheer mentions narrative once

in her article, and then not as a reflection on the emotional power of narrative, but on the changing power of a single emotive statement, 'I love you', in the romantic narratives of Bollywood films.²⁰ The stress is on the conclusion, not the process – the practice – by which this new emotional habit is instantiated and made normative. What makes new patterns of feeling habitual or practised is, in part, the narrative – the story – with its emotional architecture of delays, failures, hardships, reversals and persistence, which gives the statement its temporal and emotional depth. Scholarship on the body and on practice has continued to be a profoundly useful reformulation of how we understand subjectivity, agency and action. But it is now time to allow the temporal forms of language back into the conversation.

If Scheer is an example of the 'practice turn' applied to the 'emotional turn', then Benno Gammerl's work can be seen as an infusion of the history of emotions with the 'spatial turn'. In his work, Gammerl draws out the implications of 'spatially defined emotional styles'.²¹ 'The Supermarket calls for a different emotional repertoire compared to the beach or the office'.²² Like Scheer on the Bollywood film, Gammerl's spaces can be deepened by attention to contingent temporal frames. The emotional styles associated with a modern beach might differ according to seasonal time (the weather, for example), or the times of contingent events and normative ritual practices: the scattering of a loved one's ashes, for example, with its normative tenor of respect and sorrow, and its telos of 'closure'; or a wedding, with its mandatory joy punctuated by suspense-filled scripts of cold feet, and so on.

Liturgy can help here, too, since it explicitly makes the 'same' spaces differ in time through the rhythms of practice. In Lent, according to one widely circulating medieval liturgical commentary, the singing of the 'joyous' *Gloria in excelsis Deo* ('Glory to God in the Highest') was removed in order to signal the sorrowful longing of the people of God for their promised land.²³ This change in the liturgical soundscape followed a narrative (and temporal) overlaying of the narration of Israel's Exodus with Christ's temptation in the wilderness, and with his suffering in the Passion. The potential for emotional variation was heightened by changes in the sensory experience of the liturgy. In the days leading up to Easter Sunday, for example, images were veiled and bells silenced. The aim was to create emotional expressions 'fitting' for the times – in Lent, sorrow, lament, penitence, grief, shame; at Easter, happiness, joy and triumph.

We can sense in the writings of medieval mystics some of the ways these differences in the quality of time established through the performance of sacred narratives could affect medieval worshippers. The fifteenth-century English mystical text, *The Book of Margery Kempe*, like other texts which record such experiences across the period, repeatedly ties an intensification of Margery's emotional mystical experiences to key dates in the liturgical calendar:

One Good Friday, as the said creature saw priests kneeling on their knees and other dignified people with torches burning in their hands in front of the sepulchre, devoutly representing the lamentable death and doleful burial of our Lord Jesus Christ according to the good customs of Holy Church, the memory of our Lord's sorrows which she suffered when she beheld His precious body hanging on the Cross and afterwards buried in front of her sight, suddenly occupied the heart of this creature, drawing her mind entirely into

the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ, whom she beheld with her spiritual eye in the sight of her soul as truly as if she had seen His precious body beaten, scourged, and crucified with her physical eye; the which vision and spiritual observation performed by grace so fervently in her mind, wounding her with pity and compassion, so that she sobbed, roared, and cried and, spreading her arms wide, said with a loud voice, 'I'm dying, I'm dying!' so that many people were astonished by her and wondered what was wrong with her.²⁴

The first temporal reference here is to Good Friday, which must be seen not simply as a punctual event commemorating Christ's Passion, but as the culmination of the full season of penitence and fasting commencing even before the start of Lent, from Septuagesima Sunday, a period of time particularly devoted to pondering Christ's suffering and death. The church on Good Friday, then, is a space already situated within the narrative time of the liturgical year, a narrative space which is designed to heighten sorrowful and mournful emotional responses.²⁵ The passage, too, is saturated with the narrative of Christ's suffering: commencing with the rite at the Easter Sepulchre – where the Eucharist was ritually buried and then raised in the Easter liturgies – the *Book* practices a typical Augustinian *distentio animi* (stretching out of the soul) so that the text encompasses the whole of the passion including Christ's 'beaten, scourged and crucified' body and his 'doleful burial'. This stretching of the soul is mirrored in Margery's own bodily form – her 'arms wide' – a re-performance of Christ's own crucifixion and of the grief of his followers, especially Mary Magdalene at the foot of the Cross.²⁶ Emotional intensity is constructed through the activation of the narrative of Christ's suffering and its inscription on Margery's own body – a rich temporalizing of flesh (past and present, divine and creaturely) mirroring the multiple temporalities in play in the text itself. A final mediation of this experience through the liturgy is the prompt provided by the embodied reenactment of the Passion by the priests, who kneel at the sepulchre. In fact, Margery's final gesture is also a mirroring of the bodily form of the priest in the Good Friday liturgy. As a part of the rite, the priest was to prostrate himself before the cross. So, in experiencing her intense emotions on Good Friday, which fit Scheer's model of emotions as embodied practice, Margery is also playing out the narrative of the Passion in the pattern of the liturgical rites performed by medieval priests, rites which again are bodily, spatial and linguistic.

If we move from the intense experience of a female mystic like Margery Kempe to the dynamics of high political communication, we continue to find liturgical time framing the deployment of emotions. My example here is drawn from the complex negotiations surrounding the Ghent war of the early 1450s and its aftermath.²⁷ Rebelling against its overlord, the Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good (1396–1467), Ghent was humiliatingly defeated at the Battle of Gavere in 1453. Negotiating with the duke, Ghent positioned itself, and was positioned by, its actions and the duke's responses, as well as their representation in civic and court chronicles, and in the performances of a vast civic entry ritual. Here Ghent took on the role of a once disobedient and now penitent child petitioning a wrathful yet loving father. This relationship, played out in the planning and performance of a vast civic ritual, and represented in civic and court chronicles, was modelled explicitly and implicitly on the relationship between Israel and God.

The episode demonstrates the power of political performances of emotions, and the ways in which these could be affected by situating historical events within the narrative and affective frames of the Old and New Testaments and their liturgical reenactments. Examining the layers of this process briefly can help us to understand the emotional, temporal and liturgical resonances in this historical episode. A civic chronicle source, the *Chronyck van Vlaenderen*, records that, in 1452, Ghent mounted an embassy to the duke. The timing of this visit was crucial – the negotiations took place on Good Friday.²⁸ By bringing their embassy on this weighty date in the liturgical calendar, the citizenry of Ghent could hope to write their history into the narrative time of Jesus's redemptive act, giving Duke Philip the chance to recapitulate Jesus's love for sinners expressed in the Crucifixion. Further layers emerge in the negotiations over the duke's return to the city following the battle of Gavere. This return was fervently desired by Ghent, since it could mark the lifting of the harsh economic sanctions imposed by the duke in the wake of their defeat. In narrating this event, the court chronicler Georges Chastelain stresses the grief and penitence of the Ghentenaars, who 'languish in their hearts', and find the duke's favour for rival towns 'a new grief'.²⁹ In their sadness their voices rise in almost liturgical imprecations – echoing the penitential prayers that open the Mass, *Kyrie eleison* ('Lord, have mercy') – as the devout citizens seek the forgiveness of their Lord:

O would to God that his [the duke's] mercy could be opened toward us and that his highness would deign to know the strong and good love with which we love him!³⁰

Following the duke's final relenting, the city negotiated for his elaborate ritual entry into the city. Cunningly symbolizing the city's resurrection after its long 'death' away from its lord, while also positioning the duke as a triumphal resurrected Christ, vanquishing the sin of his subjects, the entry was originally timed for the week following Easter (remember that major medieval feasts like Easter 'coloured' not only the season, but more particularly the week following the feast day – the Octave). The Easter emotional narrative structure of love and joy following grief and desire was deployed here in the speech welcoming the duke to the city: Ghent had 'long desired [the duke's] most joyous coming into this [his] great city'.³¹ The point was hammered home in the performances of *tableaux vivants*, often biblical scenes, with associated texts drawn from liturgical antiphons associated with Advent and Lent – seasons of expectation, mourning and penitence, which then pass into seasons of celebration: Christmas and Easter. The centre of the ritual was an elaborate physical recreation of Jan van Eyck's famous Ghent Altarpiece, now known as the Adoration of the Mystic Lamb, but described in the chronicle sources as the *Chorus beatorum in sacrificium agni paschalis* ('The Chorus of the Blessed at the Sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb').³² Here the resonances of liturgical time, with its layering of apocalyptic second coming with the sacrifice of the Easter lamb in the rite of the mass, draw together multiple affective possibilities to signal that the duke's anger has ceased, forgiveness has been granted, love and peace restored. The point is not what any individual necessarily felt in response to these affective narratives, but rather that the emotional transformations embedded in the liturgy become the form for political communication and action. Without the history of emotions in dialogue with the history of liturgy, time and narrative we would simply not be able to understand these historical events.

My analysis thus far has focused on examples from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. How might the history of emotions in the confessionally diverse and divided years of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries be enriched by dialogues with the history of time? The first point here is that changes in liturgical style do not render liturgy less potent, but they might change the particular forms of emotional expression, and the particular times of heightened emotional potential. So, liturgical feasts or seasons could become sites of violent antagonisms between groups – defiant and insulting eating of a sausage in a church during Lent, for example, was an emotionally compelling gesture of reformers’ rejection of the Roman liturgical regulation of time in the sixteenth century.³³ These kinds of ‘timed’ conflicts resonate strongly with the ways in which communal violence between different religious groups, for example Jews and Christians, often flared up at emotionally heightened moments of the liturgical calendar across the wider period 1100 to 1700, shaping the later emotional memories of communities. Across the period, for example, the conjunction of Easter and Passover was often a framework within which hatred of the Jews could be fostered in narratives which brought together the events of Christ’s passion with newer stories of host desecration or ritual murder.³⁴ To take one well-known case, in Prague in 1389, Easter and Passover fell on the same date, and a charge of mockery of the Host triggered violent reprisals against the town’s Jewish community.³⁵ In the early modern period, Prague’s Jewish community continued to commemorate these events, forging habits of affectively charged memory across the following centuries.³⁶ Violent emotional narratives could also be constructed around other times of liturgical importance beyond Lent, Passover and Easter. At Korneuburg, modern-day Austria, in 1305, townsfolk accused the Jews of procuring a consecrated communion wafer at Christmas and desecrating it.³⁷ Similar feelings of hatred could also be prompted by the liturgically fostered love of the Eucharist through the new feast of Corpus Christi, founded in the thirteenth century, which maintained its capacity to generate strong feelings into modernity.³⁸ In an important recent study, Liesbeth Corens has shown how Corpus Christi could call forth strong emotion for Protestants and Catholics in the confessionally neutral health resort of Spa in the diocese of Liège in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In a space where ‘polite’ and healthy moderate behaviour was generally the socially sanctioned norm, Corpus Christi evoked different emotional displays of devout love or of ‘scandalous’ disdain.³⁹ In this way Spa continued in the pattern famously analysed by Natalie Zemon Davis where early modern religious violence is seen as ‘timed to ritual’.⁴⁰

Conflict between confessions is, however, only one side of the long history of the ways in which liturgies have shaped emotions. As another example of continuity, we might turn to another seventeenth-century source, John Donne’s poem ‘The Annunciation and the Passion’, prompted by the temporal overlay on 25 March 1608, when the Feast of the Annunciation fell on the same day as Good Friday.⁴¹ Donne here uses time and the liturgy to think and feel his way into a devotion which paradoxically holds together life and death, joy and sorrow. ‘At once’, the Virgin Mary is seen ‘Sad and rejoyc’d’, receiving Gabriel’s greeting and at the foot of the cross (l. 13). And this calls forth, at the poem’s end, an expression of a devout intent to make this story the author’s own: ‘Thys Treasure then, in Grosse, my Soule uplay, | and in my lyfe retayle yt every Day’ (ll. 45–6). Like so many in

earlier centuries, Donne makes his devotional and emotional model here Mary.⁴² These last lines, with their dynamic of treasuring up and letting out experiences in the soul, plausibly play on several moments in the early parts of Luke's Gospel which themselves foretell the longer arc of Mary's narrative, and suggest its significance for God's people: Mary's proclamation at the Annunciation that her 'soul' 'magnif[ies] the Lord' (Luke 1:46); her response to the events of the nativity (she 'treasured all these words and pondered them in her heart', Luke 2:19); and Simeon's prediction to Mary at the Circumcision that 'this child is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel . . . (Yea, a sword shall pierce through thy own soul also,) that the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed' (Luke 2:34–5). We are not far here from the liturgical shaping of affective subjectivities through the daily prayer cycles of the Hours of the Virgin, made popular two centuries earlier in Books of Hours (perhaps unsurprising given Donne's Catholic upbringing). And in what the King James Bible translates as 'the fall and rising again of many in Israel', we can see the strong parallel between the pairing of sorrow and joy in the common emotional narrative pattern we have been observing, and the soteriological pattern in which individual Christians hope to participate.

We could compare Donne, too, with another intellectual, one whose *oeuvre* initially seems forbidding territory for a history of emotions: the Leuven professor of theology Peter de Rivo, remembered for his role in highly technical debates over Aristotle's teaching on future contingency, and over the correct chronology of Christ's life, the latter conducted against the famous humanist astronomer and doctor Paul of Middelburg.⁴³ At the start of Peter's lengthy and almost unimaginably dry discussion of metonic cycles, embolisms and the like, his rhetoric shifts up a notch in imagining 'those lowly ones' who from their cradles have believed in the liturgical dating systems of the church, based on a chronological cycle which saw Annunciation and Passion occur on a single day (this overlay could also be extended at the level of the week to Adam's fall, which according to medieval chronologies also occurred on a Friday).⁴⁴ Peter's emotions are stirred to defend this lived pattern of narrative overlay, where time is filled out with sacred resonance across the ages. Like Donne, his emotional horizons are shaped by paradoxical mixed feelings which bring together fall and redemption, grief and joy. So Donne, in another famous and affectively rich passage: 'Therefore that he may raise, the Lord throws down'.

Donne's 'Hymn to God, My God, in My Sickness', which ends with this overwhelming line, finds itself, as do so many surviving sources from the period 1100 to 1700, feeling through narrative, time and liturgy. The end of a life's narrative is wrapped in the fabric of Christ's death ('So, in his purple wrapp'd, receive me, Lord', begins the speaker's petition in the last stanza). The body is central here as the site where narratives are felt, touched and known, and this body is made social and given an expanded sense of space-time through the 'love' of Donne's physicians, 'grown | Cosmographers' as they try to 'map' the stricken territory of his flesh. We sense in this poem, too, how an expanded world for Europeans – including 'the Pacific Sea', 'Anyan, and Magellan, and Gibraltar' – could make for enlarged worlds of feeling, and could be enfolded into the great narrative arcs which span the paradoxical co-inherence of East and West, 'Paradise and Calvary', the first and second Adam, joy and pain, life and death. In a final paradoxical curve, Donne's ultimate hope is

imagined at the beginning of the poem (his end is his beginning): if the Lord raises him after his final sickness, it will be to admit him into the ‘holy room’ where the celestial liturgy takes place – the music of the eternal ‘choir of saints’.

The argument of this chapter has been a simple one. Histories of emotion are enriched by the history of temporalities and vice versa – for to add an emotional gloss to Heidegger, we are *feeling* beings in time. I have explored here in only a very small range of sources how this kind of history might play out, sources that show how the narrative time of the liturgy could shape emotional experiences and actions in the period 1100 to 1700 across Europe. More work remains to be done to think beyond the liturgical frame to other temporalities – the rhythms of work, the seasons, age, for example – to show how these too were inflected by emotions, and how emotions changed in these different times.

A final thought: it is easy to let a history of narrative, time and emotion stay sealed in a medieval or early modern past. But if we will let the theories of the present make our histories, then we must also see how the past makes and transforms our modernities. So, to conclude I want to point to the complicated and difficult histories of emotions that the intersections of liturgical narrative and time might concern in more recent times, in the modern world marked by European colonial expansion. In an important essay, the historian of the Pacific Greg Denning tells the story of a rebellion against French rule in the valley of Taiohae which took place in the mid-nineteenth century on the island of Nuku Hiva, part of the modern Marquesas.⁴⁵ Captured by the French commander, Lieutenant Almaric, the rebel leader Pakoko was court-martialled and executed, at 3.00 p.m. on Good Friday, the precise moment when Christ’s death occurred, and when it is commemorated each year in the liturgies of Holy Week. This disturbing conjunction fits a longer pattern in liturgies of punishment, established in the period 1100 to 1700, of seeking to transform the criminal victim into a Christ figure, a strategy powerfully analysed by Mitchell B. Merback in his study *The Thief, the Cross and the Wheel*.⁴⁶ But what was the French commander doing on Nuku Hiva with this killing ritual on Good Friday? The aim, in part, was to evoke strong collective emotions in the surrounding crowd of soldiers and Pakoko’s fellow islanders – but what emotions? Denning refuses to analyse this conjunction, with a simple statement: ‘A strange thing. The French killed Pakoko at 3.00 p.m. on Good Friday’.⁴⁷ There is something to Denning’s reticence: the moment of affective timing resists singular interpretation because of the multiple potentials and mixtures of emotional response – triumph, perhaps, or sympathy, fear, anger, grief, disgust. If our histories are to be true to these variegated pasts we will need to feel our way into these moments with care – and to remember that time is not a passive receptacle of action, but an active partner in the making of our affective lives.

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Notes

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- 3 P. Burke, *The Renaissance Sense of the Past*, London: Edward Arnold, 1969. Also Burke, ‘The sense of anachronism from Petrarch to Poussin’, in C. Humphrey and W.M. Ormrod (eds), *Time in the Medieval World*, York, UK: York Medieval Press, 2001, pp. 157–76; R. Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. K. Tribe, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
- 4 M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism with Other Writings on the Rise of the West*, trans. S. Kalberg, 4th edn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; Burke, *The Renaissance Sense of the Past*; R.J. Quinones, *The Renaissance Discovery of Time*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- 5 J. Le Goff, *Time, Work and Culture in the Middle Ages*, trans. A. Goldhammer, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Le Goff, however, advocates for a substantially enlarged medieval period, a long Middle Ages, where the Renaissance is seen as ‘the last subperiod’. See J. Le Goff, *Must We Divide History Into Periods?*, trans. M.B. DeBevoise, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, pp. 79–112.
- 6 Koselleck, *Futures Past*.
- 7 L. Febvre, *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais*, trans. B. Gottlieb, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 395. For a recent revision of Febvre, see S. Hanß, ‘The fetish of accuracy: perspectives on early modern time(s)’, *Past & Present*, 242:2, 2019.
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- 33 See C. Kissane, *Food, Religion and Communities in Early Modern Europe*, London: Bloomsbury, 2018.
- 34 See the classic studies of D. Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996; and M. Rubin, *Gentile Tales: The Narrative Assault on Late Medieval Jews*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.
- 35 On this episode, see B. Newman, ‘“The Passion of the Jews of Prague”: the pogrom of 1389 and the lessons of a medieval parody’, *Church History*, 81:1, 2012, 1–26.
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- 37 Rubin, *Gentile Tales*, pp. 57–65.
- 38 On the institution of the feast, see M. Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- 39 L. Corens, ‘Seasonable coexistence: temporality, charity, and confessional relations in Spa, ca. 1648–1750’ (forthcoming article).
- 40 N. Zemon Davis, ‘The rites of violence: religious riot in sixteenth-century France’, *Past and Present*, 59, 1973, 51–91 (p. 72). Davis stresses Corpus Christi as well as the role of sermons in stirring up violence, often tied to particular liturgical occasions. We might add that violence is rarely possible without the triggering of strong emotions, and that narrative when collectively ritualized is a particularly strong emotional trigger.

- 41 J. Donne, *John Donne*, ed. Janel Mueller, 21st Century Oxford Authors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 149–50.
- 42 See further M. Rubin, *Emotion and Devotion: The Meaning of Mary in Medieval Religious Cultures*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009.
- 43 On this debate more widely, see C.P.E. Nothaft, *Dating the Passion: The Life of Jesus and the Emergence of Scientific Chronology (200–1600)*, Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- 44 See Champion, *The Fullness of Time*, p. 158.
- 45 G. Denning, ‘Writing, rewriting the beach: an essay’, *Rethinking History*, 2:2, 1998, 143–72.
- 46 M.B. Merback, *The Thief, the Cross and the Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, London: Reaktion, 2001.
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3

LANDSCAPE, CLIMATE AND FEELING

Helen M. Hickey and Stephanie Trigg

William Caxton's *Mirroure of the World* is his own translation, printed in 1481, of the French prose *L'Image du monde* by Walter (or Gossuin), of Metz, a work based on an earlier Latin text. In its first section appears the image of a man wandering around a spherical world like a curious fly:

Yf so were and myght so happene that ther were nothing upon therthe, watre ne other thinge that letted & troubled the waye what somever parte that a man *wold*, he might goo round aboute therthe, were it man or beste, above and under, which parte that he *wolde*, lyke as a flye goth round aboute a round apple. In like wyse myght a man goo rounde aboute therthe as ferre as therthe dureth by nature, alle aboute, so that he shold come under us.¹ (our emphasis)

(If it could ever be the case that there was nothing on the earth, no water or anything else that hindered the way a man *wanted* to go in any direction, he could go around the earth, whether he were man or beast, over and under, to which ever part he *wanted*, just as a fly goes around a round apple. And in the same way a man could go all over the earth as far as it extends in nature, all around, so that he would come beneath us.)

This image offers a potent illustration of our inquiries in this chapter. Caxton's humble and domestic simile is certainly striking, but we draw attention to its fantasy of unimpeded travel and observation: a man following his desires to whatever part of the earth he wishes. The language of desire underpins Caxton's careful explanation of material phenomena and while this may be a 'mere' figure of speech – 'what somever parte that a man wold' – the desire to traverse and explore the world from a global perspective sits behind many of the texts we discuss in this chapter.

We will trace our three key concepts – climate, landscape and feeling – as they are manifest in different parts of Western Europe between the medieval and early modern period and across a number of discursive genres and styles. This is a vast topic, and we cannot offer a comprehensive account of all the relevant materials and sources here, nor the growing body of critical scholarship in this field.² Hence,

we have selected several topics and genres (literary, historical, geographical and scientific) to indicate some of the key changes in the semantics of feeling and emotion in responses to the natural environment from the medieval to the early modern period. Our method is grounded in the discursive analysis of some familiar and less familiar texts, aimed at locating and tracking some of the semantic changes in scientific, encyclopedic and historical writing about the environment. While we are interested in the content of those texts, we also assume that the rhetorical and semantic analysis of these discourses can reveal the ‘structure of feeling’ in Raymond Williams’s term, that underpins many of the dominant attitudes to the environment. Thus, we emphasize the relationship between affective impulses and scientific or descriptive writing.

The field of eco-criticism is understandably stimulated by presentist concerns about climate change and its impact on the natural and built environment and population health; one response to this phenomenon is the scholarly desire to ask questions about how people in a range of temporalities and spatialities understood and felt about their environs and to search for older models of conscious response to the environment. Our chapter is part of this project, as we focus on the affective nature of discursive responses to the natural world.

Medieval and early modern writers, whether religious, secular or scientific, were curious about the world, how it was made, and how its parts related to each other. At the same time, they drew consistently on classical cosmographic models.³ Influential medieval examples include Isidore of Seville’s *Etymologies* (c. 615–30s), Bartholomaeus Anglicus’s *De proprietatibus rerum* (c. 1240), Vincent of Beauvais’s *Speculum maius* (c. 1240–60), Johannes de Sacrobosco’s *Sphaera mundi* (c. 1220), and John le Palmer’s *Omne bonum* (c. 1360–75). The influence of these texts was felt across a range of genres, from the encyclopedic impulse to *describe* the human, animal, vegetal and mineral world; to the imaginative impulse to *make* the world anew through narrative and imagery, often in the form of travel narratives. Although medieval European encyclopedists were keen to classify and define weather elements according to a strict arrangement of an ordered universe guided by divine/Christian principles of creation, comprehensive theories about the world were dominated by the four elements outlined by classicists such as Empedocles and others: air, fire, earth, water. Their attendant properties (hot, dry, cold and wet) combined in different permutations to constitute the physical world, and were reflected in the four humours (choleric, melancholic, phlegmatic and sanguine) that governed bodily and emotional temperament and medical discourse, but which could also be applied to the world of weather and climate. This pattern of affinities meant that the natural world was often perceived in affective and personal terms.

In our first section, we discuss historical changes in the concepts of ‘climate’ and ‘landscape’ as ways of categorizing and describing human interactions with the world and its weather. In the second section, we consider the way pilgrims, travellers and explorers move through different terrains, whether real or imagined, discovering new and comparative perspectives. Our third and final section is a more selective study of an important element of the weather: the winds of the world. Winds are often described or mythologized in affective terms that reveal complex human attitudes to the weather and the natural world, while over the course of our period they are increasingly characterized as part of an economic

framework of expanding global trade routes. This third section is intended to exemplify our methodological approach: focusing attention on the language of affect that often underpins discourse about the environment that is ostensibly more ‘scientific’.

Climate and landscape

We begin with these two terms because they accrue different affective resonances over our historical period; and we suggest this kind of semantic analysis is a powerful way of framing and orienting our inquiries.

In classical and medieval geography, the word ‘climate’ (from ancient Greek κλίμα, meaning inclination or slope) referred to the mathematical division of the globe of the earth into bands or zones (similar to what would later be called ‘latitudes’). Most medieval systems counted seven such climates and associated them with the influences of the moon and the planets on patterns of human behaviour. These patterns constitute what we might call a model of affective cosmology.

Many writers drew links between the seven planets and seven climates, characterizing the national and natural temperaments of people as they were subject to these planetary influences. As we might expect, these apparently scientific categories are not neutral in value. For example, John Mandeville, discussed in greater detail below, says ‘there is great multitude of people in India’ but these people are slow-moving like the planet of Saturn that dominates the first climate: ‘And for because that Saturn is of so late stirring, therefore the folk of that country that be under his climate have *of kind* [through their own nature] no will for to move ne stir to seek strange places’.⁴ By contrast, the English are in the seventh climate, which is governed by the moon, which moves fastest: ‘and for that skill [reason] it giveth us will of kind for to move lightly and for to go divers ways, and to seek strange things and other diversities of the world; for the moon environeth the earth more hastily than any other planet’.⁵ The English are like Caxton’s fly, then, curiously travelling the earth at great speed: it is easy to see how this idea of the English temperament as lively, curious and mobile serves the ideologies of scientific inquiry and colonial discovery.

By the sixteenth century, different systems counted up to forty-eight such bands (twenty-four on either side of the equator), although these more precise geographical divisions put pressure on the traditional planetary equivalents and associations. And indeed, when it came to making links between human temperaments and environments, the emphasis began to shift away from planetary associations to more immediate influences in the natural environment: winds, temperature, quality of air and so forth. Thus, the word ‘climate’ came to be used in a more general sense to mean ‘region’, though it was not until the sixteenth century that the association with distinctive weather patterns became more stable and secure.

Mary Floyd-Wilson describes the early modern relationship between environments and people as ‘geohumoralism’:⁶

By the mid-sixteenth century it was an unquestioned commonplace that environmental factors – the temperature, water, soil, and terrain – necessarily conditioned the appearance, complexion, temperament, and potential of all people.⁷

This tradition derives from Aristotle, who argued, not without a little bias, that the Greeks offered the perfect mean between the geographical and temperamental extremes represented by those nations ‘inhabiting the cold places and those of Europe’, between Europeans (who were high in spirit but deficient in intelligence) and Asians (who were intelligent but lacking in spirit):

But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent; hence it continues to be free and to have very good political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity.⁸

Floyd-Wilson points out that this Aristotelian schema differs from the Hippocratic idea that environments produced similar subjects; where, for example, a cold and damp climate would produce phlegmatic subjects.⁹ In the Aristotelian scheme, resistance to external cold would produce an inner heat.¹⁰ As many commentators show, there was considerable disagreement about the precise relationship between body and environment. Floyd-Wilson and Sullivan explore a number of different and overlapping models of the relationship between self and environment at a theoretical level, but despite these variations, the idea of a strong relationship between ethnicity, temperament and geographical climate persisted into early modern scientific culture.¹¹ Climates do not always correspond exactly to national boundaries, and many writers make fine distinctions between micro-regions, but the ideological appeal of identifying a regional or national ‘temperament’ often proved irresistible.

Naturally, some climates were seen as more desirable than others, especially when associated with the love of one’s homeland. The earliest use of the English word ‘climate’ to refer to ‘the characteristic weather conditions of a country or region’ offered by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) is from Edward Hall, writing in 1548 about the treaty between Edward IV and Louis XI of France in 1475. According to Hall, Louis was particularly delighted that the English would soon leave France, ‘immaginyng ever that by their taryng, thei would so like the holesome & swete aire of his fruitful country, that a great nomber would be continually sicke & vexed till thei returned, & sought for their health in the same delicious climate again’.¹² The word ‘climate’ here refers to the characteristic environment of a region: Hall assumes that this might be the object of strong personal desire. This is not a nostalgic homesickness for the place of one’s birth but a king’s very partisan fear that an invading army might be so overcome by the ‘delicious’ climate of his own country that they might sicken with longing for France once they had returned home to England and threaten to invade once more.

Overall, then, through our semantic and contextual analysis we find a discernible shift in the sense of ‘climate’, from a purely technical use in the medieval period, albeit with planetary associations and implications for regional temperament, to a more affective and emotional sense of a lived and often beloved environment conditioned by prevailing local weather conditions. The specific terms used in such accounts, from Mandeville’s ostensibly balanced but ideologically laden contrast between fast and slow, to Hall’s loving ‘holesome & swete aire’ of France, indicate the powerful shaping force of rhetorical and affective language in geohumoral discourse.

Our second key term, ‘landscape’, has a different kind of mixed history. Tellingly, the word itself is not used in English before the late sixteenth century, and only entered common usage in English and cognate Germanic languages after Dutch painters began using the word *landscap* to describe the new vogue for portraying inland scenes, as opposed to ‘seascapes’. Many commentators have suggested that this artistic development assumed a new kind of relationship between the world and the perceiving subject, or the body from whose perspective the scene is apprehended and portrayed.¹³ Thus, in contrast to medieval depictions of the natural world found in religious, literary, medicinal and encyclopedic texts, or where naturalism is abjured completely in favour of non-representational forms such as the famous ‘chequered sky’ of gothic art, a new kind of relationship was developing between the world and the perceiving subject. This shift in orientation focused on the artist who selects the environment and portrays it as a subject in its own right.¹⁴ Without entering the debate about the relative sophistication of medieval and early modern forms of representation, we think it is worth recalling the relative novelty of this word as a reminder that this particular way of apprehending the world – with human subjects at the centre – has not always been universal.

The affective qualities of landscape writing are, of course, most clearly in evidence in poetic and literary texts, especially those which use the natural world as a means of making ethical, aesthetic and subjective meaning out of human encounters. Fourteenth-century English poetry, for example, offers a range of such encounters whereby narrators and characters move through various landscapes that are figured as highly meaningful imaginative spaces. We might compare the famous moments in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* where first, after battling the wildly natural world, Gawain first sees the beautiful castle of Hautdesert where every physical and social comfort awaits, and second, after being warned away from this dangerous place he first approaches the green ‘chapel’ in the wilderness, which will turn out to be the stage for a gruelling test of ethical and physical courage.

But ‘real’ travel – and we use the term ‘real’ advisedly – produced mixed feelings of dislocation, nostalgia, curiosity and delight, while similarly bringing the concept of ‘home’ into sharp relief. The sight of unfamiliar landscapes could be a sign of the journey’s end, as in the blessed vision of Jerusalem that rewarded the weary pilgrim, but as many medieval clerics argued, such visions could also become exotic spectacles that gratified curiosity, and nothing more.

Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century readers and writers revelled in comprehensive accounts of the world that made no pretence of being based on personal travels. As its name suggests, the genre of writing about place, or chorography (from the Greek *khōra* and *graphē*), emphasized an author’s powers of written description and their capacity to transmit physical experience in textual form, though many were openly based on earlier works. For example, Francis Belleforest’s 1575 *Cosmographie* was a translation of Sebastian Münster’s 1544 *Cosmographia* that was itself a translation of Ptolemy.¹⁵ Jean Bodin’s compilations, especially his 1566 work on climates in *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*, were essentially collations of medieval knowledge although they exerted enormous influence over environmental thought in both France and England. Geohumoralism raised knotty questions about free will and agency, and as a way around this, Bodin suggested that legal and political systems ought to be tailored to match the environmentally determined actions and affects of temperaments of those living in particular countries and ‘climates’.¹⁶

In his 1621 *Microcosmus*, Peter Heylyn drew on Bodin's ideas on climate when he wrote, 'Men thus one by originall, are of diuerse complexions of body, and conditions of mind, according to the diuerse climates of the Earth', but he did not elaborate on the political implications of this concept.¹⁷ By the 1650s, however, he had fleshed out his ideas on the history, geography and climate of the known and imagined world through wider-ranging cosmographical writing. Heylyn's four-volume *Cosmographie*, first published in 1652, is a typical and comprehensive example of this tradition that in England, at least, dates back to Camden's *Britannia*, as well as the European precedents just mentioned. Heylyn ranges widely, though in varying degrees of detail, over the main countries of Europe, spending most time on Italy and England, and then, in the manner of earlier 'travel' writing, over less familiar lands. He describes his *Cosmographie* as containing the 'chorographie and historie of the whole world and all the principall kingdomes, provinces, seas and isles thereof'.¹⁸

Heylyn's descriptive vocabulary is often very intense and dramatic, as in his account of the Alps and its various passes.

The rest, by reason of their deep and dreadfull praecipices, their tedious and steep ascents, narrow ways, dangerous craggie Rocks, fierce whirlwinds, and huge balls of snow tumbling with an incredible violence from the tops of the mountains, are hardly passable by horse, not at all by waggon.¹⁹

The landscape is seen in highly emotive terms, though with an eye to practical considerations as well. Heylyn makes no pretense of having visited all the lands he describes. The rhetorical emphasis lies on his descriptive powers, but they do not depend on first-hand experience. If Heylyn's narrative voice is able to travel around the globe like Caxton's fly, it is from the perspective of divine providence which holds the world in global balance and design. Thus, the 'incredible violence' of an Alpine avalanche is balanced against the temperate sweetness by the divine hand of providence, such that 'plenty bordereth upon want, and pain on pleasure'.²⁰ Again, human utility and human emotions, under God's providence, are the main filter through which Heylyn views the terrain.

Heylyn's geohumoralist perspective can lead to some very blunt assessments of the affinity or homology between landscape and temperament. He writes of the Swiss:

And as the Countrey is, such are the Inhabitants, of rude and rugged dispositions, more fit for Armes than any civil occupations, capable of toyl and labour, which the necessities of their Countrey doth inure them to, not able otherwise to afford them an hungry livelihood.²¹

As a small, landlocked country, Switzerland offers a national character, whereas the more varied terrain of Italy, its history as a conglomerate of city-states, and what Heylyn sees as its character-driven history offers a much greater variety of terrains and regional temperaments.

These concepts of national character being linked to terrain are not all systematically applied, of course; at times Heylyn pays only lip-service to this idea, as in his writing about the different provinces of Italy:

The nature of the soyl, and the principall Rivers which refresh it, we shall see anon in the description of the Provinces into which divided. According to which Provinces, and the chief Cities of them, the Character of the people may best be taken: it being said proverbially by the *Italians*, that the *Venetians* themselves are stately, crafty and greedy; the *Veronians* studious and faithfull; the *Paduans* fierce, the *Vincentians* eager on revenge, those of *Friuli* gratefull and inconstant; those of *Histria* neither long-livers, nor of very great courage. That in the conduct of a war, those of *Venice* bring silver, those of *Treviso* swords; that the *Brescians* are fit to dig in trenches, those of *Bergomo* to lay ambushes, those of *Padua* to manage horses. And of the women it is said, that those of *Crema* are deceitful, those of *Venice* insolent, those of *Vincentia* constant, those of *Verona* gracious, those of *Treviso* jealous, those of *Brescia* diligent, and the *Bergomasque* crafty.²²

We quote this section because it is relatively rare to see this kind of analysis directed to women. But then it seems Heylyn becomes almost uncomfortable with these fine discriminations, because he immediately returns to a more sustained discussion of the Venetian character:

But not to dally longer in these proverbial characters, certain it is that the *Venetians* themselves do affect a great deal of gravity in their actions, speak very little at the table; very severe where they have authority, and many times in the excess.²³

Heylyn here seems somewhat uncomfortable with these ‘proverbial characters’. Geohumoralism is perhaps already starting to seem unscientific, as it becomes uncomfortably proverbial and familiar, a process that is exacerbated here by its homely associations with women’s characters. So, while we have been tracing the interest in affective and emotional responses in these texts, this interest is often accompanied by a sense of discomfort with the . . . ‘unscientific’ nature of this discourse.

Travel, pilgrimage, exploration

We leave Heylyn’s cosmographic view of the world and his vatic unsettling of the typologies suggested by geohumoralism in early modernity to backtrack to two medieval accounts of moving through landscape and climate. Travel writing is another discursive mode that is often very open to emotional expression. We start with Petrarch’s famous example.

Petrarch’s letter to his confessor Dionigi da Borgo San Sepolcro, in which he describes his ascent of Mont Ventoux in France, has long been claimed as the first written travel narrative that describes climbing a mountain to see the view for its own sake. Petrarch’s account is worth revisiting to understand more acutely the conflicted feelings about ‘home’ that arose from his expedition. His wish to explore the heights of Mont Ventoux was driven not only by that mountain’s fame but also by sentiments of admiration and longing intensified by a sense of optical closeness to his exiled homeland. ‘Dirigo dehinc oculorum radios ad partes

Italicas, quo magis inclinatus animus' ('From here I cast my eyes towards Italy, to which my spirit is more attracted').²⁴

Although the dominant tendency in medieval literature's treatment of nature imagery was towards abstraction and moralization,²⁵ the perimeters of Petrarch's internal and external vision of Virgil's *Italia*, and his (Petrarch's) emotions, can be extended through Paul James's methodology of abstraction, i.e. through valences of time and space. On top of the mountain, Petrarch's thoughts rapidly turn back to a moralizing and self-reflective meditation on Augustine's *Confessions*, which, as James argues, allows for this intensification of feeling. 'When subjective responses are stretched between different ontological valences emotions are intensified'.²⁶ Petrarch focuses on the unification of the Italian peninsula and longing for the restoration of Rome as a key centre of learning, but by this time, Italy was 'little more than a bloodless abstraction, incapable of inspiring its citizens to set aside their factional differences'.²⁷ James's method encourages the distinction between historical periodization and competing models of ontological formation: in this case, between the 'traditional' and the 'modern': this is a useful way of understanding the changing tensions between scientific and affective writings.²⁸

Even aesthetically, emotions and feelings were not consistent across this period. Mountains, for example, were not straightforward objects of admiration. John of Salisbury (1120–80) left a vivid account of his perils in the Grand Saint-Bernard, the route between the Italian and Swiss Alps, describing cold so intense it froze his ink: 'Lord, do not allow my brothers to come into this place of torment'.²⁹ Many early modern writers also expressed a negative view of mountains, which possibly derived from Lucretius, or Virgil, who argued for the orderly operation of Nature. Joshua Poole's *English Parnassus; or, A Help to English Poesie*, written in 1657, for example, thought 'Earth's Dugs, Risings, Tumors, Blisters . . . Earth's Warts' were proper epithets for mountains.³⁰ In the poem 'Upon the Hill and Grove at Bilbrough' (pub. 1681), Andrew Marvell thought them disfigurements on the land's surface. 'Here learn, ye mountains more unjust, | Which to abrupter greatness thrust, | That do with your hook-shouldered height | The earth deform and heaven fright'. They were seen as 'excrescences, protuberences, monstrous swellings, aberrations risen out of the earth'.³¹

Petrarch's account, full of both nostalgia and amazement, has been critically received as a significant moment in the cultural history of aesthetic nature, but far from anticipating the spectacular Romantic sublime, the key to this moment is Petrarch's feeling about his place in the world of politics and his inner spiritual state. This combination of human, natural and spiritual affects and ideas considered from his high vantage point nevertheless offers a key point of tension between competing medieval and early modern ideas about landscape. To draw out the significance of Petrarch's complex vision, we may compare his contemporary, the English monk Ranulph Higden, whose encyclopedic method in his *Polychronicon* allowed little room for affective feeling. One of the most popular histories of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Higden's text charted the physical geography of the known world, especially Great Britain. Drawing on works by Isidore and Pliny, Higden matter-of-factly comments that Italy was the noblest province of all Europe, and its name derives from the legendary King Italus of Sicily or *Siculorum*.³² Unlike Petrarch, Higden had little interest or investment in *Italia* as a site of longing, and

he wrote in a similarly unmoved way about his home of England, simply naming locations and climates, in writing devoid of obvious affect. An even more pragmatic view is expressed in William Langland's fourteenth-century poem *Piers Plowman*: the narrator enjoys the wonders and sights of nature but the character Ymaginatif chides him for finding them appealing rather than for seeking the spiritual meaning and moral ideals inherent in creation.³³

In contrast to Petrarch's mountainous ascent as a traveller driven by personal curiosity, holy sites such as Jerusalem, Santiago di Compostela in Galicia (the tomb of St James the Apostle), Canterbury in Kent (location of the martyrdom of St Thomas Becket), or Vendôme (the *Sainte larme* relic in the Abbaye de la Trinité) attracted thousands of pious or curious pilgrims from disparate parts of Europe driven to make an arduous physical journey for the sake of their soul. Some of these pilgrims, such as Margery Kempe, Felix Fabri and William Wey, left intriguing accounts of their travel that disclose mixed feelings about leaving home, about their journeys across unfamiliar lands and the emotions of confronting strange sights that were nevertheless heavily mediated by familiar and sacred histories.

Margery Kempe (1373–1438) was a mystic visionary from Norfolk who travelled to Jerusalem, Santiago di Compostela, Rome and Norway. Although critical attention has concentrated on Margery's vociferous weeping and visceral displays of emotion on pilgrimage, we focus here on her emotional experiences of travel, such as her consistently intense fear of sea waves. 'Whan sche lokyd upon hem, sche was evyre feryd'.³⁴ The 'wynd' is not seen, but it 'may wel be felt'.³⁵ Seasonal wind patterns were crucial for the pilgrimage schedule as spring ushered in north-east winds for travels across the Mediterranean to Jerusalem.³⁶ Autumn and westerly breezes brought voyagers back home to northern Europe, and indeed Kempe sometimes implies that a decision to change her spiritual direction is contingent on the weather turning hot, dry, cold or rainy. During one of her visions Christ appears to Margery claiming sovereignty over thunder, lightning, rains and powerful fierce and destructive winds that tear up buildings and uproot vegetation.³⁷ Wind is a constant source of trepidation, not just on board ship but also in this vision, where it appears closely linked to the feeling that Christ's presence may be unseen yet is still a force to be reckoned with, a force that will 'turne the erthe of her hertys up-so-down'.³⁸

Felix Fabri (1441–1502), in *Evagatorium in terrae sanctae* (*The Book of the Wanderings*), on the other hand, displays the typical curiosity of the traveller. He gives detailed, vibrant accounts of the sailors on board and their seafaring skills: they know how to run about the ropes 'like cats', and foretell storms or calms, by reading 'signs in the colour of the sea'.³⁹ His responses to the journey are very personal. He recalls the clapping for joy at prayer time that he witnessed on board ship and the sheer gladness that moved 'the human mind to joy'. Winds, though, seem to be on everyone's mind: 'This fortunate wind and delightful run lasted all that day and the following night, during which we slept most peacefully, gliding swiftly and sweetly along'.⁴⁰

Winds and airs

Our focus on the winds is our final example of our eco-critical practice: following a semantic or thematic thread across this long premodern period, observing changes in rhetorical force, semantic association and affective meaning. Discourse about the

wind seems to ease the potential tension between objective and emotional writing, perhaps because the wind is most easily described through its physical effects. Thus, the descriptive vocabulary used to characterize the wind is often closely aligned with the language of feeling and human emotion: for example, words such as stormy, tempestuous, raging, wailing and breezy. In Isidore's *Etymologies*, wind (*ventus*) is so named because 'it is furious (*vehemens*) and violent (*violentus*), for its power is such that it not only uproots rocks and trees but even disturbs the sky and the earth and tosses the seas'.⁴¹ The Aristotelian position was that winds were 'earthly exhalations' that interacted with meteorological phenomena;⁴² while Isidore thought that winds might rise from the sea, were stored in caves or originated in clouds. As with many of the features discussed in this chapter, medieval and early modern accounts of the wind were framed by a theological or spiritual understanding of the cosmos that often relied on classical antecedents and scholarship.

Nicolas Coeffeteau, in his *Tableau des passions humaines, de leurs causes et de leurs effets* (1620), follows the humoral model and proposes that there are four winds, by analogy with the four passions. Thus the four principal passions 'trouble our soules' and stir up 'diuers tempests': pleasure, pain, hope and fear.⁴³ The fluctuating motion of passions and winds seems to pair naturally with the other.

The globe increasingly preoccupied European thinking as the desire and curiosity of explorers and patrons alike led to the discovery and exploration of new places. Francis Bacon, in his *Instauratio Magna et Novum Organum* (1620), pleaded with his contemporaries to discard old scientific ways of thinking, to break away from the classical bonds that directed scholarship in this field. 'Men have been kept back as by a kind of enchantment from progress in the sciences by reverence for antiquity'.⁴⁴ This feeling of excited anticipation, combining new forms of scholarship with the reports of travellers, is expressed in *The Naturall and Experimentall History of Winds* (1622), the first comprehensive study of the wind to appear since Aristotle's *Meteorologica*. Bacon's enterprise nevertheless modelled medieval scholastic pedagogy by posing thirty-three questions about what he considered to be occult elements, air and wind. 'Their Natures are reckoned amongst secret and hidden things. . . . [the] Nature and Power of the Aire is unknowne, to whom the Windes do serve and flatter, They are not primary Creatures . . . but after born, by the order of the Creation'.⁴⁵ Bacon articulated several 'magical' qualities about wind: like 'magic carpets', winds supported journeys and adventures to unknown parts of the earth, promising the discovery of new markets and, through increased trade, an increase in wealth. Furthermore, winds cleanse the earth, sweeping the bad vapours away. But the benefits of wind are coupled with harmful properties.

The Windes gave Wings to men; for by their Assistance men are carried up through the Aire and flye; not through the Aire indeed, but upon the Sea; and a wide door is laid open to commerce, and the World is made pervious. They are the bromes which sweep and make clean the earth, which is the seat and habitation of mankinde, and they cleanse both it and the air: But they make the Sea hurtfull, which otherwise is harmlesse, neither are they some other wayes also, free from doing hurt: They are without help of man able to stir up great and vehement motions.⁴⁶

Winds, according to Bacon, were 'either in-bred, or strangers'. 'For windes are as it were Merchants of vapors, which being by them gathered into Clouds, they carry out, and bring in againe into Countreys, from whence windes are againe returned as it were by exchange'.⁴⁷ Bacon offered this classification of winds: 'general; or precise, either peculiar or free. I call them generall which alwaies blow; precise, those which blow at certaine times: Attendants or Peculiar, those which blow most commonly: Free Windes, those which blow indifferently, or at any time'.⁴⁸ Gail Kern Paster goes further: 'for Renaissance philosophers, the winds were in effect the body's passions out of doors, the passions taking elemental form'.⁴⁹

But winds would not always be seen through the patterns of humours or temperaments. Isaac Vossius, in his highly original 1677 treatise on the origin of the tides and winds (*The Motion of the Seas and Winds*), rejected the theory of the four elements. He argued that air was merely dispersed or rarefied water, another vast, nonaqueous 'ocean', ancillary to the sea although arising from it and moving in hydraulic rhythm with it.⁵⁰ Most winds are modulated to a degree but trade winds are the exception due to their privileged status as 'stable' features of air.⁵¹ The scientific tone of Vossius's theory demonstrates a feeling for order that is nevertheless occasionally disrupted by intriguing, eccentric tidbits. He relies, as so many cosmographies and scientific works in this period do, on the chorographic tradition to introduce a case of people who live in such a fantastically hot climate that the 'spirits' by which they hear and see are 'consumed'. They are 'sprights or skeletons', who, like Owls, are blind by day and seeing by night.⁵² Even though Vossius continues to draw on medieval and classical currents, like Heylyn, he is pushing at the limits of geohumoral tradition.

Imaginative and dramatic literature played an important role in holding these tensions and allusions together. Such explanations carried important meaning for their readers, even if those meanings were contradictory. If Chaucer, for example, can write in the evocatively positive terms of the 'swete breeth' of Zephyrus in the opening of *The Canterbury Tales*,⁵³ a contemporary anonymous didactic poem, 'Of ye sacramentys seuene', tells of a heathen who attacks Christians, denigrating them as 'wod as ony wynd'.⁵⁴ Clearly, winds could conjure different, often competing senses according to context.

In this famous early sixteenth-century lyric, the wind was associated with the external forces of the world's weather, in contrast to the interior longings of sexual desire:

Westron winde, when will thou blow,
The smalle raine downe can raine?
Christ if my love were in my armes,
And I in my bed againe.⁵⁵

In his *Mirroure* Caxton similarly saw the wind and weather in relation to human emotions. The winds 'maketh to thondre and lightne and falleth down in so greete rage'.⁵⁶ They are so strong that they cause the clouds to cleave and break. In short, they are 'so heuy nature' that they throw their weight around. After rising high, they return 'cryeng and breyeng'.⁵⁷ Winds both externalize human emotions and apparently express them too.

One of the richest texts for our purposes is Peter Heywood's *The Play of the Weather* (1533), which until recently has been interpreted principally as a satire

on the political workings of the Tudor court.⁵⁸ The main characters are weather elements: Saturn, Eolus, Phebe and Phebus, who control the snow, wind, rain and sun respectively, all governed by Jupiter. A range of people from different social strata and occupations – wind and water millers, a launder, a gentleman, a lady, a merchant – seek to know if Fortune’s wheel is turning towards disaster. Heywood’s play suggests that weather is ultimately democratic, giving all occupations a time to flourish or suffer misfortune since each trade wants favourable if competing climate conditions for their specific needs. For example, the merchants need control of the wind for sea voyages, so they can return with foreign commodities; the launder requires hot weather so that clothes may dry. Weather is capricious, but all get a ‘turn’ that eventually gives them what they yearn for, albeit with an element of uncertainty. The play also picks up on the economics of trade and production and their reliance on the weather, factors that would increasingly come to preoccupy mercantile navigators to the New World. But the years before Heywood wrote his play were marked by extreme cold weather that destroyed harvests in England, the so-called Little Ice Age,⁵⁹ so the weather’s centrality to livelihood may well have seemed more urgent.

Shakespeare certainly learnt to exploit the dramatic, affective and atmospheric properties of the wind and the weather. For example, in *King Lear* (first performed in 1606), Lear rails that the elements cannot hurt him more than his daughters’ ingratitude. ‘Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! rage! blow! | You cataracts and hurricanoes, spout’ (3.2.1–2).⁶⁰ In this image of weather as breath forcefully puffed out of human cheeks, Shakespeare drew upon the cartographic tradition, in which personified winds were drawn on compass perimeters of *mappae mundi*, hand-drawn navigational sea charts (portolans) and geographical depictions of the world. Often depicted as little cherubic faces with lips pursed exhaling, the winds were named with Roman and Greek taxonomies and mythologies; for example, Zephyrus the West Wind. The winds, if let loose as Lear pleads for them to be, would mirror the storm of shame, hurt and anger he suffers from the convoluted dynamics he has unleashed in his own family.⁶¹ But he commands the winds to exceed their powers, to destroy themselves, and to wreak hellish devastation on the earth that might offer an atmospheric parallel to his emotional desolation.

Another dramatic use of the element of air by Shakespeare is the cosmos that the weird sisters inhabit in *Macbeth*. Their gatherings transpire in ‘thunder, lightning, or in rain’ (1.1.2) Their natural home is the ether world, where they command volatile spirits that are reified by the turbulent movements of the earth’s elements. The witches exit the scene conveying a sense of a topsy-turvy world view – ‘Fair is foul, and foul is fair | Hover through the fog and filthy air’ (1.1.12–13). Eerie or other-worldly weather disturbs the atmosphere. Towards the end of *Macbeth*, the wood on the move (Birnum Wood) scrambles the idea of a fixed landscape. Like King Lear in crisis, Macbeth invokes the wind. ‘Blow, wind! Come, wrack! | At least we’ll die with harness on our back’ (5.5.58–9).⁶² Shakespeare frequently stages disturbed meteorological phenomena to conjure a change in scene or emphasize personally felt emotional turmoil. The symbolic association between early modern theatre and land illustrates a parity between the world as a stage, and the world as a globe. For example, Shakespeare’s own theatre was named ‘The Globe’, with its motto *totus mundus agit histrionem* (All the world plays the actor).

We conclude our chapter with a brief example and a longer exemplum that both signal a significant shift in the way weather and wind were viewed toward the end of our period. Again, an attentive reading of the language choices and semantic associations in both examples offers an entry into a semiotics of affect that illustrates the proximity of elemental words to emotional expression.

The term ‘trade winds’ (from tread, or footprint, *OED*) was first used in George Sandes’s *A Relation of a Journey* (1615). Sandes described winds ‘blowing either vp or downe, [which] when contrary to the streame [*sc.* the current at Constantinople], doth exceedingly incense it’.⁶³ The familiar terminology of affect depicts these winds as furious, raging and incensing, but the term was quickly associated with the commercial connotations and the separate semantic field of economic ‘trade’. In 1699, William Dampier’s *Voyages and Descriptions* gave a general definition of these ‘remarkable’ winds: ‘Trade-Winds are such as do blow constantly from one Point or Quarter of the Compass, and the Region of the World most peculiar to them is from about 30 d. North, to 30 d. South of the Equator’.⁶⁴ But these stable winds also disrupt the narrative of wind’s unpredictability. Once mastered by navigators and sailors, these winds were exploited to facilitate global trade between Europe and the East, transforming economic relations among countries, an example of nations becoming subject to human control.

Our second text of transition represents an important watershed moment in early modern urban environmentalism. John Evelyn’s 1661 *Fumifugium* (a petition to Charles II) expresses strong feelings about London’s human-made spoilt ‘air’ that comes from soot and sulphur from manufacturing trades in London that rely on burnt ‘sea-coal’. Evelyn’s argument recruits his own sensory experience with scientific theories about good health; he emphasizes his feelings of disgust at the destructive atmospheric effects of these fumes. Passionately imploring the king for a policy that will diminish these repugnant smells and unhealthy emissions, Evelyn argues that all life – animal, vegetal and human – and the built environment suffers through this degraded atmosphere. The petition opens with an epigraph from Lucretius’s *De rerum natura*: ‘And how easily the strong heavy fumes of charcoal creep into the brain’,⁶⁵ part of a section that described how the sensual offerings ‘of nature’ could be poisonous or wholesome, or share a somatic link between odour and memory.

Evelyn structures his petition around Latin sentences from a long list of classical writers: Plato, Diogenes, Anaximenes, Lucan and others. The scientific discourse about the elements, and especially air, which Evelyn privileges, leads to the familiar early modern view that climate through ‘natural’ air influences the temperament and inclinations of a region’s inhabitants. Like many of his contemporaries, Evelyn believed that those in cold northern regions end up strong, fierce and stupid.⁶⁶

Evelyn regrets that travellers to London are at the mercy of a powerful malodorous effect in that they smell the stinking charcoaled city before they see it. He bemoans the breathing holes (spiracles) that channel and churn out cloudy, black soot that makes London appear like the face of Etna, or the suburbs of Hell, rather than a collection of rational people. But pure, clean air, that is ‘sweetly ventilated and put into motion with gentle gales and breezes’, benefits humoral health. Comparing the ‘evil’ olfactory climate of London and its surrounds to aromatic exotic locations, Evelyn offers an absorbing bouquet of perfumed airs: the gums and spices that earn

Arabia the title ‘Happy’; the waft of rosemary from the coasts of Spain; the fragrance of orange-blossoms in Genoa; and the rose scent of Fontenay, Vaugirard and Paris.⁶⁷

Evelyn would go on to publish *Sylva, or a discourse of forest-trees and the propagation of timber* (1664) for the Royal Society, which criticized the custom of deforestation. His chapters are organized around the specific genus of each tree, and the relative genetic properties that included advice about the genera most suited for burning.⁶⁸ Nature is increasingly seen as something that can be harnessed for human use.

The various discourses that we have considered in this chapter show there was neither a straightforward nor a universal trajectory of scientific and affective taxonomies across the medieval to the early modern period. We cannot cast this trajectory in terms of linear progress or degradation. But these texts demonstrate that medieval and early modern writers in a wide range of literary, dramatic, historical and scientific genres wanted to explain how the world and its elements fitted together and affected human life on the planet. To this end, their rhetorical strategies – analogy, metaphor, simile – demonstrate this longing at a time when people are feeling their way into a global space. In thinking about emotions in this period from a twenty-first-century perspective, we model similar approaches to those used by our premodern ancestors: a reliance on previous explanatory models, and a revision of the semantics of ‘feeling’ through etymological change. Our study shows that scientific and pseudo-scientific discourse changed and developed over this period but that this type of writing depended on the language of affect and personal experience. Just as Caxton’s fly circumnavigates the apple, medieval and early modern people trawled the cosmos for explanatory paradigms that might make emotional, affective and scientific sense.

Notes

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- 3 Roman and Greek cosmographical and geographical works by inquirers such as Empedocles (*On Nature*), Herodotus (*Histories*), Strabo (*Geographia*), Pomponius Mela (*De situ orbis*), Ptolemy (*Geographia*, and other works) and Lucretius (*De Rerum Natura*) exerted enormous influence on cosmography into early modernity. Stephen Greenblatt’s *Swerve: How the World became Modern*, New York: Norton, 2011, riled many medieval scholars with its claim that the rediscovery by the fifteenth-century Italian humanist Poggio Bracciolini of Lucretius’s *De Rerum Natura* launched scientific modernity (p. 11). See the responses in, for example, the special book review forum in *Exemplaria* in 2013; e.g. ‘I could not disagree more with Greenblatt’s history of science, his showcase for modernity’, in M. Shank’s review, ‘Swerving atoms, medieval vacua, colliding meanings’, *Exemplaria* 25:4, 2013, 315.
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- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 120.
- 6 M. Floyd-Wilson, *English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern Drama*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 2.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- 8 Aristotle, *Politics*, 7, ed. and trans. H. Rackham, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932, pp. 565–7.
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- 13 A touchstone of this literature is Kenneth Clark's *Landscape into Art*, London: John Murray, 1949. Clark's totalizing position on the history of landscape art has been challenged by critics for its unconcern for issues of imperialism and class (W.J.T. Mitchell, 'Gombrich and the rise of landscape', in A. Bermingham and J. Brewer (eds), *The Consumption of Culture 1600–1800: Image, Object, Text*, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 103. Walter Cahn claims that landscape historians thought that medieval art was uninterested in figurative landscape depiction, 'Medieval landscape and the encyclopedic tradition', *Yale French Studies* 80, 1991, 12.
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- 16 L.F. Dean, 'Bodin's *Methodus* in England before 1625', *Studies in Philology* 39, 1942, 162; M. Tooley, 'Jean Bodin and the mediaeval theory of climate', *Speculum* 28, 1953, 83.
- 17 P. Heylyn, *Microcosmus*, Oxford: John Lichfield and James Short, 1621, p. 6.
- 18 P. Heylyn, *Cosmographie in Foure Books*, 2nd edn, London: Printed for H Seile, 1657, title page.
- 19 Ibid., p. 152.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid., p. 163.
- 22 Ibid., p. 118.
- 23 Ibid.
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- 45 F. Bacon, *The Naturall and Experimentall History of Winds etc.*, trans. R.G. Gent, London, 1653, p. ii.
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PART 2

SPIRIT AND INTELLECT



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4

EMOTIONS AND THE SELF

Between Aquinas and Descartes

Clare Monagle

Although they are separated by 400 years or so, Aquinas and Descartes both register the necessity, if analysing emotions, of rendering them as objects, of placing them at an intellectual distance from the selves that house them. In this respect their approaches are surprisingly similar:

We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will.¹

The defectiveness of the sciences we inherit from the ancients is nowhere more apparent than in what they wrote about the Passions. For even though this is a topic about which knowledge has always been vigorously sought, and though it does not seem to be one of the most difficult – because everyone feels them in himself, one need not borrow any observation from elsewhere to discover their nature – nevertheless what the Ancients taught about them is so little, and for the most part so little believable, that I cannot hope to approach the truth unless I forsake the paths they followed. For this reason I shall be obliged to write here as though I was treating a topic which no one before me had ever described.²

For Aquinas, the passions must be treated ‘in themselves’, but also understood as being ‘subject to the command of reason and will’. Descartes recognizes the difficulty of objectifying emotions: since ‘everyone feels them in himself’ they present as natural and available. He stresses, then, that what is required is a denaturalizing project. Emotions ought to be considered anew, reconstructed from scratch, made to stand as objects of scrutiny. This begs the question, who, or what, is the ‘I’ capable of extracting itself from emotions in order to produce their objectification? Or, to put it another way, does talking about the history or theory of emotions necessitate, concomitantly, the articulation of a self who apprehends these emotions?

The history of emotions implies, also, history of subjectivity. Emotions are subject to the person, the person is subject to emotions. During the High Middle Ages and the early modern period emotions were understood to be ‘of’ the soul, and yet separate from it. For then, as for now, thinking about emotions was a way of thinking

about their containment in human beings, and how that human being was constituted. This chapter seeks to understand the elusive ‘of’ in the formulation, *passiones animae*. In Latin, the preposition is implied through the inflection of the genitive. It is, however, also the bridging concept between emotions and self or affect and subject during this period. The passions are ‘of’ the soul. What does this mean? Might thinking through the ‘of’ help us to see how doing the history of emotions necessitates, also, a theory of the subject?³

Much work has already been done in finding out what scholars have thought about the emotions in the past.⁴ The history of emotions relies heavily upon theological/philosophical accounts of the emotions as a means of constructing norms for a given period. This is because they taxonomize and they itemize, doing the sovereign work of naming that makes things into something. Emotions are so present, and yet so mysterious, that it is comforting to have them systematized. These theological/philosophical accounts offer a schema that seems to give us a control against which we can contextualize and assess the emotional lives of our historical subjects. When thinking about emotions, the logic goes, we should look to the people who spoke most explicitly about emotions as reified objects, people like Aquinas and Descartes.

I agree that those of us studying the emotions should look to elite intellectual culture as a source for our investigations into the past, especially where elite texts constitute the bulk of our extant canon. Not, however, because they are a portal into emotions writ large in a given period. Rather, I think we need to read their texts closely as offering intense meditations upon the relationship between body and soul (in the past) or body and psyche (in the present). As a historian, I do not think these texts can bear the burden of cultural normativity. Just as in our own twenty-first-century world we would never assume that the majority of people narrate their emotional lives through affect theory, it would be foolhardy to assume that the ‘average’ person in medieval Europe understood their embodied life through Aquinas’s description of the passions of the soul. We have to be careful of the claims that we make for the constitutive and representative work performed by elite and well-preserved canonical texts from the past.

This is not to say that they cannot be used historically, or to inform historicist readings. Intellectual history, in its contextualist mode, offers rigorous protocols for understanding a text in its context.⁵ Intellectual history maps the horizon of concepts, as well as the concomitant vocabularies, that were available at a given time, in order to understand how a given text follows or repudiates its context. And if the text innovates, if it pushes the range of intellectual possibilities into novelty, then the task of the intellectual historian is to make a historical argument as to the reasons for the shift. For example, in my own work on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* of 1156, I tried to understand how the move from exegetically-based theology to systematic theology that took place over the course of the twelfth century resulted in new doctrine. In particular, I considered how the arguments that took place around the orthodoxy of Lombard’s Christology were essential to refining his ideas, allowing for the subsequent endorsement of the work at Lateran IV in 1215. I framed the production of Lombard’s work contextually, I tracked its reception and I considered the *Sentences*’ endorsement as *the* textbook of the Latin West. In so doing, I tried to make larger points as to how this shift registered changing notions of authority which had political implications in the governance structures of the papacy.⁶

This method works well for a certain type of emotions history. It helps us to track changing ideas about emotions, the *passiones* in the parlance of the Middle Ages. We can see how these concepts gained traction over time, and were modified into something new. In the history of emotions, some excellent work has occurred that has done precisely that. The turn to emotions in history has enabled scholars to notice the centrality of the theorizing of emotions to the theology of the Christian subject that was produced over the Middle Ages, into the Reformation.⁷ Aquinas and Descartes tend to bookend this story. They both write about the *passiones animae*, but do so with very different vocabularies, and informed by a very different metaphysics. Descartes as both the last scholastic and first modern philosopher provides a link to the past, but also signals a fundamental shift in conceptions of the relationship between the soul and body within theological/philosophical discourse.

These contextual and genealogical readings tell us that there was a profound transformation in the way elite thinkers understood the role and significance of emotions. For Aquinas, the emotions were one of the mechanisms through which the will could incline towards God, or move away from him. The ultimate aim of Christian life was joy in the Trinity, enjoyment understood as the capacity to be with something as it is. Negative emotions, such as pride, had the potential to lead the human to dwell in the sinful world of instrumentalized objects, to revel in things rather than God. The theology of emotions was a refraction of scholastic Christian theology more broadly. Emotions were God-given, as man was made in God's image, and thus they must be respected and understood as a crucial part of this creation. Yet, as humans had free will, emotions were not always put to the use of devotional life. They were also a way into desires that led to sin, the *passiones* oriented down as well as up. In this emotional economy, the soul and the body overlapped.⁸ Descartes's *passiones* were likewise an integral part of the human subject, and, as for Aquinas, they were ultimately of the soul. Unlike Aquinas, Descartes understood the *passiones* physiologically, as functioning in a mechanized body. They were of the soul, but separated from it through biology. For Aquinas, emotions had an ontological orientation. For Descartes, the *passiones* were not in themselves ontological, they were not linked to the putative great chain of being of the medieval theologian.⁹ In this shift alone, we can see the utility of thinking through emotions in intellectual history. That the core terminology between these two epochal thinkers remains the same, and yet some of the core ideas about embodiment have changed so profoundly, is a precise register of change within the frame of elite intellectual discourse. But can we use these texts for something different as well? As documents about feeling, can we read them as documents that tell us something about what it was like to feel in the past?

My tentative answer is, I hope so. In what follows I am going to suggest that we use insights from the history of emotions to read these texts in a different way, a way that considers the imaginary and the affect inhering within these texts, to vivify these texts as meditations that can speak to us about feeling. In so doing, I am going to assume a continuity between the two thinkers. They both think that the *passiones animae* matter, that emotions are real, and universal enough to be capable of bearing a consensus as to their names. And I am also going to assume that when they write about emotions, they are also telling us that they experience the emotions that are their topic, that they know of what they write. That is, I am going to make the move, paradoxically both obvious and radical, to assume that Aquinas and Descartes emote given that they write

about emotions. I am going to assume that the way they wrote about emotions can speak to us about how they experienced them. To the outsider, this might seem like a straightforward exercise. When people write about emotions, surely they are saying something about the experience of them. To write about anger or shame as real things is to write as a subject who has apprehended these feelings, and has an intuition that others have experienced the same feeling and is happy to give it the same name. My argument here is that prescriptive writing about emotions that aims to name and categorize, which might feel clinical and unemotional, still implicitly assumes a shared emotional register in which humans participate and which they collectively agree to demarcate in certain terms. Of course these agreements are modified by time and place. They are located in emotional communities, as Rosenwein has it.¹⁰

This is an obvious thing to do, inasmuch as doing the history of emotions necessarily assumes a recognizable human subject that permits us to talk across time and culture. Of course we are loath to define this subjectivity, and so risk the raft of simplifications and exclusions that universal concepts invariably entail. Since various ‘turns’ (linguistic, cultural, sociological, post-structural), historians have tended towards writing histories that emphasize the specific and the contingent.¹¹ They have also stressed that our experience of the past is always mediated through forms of textuality, whose rules must be encountered and accommodated in any analysis. The historical subject, apprehended through this epistemologically sceptical frame, remains shrouded. This is one of the biggest challenges facing the practice of the history of emotions: how do we historicize the feelings experienced by our mediated subjects? A great many attempts have been made to answer this problem, and this is not the place for their rendition. It is enough to say, that the intellectual problem of accessing the emotions of our subjects is both the greatest weakness and strength of the practice of the history of emotions. On the one hand, the concept of emotions serves as a heuristic in studying the distant past; it forces us to confront its profound otherness from our own times. On the other hand, thinking about emotions forces us, even if sceptically, to posit a universal subject (however contingent). We have to take a leap of faith that people feel, have always felt, and that their feelings feel something like ours. We may not be able to prove this, but it is the very condition of our inquiry.

With that all said, in this chapter I am going to err on the side of proximity, and try to sit with the feelings that pervade these texts. How do they suggest that things felt? What work do they do to convey feeling, whether its source be ontological or biological? Many scholars have told us what Aquinas and Descartes *said* about emotions, and how they understood emotions. Little has been done on how they convey the feelings of emotion, of what it means to be embodied in their time. My assumption that their feelings must be in the interstices between emotions and embodiment is unjustifiable, according to the protocols of intellectual history to which I usually adhere. The history of emotions, however, has backed me into this intellectual corner in which I feel I must at least attempt to emotionalize their reasoning, if I am to give credit to these people as feeling subjects.

Aquinas

Scholastic theology seems particularly emotion-less. In the period that offers lyrical explorations of love in poetry, in the vernacular and in Latin, theological prose tends

to precision.¹² Scholastic texts are forensic and dialectical. Aquinas's explanation as to the nature of a passion is highly argued in meticulous terms. Aquinas notes that for Aristotle 'feeling and understanding' are a kind of passion.¹³ This, however, cannot be enough in a Christian context, when the word *passio* refers not only to how humans feel, but to the suffering experienced by Christ on the cross. A *passio* can be understood as synonymous with our word 'emotion', but at the same times it also denotes suffering of the most terrible and most exquisite kind. *Passio Christi*, the passion of the Christ, ensures that the term *passio* cannot be a neutral name for feeling. The *passiones* must mean, because Christ's *passiones* mean so much. Christ's suffering was the most glorious point of his degradation inasmuch as it was his fullest experience of what it was to be fallen, to be broken. In his suffering, impossibly, Christ became post-lapsarian. And it was from this theological place that reparations could be said to be made for 'our' sins. The *passiones*, then, when understood as bearing this spiritual freight, must always be understood to be the place where ontology meets physicality.

The human being is ontological, that is, the work of the soul. The soul is what makes a human person capable of participating in the mediating work of grace. Souls live in bodies, and the concept of the *passiones animae* proffers a bridge between a corruptible body and an immortal soul. Aquinas says 'passion is properly to be found when there is corporeal transmutation'.¹⁴ What does this mean? By corporeal transmutation he means movement between the *passio* and the *agens*. The person is the agent, who embodies the teleology of being, who is in a constant state of becoming. The *passio* is that which is within the agent, but also apprehensible as something that is experienced by them. We experience joy and sadness within ourselves, but to recognize and name them as such we must disaggregate them from the core ego that understands herself to be experiencing these feelings. *Passiones*, when matched to a good will, can orient our immortal souls closer to enjoyment of the God to which the Christian subject should incline. *Passiones*, when experienced by a person whose will is deformed, can urge a movement away from the thing the will ought to desire, to mindless pleasures of the flesh. The corporeal transmutation occurs when body and soul move in tandem towards or away from God. In each case there is movement between the body and the soul, and in each case the *passiones* are not a thing in itself, but something that works upon the agentic person.

Scholastic theology is famous for splicing the created world into categories upon category, usually with attendant neologisms. Aquinas's work on the *passiones* is no exception. It is tempting to read, in these scholastic writings, a form of psychic displacement. The messiness of emotions, their status as both inside and outside the self, are transformed by scholars like Aquinas into a stratified structure whose workings can be discerned and understood. The movement of the passions threatens the stability of the Christian subject – they disrupt. They remind the agent of the potential porousness of herself; the emotions can lead to beatific joy in spiritual union, but they can also lead to a self splintered by sin. This is all to say that scholastic theology constructs an agentic person, and the emotions must always be subordinate to that agentic person. The *passiones* are of the *animae*. The passions attach to the soul, they work within the soul, but they are not the soul itself, nor are they the person.

It seems to me that all emotions talk necessitates a split between self and emotions. When we name an emotion, we make it separate from the person (or communities)

within which they operate. My question in this chapter is how that space between self and emotion is articulated in a text about emotions. And for Aquinas, this space is that of the fragility of meaning in the created world. The agentic self is a person, with a body and a soul. The soul longs to return to God. The emotions work with body and soul and can bring about this longed-for union. According to Aquinas, the greatest of all emotions is love, and it is love alone that will enable restoration. Yet the emotions also facilitate sin, they engender angst and envy and fury. Aquinas's theory of emotions manifests the paradoxical situation of Christian theology, that of the combination of joyful salvific optimism and post-lapsarian pessimism. The emotions in Aquinas offer both occasions for joy, as well as pitfalls for sin.

I wrote earlier in this chapter that I was going to err on the side of proximity in my reading, that I was going to assume that the articulated feelings of my historical subjects corresponded to some degree to my own sense of those terms. In relation to Aquinas, this means that I want to register the ambivalence that he seems to hold towards these *passiones*. They are integral to the experience of humanity, and yet also a register of the psychological fragility within which each Christian subject must experience their pilgrimage. Reading this ambivalence within the pages of the *Summa Theologiae*, I experience it as a highly emotive document in many ways. Aquinas's systematic response would suggest a desire to tame these psychosomatic forces, to make them subordinate to the totalizing vision of his version of scholastic theology. They retain, however, their power to subvert reason. Even when treating them *reasonably*, he has to concede the power of these emotions to exceed. He tells us, quoting John the Damascene, that 'passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good and evil'.¹⁵ The *passiones animae* are the place where the irrational soul is taken somewhere by the life of the mind. The *passiones animae* are indeed in excess, they overflow beyond reason.

When commenting upon Aquinas's theory of the *passiones*, scholars stress the middle way of his approach. Aquinas does not reject the emotions as somatic signs of fallen man, which must necessarily be transcended. Nor does he privilege emotions as having experiential integrity in their own right. Nicholas Lombardo writes that 'he affirms the fundamental goodness of emotions even while maintaining that, in a fallen world, human affectivity is prone to distortions'.¹⁶ It is often argued that, in this, he achieves a rapprochement between the two positions. Reading proximately, however, I am tempted to see his theory as less of reconciliation, but as exposing a lacuna. This reader, in thinking about Aquinas's rendering of emotions, experiences her own feelings of intractability. Who is the I who experiences emotions, and are the emotions of me or extrinsic to me? This very minor close reading of Aquinas permits me access (perhaps imagined) to his horizons of feeling. I imagine that he is always desiring, always craving, but also always reasoning a suitable distrust.

Whether we admit it or not, reading the past requires an undertaking of historical empathy. The most important contribution made by the history of emotions, to my mind, is to force the scholar to confront and make explicit the gap between here and now, us and them. To think through emotions, I would argue, means that this gap cannot be elided quietly in the hope that the reader will not notice. My feeling for Aquinas might not be defensible by empirical standards, but my dwelling in the text enables a thorough appreciation of the intensity of the intellectual work he performed, in order to corral emotions into a system. Surely that tells us something in

itself? To register work as painstaking, deliberate and precise is as clear an indicator that the stakes were high as we can find. As Catherine Brown has it on the ‘here’ and the ‘then’,

One way to embrace coevalness with them would be to learn to read from them, in that in-between state where polarities (subject/object, self/other, now/then) are confused, where simultaneous, apparently conflicting truths can be equally in effect, where things really begin to live.¹⁷

The *passiones animae*, when we sit amongst them, can provide the vivification described by Brown. We can register, and perhaps feel, the possibility of a deeply feeling deeply different emotional horizon to our own. We can only get there, however, if we temporarily collapse the difference.

Descartes

Descartes asks whether it is appropriate to laugh at the banter of others. He writes:

And it is not unseemly to laugh upon hearing another’s bantering; it may even be that it would be peevish not to laugh at it. But when one is bantering oneself, it is more fitting to abstain from it, in order not to seem either to be surprised by the things one is saying or to wonder at one’s ingenuity in making them up.¹⁸

In this section of *The Passions of the Soul*, devoted to the explication of particular passions, Descartes discusses mockery as a species of ‘[j]oy mingled with hatred’.¹⁹ Descartes says that mockery occurs when one experiences delight at the misfortune of one who we think deserves the misfortune. He understands mockery, thus, as a performed emotion that betrays strong emotions. Banter, however, for Descartes does not have the same freight, as it ‘constructively manages vices’. He writes that ‘it is not a Passion but a quality of a cultivated man, which shows off the cheerfulness of his temper and the tranquillity of his soul’.²⁰ Mocking laughter is not cheerful, it contains rancour and betrays hatred. It reveals a soul in a state of perturbation. In telling us that the bantering laugh is not *deshonneste* (‘unseemly’), Descartes takes us into his world. It is the only time in the text he uses that word, the most explicit time that he reads emotions in terms of propriety.

What I notice, when reading this alongside Aquinas, is that Descartes cautions against a behaviour because of how it might ‘seem’. Banter ‘shows off’ something, it enables the protagonist to reveal something of their inner cultivation to the outside world. The external demeanour of the body ought to be regulated in order to convey the discernment of one’s soul to its audience. Descartes’s soul speaks to the world through the body. Aquinas’s soul aimed to incline itself towards to God, ever fearful of taking a warped path away from the divine. For Descartes, the emotions mediate the soul to the body. He describes, for example, how when we esteem or scorn ourselves ‘it even alters the countenance, the gestures, the walk, and in general all the actions of those who contrive a better or a worse opinion of themselves than the usual’.²¹ That is, for Descartes, the body reveals an excessive self-image, whether one

of an excess in loathing or pride. The body performs the inner state, and produces intimate and consumable knowledge of the individual person. In one last example, Descartes tells us that the envious ‘usually have leaden complexions – that is, pale, mingled with yellow and black, as though bruised’, and in saying so he follows medieval traditions.²² The *passiones animae* are written on the body, and communicate with the world.

Much has been said, obviously, about Cartesian dualism. It is the *sine qua non* of modern thought, the locus upon which philosophy superseded theology. Certainly Descartes’s treatise repudiates the Thomistic/Aristotelian vision of the human person that has body and soul working together towards a telos of being. Descartes’s body is subordinate to the soul, and can be tamed with assiduous effort. Descartes writes that ‘even those who have the weakest souls could acquire a quite absolute dominion over all their passions if one employed enough skill in training and guiding them’.²³ The passions are not, then, a crucial aspect of a person’s becoming and flourishing. Instead, they should be rendered extrinsic to the soul by a process of domination. When looked at in this way, Aquinas’s integration of the somatic and the spiritual has given way to the sovereignty of the soul. Reason has conquered passion, or at least it ought to attempt a process of colonization. That story, as commonplace as it is, is an important one in the history of elite intellectual discourse about emotions between the Middle Ages and early modern eras.

When reading proximately, or coevally, however, I am most interested in Descartes’s conviction about the way the body reveals the soul. Yes, the body is subordinate, but at the same time its emotions are powerful. They are the soul’s excess, the literal embodiment of its weakness. Descartes deploys words of control, such as training and regulating, to mandate a suitable approach to the *passiones*. He writes: ‘For there is no doubt that those in whom the will can naturally conquer the passions most easily and stop the accompanying movements of the body have the strongest souls’.²⁴ The passions, despite their being subordinate, actually have the power of revelation in this account. They are elevated by their capacity to tell the truth to the world. This is the tension that I experience in reading this text, the lacuna around which the text circles within my apprehensions. These passions must be subordinated to reveal the rigour of one’s soul. Only a rigorous soul will be able to regulate these passions. It is entirely unclear which factor has causal priority. Is a strong soul built upon a successful process of bodily domination? Or does it follow in the opposite direction, that emotional perturbances are unable to penetrate a strong soul, and so do not wreak visible havoc.

Descartes seems to be writing in a world that fears uncontrolled emotion as rupture or abjection. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty has argued that for Descartes, ‘find a healthy body type and you’ll find a reliable perceiver; analyse the perceptual system of a healthy perceiver and you have the ground base for the reliability of any perceptual system that stands in a lawlike relation to the model’.²⁵ That is, she suggests that for Descartes the composed ‘healthy body type’ provides the basis for an epistemic confidence in reliable perception. The world is understood best, with most accurate apprehension, by those whose emotions are not excessive. This implies the dangerous possibilities of the unhealthy body type. Untamed emotions are then matched by inaccurate apprehensions. Body and soul might be highly bifurcated concepts, but in this intellectual economy, the soul is mute without the

body's communicative work. Thus, the unhealthy body haunts the emotional spectrum proposed by Descartes, at least in the reading of this reader. Underneath the coherent Cartesian subject, capable of colonizing itself, lies the threat of an irrational eruption that cannot be mastered.

The history of emotions has taught us how to seek out, and to historicize, the emotions. We have learnt to think through emotional regimes, emotional communities and emotion words, to name but a few. We are always seeking ways to know the emotions of the past without denying historical subjects their specificity and their particularity. We want the universal emoting subject, while always acknowledging the limitations of our sources, and our profound alienation from the past. This is the fundamental tension of the field. It craves intimacy with the past, and the disinterment of historical actors. To give them their historical due, however, we must allow them to be other. To my mind, this is the field's core insight: it takes us to into history's own lacuna, the space that exists between the appetite for encounter and the recognition of absence.

Into this space, I have proffered readings of Aquinas and Descartes that err on the side of the desire for proximity. I have tried to go slow with their texts, not to tell us what they mean in the history of Western ideas, but to experience the tension they contain, the forms of impassability that inhere within each. Both texts, it seems to me, write about emotions in order to insist that they can be colonized by reason. They both perform acts of itemization, in order to turn feelings into an ordered system that can be related to something outside of themselves, God for Aquinas and the reasoned mind for Descartes. But they both must concede, however, that this mapping cannot elide the reality that emotions erupt, and seem to have their own volition. The subject may aim at self-mastery, to transform him or herself into a something governable through the will. The *passiones animae* persistently trouble this fantasy; they both tell stories that the conscious subject does not want told. Or, to paraphrase a famous line from *Top Gun*, the ego writes cheques that the body can't cash.

None of this is to say that Aquinas and Descartes are the same. In fact their difference is one of the most important 'facts' of narratives of Western thought. Both are considered the most perfect canonical thinker of their age, the person whose ideas can be used to characterize, in shorthand, the essence of an age, and as bearing a paradigm that would both change everything, and then be overturned in the next shift. Focusing, however, on this normative story of the genealogy of big thinkers means that we miss their commonality. Aquinas and Descartes may stand for very different things in our narratives of intellectual history. Reading them proximately, through emotions, enables us to encounter them as human beings in the thrall of the same problem. This problem is that of the impossibility of self-mastery when confronted by the excess always threatened by the *passiones animae*. The *passiones* are fundamental to each man's theory of the self, and yet at every turn their unknowable volatility destabilizes the ego. By ego, I mean both Aquinas's Christian subject, and Descartes's declared self in the *cogito*. They both argue for a self who can taxonomize the emotions into submission, while also conceding that they cannot be corralled into a mechanism.

In order to get here, I have tried to be critically attentive, rather than properly historicist. That is, in the words of Cary Howie, I have attempted 'to put on

hold – for a while, if not necessarily forever – the evaluative and policing functions that so frequently attend what comes to be called critical’.²⁶ I did this, and it is new for me, because working in the history of emotions has taught me that if I want to encounter the past, in the way that field seems to want to do, I have to attend to the texts, without trying to wrestle a narrative out of them. To do this, I cannot pretend I am not there.

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Notes

- 1 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IaIIae.24.1, ed. J. Mortensen and E. Alarcón, trans. L. Shapcote, vol. 15, Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012, p. 239.
- 2 R. Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, trans. S. Voss, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1989, p. 19.
- 3 On this point, I am particularly indebted to Leigh Boucher, who first made me think about the relationship between theories of the subject and the history of emotion.
- 4 Jan Plamper’s *The History of Emotions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, offers an excellent state-of-the-field summary, in which he details the myriad forms it has taken. Some of the key texts in the intellectual history of emotions in the Middle Ages and the early modern periods are, in a non-exhaustive list: S. James, *Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997; S. Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004; N. Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion*, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011; R. Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae Ia2ae 22–8*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; and M. Pickavé and L. Shapiro (eds), *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- 5 An excellent introduction to intellectual history, although over thirty years old, can be found in ‘What is intellectual history?’, *History Today* 35:10, 1985, 46–54. In this article, edited by Stefan Collini, a number of leading scholars of the time discuss core methodological issues.
- 6 C. Monagle, *Orthodoxy and Controversy in Twelfth-Century Religious Discourse: Peter Lombard’s Sentences and the Development of Theology*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2013.
- 7 Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, is particularly interested in how Aquinas’s theology of the passions articulates a notion of the soul’s journey towards God. S. Karant-Nunn’s *The Reformation of Feeling: Shaping the Religious Emotions in Early-Modern Germany*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, considers how the relationship between Protestant doctrines of the body and soul transformed feeling cultures in the period.
- 8 See P. King, ‘Aquinas on the passions’, in S. MacDonald and E. Stump (eds), *Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 101–32.
- 9 See D.J. Brown, *Descartes and the Passionate Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- 10 B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006. See also her article, ‘Worrying about emotions in history’, *American Historical Review* 107, 2002, 821–45.
- 11 See the introduction to Gabrielle M. Spiegel’s *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2005, pp. 1–33.

- 12 For a grounding in scholastic theology, see R. van Nieuwenhove, *An Introduction to Medieval Theology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- 13 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IaIIae.22.1., p. 226.
- 14 Ibid., IaIIae.22.1., p. 226.
- 15 Ibid., IaIIae.22.3., p. 229.
- 16 Lombardo, *Logic of Desire*, p. xii.
- 17 Catherine Brown, 'In the middle', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 30, 2000, 547–74 (p. 559).
- 18 Descartes, *Passions of the Soul*, p. 117–18.
- 19 Ibid., p. 117.
- 20 Ibid., p. 180.
- 21 Ibid., p. 103.
- 22 Ibid., p. 119.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 48–9.
- 24 Ibid., p. 46.
- 25 A. Oksenberg Rorty, 'Descartes on thinking with the body', in J. Cottingham (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 371–92 (p. 377).
- 26 C. Howie, 'Waiting for criticism', *Diacritics* 38, 2008, 43–58 (p. 43).

DREADFUL DEVOTION

*Paul Megna***Beyond compassion: affective piety and the history of emotions**

Like most historiographic terms, ‘affective piety’ is difficult to define due to the fact that its exact meaning has never been absolutely agreed upon by the scholars who use it. The fact that ‘affective piety’ lacks a totally stable definition does not prevent us from outlining what scholars generally mean by the term. For these purposes, Anne Clark Bartlett and Thomas H. Bestul offer a helpful definition of ‘affective piety’ as ‘a form of spirituality [ascendant in twelfth-century Europe] that differed from that of previous centuries by placing much greater emphasis on self-examination, the inner emotions, and the cultivation of an interior life’.¹ More specifically Bartlett and Bestul relate that ‘[t]his form of piety was typically anchored in devotion to Christ in his human form, with special attention to the events of the Passion’.² This definition is deeply indebted to R.W. Southern’s foundational thesis that the twelfth century saw a shift to an emotional mode of devotion to Christ’s suffering, quintessentially represented by the work of Anselm of Canterbury.³ Although still influential, Southern’s narrative hardly reflects a scholarly consensus. For one thing, many scholars focusing on earlier time periods have found examples of intense devotion to Christ’s suffering in texts composed well before the twelfth century.⁴ Other scholars, like Sarah McNamer, have rejected Anselm as the founding father of affective piety, arguing importantly that ‘women were instrumental to this shift in sensibility at the very beginning’.⁵ Nevertheless, most scholars continue to consider affective piety an emotional mode of devotion to Christ’s human form and particularly his Passion. On the one hand, doing so furnishes us with a helpful key-term to discuss something that we all agree is present in medieval Europe: a deeply emotional mode of Christian spirituality. On the other hand, the label can be deceptive. After all, taken at face value, affective piety can generally be taken to mean any mode of spirituality, Christian or otherwise, that involves emotion and/or emotional display. Of course, no one culture invented emotional devotion and, when traversing the archive, we certainly need not wait until twelfth-century Europe to find plenty of examples thereof. I would not go so far as to argue that we should entirely abandon the more culturally contingent understanding of affective piety for the less localized one. I would, however, argue that the common practice of defining ‘affective piety’ as a mode of devotion particularly obsessed with Christ’s suffering has yielded a rich and nuanced scholarly discussion of compassion’s role in a variety of premodern

Christian cultures and substantially less scholarly attention to the role played by other emotions in those same devotional communities.

Happily, this is now quickly changing. Take, for example, scholarship on the endlessly emotional late-medieval mystic Margery Kempe. Scholars have long been fascinated by the roots of Kempe's emphatic emotionality. In the fifth chapter of her groundbreaking study of *The Book of Margery Kempe*, Clarissa W. Atkinson has much to say about the compassionate devotion displayed therein, connecting it to a genealogy of affective piety generally indebted to Southern's, though paying specific attention to its popularization by the Franciscans.⁶ Atkinson argues that Kempe belonged to a culture of performative compassion, noting links between the loud performances of compassion portrayed in Kempe's *Book* and the Carthusian monk Nicholas Love's adamantly compassion-soliciting *Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ*.⁷ Many other critics have analysed Kempe's compassion. For example, Kathy Levezzo compellingly explores the homoerotics of Kempe's compassionate relation to the Virgin Mary.⁸ Other scholars have paid attention to different emotions evinced in Kempe's *Book*. Andrew Cole, for example, argues that Kempe revels in the shame heaped on her by those who misdiagnose her as a Lollard insofar as she conceptualizes her endurance of it as an act of *imitatio Christi*.⁹ Jessica Rosenfeld, moreover, examines envy in Kempe's *Book*, arguing that Kempe 'shows envy to be an essential component of the practice of critical *imitatio*, positing new possibilities for exemplarity and community formation'.¹⁰ Finally, both Nicholas Watson and Barbara H. Rosenwein provocatively explore Kempe's *Book*'s portrayals of despair in relation to later Protestant understandings of despair.¹¹ These non-compassion-centred studies by no means negate or undermine scholarly interest in compassion's role in *The Book of Margery Kempe*, but they represent a renewed interest in emotional modes of premodern piety that presupposes (quite correctly) that compassion is one very important emotion among many others integral to premodern Christian piety.

We might credit the rise of history of emotions scholarship over the last two decades or so with stoking the flames of our collective decision to widen the semantic range of 'affective piety' to include emotions beyond compassion. Although too many good surveys of the history of history of emotions scholarship exist to summarize it here, I will note that affective piety has been an important subject of discussion by historians of emotion. Most notably, McNamer's vital *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* employs key concepts from history of emotions scholarship (e.g. 'emotives', 'emotional communities', 'emotion scripts') in her monumental rereading of medieval compassion as gendered female.¹² In what follows, I will explore how two relatively recent developments in the historiography of emotions can help us as we continue to widen the study of affective piety. The first is Monique Scheer's application of Bourdieuan practice theory to the study of the history of emotions, which encourages us to think of emotions as practices embedded in history.¹³ Among many advantages, Scheer's approach is attentive to the embodied and radically contextual nature of emotional experience – emotional practices, for Scheer, are historical events in which bodies and ideologies mutually inform each other. The second development in history of emotions scholarship I'd like to mention is the generational approach developed in Rosenwein's recent work. Rosenwein is best known for her field-changing work on 'emotional communities',

which has tended to engender relatively synchronic studies of the emotional mores of a community at a certain moment in history.¹⁴ Her recent work, however, grapples with the diachronic processes through which emotional communities reproduce themselves over time, always mutating to adapt to ever-changing contingencies.¹⁵ Without abandoning her earlier scholarship's commitment to synchronic 'micro-history', Rosenwein's newer scholarship provides a helpful framework for studying emotions in the *longue durée*. For example, she situates her aforementioned discussion of *The Book of Margery Kempe* adjacent to an analysis of a near-contemporary, but emotionally different source: the Paston letters.¹⁶ In subsequent sections dealing with dread and despair in post-Reformation religiosity, moreover, Rosenwein recalls Kempe, drawing compelling analogies between Kempe's tendency to revel in tears of shame and that of the mid-sixteenth-century Puritan, Henry Walker.¹⁷ In making both synchronic and diachronic comparisons, Rosenwein's approach can take into account both the myriad overlapping 'emotional communities' that inhabit any given historical moment and the ways that certain emotional practices (such as transforming shame to pride by casting it as *imitatio Christi*) can be productively employed in radically different, non-contemporary emotional communities.

Although they are quite different, Scheer's approach (which closely engages with Rosenwein's earlier work) and Rosenwein's later work can be fruitfully combined. Emotional practices, after all, are always anchored in a socio-historical context, but the ascetic techniques necessary to perform such practices are passed down diachronically through a variety of cultural channels. Moreover, it is possible to productively compare historically disparate texts prescribing or portraying emotional practices without positing a direct (or even indirect) influence of the earlier text on the later one. After all, Henry Walker probably did not read *The Book of Margery Kempe*, but he nevertheless left behind a textual footprint describing emotional practices quite analogous to those recorded in Margery's *Book*. In what follows, I will explore how taking a methodological approach informed by the work of Scheer and Rosenwein, as well as McNamer and other scholars of affective piety, might help us study the long history of Christians prescribing and describing emotional practices designed to conjure, channel, and manage dread.

Repurposing practices

Unlike compassionate Christian devotion, which is rooted in practices of meditating on Christ's Passion and the Christlike suffering of subsequent saints, Christian modes of dreadful devotion are less Christ-centred. While Christ is certainly capable of inspiring dread (as, for example, when he chases the moneylenders from the temple with a whip of cords), he more often urges his followers *not* to fear. In his most definitive statement on fear, Christ mandates fear of God while prohibiting fear of worldly power: 'And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell' (Matthew 10:28; cf. Luke 12:4–5). Here, Christ echoes a large subsection of Jewish scripture that mandates fear of the Lord: 'But the Lord of hosts . . . let him be your fear, let him be your dread' (Isaiah 8:14); 'fear your God' (Leviticus 25:17); 'we may serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear' (Hebrews 12:28); 'fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom' (Proverbs 9:10; Psalms 111:10), 'fear of the Lord

is clean, enduring forever' (Psalms 119:9). Taken together, these passages attest to a long, pre-Christian tradition of performing emotional practices centred on the fear of God. Indeed, lines such as Psalms 119:120 – 'My flesh trembles for fear of you, and I am afraid of your judgements' – beg to be read, following McNamer, as emotion scripts designed to facilitate performances of trembling fear. Such practices, of course, pepper the long history of Judeo-Christianity, having impacted the minds and bodies of countless religious ascetics bent on performing fear of the Lord for devotional ends.

Much of the scholarship on affective piety is devoted to determining when, where and by whose efforts it originated. Happily, we are not working in the shadow of any grand narratives about the rise of dreadful devotion and can therefore sidestep contentious arguments about origins from the beginning by agreeing that there is probably no discernible origin of dread-based emotional practices in religious contexts, and certainly none to be found between 1100 and 1700 CE. In fact, many if not all of the archival areas that scholars of affective piety have so fruitfully studied have much to say on dreadful devotion. Of course, many of the characters central to the prevailing narrative on affective piety engaged in and promoted dreadful devotion in addition to compassionate devotion. In the prologue to his *Prayers and Meditations* (c. 1100), which Bestul calls 'one of the earliest and most widely diffused statements of the emotive purpose of devotional literature',¹⁸ Anselm expressly states that the 'purpose of the prayers and meditations that follow is to stir up the mind of the reader to the love or fear of God, or to self-examination.'¹⁹ Among Anselm's surviving meditations is the *Meditation for Stirring up Fear*, an emotion script designed, as its title suggests, to produce (or at least magnify) fear in a reader who is not afraid enough.²⁰ The earlier part of Anselm's meditation oscillates between a penitential voice expressing itself in the first person ('I am afraid of my life. For when I examine myself carefully, it seems to me that my whole life is either sinful or sterile'),²¹ and an accusatory voice that rails on its sinful audience in second-person assaults ('So sinner, now not almost the whole, but certainly the whole of your life is either sinful and damnable, or unfruitful and contemptible').²² The result is an emotion script that asks its performer to alternate between the role of a self-lacerating sinner and that of a condemnatory judge in an effort to instil fear of the Last Judgement and its eternal consequences.

The *Meditation for Stirring up Fear* crescendos in the following chilling, first-person view of the Last Judgment:

O what anguish! Here are sins accusing me – there is the terror of judgment. Below the horrible chaos of hell lies open – above is the wrath of the judge. Inside is the burning of conscience – outside is the burning of the world. Scarcely shall the just be saved, and thus overtaken, where can a sinner turn? I am bound fast, where shall I turn? How can I show myself? It will be impossible to hide, it will be intolerable to appear. I will curse being seen, and I will be exposed everywhere.²³

By asking us to articulate the thoughts and feelings of one in the horrifying position of being stuck between the rock of hell and the hard place of an angry judge, burning with shame as the world burns, Anselm encourages, somewhat surprisingly,

not despair but hope. The crucial difference between the actual circumstances of Anselm's audience and those imagined in the meditation is that in the former the chance for redemption remains, whereas in the latter it does not. Hence, the final lines of the *Meditation for Stirring up Fear* shift radically in emotional tenor, expressing the sort of hopeful relief that comes upon waking from a nightmare: 'But it is he himself, he himself is Jesus. The same is my judge, between whose hands I tremble. Take heart sinner and do not despair. Hope in him whom you fear, flee to him from whom you have fled.'²⁴

We are fortunate to have a record of contemporary audience response to Anselm's *Meditation for Stirring up Fear* in the form of a gushing letter to Anselm from Abbot Durandus of Casa Dei. Having read the *Meditation* and Anselm's other prayers and meditations, Durandus conveys not only his conviction that they record Anselm's authentic emotional experience, 'written out of the goodness of [Anselm's] contrite heart', but also his shock at how easily they elicit analogous emotional experiences from those who read them:

When we read these words, your pious tears were before us, drawing the same from us, so that we marvelled in every way, both that such a dew of blessing should overflow from your heart, and that from thence without a murmur such a stream should descend into our hearts. For this is in fact what happened.²⁵

Very few texts come to us adorned with such ardent testimonials of their efficacy as emotion scripts. Durandus assumes that the *Meditation for Stirring up Fear* was born from the matrix of Anselm's contrite experience and attributes to this authenticity its efficacy as an emotion script. To be sure, Anselm did not originate dreadful devotion, but his meditations certainly influenced the emotional practices of his contemporaries and continued to influence those of medieval Christians long after his death.

Not only were Anselm's prayers and meditations translated and adapted in various vernaculars, but they were frequently quoted by later authors in a wide variety of contexts.²⁶ A snippet from the *Meditation for Stirring up Fear* analogous to that quoted above appears, for example, in Geoffrey Chaucer's Parson's Tale:

[A]s seith Seint Anselm, 'Ful greet angwyssh shul the synful folk have at that tyme; ther shal the stierne and wrothe juge sitte above, and under hym the horrible pit of helle open to destroyen hym that moot biknowen his synnes, whiche synnes openly been shewed biforn God and biforn every creature; and in the left syde mo develes than herte may bithynke, for to harye and drawe the synful soules to the peyne of helle; and withinne the hertes of folk shall be bitynge conscience, and withouteforth shal be the world al brennyng. Whider shal thanne the wrecched synful man flee to hiden hym? Certes, he may nat hyden hym; he moste come forth and shewen hym'.²⁷

The Parson's long prose 'Tale' is a Middle English treatise on penitence which is either Chaucer's translation and amalgamation of two Latin works – Raymond of Peñafort's *Summa casuum poenitentiae* and William Perault's *Summa vitiorum* – or his

translation of a now-lost, maybe-French intermediary amalgamation of Peñafort's and Perault's *summae*.²⁸ While Chaucer's Retraction refers to the Parson's Tale as 'this litel tretys',²⁹ the Parson and Harry Bailey call it a 'meditacioun' in the Parson's Prologue, suggesting a rhetorical function not unlike Anselm's.³⁰ It is ultimately unclear whether Chaucer himself chose to stitch the Anselm quote into his text or whether he translated it from the intermediary text, though Bestul argues convincingly for Chaucer's knowingly having done so for the sake of engaging the emotional mode of devotion popular in contemporary vernacular theology.³¹ However it got there, the quote occurs early in the Parson's Tale in the midst of his preliminary discussion of the six causes of contrition, the third of which is 'drede of the day of doom and of the horrible peynes of helle'.³² Chaucer's citation of Anselm constitutes an interesting moment in which the Parson's descriptive account of contrition's causes momentarily becomes an emotion script designed to elicit actual contrition.

Although the Parson borrows Anselm's most dread-inducing rhetoric without reproducing his despair-quelling, hope-inducing conclusion, he expends a great deal of breath detailing the remedial virtues that can counter the Seven Deadly Sins that he describes even more loquaciously. Moreover, the Parson likewise ends on a hopeful note by describing the boundless joy of heaven,³³ directly before Chaucer himself – whether Chaucer-the-pilgrim, Chaucer-the-poet, or some combination of both is unclear – launches into his famous Retraction of his less devotional and/or philosophical works which concludes as follows:

[T]hat thanke I oure lord Jhesu Crist and his blisful Mooder, and alle the seintes of hevene, bisekyng hem that they from hennes forth unto my lyves ende sende me grace to biwayle my giltes and to studie to the salvacioun of my soule, and graunte me grace of verray penitence, confessioun and satisfaccioun to doon in this present lyf, thurgh the benigne grace of hym that is kyng of kynges and preest over alle preestes, that boghte us with the precious blood of his herte, so that I may been oon of hem at the day of doom that shulle be saved.

By ending *The Canterbury Tales* with an allusion to 'the day of doom', Chaucer brings back to our minds his Parson's citation of Anselm. Given the fact that Chaucer fictionalizes himself among the Canterbury pilgrims, these last lines of the Retraction can be taken to imply that Chaucer-the-pilgrim, moved by the Parson's vivid injunction to imagine Judgement Day, renounces his non-devotional works. In other words, in the Retraction, Chaucer fictionalizes his own reaction to Anselm's *Meditation*, portraying and perhaps even performing the intended effect of Anselm's dreadful devotion. We cannot be sure that Chaucer's Retraction is completely genuine, or devoid of irony, and I am certainly not advocating that it is.³⁴ Where Anselm explicitly tells his audience that the purpose of his meditation is to make them experience dread, Chaucer's citation of Anselm is embedded in a complex web of fiction. In addition to his apparent attempt to solicit an emotional response from his audience through his allusion to Anselm, Chaucer fictionalizes Anselm's didactic project and thereby opens up interpretive vistas through which we can question the psychology and sociology of dreadful devotion.

Texts like Anselm's were clearly meant to function as emotion scripts, and texts like Chaucer's offer fictional (or quasi-fictional) accounts of how such emotion scripts may affect the historical subjects who performed them, though they too may have been intended and/or used as emotion scripts. On the other hand, many medieval Christian devotional texts conceptualize holy fear, not as the product of a willful performance, but instead as a gift of the Holy Spirit. According to an exegetical tradition stretching back to late antiquity, fear of the Lord is the first of seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit.³⁵ Patristic and scholastic exegetes derived the Gifts – which include wisdom, understanding, counsel, strength, knowledge, piety and fear of the Lord – from Isaiah 11:2–3, positing that its list of virtues enumerates the benefits that Christians receive from the Holy Ghost in baptism. In so doing, they often cite the Psalmic maxim 'fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom' to justify reversing the order of Isaiah's list to begin with fear of the Lord and end with wisdom.³⁶ This practice, in turn, feeds into the practice of including 'initial fear' (*timor initialis*) in elaborate taxonomies of holy and unholy fears. Emanating from a Patristic tradition of distinguishing between 'servile fear' of divine punishment and chaste or filial fear of sundering oneself from God in sin, the tradition of taxonomizing fear thrived in the High and late Middle Ages.³⁷ As with the Gifts, taxonomies of dread were generally developed in Latin and then gradually translated into a variety of vernacular languages. Margery Kempe's contemporary Julian of Norwich, for example, offers a four-part taxonomy of dread.³⁸ I've argued elsewhere that Julian strategically tinkers with older taxonomies of dread to craft a remarkably tolerant programme of dreadful devotion in which even despair can be advantageous to suffer through, and the only dreads that should be outright eschewed are those which doubt one's genuine mystical connection to God: a particularly savvy move for a mystic in an age in which revelatory writing is placed under ecclesiastical suspicion.³⁹ Ranging from two to six types of fear, these taxonomies almost invariably distinguish between servile fear of punishment and chaste fear of God, and often also contain sudden or natural fear (something like what we might call shock or startlement), fear of worldly punishment, a hopeless fear of damnation (i.e. despair), and an initial fear in which servile and chaste fear are intermingled. While they all reproduce older traditions, these taxonomies also respond to contemporary contingencies and are sometimes crafted to facilitate polemical ends. For example, the heresiarch John Wycliffe composed a Latin sermon containing a taxonomy of fears clearly designed to critique the institutional church's zeal for property ownership by condemning illegitimate fears whose object is the loss of worldly goods.⁴⁰

Reforming practices

Many scholars have seen Wycliffe's trenchant critique of the institutional church as a harbinger of the Protestant Reformation.⁴¹ Like Wycliffe, many early modern reformers adapted older discourses on dreadful devotion to their own ends. Consequently, with the confessionalization of Europe a number of differential discourses on dread emerged and developed as their respective champions debated against each other. Fear, to give a prominent example, plays an important role in Martin Luther's *Disputation on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgence*, more commonly known as the 95 Theses.⁴² There, Luther argues that the fear one experiences while dying, insofar as it

is close to the despair of those in hellfire, ‘in and of itself . . . matches the penalty of purgatory’.⁴³ Luther, of course, would not explicitly deny the existence of purgatory for another eleven years, but it is possible to read in his likening of the earthly fear of the dying to purgatorial pain a preamble to his later arguments that the scripture usually taken to justify the doctrine of purgatory refers not to the sufferings of the dead but to those of the dying.⁴⁴

Unlike Anselm’s *Meditation for Stirring up Fear*, Luther’s *Theses* are clearly not intended to stir servile fear in either the healthy or the dying. Indeed, Luther had little regard for servile fear’s devotional value. In a 1518 sermon on penance, for example, Luther holds that contrition stems not from fear of pain, but from love.⁴⁵ Among many others, this claim of Luther’s evoked the indignation of his former friend Iohann Eck. As Pietro Delcomo has illustrated, the distinction between servile and chaste fear, particularly the question of whether servile or chaste fear is the beginning of wisdom, was integral to Luther and Eck’s ensuing debate on contrition.⁴⁶ Following Augustine, Eck argued that servile fear is a necessary emotional pit stop on the journey to grace and love. Thus, for Eck, servile fear is the fear referred to in the maxim ‘fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom’: a supposition through which he justifies a pastoral tradition of preaching fire-and-brimstone to inspire fear.⁴⁷ Luther countered that chaste fear of God (which, according to Augustine and his medieval followers could and did co-exist with love of God) is the beginning of wisdom, while fear of pain was the beginning of non-wisdom (*insipientia*).⁴⁸ In differentiating servile and chaste fear, Luther and Eck participated in a very old theological discussion on the devotional value of the fear of punishment, with important implications for the emotional practices involved in Christian devotion. On the one hand, Luther’s insistence on servile fear’s insipience constitutes a radical departure from a medieval tradition that saw devotional utility in pastoral practices designed to inspire servile fear. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to cast Luther as an unequivocal critic of dreadful devotion. Indeed, Luther remains invested in a concept of chaste fear which the vast majority of Christians, from Augustine onward, privilege over servile fear. Indeed, midway through his *Theses* (the primary rhetorical purpose of which, of course, was to argue that papal indulgences lack the authority to remove the guilt of sin), Luther posits that among the dangers of papal pardons is their potential to lessen fear of God: ‘Christians are to be taught that the pope’s indulgences are useful, only if they do not put their trust in them, but very harmful if they lose their fear of God because of them’.⁴⁹ By situating the sort of servile fear Anselm is intent on stirring up as an inevitable worldly punishment for those dying in a state of sin, and expressing concern that the false assurance culled from papal indulgences has the potential to detract from holy fear of God, the *Theses* do not entirely eschew dreadful devotion, but begin a long process of building a new Lutheran mode of it.

Like Luther, John Calvin was deeply concerned with the role of fear – which Calvin tends to call anxiety (*anxietas*) – in Christian devotion. As William J. Bouwsma puts it: ‘Anxiety is a motif that beats through almost everything that Calvin wrote. Himself deeply anxious, he described anxiety, analyzed anxiety, and prescribed for its relief’.⁵⁰ Although Calvin is often remembered as imposing on his followers a particularly dread-tinged programme of devotion, he often critiques Catholicism for heaping too much anxiety on practitioners, particularly mandating annual confession, which Calvin views as an absurd injunction, since recounting the sins of a single day would

surpass the capacity of an earthbound human's imperfect memory.⁵¹ Calvin was not terribly enthusiastic about the devotional value of servile fear, though perhaps more so than Luther. After all, Calvin admits lukewarmly that servile fear can be useful and instructive to those who are destined to be saved but not yet assured of their salvation, though he holds that such servile fear is completely distinct from the 'pure and chaste fear' of God experienced by those assured of their salvation.⁵² For Bouwsma, Calvin's anxious temperament inspired not only his enthusiasm for a faith that drives off fear of punishment, but also his doctrine of predestination: 'Calvin's conception of an arbitrary and all-powerful God, constantly and directly active, according to a providential but mysterious plan, in the government of the universe, down to its minutest details, seems, then, to be an antidote to his fear that this fragile world is always on the verge of physical annihilation'.⁵³ Whether or not he is correct that Calvin's anxiety informed his Christian metaphysics, Bouwsma's bold argument reminds us that one person's unique emotional temperament can have dramatic and long-lasting effects on the emotional practices performed by countless followers.

Although Luther and Calvin did not produce elaborate taxonomies of fear (an all too scholastic practice), they continued to differentiate between spiritually productive and counterproductive fears, lionizing the former and pathologizing the latter. As reformers like Luther and Calvin developed their respective programs of dreadful devotion, Catholic humanists like Erasmus of Rotterdam and Thomas More also thought deeply about fear's role in Christian life. Indeed, Erasmus's 1503 work *De taedio Iesu* sparked an in-depth exegetical conversation on Christ's anguish in the Garden of Gethsemane in which Eck, Luther and Calvin all participated. In his 1535 work *De tristitia Christi*, More too made much of Christ's agony in the Garden, arguing throughout that 'the fear of death and torments carries no stigma of guilt, but rather is an affliction of the heart of the sort that Christ came to suffer, not to escape'.⁵⁴ Though it is unclear whether *De tristitia Christi* is More's final work, we know that it was written during his imprisonment in the Tower of London at a moment in which any hope of More's being allowed to live out the remainder of his life in prison was quickly dwindling. When More posits that Christ went out of his way to inform the Apostles of his suffering in the Garden in order to provide comfort for future martyrs who feel corresponding dread at the prospect of martyrdom,⁵⁵ he is clearly lending comfort to himself, his family and future martyrs by conceptualizing this prospective suffering as a mode of *imitatio Christi*. Unquestionably influenced by Erasmus's *De taedio Iesu*, his *De tristitia Christi* also, as Seymour Baker House argues, bears the influence of older texts including Pseudo-Bonaventure's *Meditations on the Life of Christ*, as well as Nicholas Love's fifteenth-century Middle English translation of it.⁵⁶

To be sure, dreadful devotion was radically altered in the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, scholars have noted myriad continuities between medieval and early modern discourses on dreadful devotion. Against Michael McDonald's argument that early modern Protestants differed from medieval Catholics in conceptualizing despair 'as a stage through which Puritans, Methodists, and others must pass during their early spiritual development',⁵⁷ Watson argues that Protestant discourses on despair are anticipated in an English mystical tradition rooted in the theology of the fourteenth-century Augustinian Friar William Flete and manifesting in a wealth of Middle English mystical texts including the writings of Julian of Norwich and Margery Kempe. Himself anticipating Rosenwein, Watson offers the following trans-periodic

comparison: ‘*The Book [of Margery Kempe]* is as full of horror at the possibility of damnation and as repetitive in its search for assurance as any Protestant autobiography’.⁵⁸ Indeed, the mystical tradition to which Kempe belongs extends into early modernity: just as Kempe and her fellow medieval mystics thought obsessively about the role of fear (of which despair was frequently conceptualized as a brand) in their mystical praxis, early modern mystics do so as well, drawing on a tradition of negative theology stretching back through premodernity. For example, as Terrance G. Walsh, SJ, argues in an article not unlike Bouwsma’s, Teresa of Ávila develops an understanding of fear in her *Interior Castle* that ‘constitutes a compelling defense of Christian mysticism by the way in which she links both her existential fears and writing anxiety [i.e. her anxiety that others will doubt the authenticity of her necessarily faulty written accounts of her mystical experience] to the death agony and Passion of Christ’.⁵⁹ Like her fellow early modern Catholic More (not to mention Margery Kempe), Ávila alleviates anxiety by rendering it, through discourse, a heroic mode of *imitatio Christi*.

In concluding his argument, Watson posits another point of continuity between Kempe’s proto-phenomenology of despair and that of an early modern Protestant: John Bunyan. Watson focuses his attention on two of Bunyan’s works – *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners* and *Pilgrim’s Progress* – both of which contain a desperate ‘vocabulary and sentiment’ not unlike those found in Kempe’s *Book*.⁶⁰ In concluding my own broad and patently non-exhaustive overview of dreadful devotion in Western European Christendom between 1100–1700, I want to nod all too briefly to another of Bunyan’s works: *A Treatise on the Fear of God*. On the one hand, Bunyan’s *Treatise* is quite reminiscent of Calvin’s theology of fear. For example, it insists that fear of damnation is ‘good and Godly’ only before ‘Christ by the Spirit in the word of the gospel is revealed to us, and we made to accept of him as so revealed and offered to us by a true and living faith’.⁶¹ Once the Holy Spirit has ‘come to the soul as a spirit of adoption’, Bunyan posits, it will never again engender fear of damnation.⁶² While Bunyan allows that fears of damnation may recur after such a conversion experience, he insists that they are not God-given. Thereafter, the Holy Spirit inspires only a ‘grace of fear . . . which *softeneth* and *mollifieth* the heart, and that makes it stand in AWE both of the mercies and judgements of God’.⁶³ This fear, for Bunyan, is only in those who have been visited by the ‘spirit of adoption’:

This fear flows from a new heart. This fear is not in men by nature; the fear of devils they may have, as also an ungodly fear of God; but this fear is not in any but where there dwelleth a new heart, another fruit and effect of this everlasting covenant, and of this distinguishing love of God.⁶⁴

Bunyan re-employs an old distinction between servile fear of punishment and chaste fear of God with the Calvinist twist of insisting that the type of fear inspired by the Holy Spirit changes dramatically upon the visitation of ‘the spirit of adoption’. Like medieval Catholics who considered ‘fear of the Lord’ among the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, Bunyan does not conceptualize ‘good and Godly fear’ as an emotional practice that one can simply perform without the aid of divinity. On the other hand, towards the end of his *Treatise* Bunyan offers his reader ‘a few things that, if God will, may provoke thee to fear the Lord’,⁶⁵ in the midst of which he lambastes his audience in a manner quite reminiscent of Anselm’s *Meditation for Stirring up Fear*:

Sinner! what wilt thou do when thou comest into this snare; that is, into the guilt and terror that thy sins will snaffle thee with, when they, like a cord, are fastened about thy soul? This snare will bring thee back again to the pit, which is hell, and then how wilt thou do to be rid of thy fear? The fear, pit, and the snare shall come upon thee, because thou fearest not God.⁶⁶

In Bunyan's remarkable formulation, 'good and Godly fear of God' (i.e. the fear that is both 'the beginning of wisdom' and a chastity 'enduring forever') counteracts the sinful behaviour that engenders both fear of damnation and damnation itself. While Anselm's *Meditatio* and Bunyan's rhetorical insertions late in his *Treatise* are the products of very different underlying theologies of fear, both situate themselves as emotion scripts designed to inspire fearful emotional practices that will facilitate salvation and eschew damnation. Both, therefore, constitute works of dreadful devotion.

Conclusion: dreadful devotion beyond European Christianity

Recent advances in history of emotions scholarship have furnished us with a robust methodological lexicon for describing the countless, inextricably intertwined continuities and differences that characterize even the smallest temporal and spatial swathes of the history of emotions. By combing Rosenwein's intergenerational method (which itself develops her earlier work on emotional communities) with the stellar work done by Scheer on emotional practices and McNamer on 'emotion scripts', we can avoid choosing between studying the *longue durée* and limiting ourselves to micro-historical methodologies. Of course, any historiographic project has its own limits and involves myriad choices of what to consider and what to leave out. Nevertheless, the ever-burgeoning field of the history of emotions is providing a multitude of studies that challenge received boundaries of periodization and regionalization in a variety of ways. Studying dreadful devotion across the medieval-early modern boundary shows how emotion scripts designed to facilitate dreadful emotional practices were always both influenced by longstanding ascetic traditions and shaped by very particular social contingencies. I myself anxiously await even broader studies which explore, for example, the many lines of influence between Christian cultures of dreadful devotion and those espoused by members of other faiths.

Notes

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- 2 Ibid.
- 3 R.W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953, pp. 219–58.
- 4 A.J. Frantzen, 'Spirituality and devotion in the Anglo-Saxon penitentials', *Essays in Medieval Studies* 22:112, 2005, 117–28.
- 5 S. McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010, p. 59.

- 6 C.W. Atkinson, *Mystic and Pilgrim: The Book and World of Margery Kempe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 129–56.
- 7 Ibid., pp. 154–56.
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- 11 B.H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling: A History of Emotions, 600–1700*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 193–210; N. Watson, ‘Despair’, in B. Cummings and J. Simpson (eds), *Cultural Reformations: Medieval and Renaissance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 342–60.
- 12 McNamer, *Affective Meditation*.
- 13 M. Scheer, ‘Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them have a history)?: A Bourdieuan approach to understanding emotion’, *History and Theory* 51, 2012, 193–220.
- 14 B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.
- 15 Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*.
- 16 Ibid., pp. 210–26.
- 17 Ibid., p. 273.
- 18 T.H. Bestul, ‘Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale and the late-medieval tradition of religious meditation’, *Speculum* 64:3, 1989, 600–19 (p. 615).
- 19 Anselm of Canterbury, *The Prayers and Meditations of St Anselm, with the Proslogion*, trans. Sister B. Ward, SLG, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1973, p. 89.
- 20 Ibid., pp. 221–4.
- 21 Ibid., p. 221.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid., p. 223. In the first word presented here, I have altered Ward’s ‘Alas for me’ to ‘O anguish!’, which more literally represents Anselm’s ‘O angustiae!’ Anselm of Canterbury, ‘Oratio ad concitandum timorem’, in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, vol. 3, ed. F.S. Schmitt, Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946, p. 78, l. 72.
- 24 Anselm, *Prayers and Meditations*, p. 224.
- 25 Ibid., p. 220.
- 26 For an account of the various Middle English translations of Anselm’s *Meditation for Stirring up Fear*, see E. Hauwaerts, ‘Middle English versions of Saint Anselm of Canterbury’s *Prayers and Meditations*’, in G.E.M. Gasper and I. Logan (eds), *Saint Anselm of Canterbury and His Legacy*, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2012, pp. 258–69.
- 27 G. Chaucer, *The Riverside Chaucer*, ed. L.D. Benson, 3rd edn, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1987, p. 291.
- 28 On Chaucer’s sources for the Parson’s Tale, see R. Neuhauser, ‘The Parson’s Tale’, in Robert M. Correale (ed.), *Sources and Analogues of the Canterbury Tales*, vol. 1, Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2002, pp. 529–615.
- 29 Chaucer, *Riverside Chaucer*, p. 328.
- 30 Ibid., pp. 287–88.
- 31 Bestul, ‘Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale’, p. 606.
- 32 Chaucer, *Riverside Chaucer*, p. 290.
- 33 Ibid., p. 327.
- 34 As M.L. Cook puts it, ‘the tradition of skepticism concerning the *Retraction* and its origins is nearly as old as the field of Chaucer studies itself’ (‘“Here taketh the makere of this book his leve”: the *Retraction* and Chaucer’s works in Tudor England’, *Studies in Philology* 113:2, 2016, 32–54 (p. 33)). Indeed, Cook’s article shows how early print editions of Chaucer’s works frequently elide the *Retraction* and instead situate *Adam Scryveyn* as Chaucer’s final

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 - 39 P. Megna, 'Better living through dread: medieval ascetics, modern philosophers, and the long history of existential anxiety', *PMLA* 130:5, 2015, 1285–1301 (p. 1290–1). On the growing distrust of revelatory writing in Julian's England, see K. Kerby-Fulton, *Books under Suspicion: Censorship and Tolerance of Revelatory Writing in Late Medieval England*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006, pp. 315–23.
 - 40 J. Wycliffe, *Iohannis Wyclif Sermones*, vol. 3, ed. I. Loserth, Ludgate Hill, UK: Wyclif Society, 1888, pp. 284–97.
 - 41 See for example Anne Hudson's magisterial *The Premature Reformation: Wycliffite Texts and Lollard History*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
 - 42 My discussion of Luther and Calvin is deeply indebted to Kirk Essary, who generously shared with me an as-yet unpublished paper entitled 'In proximity to despair: varieties of fear in Luther's 95 Theses', which deals with many of the issues expressed below in more detail.
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 - 44 For an overview of Luther's changing understanding of purgatory, see J.L. Walls, *Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 35–45.
 - 45 M. Luther, *D. Martin Luthers Werke: kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1883, pp. 317–24.
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 - 47 Luther, *Werke*, vol. 2 (1884), p. 360.
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 - 49 Luther, *The Ninety-Five Theses*, p. 8.
 - 50 W.J. Bouwsma, 'John Calvin's anxiety', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 128:3, 1984, 252–6.
 - 51 J. Calvin, *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. Henry Beveridge, Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1846, Book 3, Chapter 4, Subchapter 17.
 - 52 Ibid., Book 2, Chapter 7, Subchapter 11.
 - 53 Bouwsma, 'John Calvin's anxiety', p. 254.
 - 54 T. More, *De Tristitia Christi*, in *Complete Works of St Thomas More*, vol. 14, part 1, ed. C.H. Miller, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976, p. 83.
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 - 57 Watson, 'Despair', p. 342. Cf. M. McDonald, 'The Fearefull Estate of Francis Spira: narrative, emotion, and identity in early modern England', *Journal of British Studies* 31, 1992, 32–61 (p. 59).

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- 59 T.G. Walsh, SJ, 'Writing anxiety in Teresa's *Interior Castle*', *Theological Studies* 56, 1995, 251–75.
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- 63 Ibid., p. 53.
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6

RHETORICAL THEOLOGY AND THE HISTORY OF EMOTIONS

Kirk Essary

The purpose of this chapter is to chart some useful scholarly approaches to the history of medieval and early modern affective theologies. It aims to show how a focus on emotions is especially conducive to revealing meaningful continuities that are often obscured by rigid modes of periodization, on the one hand, and by the anti-scholastic rhetoric of early modern biblical humanists, on the other. The confluence and divergence of multiple intellectual traditions gave rise to deep complexities in the history of theological approaches across the medieval and early modern period. But lines of influence and reception were often blurred by the explicit appropriation of classical and patristic texts and ideas in the Renaissance, and humanists tended to argue that their own approach to theology (rhetorical rather than dialectical, to put it simply) was novel in its affectivity but also superior to medieval approaches insofar as it attended to the whole person – *intellectus* and *affectus*. A closer look reveals a more complicated picture, of course, and I would like to suggest the possibility that *theologia rhetorica*, a heuristic device originally conceived for delineating a theological tendency specific to the Italian Renaissance, can serve as a useful tool when employed alongside approaches from the new history of emotions to think about the relationship between rhetoric, emotions and theology in medieval and early modern Europe.

‘Theology abides in emotions more than in clever arguments’.¹ So Erasmus of Rotterdam writes in a treatise on theological method appended to the second (1519) edition of his famous Greek New Testament. It is a succinct statement that gets at one of the key purposes of theology for Erasmus, which is to move Christians to a life of virtue, modelled on Christ’s life, rather than to convince them of metaphysical truths. His reference to *argutiis* – witty disputations or clever arguments – represents a dig at university theologians who, to his mind, had ruined the ‘queen of the sciences’ by focusing on impractical and speculative questions. In this way, Erasmus’s comment is one about the *form* of theology as much as the *content*, and he elaborates on the duty of theologians to engage the affections and eschew dialectical disputation: ‘The particular aim of the theologian is to interpret the divine writings wisely, from faith and not via the method of frivolous *quaestiones*,

with grave piety and efficacious discourse, bringing forth tears and kindling the heavenly spirit'.² This posture is representative of a broader Christian humanist tendency to excoriate the proliferation of what were deemed to be superfluous philosophical categories, as well as a focus on dialectic, for rendering theology irrelevant and inaccessible to most of Christendom. It also contains a concomitant appreciation of affectivity built-in to the practice of theology.

Erasmus was not novel, of course, in attaching a fundamental importance to the emotions and to rhetoric in theological discourse. In his monumental 1970 study, *In Our Image and Likeness*, Charles Trinkaus employed the term *theologia rhetorica* to delineate a Quattrocento humanist approach to theology that was, in part, distinctive in its affective-rhetorical orientation when compared with scholastic dialectic (and self-consciously so). This Italian humanist brand of theological method sought to revive theology by infusing it with literary and rhetorical force – 'with words that bite and sting . . . rather than tight logical arguments' – so that it could have more practical effect.³ Describing Petrarch, who sat at the forefront of the humanist movement, Trinkaus writes, 'Sometimes he sounds anti-intellectual, anti-scientific, but it is because he trusts to the insights of literature and poetry and history more than to those of dialectic and natural philosophy. The former reveal the *actualities of human life and feeling*, the latter deal in false abstractions'.⁴

In addition to advocating for a theology that was relevant to human life and feeling, humanists took a critical stance towards their scholastic contemporaries and forebears who held most of the formal positions in theology faculties in European universities. A branch of humanists from Quattrocento Italy through to northern Europe in the sixteenth century distilled their criticisms into a series of tropes suggesting that scholastic theologians were frigid in their discourse and method, that their approach to theology was ineffective in its abstruseness, and that their subject matter appealed too restrictively to the intellect alone. What was required was a return *ad fontes*, to classical literature, patristic theology and the biblical texts themselves in order to resurrect a meaningful theological approach that could appeal to everyone. A result of this approach was, ostensibly at least, a reconceptualization of the function of emotions in theology and the Christian life.

But from the perspective of the history of emotions over the *longue durée*, were these rhetorical theologians doing anything truly new? After all, as many of my medievalist colleagues would immediately ask (and have asked): What about the obviously affective theologies of the earlier Middle Ages? What about the extensive practices of affective meditation in monasteries, the mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux on the Song of Songs and Anselm's *Meditations*, or the 'affective anthropology' of Aelred of Rievaulx?⁵ Attention to affectivity in intellectual history suggests that a robust affective-theological tradition in the Middle Ages would seem to belie the humanists' protests as somewhat disingenuous, and to complicate their claims that returning *ad fontes* meant passing wholesale over the period that lay between classical antiquity and their own time.⁶ As Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle aptly put it:

The humanist reform of theology was indeed, as it eagerly acknowledged its imitation of the ancient method, a renaissance of the patristic tradition. It was, however, also what it eschewed to acknowledge, a continuity

with the medieval tradition of those mystical theologians from Bernard to Bonaventure and beyond who identified human excellence with the will rather than the intellect and who, not fortuitously, wrote rhetorically rather than dialectically about God.⁷

In other words, we must not be too quick to accept at face value the vigorous denunciations of medieval theologians by humanists and reformers, but rather we should understand them as part of a broader strategy to carve out a theological position in contradistinction to their contemporaries. Recent approaches from the history of emotions can help us to sharpen our understanding of intellectual trajectories in Christian thought over the course of the Middle Ages and through the sixteenth-century religious reformations by attending to the affective features of approaches to theology in this period.

For example, in their criticism of school theologians *and* in their omission of certain debts, reform-minded humanists had constructed a distinct emotional community, defined by Barbara H. Rosenwein as a social group that ‘adheres to the same valuations of emotions and how they should be expressed’.⁸ Moreover, they had created a separate emotional community as a rhetorical foil in the form of cold-hearted and detached ‘scholastics’.⁹ Approaches from the history of emotions, moreover, can help us to answer questions about change over time in theological discourse, and about periodization from the perspective of the intellectual history of Christianity. Focusing on the role of affectivity in approaches to theology in the period 1100–1700 can help to clarify what is borrowed and what is new, and this aids in further illuminating lines of influence and reception, even (or especially) where a rhetorical posture of dissociation (such as Erasmus’s above) is employed. As Rosenwein has put it, ‘Although there are other ways to bridge the medieval/early modern divide, the study of emotions has unusually good potential to knit together two sides and yet point up their differences’.¹⁰

Histories of medieval Christian emotions: rhetorical theology before the Renaissance

A recurring feature of scholarship on the place of emotions and rhetoric in the Renaissance is a suggested revival of *something* ‘Augustinian’, and this has been a feature of scholarship on the period since before the history of emotions became a codified discipline (or something approximating one). What William Bouwsma referred to as ‘the two faces of humanism’, Stoicism and Augustinianism, acknowledged a rather specific dilemma – often unresolved – in approaches to affectivity in the Renaissance.¹¹ The distinction, in part, replays an older story of rational versus volitional anthropology, in which the former generally disparages the passions as problematic inhibitors of intellectual activity, while the latter recognizes the importance of the emotions in directing the will to virtue. As Bouwsma writes regarding the ‘Augustinian’ strain:

The will, in this view, is seen to take its direction not from reason but from the affections, which are in turn not merely the disorderly impulses of the treacherous body but expressions of the energy and quality of the heart, that mysterious organ which is the center of the personality, the source of

its unity and its ultimate worth. The affections, therefore, are intrinsically neither good nor evil but the essential resources of the personality; and since they make possible man's beatitude and glory as well as his depravity, they are, in Augustinian humanism, treated with particular respect.¹²

The neutrality of the affections in this schema is contrasted with Stoic antipathy toward emotion, but crucial too is the importance of the heart, which in this context is ultimately a biblical category that encompasses the full range of human psychology. Debora Shuger has detailed the rejuvenation of this sort of Augustinian appreciation of affectivity in early modern preaching manuals in particular, tracing the influence of rhetorical traditions on sacred teaching, and emphasizing an attendant anthropological reorientation. As she writes, 'The polarization of reason and passion, and hence of philosophy and rhetoric, does not seem to have been central to Renaissance thought'.¹³ This is a crucial insight, and once taken seriously it opens up new avenues for understanding Renaissance and Reformation Christian texts. But while the blurred anthropological categories of some humanist and Protestant thinkers set their understanding of the soul or self apart from a predominant Thomist-Aristotelian rationalism, Augustinian theologies of the heart were hardly uncommon in the medieval period.¹⁴ A number of recent scholarly studies from the domain of the history of emotions have contributed much to our understanding of the multiple 'Augustinianisms' that shaped Christian thought in the medieval and early modern era. What ties many of these together is an emphasis on the importance of affectivity in thinking about the Christian subject.

Eric Jager, for example, has detailed the vivacity of what he calls an Augustinian 'pectoral psychology' in the Middle Ages which, as he defines it, 'evokes the heart mainly in its biblical sense as the center of moral and intellectual life, including conscience, understanding, the affections, volition, and memory'.¹⁵ Damien Boquet, meanwhile, describes the ways in which the heart is central to the Cistercian '*anthropologie affective*' in an extensive study of the affective theology of Aelred of Rivaux and the traditions he was tapping into.¹⁶ And rhetoric's role in engaging the affections for the sake of persuasion was commonplace, as Vincent Gillespie notes in quoting Robert Grossteste as follows: 'to Rhetoric especially belongs the setting in motion of our affections, the rousing up of torpid spirits, the correction of the unruly, the encouraging of the faint-hearted, the assuaging of the truculent'.¹⁷ What Shuger refers to as the 'assimilation of spiritual and affective experience' in the works of Christian humanists and Protestant preachers, while useful for delineating humanist and scholastic approaches synchronically in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was by no means novel in the Christian theological tradition. Indeed, it may be the case that Christian theologies that fail to assimilate spiritual and affective experience are rather the exception than the rule.¹⁸

The many faces of Augustine are found together in an earlier text as well (which no doubt influenced the twelfth-century writers mentioned above), the first of Anselm of Canterbury's *Meditations*. Glossing Psalm 39:3, he writes:

What then remains but, duly considering all these things, by all means possible to rouse thy heart's ardours towards the attainment of so great blessings, and to implore Him who created thee for their possession to snatch thee out

of the pit of misery and out of the mire of dregs, and to make thee possessor of so great happiness? For what is the ‘pit of misery’ but the gulf of worldly desire? And what is ‘the mire of dregs’ but the filth of carnal pleasure?¹⁹

It is clear here that earthly desires are inextricable from human sinfulness, but the way out is to rouse the ‘heart’s ardours’ and, a bit later, ‘by confession, by tears, by carefully inviting holy thoughts into the heart’ to ask God ‘to establish thy heart’s affections in the strength of Christ’.²⁰ Both sin and redemption, in other words, operate through an individual’s emotions, a theological orientation that Simeon Zahl has referred to as ‘affective Augustinianism’ when discussing emotions in Martin Luther’s theology.²¹ Anselm’s writings led R.W. Southern to place him at the forefront of what he described as a ‘mood of emotional tenderness which runs through the literature of the twelfth century’.²² Southern’s thesis proved a long-influential suggestion that has undergone multiple challenges, notably by Caroline Walker Bynum and Sarah McNamer, the latter arguing that practices of affective meditation originated with the devotional practices of early medieval women, which shifted affective attitudes towards Christ.²³ But apart from the question of the origins of affective piety, and while acknowledging the fundamental importance of thinking about emotions in theology from a gendered perspective, we might nevertheless make a distinction in emotional regimes between the attitudes towards Christ’s Passion – which are so commonly understood to stand at the centre of theologies and practices of ‘affective piety’ from the eleventh century through to the early modern period – and the function of different emotions or of affectivity broadly construed in theological discourse.²⁴

Not all medieval affective theology is reducible to affective piety, or oriented so closely around compassion (as Paul Megna argues eloquently in his chapter in this volume). When considered in broader perspective, medieval affective theologies are also more easily tracked in the early modern period in contexts where affective piety would not have been nearly so well appreciated. Indeed, the model operating in works like Anselm’s *Meditations* would, on the face of it, seem to fit broadly within the mould of *theologia rhetorica* as outlined by Trinkaus. And the affective-theological remit of the first meditation would persist well into the Reformation era. Conventional paradigms of periodization break down here. For example, Debora Shuger cites the sixteenth-century German Calvinist Bartholomäus Keckermann to an effect similar to that exemplified in Anselm. For Keckermann, the preacher’s duty is ‘moving the emotions rather than teaching the minds of his hearers, for men sin more from corrupt emotions than ignorance of the truth’.²⁵ On this reading, affectivity is crucial to the theological task not because the emotions are efficient conduits to faith or persuasion of theological verities, but because they themselves need conversion more than the intellect needs convincing. This is precisely what Anselm suggested in his *Meditations*, and the subtle tack reveals the deep complexities of attitudes toward emotion in varying Christian theological traditions: affectivity can be a central feature of a theological approach for very different reasons. Without suggesting that there’s nothing new under the sun, Rosenwein’s insistence on evaluating emotions in the discursive contexts of medieval and early modern religious and intellectual life forces us to acknowledge meaningful continuities across the increasingly elusive medieval–early modern divide.

Even the purportedly über-rationalist scholastics had their affective offshoots. Alastair Minnis, for example, has discussed the ways in which medieval scholastic theology had its own affective strand that sought to emphasize the primacy of *affectus* and/or *voluntas* over *intellectus* in theological method. He writes that ‘Richard Fishacre, Robert Kilwardby, and Giles of Rome argued that theology is essentially affective, while others, including Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Henry of Ghent, sought to emphasize (in different ways and to different extents) the rational and intellectual nature of the science of theology’.²⁶ These traditions form the bedrock, Minnis also argues, for Middle English devotional literature of the later medieval period, the emotional discourses of which have recently been elaborated on by Paul Megna.²⁷ The pre-eminent scholastic Peter Abelard, too, becomes a rhetorical theologian in an insightful essay by Peter Von Moos, who outlines Abelard’s approach to literary theology in terms that Renaissance biblical humanists would fully endorse: ‘Holy Scripture is to be understood as the product of divine eloquence. To study it one needs, among the propaedeutic disciplines, rhetoric rather than grammar or dialectic’.²⁸ And while Von Moos does not treat affectivity at length in the article, he does write that Abelard, in his criticism of ‘professors of dialectic’, is seeking to ‘attribute an erotic dimension to intellectual activity’.²⁹ Even from the perspective of the professors of dialectic, however, a surge in studies on emotion in the thought of Thomas Aquinas has revealed the importance of the passions to his understanding of moral theology.³⁰

Outside the confines of the schools, many more examples could be adduced of explicitly affective if not explicitly rhetorical theologies, and here we find avenues of continuity with later traditions of Christian humanism as well. An expanding scholarly focus on the language of feeling, or what Ute Frevert has called the ‘historical semantics of emotion’, allows us to comprehend better the particularities of emotions discourse, including the significance of shifts in use and meaning of emotion terms at varying levels of analysis: in a single-author corpus, in a correspondence, cross-culturally but in a single language, and cross-linguistically either in translation or through comparison of emotion terms in multiple languages.³¹ Barbara Newman, for example, has recently traced the significance of the Latin *affectus* (affection, emotion) in Hildegard of Bingen’s (1098–1179) correspondence. While she suggests that Hildegard herself does not have a theory of emotions and only rarely uses terms like *affectus*, one passage from a letter to Hildegard from a Premonstratensian abbot illustrates nicely the positive evaluation of emotion in the context of Christian love (both of God and of one another): ‘Charity without affection seems like a frigid fire. For just as fire without heat cannot weld iron to iron, so charity without affection can by no means cause believers to be of one heart and one soul in God’.³² The description of the theological virtue of *caritas* as only legitimate when both *warm* and *efficacious* is an assessment that runs through the long affective-theological Christian tradition, and which repeatedly instantiates itself as an alternative to dialectical formalism. As Newman writes, ‘The abbot’s letter could even be read as a polemic against the chilly formal appeals to *caritas* that tempted some epistolary writers’, and she argues that similar language used by the nuns of Helfta (at the end of the thirteenth century) are indicative – perhaps constitutive – of their ‘affective community’.³³

In a similar vein, Constant Mews teases out another important feature of affective theology in a recent essay on language in twelfth-century Cistercian writings, but it

also reveals just how complex and varied the reception of Augustine can be in the context of affective theology. He points out that Augustine did not use the phrase *affectus naturalis* (a natural, rather than sinful, emotion or affective disposition), unlike a different trajectory of patristic thought (led by Origen of Alexandria) that influenced medieval thinkers like William of Saint-Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux. The implication is that the Cistercians contravened a version of Augustine in their appreciation of affectivity as conducive to, rather than inhibitive of, Christian virtue, grounded in assumptions about the fundamental sinful orientation of the will.³⁴ While recent studies on Augustine have tried to complicate the notion that the Bishop of Hippo had a generally negative view of affectivity as a vehicle for Christian virtue, what Mews hints at here points at the inherited ambiguities of the tradition and also forms two possible models: 1) to think of the tendency to posit ‘natural’ emotion as a positive means for faith and piety; and 2) the tendency to equate emotions with sinful desires.³⁵

According to Mews, the Cistercians imagine the affective aspect of the individual to be an essential feature of human nature – ‘a certain spontaneous and sweet inclination of the mind to God’, in the words of the twelfth-century text, *De spiritu et anima* – and not as a faculty with primarily sinful proclivities.³⁶ On the other end of the spectrum, Michael Barbezat writes that in the theology of Hugh of St Victor ‘*affectus* is the lynchpin in humanity’s disorder’, and Hugh uses the phrase *affectus naturalis* to define carnal desire.³⁷ That is, understanding the affections as ‘natural’ does not preclude a good Augustinian from understanding them as sinful. In the end, only the most pessimistic of Augustinians could suggest that the emotions are irredeemable, and Barbezat details how, for Hugh, the corrupted affective disposition is changed through God’s grace when the object of desire shifts from the earthly to the divine. (Aquinas, meanwhile, has a discussion of ‘natural’ passions that falls on a rather different trajectory.³⁸) Again, considering the shifting and subtle semantics of feeling in these texts allows us to appreciate the varied textures of affective theology across the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance and Reformation.

A Renaissance of Christian feeling? – Continuity and discontinuity

The Renaissance reappropriation (and rediscovery, in certain cases) of certain classical texts likewise combined to effect a shift in understandings of the relationship between emotions and rhetoric, even if it did not account for the whole scope of humanist rhetorical theologies.³⁹ Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* would have far-reaching effects (it is cited positively, for example, in Erasmus’s *Ratio*, which we began with), while Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria*, rediscovered in the early fifteenth century by Poggio Bracciolini, contributed significantly to new taxonomies of emotion as well as to a more positive appropriation of their role in rhetoric.⁴⁰ When insights from such works were adapted to methodological questions in Christian theology, an inevitable transformation took place, and it would eventually give rise to an essentially new genre. Thus, scholarly approaches to this context which emphasize the crucial role affectivity played in late medieval and early modern Christian pedagogy and preaching illuminate an under-studied feature of religious thought and practice in this period.

While certain methodological approaches developed by historians of emotion can still benefit the study of this intellectual milieu, equally important is the more simple

shift in scholarly attention to emotions and affectivity in religious texts from this period. As Debora Shuger's research in particular has also shown, the publication of Renaissance 'sacred rhetorics' exploded in the sixteenth century, with over five hundred unique works published between 1500 and 1700.⁴¹ As Shuger describes them, 'The majority of Renaissance sacred rhetorics, both Catholic and Protestant, do not favor dispassionate, unadorned, "philosophic" language but, quite startlingly, advocate a deeply emotional and richly figurative style'.⁴² This would be the most explicit extension of a methodological approach to rhetorical theology in genre form, but affectivity would shape theological discourse outside these handbooks as well. In this final section, I'd like to move into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while keeping in mind the scholarly approaches mentioned above.

In Erasmus's dialogue *Ciceronianus*, published first in 1528, the broadly Erasmian character Bulephorus describes 'Thomas Aristotelicus' (i.e. Aquinas) as *apathes in dicendo* – emotionless in his writing – with the result that he (merely) *taught* his readers.⁴³ The implication is that Aquinas's works were dry and lacking in rhetorical movement, and that he did not fulfil the other two aims of eloquence: to move and to delight. While *delectare* was less important to Erasmus for the Christian pedagogue (indeed, the main purpose of the *Ciceronianus* is to lambaste slavish Ciceronians), *movere* was a critical feature of proper theological discourse. John O'Malley describes his approach in the following way: 'What must be clearly recognized is that touching the emotions, either rhetorically or poetically, is not merely an aim of his spirituality, but constitutive of its form . . . In him, if in anybody, form and content cannot be separated'.⁴⁴ That is, while Erasmus does not often employ *movere* as a specific analytical category, he has made explicit an affective approach to the theological task that seems to have only been implicit in the affective theologies of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

As Brian Cummings and others have noted, moreover, literary approaches to theological discourse in the Renaissance are both highly affective and more complex than the rote application of classical-rhetorical norms.⁴⁵ Likewise, Reinier Leushuis has teased out the importance of affective discourse in Erasmus's *Paraphrases* of the Gospels – texts that were immensely popular in the sixteenth century. Paraphrasing Luke 24:32, Erasmus has the Gospel author describe Jesus's ability to explain the difficulties of the *figurae* in the prophetic books: 'He pricked his hearers, moved them, carried them out of themselves, seared them, set them afire, left sparks and darts in their hearts'.⁴⁶ Leushuis helpfully points out that while paraphrasing Luke, Erasmus does not 'stage a simple rhetorical *accommodatio* to facilitate the conventional processes of *docere* (to provide moral instruction), *movere* (to stir the audience's emotions for the sake of persuasion), and *delectare* (to delight) that classical rhetoric asserts as the central goals of the orator's speech'.⁴⁷ Erasmus's Jesus, rather, is himself a literary character whose mimetic function takes the reader 'well beyond the orator's *movere*', an aspect of the *Paraphrases* that 'challenges all-too-comforting delineations between rhetoric and literature in the early modern period'.⁴⁸ Erasmus's Jesus is also, it goes without saying, the teacher/theologian *par excellence*, and thus his method is a model for all preachers and theologians.

Leushuis's treatment of the *Paraphrases* is reminiscent of Simo Knuuttila's description of Bernard of Clairvaux's approach to biblical hermeneutics (showing, again, that taking a wide comparative view can illustrate surprising continuities):

Like John Cassian, Bernard assumed that progress in understanding biblical texts consists in becoming more and more involved in the original affections of the inspired authors of the Bible. Through meditating on these texts Christians learn new modes of affection, which tie their souls closer to divinity if they receive the grace of being so affected . . . Affective experience is the medium of understanding biblical texts and also the source of the certainty of faith.⁴⁹

This is rather provocative, and it maps neatly on to the goals of a humanist *theologia rhetorica*, even if the feature of Cistercian theology that ‘regarded affective mystical experiences as the ground for certainty concerning one’s salvific status’ moves somewhat beyond it.⁵⁰

Opinions about the extent to which emotions ought to feature heavily in theological approaches ran on a spectrum, and defending them on the grounds that they were *biblical* was a hallmark of reform-minded theologians, and a *sine qua non* of Christian anti-stoicism as well.⁵¹ The following example from Erasmus’s letter to Gilles may be taken as representative of Catholic humanist and Protestant attitudes in the early modern era:

Nowadays anyone who chose to stand stubbornly by the Stoic doctrine of *apatheia* would even be considered a heretic. For joy, grief, hope, fear, love, hate, benevolence, pity are unquestionably emotions [*affectus*], and yet throughout the sacred writings they are used of men living not just according to the flesh but according to the spirit, they are also used of Christ, indeed they are even used of the divine nature . . . Do we not read in the Gospel that the Lord exulted in spirit, shouted in anger, wept, was indignant and moved to pity? And the word *affectus* encompasses all these movements of the soul . . . And are not joy and love attributed to the angels, even though they are incorporeal?⁵²

The affective-theological strategies of Catholic humanists like Erasmus would leave an indelible imprint on the writings of reformers on the other side of the Protestant schism during the Reformation era. While Erasmus’s suggestion that his interlocutor (in this case, Flemish Franciscan Francis Titelmans) was dabbling with heresy in rejecting the validity of *affectus* in translating the New Testament, some Swiss Protestants would list Stoic *apatheia* among the list of theological errors embraced by the Anabaptists (whom they persecuted as heretics).⁵³ How one understood the function of emotion in Christian life occasionally bore on the question of whether one was orthodox or not.⁵⁴

Anti-scholastic tendencies that were inaugurated by Italian humanists like Petrarch and Lorenzo Valla would persist for generations and would migrate north of the Alps and eventually across confessions after the Protestant break with Rome. More generally, Protestant reformers followed their humanist predecessors in routinely denouncing scholastic philosophizing as frigid and ineffective, while at the same time rejecting outright Stoic *apatheia*. Both scholastics and Stoics were convenient rhetorical foils for constructing emotional communities among humanists and Protestants. But these recycled rhetorical strategies did not exhaust their

appreciation of the emotions, nor were they always imagined as meaningful for their role in *persuasio*. Simeon Zahl has recently described Martin Luther as ‘one of the great theologians of the affections in the Christian tradition’ in a study of the emotional valence of several of the German reformer’s works, although it should be noted that Luther vehemently criticized Erasmus’s use of rhetoric in theological disputation.⁵⁵ Luther’s lieutenant, Philip Melanchthon, embraced Luther’s view that faith is born from a terrified and anxious conscience which, as Zahl has argued elsewhere, constitutes a series of ‘affective predicates’ that results in the orientation of even the most specialized (read ‘scholastic’) aspects of Melanchthon’s theology to have ‘affective salience’.⁵⁶ Zahl’s research shows that even the most jargon-laden and, relatively speaking, idiosyncratic sixteenth-century theological debates were often at root emotionally significant.

John Calvin, despite his reputation as the founding father of a severely repressed puritanism, was heavily indebted to multiple affective-theological traditions. He writes in his theological masterwork the *Institutes* that faith is ‘more of the heart than the brain, and more of the *affectus* than of the understanding’.⁵⁷ The gospel ought, Calvin continues, ‘to penetrate the inmost affections of the heart, take its seat in the soul, and affect the whole man a hundred times more deeply than the cold exhortations of the philosophers’.⁵⁸ In the preface to his commentary on 1 Corinthians, for example, he writes that ‘no one will be suited for teaching unless they have first imbibed the power of the gospel, so that they are speaking not from the mouth, but from the affections of the heart’.⁵⁹ While a narrative of Calvin and Calvinism as distinctly unsympathetic and Stoic in orientation is so pervasive as to have become a cliché in the modern period, examining his works in this context reveals the characteristic importance of the emotions and rhetoric in Calvin’s thought, and more recent scholarship has offered refreshing revisions of an oft-caricatured religious tradition.⁶⁰ William Bouwsma first suggested that *theologia rhetorica* ought to be considered a meaningful interpretive framework for understanding Calvin’s thought, and recent research that focuses on emotions in his works only confirms that Calvin was participating in a long-standing humanist tradition of embracing an affective approach to theological discourse in explicit contradistinction to what he referred to as the ‘Sorbonnist sophists’ on the one hand, and the ‘new Stoics’ on the other.

While much can be learned from theological treatises about how individual thinkers understood the function of emotions in theology and the Christian life, recent scholarship on sermons has revealed how valuable they are as a source for understanding the Christian rhetoric of feeling in the early modern period as well as for creating and sustaining emotional communities. Susan Karant-Nunn has traced important distinguishing features of confessional trajectories in the sixteenth century, charting what she calls ‘clerical agendas’ for shaping religious feeling.⁶¹ While she does not seem to appreciate the positive aspects of affectivity in Calvin’s theology, her focus on the (generally negative) emotional tenor of Calvin’s sermons is nevertheless important for understanding different emotional styles in preaching in the sixteenth century, and her work is crucial for its emphasis on the role of bodies in framing emotional norms, especially in sermons on Christ’s Passion. In addition to clerical agendas in shaping confessionalized emotional communities, preachers also treated emotions as a subject in sermons in the period, occasionally suggesting more continuity with previous traditions than sectarian difference in a tumultuous time.

Similarly affective theologies were produced across the Channel, as Jennifer Clement's recent research has shown. As she writes, 'one of the most important lessons sermons taught was how to feel, and congregations learned this lesson through the emotional rhetoric of the sermon'.⁶² These sermons were also underpinned by theoretical considerations, and the second half of the sixteenth century saw a large proliferation of rhetorical treatises, most of which had something to do with sacred rhetoric. These theoretical approaches took a variety of forms as well as a variety of positions on the emotions themselves. A recurring feature of rhetorical theology in a sermonic context, at least since Erasmus's massive preaching manual, the *Ecclesiastes*, was an anxiety about how and how much a preacher ought to rouse the emotions. Many preaching manuals repeated a *topos* from Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* that emotions must be roused in the orator for them to be felt in the listeners, but *how much* they ought to be roused would shift from manual to manual.⁶³ This is a more specific aspect of a general tendency, described by Alec Ryrie as 'going beyond the medieval, scholastic view of the emotions as appetites to be bridled, and beyond even the Aristotelian view of them as passions to be brought into harmony with the higher faculties. Certainly the affections had to be disciplined, but they ought not to be restrained: rather, the point was to direct and to heighten them'.⁶⁴

There was no shortage of works from the period that detailed how the affections might be disciplined, but also how they might be directed via rhetorical expertise. As Cinta Zunino-Garrido has recently shown, even a rather technical work like Henry Peacham's 1593 treatise *The Garden of Eloquence* often theorizes the role of rhetorical figures in relation to their emotive power.⁶⁵ And although the text is not a theological work per se, a substantial portion (if not the vast majority) of the examples Peacham gives of the litany of rhetorical figures that comprise the treatise are taken from the Bible – a sign that Peacham took seriously the humanist contention that biblical eloquence was worthy of consideration alongside classical works.⁶⁶ But while Peacham advocated a moderate use of figures and tropes, specifically so as not to overly disturb the reader or hearer's passions, Thomas Nashe unabashedly defended his own high style in the second edition of his *Christs Teares over Jerusalem*, published in 1594, linking his approach to Augustine and Jerome:

The ploddinger sort of unlearned Zoilists about London exclaim that it is a puffed-up style, and full of profane eloquence; others object unto me the multitude of my boisterous compound words, and the often coining of Italianate verbs which end all in -ize, as mummianize, tympanize, tyrannize. To the first array of my clumperton Antigonists this I answer, that my style is no otherwise puffed up than any man's should be which writes with any spirit, and whom would not such a divine subject put a high-ravished spirit into? For the profaneness of my eloquence, so they may term the eloquence of Saint Austin, Jerome, Chrysostom profane, since none of them but takes unto him far more liberty of tropes, figures and metaphors, and alleging heathen examples and histories.⁶⁷

Nashe's method in treating such a noble subject can be explained, in his words, as one embracing a 'high-ravished Spirit', and in the 1593 text he decries 'literally expounded and sophistically scanned' Scripture as sooner feeding despair than faith.⁶⁸

In the seventeenth century, John Donne's sermons reach similarly high rhetorical flights, and his meditations on Christ's emotions in his sermon on John 11:35 ('Jesus wept') reveal astute affective-theological sensitivities. He rejects frigidity in the faithful, as had Erasmus and Calvin before him (whom he no doubt read): 'A disease, a distemper, a danger which no time shall ever be free from; that wheresoever there is a coldness, a disaffection to God's cause, those who are any way occasionally instruments of God's glory, shall find cold affections'.⁶⁹ And after a lengthy consideration of the significance of Christ's extreme (but sinless) emotions, expressed at the death of Lazarus, he generalizes in anti-Stoic mode: 'Self-love in man sinks deep: but yet you see, the apostle in his order, casts the other sin lower, that is, into a worse place, *to be without natural affections*'.⁷⁰ Katrin Ettenhuber refers to Donne's approach as 'Augustine's volitional dynamic in its purest form', reminding us, again, that the legacy of affective Augustinianism pervades the Christian tradition in its myriad attempts to negotiate the proper place of feeling in a theological context.⁷¹

In closing, it might be best to leave off with a summary from Donne's predecessor Nashe explaining the significance of affectivity in rhetorical theology, complete with a nod to its patristic origins:

If you count it profane to art-enamel your speech to empierce, and make a conscience to sweeten your tunes to catch souls, religion (through you) shall reap infamy. Men are men, and with those things must be moved that men wont to be moved. They must have a little sugar mixed with their sour pills of reproof; the hooks must be pleasantly baited that they bite at. Those that hang forth their hooks and no bait may well enough entangle them in the weeds (enwrap themselves in contentions), but never win one soul. Turn over the ancient Fathers, and mark how sweet and honeysome they are in the mouth, and how musical & melodious in the ear. No orator was ever more pleasingly persuasive than humble Saint Augustine.⁷²

The history of emotions permits us to more fully appreciate the wide context of Nashe's contention that religious conversion is inextricable from emotional movement, and that theological discourse is more effective when it is more affective. Sustained focus on the history of affective discourse, whether via the lens of (rhetorical) emotional communities, through the close analysis of emotional lexicons in theological texts or by tracing affective Augustinianisms as they crop up and are renovated in multi-generic Christian texts, illuminates lines of continuity and discontinuity crucial for historical analyses of periodization and reception. While Trinkaus's category of *theologia rhetorica* predates the 'new history of emotions', when fleshed out and substantiated with the tools of the newer approach it can still serve as a useful scholarly heuristic for considering and reconsidering intellectual genealogies in medieval and early modern Europe.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

- 1 'Et quoniam professio Theologica magis constat affectibus quam argutiis': Desiderius Erasmus, *Ratio seu methodus compendio perveniendi ad veram theologiam*, in *Erasmus Roterdamus: Ausgewählte Werke*, ed. H. Holborn and A. Holborn, Munich: Beck, 1933, repr. 1964, p. 187 (my translation). In the *Paraclesis*, another meditation on the proper approach to biblical theology, Erasmus writes that the Christian philosophy is situated 'more in the emotions than in syllogisms' ('Hoc philosophiae genus in affectibus situm verius, quam in syllogismis'; quoted in *Novum instrumentum omne*, Basel: Froben, 1516, fol. aaa4).
- 2 'At praecipuus Theologorum scopus est, sapienter enarrare Divinas litteras: de fide, non de frivolis quaestionibus rationem reddere: de pietate graviter atque efficaciter disserere: lacrymas excutere, ad coelestia inflammare animos' (Erasmus, *Ratio*, in *Desiderii Erasmi Roterdami opera omnia*, ed. J. LeClerc, 10 vols, Leiden, 1703–06, vol. 5, pp. 83–4).
- 3 Charles Trinkaus, *In Our Image and Likeness*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970, pp. 206–7.
- 4 Ibid., p. 769 (my emphasis).
- 5 It may be prudent for the purposes of this chapter to make a distinction between theologies that systematically consider emotions as an object of inquiry and theologies that orient themselves around affectivity. Thomas Aquinas writes about the passions extensively in *Summa Theologiae*, IaIIae.22–48, a section which Simo Knuuttila calls 'the most extensive medieval treatise on the subject' (*Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, p. 239), and yet in comparison with Bernard of Clairvaux and other Cistercians who imagined the heart to be the vital centre of human life, for example, or the deliberately rhetorical theologies of the Renaissance, it would be a stretch to call his theology an affective one.
- 6 A few prominent studies on emotions that deal extensively with medieval theology broadly are S. Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001; D. Boquet and P. Nagy, *Sensible Moyen Âge*, Paris: Le Seuil, 2015; and B.H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling: A History of Emotions, 600–1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- 7 'Rhetorical Theology: Charity Seeking Charity', in *Calvinism as Theologia Rhetorica?* (Protocol of the Fifty-Fourth Colloquy of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, ed. W. Bouwsma and W. Wuellner, Berkeley, CA: General Theological Union and University of California Press, 1986, pp. 22–28, (p. 24)).
- 8 J. Plamper, 'The history of emotions: an interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns', *History and Theory* 49, 2010, 237–65 (p. 253).
- 9 See further Erika Rummel, *The Humanist-Scholastic Debates in the Renaissance and Reformation*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, for an analysis of the pervasive rhetorical propaganda perpetuated by both sides of this debate, which was an important feature of identity-formation, especially in the first half of the sixteenth century.
- 10 Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*, p. 252.
- 11 See W. Bouwsma, 'The two faces of humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance thought', in *A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990, Ch. 1.
- 12 Bouwsma, 'The two faces', p. 47.
- 13 D. Shuger, 'The philosophical foundations of sacred rhetoric', in J. Corrigan (ed.), *Religion and Emotion: Approaches and Interpretations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 115–32 (p. 120).
- 14 Indeed, another version of this paper could have been written only about versions of Augustinian affective theology, and we must remind ourselves that 'Augustinianism' is far from a monolithic tradition, even in its affective guise(s).
- 15 E. Jager, *The Book of the Heart*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000, p. 29.
- 16 See D. Boquet, *L'Ordre de l'affecte au Moyen Âge*, Caen: CRAHM, 2005, pp. 161–5. From p. 161: 'Le coeur est le véritable centre de la conscience, psychologique et morale'.
- 17 V. Gillespie, 'Mystic's foot: Rolle and affectivity', in M. Glascoe (ed.), *The Medieval Mystical Tradition in England II*, Exeter, UK: Short Run Press, 1982, pp. 199–230 (p. 218).

- 18 Anselmian affective theology giving way to a more robust Cistercian version was charted by R.W. Southern, beginning in the 1950s, and his theses have been challenged in various ways ever since. Heiko Oberman wrote about the ‘Franciscan Middle Ages’ as bearing a particularly ‘anti-speculative, affective thrust’ (see ‘The reorientation of the fourteenth century’, in A. Maierù and A. Paravicini Bagliani (eds), *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, Rome: Raccolta di Studi e Testi, 1982), pp. 513–530 (p. 514).
- 19 Anselm, *Book of Meditations and Prayers*, trans. M.R., London: Burns and Oates, 1872, pp. 24–6.
- 20 Ibid., p. 26.
- 21 S. Zahl, ‘The bondage of the affections’, in D. Coulter and A. Yong (eds), *The Spirit, the Affections, and the Christian Tradition*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016, pp. 181–206 (p. 198).
- 22 R.W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953, p. 211.
- 23 See S. McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010. For Southern, see *Making of the Middle Ages*, p. 221.
- 24 For further discussion, and a counterpoint to McNamer, see R. Fulton Brown, *From Judgment to Passion*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.
- 25 Cited in Shuger, ‘The philosophical foundations of sacred rhetoric’, p. 120.
- 26 A. Minnis, ‘Affection and imagination in “The Cloud of Unknowing” and Hilton’s “Scale of Perfection”’, *Traditio* 39, 1983, 323–66 (p. 325).
- 27 P. Megna, ‘Affeccoun in Middle English devotional literature’, in J. Ruys, M.S. Champion and K. Essary (eds), *Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling, 400–1800*, London: Routledge, forthcoming 2019.
- 28 P. Von Moos, ‘Literary aesthetics in the Latin Middle Ages: the rhetorical theology of Peter Abelard’, in C. Mews, C.J. Nederman, and R.M. Thomson (eds), *Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100–1540*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2003, pp. 81–97 (p. 87).
- 29 Ibid., p. 91.
- 30 See, for example, R. Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- 31 U. Frevert, Christian Bailey, Pascal Eitler, Benno Gammerl, Bettina Hitzer, Margrit Pernau, Monique Scheer et al., *Emotional Lexicons: Continuity and Change in the Vocabulary of Feeling, 1700–2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- 32 Hildegard of Bingen, ‘Epistle 230’, from H., a prelate in Wadgassen, translated by Barbara Newman in ‘*Affectus* from Hildegard to Helfta’, in Ruys, Champion and Essary (eds), *Before Emotion*. Latin: ‘Caritas sine affectu frigidus igni simillima videtur. Nam sicut ignis sine fervore ferrum ferro conglutinare non valet, ita et caritas sine affectu nequaquam afficere potest ut credentium sit cor unum et anima una in Deo’ (Hildegard, *Epistolarium pars secunda*, ed. L. Van Acker, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis 91A, Turnhout: Brepols, 1993, pp. 505–6).
- 33 Newman, ‘*Affectus* from Hildegard to Helfta’.
- 34 C. Mews, ‘*Affectus* in the *De spiritu et anima* of Alcher of Clairvaux and Cistercian writings of the twelfth century’, in Ruys, Champion and Essary, *Before Emotion*.
- 35 For a more in-depth discussion of Augustine’s legacy in terms of conceptualizing sinful desires in the medieval period, see Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Ch. 3.
- 36 Mews, ‘*Affectus* in the *De spiritu et anima*’.
- 37 M. Barbezat, ‘Desire to enjoy something thoroughly: the use of the Latin *affectus* in Hugh of St Victor’s *De archa Noe*’, in Ruys, Champion and Essary, *Before Emotion*.
- 38 A passion can be natural for Aquinas if it pertains to the natural appetite, and thus does not involve perception or cognition (*sensus seu cognitio*), meaning that even things ‘lacking in the power of cognition’ (*cognitione carentibus*) can be said to have natural passions such as love and hope (see *Summa Theologiae*, IaIIae.41.3; and further discussion in Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 251). This conception is dependent upon an Aristotelian faculty psychology, and his argument cites the *Rhetoric*, recently translated by William of Moerbeke in the 1260s.

- 39 Mention should be made also of the influence of the *Devotio Moderna* movement of religious reform, which flourished especially in the Low Countries in the fifteenth century. Northern European humanists such as Erasmus (who was reared in this tradition), and reformers like Luther, were no doubt influenced by the anti-speculative tendencies of the movement.
- 40 For a recent study of Quintilian's longer legacy from the standpoint of emotions research, see K. Essary and Y. Haskell, 'Calm and violent passions: the genealogy of a distinction from Quintilian to Hume', *Erudition and the Republic of Letters* 3:1, 2018, 55–81.
- 41 Shuger, 'The philosophical foundations of sacred rhetoric', p. 116.
- 42 Ibid. See also M. Morrissey, 'Scripture, style, and persuasion in seventeenth-century English theories of preaching', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 53:4, 2002, 686–706.
- 43 'Thomas Aristotelicus prorsus est, apathes in dicendo, tantum hoc agens, ut doceat lectorem' (Erasmus, *Ciceronianus*, in *Opera omnia Desideri Erasmi Roterodami*, Amsterdam, 1969–, vol. I-2, p. 660.
- 44 From the introduction to the *Enchiridion*, in the *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 66, ed. J.W. O'Malley, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, p. xxx.
- 45 See B. Cummings, 'Erasmus and the invention of literature', *Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook* 33, 2013, 22–54.
- 46 Erasmus, *Paraphrase on Luke 11–14*, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 48, trans. J.E. Phillips, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003, p. 272.
- 47 R. Leushuis, 'Emotion and imitation: the Jesus figure in Erasmus's Gospel paraphrases', *Reformation* 22:2, 2017, 82–101, (p. 97).
- 48 Leushuis, 'Emotion and imitation', p. 100.
- 49 Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, p. 198.
- 50 Although that question would certainly remain live well into the modern era. For an illuminating treatment of how this question was debated in the Antinomian controversy in Puritan America, for example, see A. Van Engen, *Sympathetic Puritans: Calvinist Fellow Feeling in Early New England*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- 51 For a fascinating treatment of the relationship between affective theology and biblical exegesis in the medieval period, with special attention to Middle English writings, see V. Gillespie, 'Mystic's foot', pp. 200–30.
- 52 Erasmus, Letter to Gilles (2260), in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 16, ed. J.M. Estes, trans. A. Dalzell, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2015, p. 153.
- 53 For examples including Martin Bucer and Wolfgang Musculus, see C. Farmer, *The Gospel of John in the Sixteenth Century*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 164–7. Richard Strier aptly writes, 'The Renaissance revived anti-Stoicism as well as Stoicism' (Strier, 'Against the rule of reason: praise of passion from Petrarch to Luther to Shakespeare to Herbert', in G. Kern Paster, K. Rowe and M. Floyd-Wilson (eds), *Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, pp. 23–42 (p. 23)). See also B. Pitkin, 'Erasmus, Calvin, and the faces of Stoicism in Renaissance and Reformation Thought', in J. Sellars (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition*, London: Routledge, 2016, pp. 145–59.
- 54 For an excellent study of the role of sympathy in circumscribing orthodox emotional communities in American Puritanism, see Van Engen, *Sympathetic Puritans*.
- 55 Zahl, 'The bondage of the affections', p. 197. Zahl also notes that Luther had studied Anselm's *De concordia* and Bernard's writings in the years before his break with the Church of Rome, which again affirms continuity of affective theologies with the earlier medieval period. For an analysis of the Erasmus–Luther dispute over free will from the perspective of rhetoric, see M. O'Rourke Boyle, *Rhetoric and Reform: Erasmus' Civil Dispute with Luther*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
- 56 S. Zahl, 'On the affective salience of doctrines', *Modern Theology* 31:3, 2015, 428–44.
- 57 Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. J.T. McNeill, trans. F.L. Battles, Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960, III.vi.4 (modified).
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 For further discussion, see K. Essary, *Erasmus and Calvin on the Foolishness of God: Reason and Emotion in the Christian Philosophy*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017, pp. 139–40. There I am channeling W. Bouwsma, *John Calvin*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989,

- Ch. 7, who has several other relevant examples. See also O. Millet, *Calvin et la dynamique de la parole: Étude de rhétorique réformée*, Bibliothèque littéraire de la Renaissance, 3rd ser., 28, Paris: Champion, 1992, and for an argument that situates Calvin's affective anthropology in an Augustinian-Melanchthonian context, see R. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 174–80.
- 60 See, especially, A. Ryrie, *Being Protestant in Reformation Britain*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, Ch. 1; and the introduction in Van Engen, *Sympathetic Puritans*.
- 61 S. Karant-Nunn, *The Reformation of Feeling: Shaping the Religious Emotions in Early Modern Germany*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 1.
- 62 J. Clement, 'The art of feeling in seventeenth-century English sermons', *English Studies* 98:7, 2017, 675–88 (p. 676).
- 63 For Erasmus and other examples, see discussion in K. Essary, 'Fiery heart and fiery tongue'; and J. Clement, 'Dearly beloved: love, rhetoric, and the seventeenth-century English sermon', *English Studies* 97:7, 2016, 729–30.
- 64 Ryrie, *Being Protestant in Reformation Britain*, pp. 18–19.
- 65 C. Zunino-Garrido, 'Henry Peacham's affective rhetoric and the Renaissance 'philosophy of man' in *The Garden of Eloquence* (1577, 1593)', *Parergon* 33:3, 2016, 97–120.
- 66 On the transition of Protestant attitudes toward figuration and allegory in the biblical text from one of anxiety to one of embrace, see B. Cummings, 'Protestant allegory', in R. Copeland and P. Struck (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Allegory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 177–90.
- 67 Nashe, *Christ's Tears over Jerusalem* (excerpts), online, available at: <www.oxford-shakespeare.com/Nashe/Christs_Tears_2.pdf> (accessed 24 October 2018), p. 4.
- 68 Nashe, *Christ's Tears over Jerusalem*, p. 19.
- 69 John Donne, *The Sermons of John Donne*, ed. G.R. Potter and E.M. Simpson, vol. 4, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962, p. 343.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 K. Ettenhuber, '"Tears of passion" and "inordinate lamentation": complicated grief in Donne and Augustine', in B. Cummings and F. Sierhuis (eds), *Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture*, Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2014, pp. 201–16 (p. 209).
- 72 Nashe, *Christ's Tears over Jerusalem*, p. 67.



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PART 3

BODIES



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THE EMOTIONAL BODY IN RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND PRACTICE

Rebecca F. McNamara

The body is a central feature of the most recent history of emotions scholarship,¹ but its relation to religion and premodern emotion developed in a burgeoning of research in this area during the first decade of this century.² The present chapter addresses further work over the last ten years in the history of emotions of the body and religion in Europe, 1100–1700. A few areas of focus emerge, situated mainly around religious belief and practice. I first discuss work on religious belief and identity across the period, including embodied emotions of body–soul theology and teaching on Christ’s and the believer’s body. I move next to religious practice, from medieval mysticism to its echoes in embodied spiritual practices following the Protestant and Catholic Reformations – here we see issues of continuity and change in premodern Europe foregrounded. I focus then on studies that examine bodily signs of religious engagement with emotions, especially weeping and facial expression. Finally, I review new research on emotions and materiality that takes up premodern religion and the body.

These topics are necessarily selective, since study of the body in premodern European religion has permeated many overlapping areas of emotions history. The most recent work no longer takes up the issue of *whether* emotion is embodied but *how* it is embodied and what theoretical and methodological approaches provide promising directions. From a theoretical standpoint, William Reddy’s emotives, emotional regimes and emotional refuges³ and, especially, Barbara H. Rosenwein’s emotional communities⁴ remain important influences in much of this research, as do Sarah McNamer’s performative, affective reading practices.⁵ The habituated practice of the body as articulated by Monique Scheer⁶ is increasingly being adopted, as are syntheses of historical research with neuroscientific and psychological research that posit a biocultural history of premodern emotions.⁷ And as we see in the final section of this chapter, some of the most recent work critiques boundaries between human bodies, emotions and things by applying material cultural theories to the history of emotion of religion.

Questions of continuity and change are highly relevant to this chapter, for Europe is sometimes delineated by pre- and post-Reformation shifts in religious beliefs and practices regarding the body. Susan Karant-Nunn, however, has argued that even with the reduction of outer emotionality in Lutheran and

Calvinist preaching in sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Germany, emotion and the body persisted in religious teaching, particularly the wounded body of Christ and the heart of the Protestant believer.⁸ Indeed, Karant-Nunn and others would agree with Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy that Christ's suffering body remained a locus of religious practice in an otherwise shifting environment for emotions across premodern Europe.⁹

Belief and identity

The suffering body of Christ, the devotee's embodied imitation of or empathy with Christ's Passion and the believer's heart emerge as foci in recent studies of emotion and religious belief and identity in premodern Europe. The body was integral to theorizing Christian belief long before 1100, and this is especially evident in discussions of the body and soul, their relationship to each other and their relationship to God. Andrew Tallon's outline of Platonic and Aristotelian soul-body dualisms and these ideas' influence on Christian doctrine are useful for framing the most basic terms of the relation of the body and emotions to Christian belief.¹⁰ Augustine (354–430) took up Platonic dualism of the soul and body (wherein emotions were bodily) as two entities that existed separately but were bound up temporarily on earth. This framework facilitated an understanding of the soul as 'the subject of divine action (God is spirit and acts on spirit)', while the physical body was disparaged.¹¹ Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) used re-discovered Aristotelian texts to redefine body-soul dualism as 'two *principles* coconstituting *one substance* or being'.¹² Aquinas's dyadic soul associated emotions with the 'lower', animal, sensate soul, while the 'spiritual' faculties of reason and will were associated with the higher soul. In this view, what was real was no longer that which could be sensed but that which could be understood, an epistemological move from perceptibility to intelligibility. Descartes took up Platonic substance dualism again in the seventeenth century, characterizing emotion as 'merely bodily' and the soul, 'the real person', as rational and free.¹³ Aquinas's thirteenth-century thinking on religion, emotion and the body was a 'revolution', as the dyadic soul was 'woven into the fabric of Christianity's relation to embodiment and emotion from then on'.¹⁴

Barbara H. Rosenwein also acknowledges the revolutionary influence of Aquinas's concept of the passions, especially on schools. But she locates Aquinas's theory in more broadly contextualized ideas about embodied emotions, showing similarities to ideas not only from Aristotle but from Cicero, Augustine, John of Damascus, Gregory of Tours, Alcuin and Aelred. While Aquinas's concept of passions accompanied by bodily transformations 'is thoroughly Aristotelian', Rosenwein notes that before his day, 'mystics like Saint Francis, Christina Mirabilis, and Marie d'Oignies had made such an association a regular – though not, as with Thomas, a theoretical – part of their affective lives'.¹⁵ Such overlapping or directly intertwined theories of emotion are the methodological lynchpin of Rosenwein's *Generations of Feeling*. She compiles 'emotional vocabularies' (lists of emotion words) and 'emotional sequences' (not emotion scripts, but varieties of emotions and emotional gestures that occur one after another) to show that emotional communities build on, reinvent and alter emotional ideas and practices of communities that precede them. By choosing theories of emotion and emotional communities across medieval and early modern

England and France, Rosenwein collapses periodization to track ‘emotional inheritances’.¹⁶ Rosenwein emphasizes that emotions are biocultural and that she finds no teleology or civilizing process in the story of emotions, instead insisting on ‘a lively narrative of continuity and change’.¹⁷ Methodologically, Rosenwein focuses on emotion words and definitions, with alternating chapters describing a prominent theory of emotion and then showing through microhistories how that theory played out in two different communities. She argues that even material objects, performance or other extra-textual sources for emotion all come back to words, therefore advocating words as the primary source for the historian of emotions.¹⁸ But her chapter on ‘Love and Treachery’ shows that a focus on words certainly encompasses embodied emotion. Here she shows how Alcuin’s eighth-century theory of emotion, expressed in his treatise *On the Virtues and Vices*, had been absorbed into common heritage for newly ascetic monastic orders in the twelfth century, using the example of abbot Aelred’s (1110–67) Cistercian monastery of Rievaulx in England. In Aelred’s emotional community, Christian belief and emotionality anchored in charity prompted peacemaking and friendship, both marked by bodily actions. Spurred by charity, kissing and embracing enacted peacemaking between monastic brothers, and the kiss was a generator and sign of friendship that was similar to the doctrine of one heart and soul between a believer and Christ.¹⁹

Additional historians of emotion have thought about how inherited theories of body–soul dualism(s) influenced medieval Christian writers across a range of genres. Philippa Maddern shows that late medieval vernacular Body–Soul debate literature displays variations of the traditional Western philosophical and Christian characteristics of the relationship between body and soul.²⁰ For example, the body sometimes made rational arguments that should be the purview of the soul, and the soul might express suffering of embodied pain in hell. Maddern argues that the ability of the soul and body to switch characteristics in this genre and in other late medieval vernacular literature is a dystopian reflection of the postlapsarian shattering of the perfect relationship between humans’ bodies, souls and God. In the same edited volume, Alicia Marchant contends that Welsh chronicler Adam Usk (d. 1430) defies typical ‘unemotional and impersonal’ generic conventions by using first-person narration to cast himself as a participant in the world and in the events that he records, thus increasing the perceived veracity, quality and immediacy of his chronicled events.²¹ Key to Marchant’s argument is Usk’s self-identification with Adam, the first God-created human, as a fellow ‘embodied and ensouled being, a sinner and sufferer’, thus linking Usk’s self-described bodily suffering and restoration with the fall and restoration of humankind through Christ.²² Marchant does not situate this analysis within history of emotions theory (as she does elsewhere),²³ but her careful close reading of deviations from generic forms and situating of Usk’s chronicle within larger contexts of religious belief and practice are a study of shifting emotional styles alongside ways in which late medieval writers could identify themselves as embodied and ensouled participants in Christian history.

Approaches to embodied emotions and belief have also prompted reconsideration of seemingly contrasting Christian identities in premodern Europe. Lollard belief was first marked by the Christian church as heretical, but Fiona Somerset has shown that Lollards articulated their beliefs through a religious identity not too distant from their Catholic persecutors. Somerset examines late fourteenth- to early

sixteenth-century Lollard writing to show that Lollards cultivated a religious identity for themselves and their readers that was structured on a proper disposition of emotion: feeling like saints, which included welcoming physical suffering and mockery for their beliefs.²⁴ Somerset's research is informed by Rosenwein's emotional communities and Reddy's emotives, emotional regimes and emotional refuges, and she draws on McNamer's proposal to use the term 'feeling' for analysing emotions in medieval English texts.²⁵ But Somerset establishes Raymond Williams's 'structures of feeling' as best suited to her study, for Lollards were various individuals more than they were a community, and she finds Williams's concept 'deeply sensitive to the relationships between as well as within social groups and to the ongoing processes by which any human understanding of emotion develops in tension with lived experience, as well as with cultural norms articulated through both social practice and written texts'.²⁶ She presents Lollard writing as characterized by a 'lollard [sic] confessional poetic', which involves 'self-interpolation or even full-on impersonation' of biblical narratives, saints and Christ.²⁷ Lollard interest in affective devotion has been previously denied or neglected by scholars, but Somerset argues that it 'is strongly attested by frequent lollard references to Christ's passion' and 'earthly ministry'.²⁸ This recasting of Lollard identity as expressed in their own texts demonstrates how attention to devotees' emotional comportment and the imitated body of Christ can refigure what seem to be static divisions amongst premodern Christian beliefs and identities as more like commonalities.

Indeed, Karant-Nunn's study of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist preaching in Germany shows Christ's and believers' bodies as sites of emotional continuity and change in Christian belief. Karant-Nunn acknowledges a dampening of outward emotional expression and reduction in focus on Christ's body in Lutheran preaching compared with Catholic religiosity. But she argues that Lutherans were instructed to inculcate heartfelt inner feeling as they engaged with faith and that emotions remained an 'indispensible underpinning of belief and deportment' for Catholic, Lutheran and Reformed denominations.²⁹ Erin Sullivan also puts pressure on modern divisions between late medieval and post-Reformation embodied emotional Christian belief. Sullivan argues that 'a strong emphasis on feeling as an index of faith resulted in a continued reliance within [Protestant] sermons, treatises, and poetry on the language of the body'.³⁰ Building on Peter Stearns and Carol Stearns' emotionology,³¹ Reddy's emotives, Rosenwein's emotional communities, Scheer's emotional practice, and Anna Wierzbicka's cultural scripts,³² Sullivan develops 'emotive improvisation': 'the process by which actors (both in the sociological and the theatrical sense) find new pathways through and sometimes beyond existing emotional standards and scripts'.³³ Methodologically, Sullivan emphasizes literary and dramatic texts as sources, and she aims to redirect the study of emotions in Renaissance England beyond medical humoral theory³⁴ to the 'immaterial' dimensions of passionate experience (such as theology of predestination and concerns with powers of the rational soul) in order to reveal a more 'dynamic, pluralistic, and at times unpredictable model of affective selfhood'.³⁵ However immaterial her approach to passionate experience, Sullivan's analysis is linked to the body. Her chapter 'Godly sorrow: feeling faith and the broken-down heart' analyses life-writings and illness narratives of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English autobiographers, Protestant sermons and treatises and

devotional poems by John Donne and George Herbert. Sullivan finds that language of the heart made the painful experience of godly sorrow inhering in the soul a ‘palpable and sharable’ process in the formation of Christian selfhood.³⁶

Practice

Christian belief and identity in Europe 1100–1700 continued to feature the body of the believer and of Christ, but embodied emotions are even more evident in studies of Christian practice during this time. The eleventh century has figured as a ‘remarkable shift’ in contemplative practice and iconography related to the suffering body of Christ and the sacrifice of martyrdom while emphasizing a devotion that was ‘more emotional than ever before’.³⁷ Eleventh-century monastic thinkers, including Jean of Fécamp and Anselm of Canterbury, paved the way for teaching on Christ’s suffering and its devotional imitation, characterized by Bernard of Clairvaux and William of Saint Thierry in the twelfth century and taken up in devotional practices of mystics such as Elisabeth of Schönau, Beatrijs of Nazareth, Hadewijch of Antwerp, Mechthild of Magdeburg, Mechthild of Hackeborn, Gertrude the Great, Angela of Foligno, Henry Suso, Elisabeth Stigel, Christine and Marguerite Ebner and Catherine of Siena.³⁸ Historians of emotion have attended to Christian mystics’ experiences, which often employ or evoke the emotional body even as they seek to transcend the material for the spiritual. Mystics challenge culturally normative emotions with their ‘extraordinary emotional artistry’: Fiona Somerset notes that while medieval mystical writers are aware of body–soul theories that interlink sensory, emotional and cognitive aspects, their practices push the implications of these theories further as they seek the divine, describing ‘possibilities beyond the typical expectations of their culture, or even outside human capacity as they perceive it’.³⁹ Mystics’ embodied emotions are transformative of self, relationships and communities – they are interpreted by Piroska Nagy as processes that generate change. Discussing the embodied emotions of Angela of Foligno and Lukardis of Oberweimar (d. 1309), Nagy suggests that ‘emotions take the self from one place or state to another’.⁴⁰ Such transformative processes are akin to McNamer’s interpretation of affective meditations on Christ’s Passion from the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries as ‘intimate scripts’.⁴¹ The ‘I’ in early affective prayers may not be self-expressive but instead intended to be performed by devotees, teaching medieval Christian compassion as a ‘performatively constituted emotion’ that was ‘insistently gendered as feminine’.⁴²

Some research has articulated the dark side of late medieval Christian devotional focus on imitating Christ’s suffering body in the way that Jews were constructed as inflictors of Christ’s pain and foils of penitent Christians.⁴³ Anthony Bale analyses medieval European depictions of the faces and figures of Jews in scenes of Christ’s Passion and discusses geographical sites of Jewish persecution, including the actual, imagined and – across Europe – remade spaces of Jerusalem and Calvary. Images of Jews in medieval Christian texts are instructive: the images’ ‘violence helps the Christian reader to read memorably and affectively’,⁴⁴ and these ‘affective memory-images [are] designed to bring the edifying and pleasurable experience of fear, violence, and contrast into the medieval reader/viewer’s aesthetic world’.⁴⁵ Bale’s theorization of feeling is framed through readings of medieval thinking about feeling and also contemporary work in the history of emotions and affect studies, using critical

interpretations of affect that connect feeling with physical processes while acknowledging the socially constructed nature of feelings and the body.⁴⁶ He draws on philosopher Jessi Prinz's work on 'constructive sentimentalism' (where 'moral education derives from emotional disposition'),⁴⁷ the affective literacy of Mark Amsler and the performative reading of Michael Camille.⁴⁸ The body is therefore integral to Bale's analysis of religious affective experience in terms of how the Jewish body was figured, both imaginatively and in performance, and in terms of how practices of writing, reading, seeing and touching texts and images about suffering Jews were performed by medieval scribes' and readers' bodies.

Devotional practice of improving spiritual health in premodern Europe also seeped into care for the physical body. Naama Cohen-Hanegbi discusses how fifteenth-century Paduan physician Bartolomeo Montagnana treats the body of his patient Johannes of Milano (whose health had deteriorated following his daughter's death) but is also concerned with healing his patient's soul.⁴⁹ The interrelation of medical and religious disciplines in Bartolomeo's practice speaks to the spiritual and social associations of emotion generally and grief specifically, and while Cohen-Hanegbi points out that Bartolomeo's approach is unusual, it represents wider debates in medicine which deliberated whether and how to include religion in medical practice. Cohen-Hanegbi notes the divergence between medical and religious approaches to grief – late medieval medicine typically characterized grief and other 'unhappy' emotions as hazardous to the body, while morality and religion 'welcomed and even encouraged clearly defined displays of grief and sorrow for political, social and spiritual purposes'.⁵⁰ Historians of emotion have also explored the interrelation of the spiritual and physical in premodern death practices. Juanita Ruys shows how attention to both body and soul was part of learning to die well in late medieval Europe. *Ars moriendi* texts prompted readers to imagine their corporeal destruction in order to invoke fear that would initiate preparing the soul for death. But Ruys contends that as the genre developed over the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, descriptions of the failing physical body expanded, 'becoming ever more emotionally provocative', so that fear could be a debilitating hindrance to penance and preparing for death properly.⁵¹ As an antidote to this fear of bodily destruction, later *ars moriendi* writers, like fifteenth-century English bureaucrat Thomas Hoccleve, promoted 'experiential identification' with Christ's Passion for the dying person, so that excessive emotion aroused by impending death could be calmed and the person could focus on preparing their soul for penance and a good death.⁵² Both Cohen-Hanegbi and Ruys situate their studies within late medieval definitions of emotions and the body, taking up a contextual and text-based methodology analogous to the text-centric approach of Rosenwein.

Laurence Lux-Sterritt and Claire Walker have examined the effects of more stringent rules in the seventeenth century on the emotionality of early modern nuns. The Catholic Reformation reinforced gendered understandings of the body, emotions and spirituality, opening up more active roles for male religious but further enclosing and restricting female religious, as women were understood to be more sensual and therefore more emotional than men. Lux-Sterritt explores the affectivity of English Benedictine nuns living in exile in France and the southern Netherlands in the seventeenth century, using texts written by nuns that document their journeys of dying to the world and themselves in order to experience divine

love.⁵³ Nuns were to fight against their base human passions – one nun denounces worldly feelings, located in ‘the inferior portion of the soule’, warning that her sisters should instead exercise the ‘spiritual or intellectual portion of their souls’, invoking the dyadic passionate soul inherited from Aquinas.⁵⁴ In order to ‘become blank slates on which the divine spirit would inscribe its will’, nuns practised physical and moral asceticism by mortifying their bodily senses and humiliating their emotions.⁵⁵ For some nuns, especially the Benedictines of Cambrai, the burden of the physical body and its associated emotions was so great that death was desirable, ‘a liminal moment in which the nun would finally be born into her spiritual self’ and united with Christ.⁵⁶ Passages on this disembodied divine union after death use highly expressive and affective language, and Lux-Sterritt emphasizes the difficulty for nuns of separating divine experiences from the language of the body and its emotions. For the spiritual emotions, although distinct from animal passions, also found their source in the body ‘and expressed themselves in joy, tears, or sensory images such as burning or drowning’; although nuns sought to subjugate or escape their ‘corporal shell’, the body ‘could also be the very locus of experience of divine love, and the opportunity for spiritual bliss’.⁵⁷ Claire Walker couches her analysis of seventeenth-century nuns’ emotions in more attentively theorized terms than Lux-Sterritt, drawing on Rosenwein’s and Reddy’s work to explain how English convents used alternative emotional styles to challenge the dominant emotional regimes prescribed by post-Reformation Catholicism.⁵⁸ Although official instruction advocated mortification of the passions as part of nuns’ death to the world, nuns ‘sought refuge in alternative “counter-cultural” styles’ by ‘embedding complaints within their spiritual texts [to] articulat[e] their concerns and expres[s] their fears’, and nuns also corresponded with family outside the cloister, where they ‘might freely express their feelings without threatening collective order’.⁵⁹ Walker follows Scheer’s and Arlie Hochschild’s views that emotions are embodied as practices or as inscriptions on the body,⁶⁰ thus establishing as given the relationship of her subjects’ emotions and bodies to their religious belief and practice.

Expression: weeping and the face

Within scholarship on emotions and the body in premodern religious devotional practice and iconography, research emphases emerge on weeping and facial expression, where scholars often take the performative or embodied practice of emotions as a starting point for interrogating religious expressions and perceptions of feeling. A collection on crying in the Middle Ages, edited by art historian Elina Gertsman, brings together art historians, historians and literary scholars working in Christian, Jewish and Islamic contexts.⁶¹ Here Christopher Swift uses psychological theories on evolutionary components of emotion, as well as Stanislavsky’s psychophysiological methodology for acting with true emotion, to explore culturally distinct ‘legible corporal and vocal signs’ in medieval lay devotional practices that Swift sees as methods of integrating ‘basic human feelings’ like ‘guilt, sorrow, and anger’.⁶² Swift contextualizes penitential devotion in Stanislavskian terms in order to address how lay devotees in late medieval Spain conceived of affective contrition and what tools they used to prepare themselves for ritual public weeping. Performing bodies imitated Christ’s divine body, for example through self-flagellation and tearful lamentation,

so that the ‘present experience of a bleeding, tearful body coalesced around a nexus of emotional and athletic engagement with sacred narrative’.⁶³

Recent emotional histories of premodern religious weeping often touch on the medieval period,⁶⁴ but Rosenwein links the spiritual and emotional gesture of weeping described in the fifteenth-century *Book of Margery Kempe* to the weeping in mid-seventeenth-century testimonials of a Puritan church.⁶⁵ The Protestant experience in the seventeenth century was ‘repurposing some of the emotional vocabularies and sequences of the fifteenth’, but Rosenwein concedes that ‘they no doubt *felt* differently’, especially considering that Protestantism ‘emphasized a radically transcendent God who had predetermined salvation and damnation, [so that believers] were never entirely sure of their salvation. Their comfort alternated with doubts’.⁶⁶ Alongside continuities and nuances in vocabulary, Rosenwein contrasts the ways in which the weeping of these two sets of believers was received by their communities, finding that though the Puritan believers, unsure of their salvation, ‘were more anxious’, they received emotional support in their community, whereas Margery received scorn.⁶⁷ This comparison across medieval and early modern England and across denominational difference shows how bodily signs of emotions could be similarly associated with religious experiences or sequences of emotion, while distinctions existed in the ways that those signs were received by others and in what they meant to weeping individuals.⁶⁸

Beyond its implication in the production of tears, the face more generally has been taken up as an important site for the history of emotions, with Stephanie Downes and Stephanie Trigg pointing out that ‘the various social practices associated with the face and faciality help to constitute that history’.⁶⁹ Elina Gertsman has reconsidered the meaning of the Gothic smile in a study of thirteenth-century architectural sculptures on church thresholds. Most of Gertsman’s examples are German and French sculptures of the biblical parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins, and she uses Rosenwein’s emotional communities to think about a viewing community’s experience of interpreting thirteenth-century Gothic expressions. The smiling face, Gertsman concludes, is far from a static, somatic descriptor of the soul. Although there are examples of wise virgins with smiling expressions and foolish virgins with downturned expressions and bodily gesticulations, there are other iterations of the parable in which facial expressions do not seem to correspond to the moral virtue and vice and suggested eternal salvation or damnation of the two groups of virgins. Instead, Gertsman suggests that the ‘Gothic smile, recast in different visual contexts, constantly transforms, becoming one of the most versatile and ambiguous gestures in medieval visual language’.⁷⁰ She calls for ‘a break in the so-called universal anthropological equation between gesture and emotion’, and for a divorce between the gesture and the ‘inner passion of the soul’.⁷¹ Thus, Gertsman disagrees with Paul Ekman’s figuration of smiles and other facial expressions as universal signs of ‘basic emotions’, and she also challenges Paul Binski’s idea that Gothic smiles consistently or plausibly exteriorize the soul’s inclinations.⁷²

Philippa Maddern has also suggested a reformulation of interpreting faces in religious written texts and visual art in fourteenth- to early sixteenth-century England. Maddern argues that reading faces during this period seems to have depended much less on interpreting facial expression (alteration of facial muscles) than it did on those aspects of the face (shape or habitual colouring) that were understood as signs of

that person's humoral constitution or astrological nature, changing facial colour, gestures of the face (holding it at an angle) and facial outputs (tears, sweat, or blood).⁷³ Of facial outputs, blood and sweat were more unequivocal signs of emotions, but tears were more ambiguous and received more scrutiny to determine their nature and sincerity.⁷⁴ Maddern points to the imitation of Mary's weeping and sympathy for Christ on the cross that became more widespread in late medieval devotional traditions, where Mary's sorrow was to be imitated by the devotee, then used to evoke tears that would signify both love for Christ and the observer's contrition for Christ's death.⁷⁵ Maddern concludes that sorrow on the face of Christ or Mary was not comprehended through their facial expressions. Referring to Hans Memling's 1475 *The Man of Sorrows in the Arms of the Virgin* (National Gallery of Victoria, Australia), Maddern argues instead that 'medieval viewers must have deduced the sorrow and agony of the image from facial coloring (comparatively pale); facial gesture (the heads drooped to one side); and facial output (the tears on the Virgin's face mirroring the blood running down Christ's forehead)'.⁷⁶ Gertsman's and Maddern's conclusions both reinterpret bodily expressions of emotion that supposedly correlated with medieval Christian spirituality, and their findings could be extended to written descriptions and literary imagery of the religious body.

The history of emotions and studies of late medieval ethnographic constructions in Western Christendom have neglected analyses of facial gesture and emotion as compared with attention to skin colour or physiognomy.⁷⁷ Kim Phillips maintains that facial expressions such as 'the mocking grins, bestial grimaces, and lolling mouths common in depictions of demons, Jews, and Ethiopians' are 'indicative of their subjects' special role in the medieval Christian imaginary, especially in their perceived enmity to Christ and Christians and (in Ethiopians' case) their perceived connections with the bestial'.⁷⁸ But Phillips's study demonstrates how European figurations of Mongol peoples changed swiftly from the early- and mid-thirteenth century to the end of that century, as Mongol peoples became for Christian Europeans potential converts, allies against common Islamic enemies and trade partners. European Christian artistic renderings of Mongol peoples in the thirteenth century were dominated by savagery: 'their open mouths and gory teeth connect them to ubiquitous imagery of death, demons, the Antichrist, apocalypse, and hell'.⁷⁹ But writings and imagery of Mongol peoples shifted in the fourteenth century; Marco Polo's travelogues, for example, tended not to comment on the body or face of Mongol peoples, and illuminations accompanying Polo's books about Asia portrayed restrained faces and emotional states. Phillips emphasizes, however, that fifteenth-century descriptions of inhabitants of Southeast Asia and southern India were often pejorative, depicting serene-faced people eating human remains, worshipping idols or selling children for food.⁸⁰ Like Bale's study of medieval Christian depictions of Jews, analysis of bodily expression in relation to European Christian identity and propaganda is an area that invites more work by historians of emotions.⁸¹

Materiality

In the last couple of years, historians of emotion have increasingly utilized material culture to illuminate relationships between things, religion and feeling.⁸² Central to recent theories of materiality and emotions are the views that 'emotions exist in the

material world, which includes the human body, and that they affect and are affected by it'.⁸³ Two examples of recent work on early modern Europe suggest directions for theorizing emotions and religion through material objects. Charles Zika examines the embodied emotional experiences of individuals and collectivities in relation to devotional objects at the pilgrimage site of Mariazell, Austria.⁸⁴ Zika analyses a variety of sources: written records of the pilgrimage site, practices associated with the devotional objects, and records of these objects and their changing architectural contexts, drawn from written descriptions, pilgrimage badges, engravings, woodcuts and paintings. He theorizes emotions as performative speech acts, drawing from Reddy and Scheer, but he discusses the devotional objects' significance in terms of 'emotional economy' in order to highlight the 'benefits and resources of the pilgrimage shrines' in terms of their 'complex system of exchange involving many different actors, producers, promoters, interpreters, and custodians'.⁸⁵ While Zika's argument for the ways the shrine at Mariazell 'stimulated an emotional identification with a proto-national Austrian state' ostensibly focuses on the seventeenth century, he develops his history of the emotional economy of Mariazell's devotional objects from their twelfth-century beginnings.⁸⁶ This time span is integral to his arguments about the shifting emotional meanings that the Virgin's shrine has had across the life of the pilgrimage site (including into the present: Mariazell remains a pilgrimage site), even while the Virgin has remained a constant and important figure for the site.

Art is often interpreted by how it represents emotion, but Helen Hills steps away from this approach to examine instead how art and architecture 'work materially in non-representational terms to produce affect'.⁸⁷ Hills analyses this phenomenon in relation to miracles in seventeenth-century Italy, interpreting written accounts of miracles alongside reliquary objects and architectural spaces in which they occur. She suggests that the liquefaction of blood in the San Gennaro blood relic in Naples 'required devotional and spiritual change in its witnesses' through its performative, material changes, and that the miracle made visible 'the affective economy binding the devout, saint, and blood' while it also secured 'place through that relationship'.⁸⁸ Zika's and Hills's employment of emotional/affective economies provides promising directions for ways in which religious objects, place, bodies and emotions can be understood to relate to each other in the premodern past and up to the present.

Conclusion

From the embodied emotions of thirteenth-century mystics and seventeenth-century nuns, to the pervasive suffering Christ in pre- and post-Reformation Catholic (and some Protestant) teaching, emotions and the body remain integral to premodern European faith. As foundational theoretical approaches in the history of emotions are adapted, new ways of understanding religious embodied emotions emerge, with increasing use of non-essentialist, biocultural approaches to religious belief, identity, practice and expression. This chapter offers only a selection of scholarship from the last decade that shows how religion and the body have influenced the history of premodern emotions, but it suggests areas for development. More work remains to be done by historians of emotion on the ways in which the body, religion, race and ethnicity interrelate in premodern Europe. There is also great potential for bringing critical disability studies into conversation with the history of emotions of premodern European religion and the

body.⁸⁹ Forthcoming studies of premodern affect,⁹⁰ alongside studies that draw from neuroscience and New Materialism, will likely offer further insight into how the history of emotions might take up the biocultural experience, construction and context of emotions in premodern European religion.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

- 1 Barbara H. Rosenwein and Riccardo Cristiani find that the newest histories of emotion have the body as an overarching theme: specifically, historians focus on two fundamental conceptions of the emotional body: the ‘bounded’, autonomous body, and the ‘porous’ body as it interacts with and is defined by the material world and the environment; Rosenwein and Cristiani, *What is the History of Emotions?*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018, pp. 62–102.
- 2 C. Bynum, *Wonderful Blood: Theology and Practice in Late Medieval Northern Germany and Beyond*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007; S. McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010; M. Rubin, *Emotion and Devotion: The Meaning of Mary in Medieval Religious Cultures*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009; and S. Karant-Nunn, *The Reformation of Feeling: Shaping the Emotions in Early Modern Germany*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010 are foundational for the history of embodied emotion and religion in pre-modern Europe.
- 3 W.M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- 4 B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- 5 McNamer, *Affective Meditation*.
- 6 M. Scheer, ‘Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them have a history)?: A Bourdieuan approach to understanding emotion,’ *History and Theory* 51, 2012, 193–220.
- 7 A recent study integrating the history of emotions and neuroscience is R. Boddice, *The History of Emotions*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2018. Instead of using emotional communities or regimes, Boddice theorizes past emotions via the ‘moral economy’: ‘not only does it stress the emotional practices that inhere in a community, but it also points to the ways in which those practices are evaluated and according to what authorities’ (p. 211). Using Boddice’s approach, religion and spirituality, as histories of morality, are inherently bodily, for the history of organized religion is full of examples of ‘translating sensory input into meaningful and evaluated outputs’, although ‘the meanings of sensory inputs change radically’ in time and place (p. 203).
- 8 Karant-Nunn, *The Reformation of Feeling*.
- 9 D. Boquet and P. Nagy, *Sensible Moyen Âge: une histoire des émotions dans l’Occident médiéval*, Paris: Seuil, 2015.
- 10 A. Tallon, ‘Christianity’, in J. Corrigan (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 111–24. Tallon’s approach to emotion and religion is essentialist, grounded in an evolutionary, universalist standpoint, a view that may give many of today’s historians of emotion pause as they move away from universalizing arguments. Tallon also calcifies periodic distinctions and advocates for a teleology that privileges the methods and knowledges of empirical science (pp. 121–2). See also reviews of philosophies of soul, body and religion in J. Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 9–25, and B.H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling: A History of Emotions, 600–1700*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- 11 Tallon, ‘Christianity’, p. 116.

- 12 Ibid., p. 117.
- 13 Ibid., p. 118.
- 14 Ibid., pp. 117–18.
- 15 Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*, pp. 149, 169.
- 16 Ibid., p. 9.
- 17 Ibid., p. 15.
- 18 Ibid., pp. 5–9.
- 19 Ibid., pp. 102–3.
- 20 P. Maddern, ‘Murdering souls and killing bodies: understanding spiritual and physical sin in late-medieval English devotional works’, in D. Kambasković (ed.), *Conjunctions of Mind, Soul and Body from Plato to the Enlightenment*, Rotterdam: Springer, 2014, pp. 25–46.
- 21 A. Marchant, ‘“Adam, you are in a labyrinth”: the first-person voice as the nexus between body and spirit in the Chronicle of Adam Usk’, in Kambasković, *Conjunctions of Mind, Soul and Body*, pp. 47–68 (p. 54).
- 22 Ibid., p. 63.
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- 24 F. Somerset, *Feeling Like Saints: Lollard Writings After Wyclif*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
- 25 S. McNamer, ‘Feeling’, in P. Strohm (ed.), *Middle English*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 241–57.
- 26 Somerset, *Feeling Like Saints*, pp. 181–2.
- 27 See especially analysis of the *Letter of Richard Wyche*: *ibid.*, pp. 154–8.
- 28 Ibid., p. 158.
- 29 Karant-Nunn, *Reformation of Feeling*, p. 143. The heart is also central to embodied, affective pain – particularly compassion, love and sorrow – in A. Lazikani’s study of English religious texts in the High Middle Ages: *Cultivating the Heart: Feeling and Emotion in Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Religious Texts*, Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press, 2015.
- 30 E. Sullivan, *Beyond Melancholy: Sadness and Selfhood in Renaissance England*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 128. Whereas historians of emotion increasingly disagree with Paul Ekman’s ‘basic emotions’ theory, Sullivan begins her book with a modern behavioural scientific claim for the essential, unchanging universality of sadness as a basic emotion, going on to describe shifting and conflicting cultural paradigms for sadness in Renaissance England. See P. Ekman, ‘Basic emotions’, in T. Dalgleish and M. Power (eds), *Handbook of Cognition and Emotion*, New York: Wiley, 1999, pp. 45–60.
- 31 P. Stearns and C. Z. Stearns, ‘Emotionology: clarifying the history of emotions and emotional standards’, *American Historical Review* 90:4, 1985, 813–36.
- 32 A. Wierzbicka, ‘Emotion, language, and cultural scripts’, in S. Kitayama and H. Markus (eds), *Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies of Mutual Influence*, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1994, pp. 130–98.
- 33 Sullivan, *Beyond Melancholy*, p. 9.
- 34 See the influential work of G. Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
- 35 Sullivan, *Beyond Melancholy*, p. 4.
- 36 Ibid., p. 128.
- 37 N. Largier, ‘Medieval Mysticism’, in Corrigan, *Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion*, pp. 364–80 (p. 375).
- 38 Ibid., p. 374. Sarah McNamer foregrounds the role of female religious readers in the practice of compassionate devotion to the Passion: *Affective Meditation*, pp. 84–7.
- 39 F. Somerset, ‘Emotion’, in A. Hollywood and P. Beckman (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 294–304 (pp. 302, 295).
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- 41 McNamer, *Affective Meditation*, p. 12.

- 42 Ibid., pp. 3, 17.
- 43 A. Bale, *Feeling Persecuted: Christians, Jews, and Images of Violence in the Middle Ages*, London: Reaktion Books, 2010; Bynum, *Wonderful Blood*, pp. 239–44; Karant-Nunn, *Reformation of Feeling*, pp. 133–57.
- 44 Bale, *Feeling Persecuted*, p. 17.
- 45 Ibid., p. 65.
- 46 Ibid., pp. 18–22.
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- 60 A. Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983.
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- 67 Ibid., pp. 269–70.
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- 74 Ibid., p. 30.
- 75 A tradition traced in M. Rubin, *Emotion and Devotion*, pp. 79–110, and M. Rubin, *Mother of God: A History of the Virgin Mary*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009, pp. 243–55.

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- 79 Ibid., p. 91.
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- 87 H. Hills, 'Miraculous affects and analogical materialities: rethinking the relation between architecture and affect in Baroque Italy', in M. Bailey and K. Barclay (eds), *Emotion, Ritual and Power in Europe, 1200–1920: Family, State and Church*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2016, pp. 193–219 (p. 194).
- 88 Ibid., pp. 205, 206.
- 89 For example, Julie Orlemanski applies critical disability studies in interpreting accounts of the leprous kiss in holy lives from the fourth to the fifteenth centuries, suggesting that 'disgust and its concomitants provide a kind of affective heat fueling the spiritual transformations produced out of the kiss': Orlemanski, 'How to kiss a leper', *postmedieval* 3:2, 2012, 142–57 (p. 151).
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THE CORPOREAL ORIENTATION

Understanding deviance through the object(s) of love

Michael D. Barbezat

Western intellectuals and Christian theologians in the medieval and early modern periods understood human deviancy through their theories of the emotions. As they theorized, deviant thoughts, deviant beliefs and deviant actions ultimately resulted from misguided love. In their theory of love, love should be directed towards the immaterial God who created all material things. Deviancy, in contrast, resulted from love directed towards created things instead of their creator. Correct love had a spiritual orientation, while bad love had a corporeal one. The spiritual orientation was straight, a direct line between created human and the creator God; the corporeal orientation was inverted, a turning of the created back into itself.¹ This framework, or ideology, of love and its two essential orientations was enormously influential, shaping ideas about supposedly aberrant social groups and individuals. In it, love acted as both an emotion and as an emotional governor, directing and shaping other emotions and experiences linked to the emotions. In particular, the orientation of love was an essential element of successful hermeneutics, as only those who love rightly can ultimately read past the outer appearances of things and of words to understand inner meanings.

The basic assumptions behind the historical corporeal orientation have remained tenaciously ingrained in Western thought, sometimes unmoored from the larger ideological framework in which they arose; current research into the history of the emotions provides tools with which to understand the complex and momentous results of corporeality as an emotional and cognitive orientation. In particular, recent emotions scholarship can clarify the importance of the ideological models used to explain deviance as a theological/moral category, as well as illuminate how this ideology of difference could create many different expressions over time. In my exploration of one particular ideological construct used in the past to explain the essentially unitary nature of deviance, as well as some of the particular expressions of that construct, I have been inspired by a number of theoretical approaches to the emotions. In addition to well-known theories of emotions research, I have drawn on theoretical frameworks that are less commonly encountered in work dedicated to the history of the emotions.² In this chapter, I attempt to relate some common approaches to the history of the emotions to central concepts in medieval Western Christian theology, premodern theories of cognition and modern queer theory.

I will first explore some of these theoretical approaches before analysing the essential framework of the corporeal orientation as found in the work of Augustine of Hippo. Next, I will interrogate how these ideas function in the twelfth-century account of human cognition offered by Hugh of St Victor. From Hugh, I will examine how Chaucer's Pardoner, in the fourteenth century, exemplifies the idea of a corporeal love as described by Augustine and Hugh. Finally, I will briefly examine how the Fall of humanity in Milton's seventeenth-century *Paradise Lost* follows the framework of the corporeal orientation outlined earlier by Augustine, Hugh and Chaucer.

Community, regime and the goals of emotional effort

In William Reddy's concept of the human emotions and their history, the ideals believed in by any community are centrally important. In fact, these ideals can help to shape the goals that form the basis for the emotions themselves. There is always a multiplicity of goals, arising from personal and societal needs. The emotions are a 'domain of effort' in which individuals struggle to shape their own emotional experience according to some of these wider goals.³ Through the use of 'emotives', a type of speech act that both describes and changes the world, individuals can either shape themselves through a process of emotional management towards the better service of a particular goal or fall into a state of delusion in which the conflict between feeling and expectation continues to exist.⁴ Reddy calls this self-fashioning process 'emotional navigation', and this navigation describes attempts by an individual at reconciliation or reorientation that can lead to either 'self-deception' or a 'conversion experience'.⁵

In Reddy's schema, normative orders for the emotions that include prescriptions about how they should be ideally experienced and expressed must exist for stable and enduring social organizations to persist. He calls these sets of normative emotions, rituals and practices 'emotional regimes'. These regimes, often synonymous with political regimes, structure a community's emotional order around 'ideals to strive toward and strategies to guide individual effort'.⁶ In all levels of Reddy's theories of the emotions, the goals believed by individuals and their society are central and formative, and while there may be many emotional regimes, the ideologies that inform their goals may certainly have a longer history. Since emotional regimes not only police certain types of emotion but also help to bring it about, the ideals that inform them can become a kind of active agent.

Barbara H. Rosenwein's idea of 'emotional communities' parallels, to some extent, Reddy's concept of the emotional regime. For Rosenwein, emotional communities are 'groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions'.⁷ In contrast to emotional regimes, however, emotional communities are not hegemonic.⁸ Individuals can choose to move between any number of overlapping and simultaneously available communities of feeling. One remains in a community, presumably, because one shares its values and chooses to maintain that sharing. For Rosenwein, emotional communities are a kind of 'genome mosaicism', an emotional inheritance that adapts old traditions to new needs.⁹ Rather than a series of supersessions, changes in emotional communities involve the persistence of the past. Rosenwein's emotional communities are a kind of generational descent in which the past is not dead; rather,

‘generations of feeling’ are best understood through the ‘constant availability and potentiality of older and coexisting traditions’.¹⁰ This is a system in which parents never irrevocably have to die.

Emotional regimes and emotional communities take the ideals that inform them very seriously as guides to human effort, and both types of community invest themselves in the past. As I have argued, the emotional regime gains its coherence through normative goals and values. Emotional communities take shape around shared values and types of expression. Regarding the past, the recurrent supersessions of one emotional regime over another create clashes between the present order and the past that must be negotiated by the individual, leading to significant potential suffering. Likewise, for emotional communities the past is not dead but somehow living through the collective choices of different groups. In both of these frameworks, continuous individual effort and choice remain central. The concept of the corporeal orientation can provide a great deal of material for either theoretical approach.

The corporeal orientation: common deviance through misdirected love

Medieval theologians had a lot to say about the orientation of love. Augustine had described the world as divided into two cities or human communities formed from two different loves. One was formed by the love of God, and the other took form around a love of self.¹¹ Deviance existed as the result of a love directed towards carnal objects: the self and the enjoyment found in created things. In the work of medieval intellectuals, this orientation towards the created rather than the creator is a trait shared by many categories of threatening difference. Those renowned for and in large part defined by their carnal love, among others, included Jews, Muslims, historical pagans and Christian heretics.

A supposed corporeal orientation was used to describe many supposedly deviant groups and non-normative behaviour. The carnal orientation ascribed to Jews is the most famous and the most studied, but Judaism has often functioned in Western discourse as a way for non-Jews to ‘make sense of and criticize their world’, rather than solely as an attempt to grapple with a true living Jewish minority.¹² For medieval Christian theologians, the Jewish nature was imagined as a carnal opposite to the spiritual Christian. The carnality of Jews resulted in their inability to interpret the spiritual or allegorical meanings of biblical texts.¹³ Like animals, they only saw what was immediately before them; they could read the letter but not its signification.¹⁴ Heretics too supposedly saw the carnal around them and missed its wider meanings. They read like Jews, taking the literal meanings of texts uncritically.¹⁵ They did this as a result of their love of created things, and this same love led them, inevitably, to sexual deviance.¹⁶ In fact, some of the most common terms used to describe same-sex acts were also the vocabulary of heresy: ‘to commit heresy’, or ‘to bugger’ all arose from the strong association between heresy and deviant sex.¹⁷ In fact, the theological category of sodomy, in the words of Mark Jordan, came about in the Middle Ages as a ‘pure essence of the erotic’.¹⁸ This ‘pure eroticism’ was a distilled love of sensual pleasure unmoored from all other teleologies. Likewise, the presentation of Muslims by Western authors also carried these elements, liking them to carnal interpretive failures in spiritual reading and sexual excess.¹⁹ All of these similar presentations have

underneath them the assumption of a similar love. All of these categories of difference supposedly have a corporeal orientation.

The alignment of love fundamentally affects human cognition, and the corporeal orientation is in many respects inextricable from hermeneutics. Those who love carnally cannot interpret correctly, while those who love spiritually can. At its base this concept can be explained through another Augustinian formulation, although its fundamentals are hardly an invention of Augustine. The created world is like a text, written by God. It can be read or interpreted by his human creations to achieve greater knowledge of Him.²⁰ In his *On Christian Teaching* Augustine explains how this interpretation is enabled by the orientation of love. Things can either be used or enjoyed. Only God is to be enjoyed or loved. The things He has created are to be used to learn more about the God that created them and to return to that God.²¹

In this idea of use and enjoyment lies the suggestion that the created things encountered by human beings in their lives should be appreciated as signs. The created world and all its contents ultimately constitute signs that signify God and they should be interpreted that way, leading toward a greater knowledge and experience of Him. The experience of the world and all its contents is a stage in an interpretive process; it is a vehicle not an end:

The whole worldly arrangement was made by divine providence for our salvation. We must make use of this, not with a permanent love and enjoyment of it, but with a transient love and enjoyment of our journey, or of our conveyances (so to speak) or any other expedients whatsoever (there may be a more appropriate word), so that we love the means of transport only because of our destination.²²

Conversely, mistaking a sign for a thing that is signified disrupts the journey to God. When one loves created things for themselves, as a good in and of themselves, this misplacement of love from creator to created thing is the same as mistaking a sign for the thing it signifies. It is exactly this misplacement that lies at the heart of what I call the corporeal orientation.

The misplacement of love is also a question of the direction of the will. The object of the human will or of human desire – Augustine's term *voluntas* can mean both – was also the object of its love.²³ The orientation of desire is here the orientation of love, but this desire is not wholly in human hands since it depends upon grace.²⁴ Each Christian needs grace to will and to love correctly. Without grace, there is only a crooked direction to love and the will. This deviance from the proper direction leads away from the eternal good of God towards eternal immersion in changeable matter. Enabled by grace, the human being must will in the right direction, and there is always the possibility that this focus of the will can be disrupted.

The corporeal orientation is not only a force outside the body of Christian community, but also a presence within it. It haunts the Christian, threatening always to disrupt the salvific alignment of love. This haunting is in some senses a disruption of proper temporalities.²⁵ The pre-Christian past is defined by an entrapment in a carnal love, and resultant carnal understandings, that were superseded by the coming of Christ. After the Incarnation, the spiritual truths within the Old Testament could finally be read. Likewise, the pagan superstitions of antiquity

could be recognized as the carnal fictions they were. This carnal past did not properly die. It lived on in the form of the Jews, and in the form of the great texts of pagan antiquity among others.

The linear temporality of each Christian life also was marked by the carnal. At birth, each human being was by default a member of the unredeemed body of Adam. In this state of Original Sin, carried through the matter of the parent, not only were people damned but they were also enfeebled by epistemological and hermeneutical deficiencies.²⁶ In this state, a human being would normally incline towards carnal loves and would miss the spiritual significations of the objects of carnal love, through which God could be known and approached. At baptism, the human journey away from this functionally innate carnal orientation could begin. After this journey away from flawed origins commenced, it could always be interrupted. The Christian who wished to love spiritually, to understand correctly, could always fall back into the carnality and the ignorance that was their origin. In other words, loving correctly was a 'domain of effort' that required constant maintenance and vigilance.

Steven Kruger has explained the possibility of reversion to carnal love and carnal understandings led on by that love through the spectre of Judaism. This spectre haunted Christian self-conception, suggesting the possibility of a reversion to its origins in an earlier Judaism.²⁷ As Kruger recognizes, this conviviality with superseded origins is not a unique feature ascribed to Judaism, only a prominent one. In fact, the possibility of a fall back into the carnal is a wider threat to the premodern Christian.

The descriptions of multiple types of deviance produced in the Middle Ages relied heavily on an essential carnality, and this carnality also created the very punishment deviance was due. Religious and sexual deviants – hardly two completely separate categories – were particularly understood through this lens in comparison to other supposed deviants. Likewise, the ultimate punishments levied upon these types of people relied upon this same logic of worldly love. The role of carnal love in punishment is particularly apparent in the forms of Purgatory and Hell. Hell, as the ultimate reward of deviance, is a special place that is also a state of being reached through love. In fact, one reaches Hell by essentially loving in the wrong direction. This loving wrongly leads to thinking wrongly, and the torments of the Other World are best imagined through this particular combination.

I will use a minor work of the great twelfth-century intellectual and theologian Hugh of St Victor, 'On the Union of the Body and of the Soul', as an example of the nature and effects of a carnal love, both in hermeneutics and in otherworldly punishment. These two seemingly distant realms are deeply connected, and they illuminate the essential logic ascribed to human deviance. For Hugh, the corporeal orientation is not only the cause of human failure to know and follow God but also the tool for the punishment this type of essential deviancy incurs. In all respects, for Hugh, these elements all rely upon the alignment of love and the passions.

A skin for the soul: carnality and cognition in Hugh of St Victor

For Hugh of St Victor, the meeting point of the body and the soul occurs in the realm of images. These images are the same as the Augustinian signs that should be used as a vehicle to God, and function virtually identically to the Augustinian

category of spiritual vision. For Hugh, the sense impressions of worldly things should be understood as words in a text, designed to convey knowledge of its author, for '[t] his entire sensible world is like a book written by the finger of God'.²⁸ So understood, the world should not be loved as a good in-and-of itself; instead it should be loved only for the sake of its creator. The reading of the created world and its contents as signs is not a simple thing, and if the passions behind the encounter between the body and the soul are disrupted, signs can become a prison of a kind for the soul. To phrase it again in a more thoroughly Augustinian vocabulary, if the sign is mistaken for what it signifies, the result is a kind of slavery to the sign. The sign is the image of created things, and thus slavery to the sign is slavery to corporeality.

In his 'On the Union of the Body and of the Soul', Hugh situates his mediation between the body and soul in the context of differing grades of spirituality and corporeality.²⁹ Some bodies are closer to the spirit than others; likewise, some spirits are closer to the body (indeed, almost lower than the body) than others. The meeting point between the body and the soul can only take place in an encounter between the lowest type of spirituality and the highest type of corporeality. The images of material things are the essential link in the mediation between the spiritual and material worlds. It is in these images, and the interpretive powers applied to them, that the body meets the spirit, particularly in the impressions from the senses that act in the imagination. The imagination and the impressions from the bodily senses are fundamentally linked, because, as Hugh reminds us, sense is the 'instrument of sensuality and the origin of imagination'.

The imagination is a type of refined fire, a spiritual corporeality. The fiery power that takes the impression of sense inward is the imagination. The image seen by the eye passes through its matter into the brain.³⁰ Purified through this passage, it is now the imagination. In the brain, the imaginary image moves from the front (the 'cella phantastica') to the middle, where it 'touches the very substance of the rational soul'.³¹ In this contact, it is the most spiritual type of corporeality, but it is still corporeal.³² Reason, which is above it, is a function of the incorporeal spirit. While Hugh's exposition privileges the process of sight, impressions from the other senses also work in this way, moving from the organs of sense inward until they are made a spiritual type of impression in the corporeal imagination.³³

The imagination 'is nothing other than the similitude of a body, conceived outwardly from contact with bodies by the senses'.³⁴ Brute animals think only with these impressions. Rational animals, like human beings, are themselves composites of matter and spirit, and in the application of reason to the data of the senses, human beings unite matter and spirit into one. The images of sense, rationally understood, are signs. Reading these signs can go terribly wrong, based upon the orientation of human love. Reason is a light, but imagination, 'in as much as it is the image of a body', functions as a shadow.³⁵ The imagination rises up to reason 'like a shadow coming into light, and coming up to the light, in as much as it comes to it, it is clarified and delineated; in as much as it arrives at [or actually reaches] the light, it obscures, darkens, envelops, and conceals it'.³⁶

The images of the imagination envelop reason, and it can only escape through contemplation. Contemplation allows carnal images to be removed from the immaterial mind, like taking off a garment.³⁷ The orientation of human love, however, can make this removal impossible:

If reason clings to the imagination through delight, the imagination becomes like a skin for it, to which it clings with love, so that it cannot be removed without pain.³⁸

The immaterial reason of a human being, which for Hugh is the essence of the human, becomes trapped by the carnal images of things that it loves. A reason engaged by these loves is the lowest type of spirituality. This is a wrongful, harmful type of love that makes the self a kind of allegory that cannot be resolved. The things of this world can become a covering or an integument for the soul, hiding its own spiritual nature, its own meaning from itself. The reading of an allegory and the reading of the self are parallel activities.

In fact, it is this entrapment through the love of things that explains the kind of suffering revealed in visions of the afterlife or described by theologians:

Souls leaving their bodies can still be held by corporeal passions, because they have not yet been cleansed from the corruption of corporeal affections. For the spirit itself has a certain changeability in its nature, according to which it draws near to the body in order to give it life, in which that spiritual, incorporeal substance gives up some of its purity.³⁹

This mutability opens the door for the soul to keep with it something of the corporeal even when separated from material things through which it can suffer:

The soul itself, in as much as it is affected by the love of the body, drawing with it a kind of fleshiness, is deformed by these very same phantasms of corporeal imaginings, and from these same deeply impressed [phantasms] it is not separated even when freed from the body.⁴⁰

The soul would then experience the Other World in these images, perhaps living out the many and varied stories of Hell as if these literary images were materially real.⁴¹

The implications of Hugh's system here are profound, replicating modern anxieties arising from poststructuralist literary critique. The images of the imagination are the highest type of corporeality. These images, directly derived from sense or repurposed in creative ways, perhaps in response to the stories of the poets, contact the soul. They touch it; they envelop it; they can entrap it. This imprisonment in images results from taking the signifier for the signified, and the soul is then trapped in these images as an otherworldly prison of discourse in which no access to a raw signified is possible. Hugh of St Victor's concept of Hell is very close to critiques of modern poststructuralism that see in it the concept of the signifier becoming the equivalent to the concept of being.⁴² These images, badly loved, block spiritual reading or interpretation. What differentiates success from failure is the nature of love. While the carnal, entrapping love Hugh outlines resonates most strongly with common contemporary stereotypes of Judaism, it is not confined to these specific stereotypes. This is a much wider schema for conceiving of deviance; in fact, it is what is wrong with all the wicked, and it is an orientation that all the damned share.

In his other works, Hugh describes the worldly, affective orientation that underlies human wickedness through the word *cupiditas*. *Cupiditas*, or cupidity, for

Hugh, describes the entire complex of worldly desires that distracts and removes an individual from God.⁴³ This is the love that entraps the soul in misplaced loves in which misunderstood signs become prisons that limit human thought. It is the ‘root of all vices’, in direct opposition to the love of God that is the source of all virtue, called charity or *caritas*. Hugh’s use of *cupiditas* follows that of Augustine, who had used it to describe the fallen love of creation that acted as the opposite of the spiritual unity of charity, or divine love, between man and God.⁴⁴

Hugh’s invocation of *cupiditas* revolves around a citation of 1 Timothy 6:10: *Radix malorum est cupiditas*, or ‘Cupidity is the root of evils’. The Latin version of this verse has a wider range of possible meanings than the Greek original. In place of *cupiditas*, the Greek *philarguria* means ‘the love of money’, and this meaning has shaped modern biblical translations. For example the Douay-Rheims Bible reads, ‘For the desire of money is the root of all evils’, and the King James Bible has ‘For the love of money is the root of all evil’. In Latin, *cupiditas* can refer to the desire for money, but its signification for medieval readers was wider than translations from the Greek *philarguria* would suggest. The translation of the Wycliffe Bible of 1395, drawn from the Latin Vulgate, allows for more of this range: ‘For the rote of alle yuelis is coueytise’. *Cupiditas* is the love opposed to divine love. For Augustine, as I have argued, it is a ‘foul love’ that leads the soul to incline towards things less than itself.⁴⁵ Hugh’s near-contemporary, Aelred of Rievaulx, opposed *cupiditas* to *caritas* as the two sources from which all good and all evil originate.⁴⁶ Peter Lombard, the author of the tremendously influential *Four Books of Sentences*, concluded ‘there is no type (*genus*) of evil that does not in some way proceed from *cupititas*’, and suggested that the avarice for money was a species of the genus *cupiditas*.⁴⁷

Thomas Aquinas sums up the expansiveness of the term *cupiditas* as a way of describing the carnal love that lies beneath human deviance. He acknowledges that the word can be understood in different ways. It can refer to the specific love of wealth, in which case it is a special or specific sin. It can also denote ‘an inordinate turning to a mutable good’, in which case ‘it is a genus comprising all sins’. This sense leads into a final and even more expansive one as the ‘inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods’, because all sin arises for the love of created and changeable things.⁴⁸ The struggle between this carnal love and its spiritual opposite constituted the central affective dialectic of the Christian life.

The root of all evils: cupidity and the corporeal orientation in Chaucer’s Pardoner

The character of the Pardoner in Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales* provides a compelling example of the expansiveness and wide-ranging transgressivity of the corporeal orientation denoted by *cupiditas*. The Pardoner also embodies the interpretive challenges and limitations imposed by worldly love. Finally, his characterization bears with it a threatening temporality, in which the Pardoner’s way of loving represents a larger past ruled by carnal love.⁴⁹ This past can overcome the present if the proper order of affections is not maintained. The reader must resist the Pardoner by learning how to read him through divine love, and by doing so transform his deviance into an instructive sign that performs the very mediation the Pardoner does not wish to accomplish.

The Pardoner is direct about the object of his love, and he makes it his theme:

My theme is alwey oon, and evere was –
Radix malorum est Cupiditas.
 (*Canterbury Tales*, VI.333–34)⁵⁰

The citation of 1 Timothy means here what it did to Hugh of St Victor, and this theme is more than just the message of the Pardoner's tale; it is everything he is and everything he generates. The presence of the Pardoner, so often understood in modern criticism as a queer, haunting and grotesque presence, is defined by the Pardoner himself through the essential framework of carnal love.⁵¹ The Pardoner knows that his desire is disordered, directed towards worldly things rather than spiritual; he identifies through his corporeal orientation. As Chaucer shapes the presentation of the Pardoner's orientation, the Pardoner begins to offer the same sorts of interpretive challenges posed by other types of threatening carnality to be navigated by the proper Christian alignment of love.

The Pardoner, in his pursuit of avarice, pays particular attention to time. 'Olde stories', he says, are the best for his purposes (VI.436). They move the simple easily and they are more memorable. He carries with him the supposed relics of saints. These relics are false, fragments of rags and bones, covered in glass like a veil so they will be taken as more than they are (VI.347–49). Rather than pieces of worldly stuff that have directly contacted the numinous, they are most likely unremarkable bits of material stuff. The Pardoner's past is a carnal past and it reflects in microcosm the other larger carnal past that haunts the Christian present.

In all of these invocations of the past lies the threat of carnal reversion along with the suggestion of the enduring potential for a spiritual reading. In his carnal love, the Pardoner is an expression of the *vetus homo*, the 'old man' of the age before the Incarnation, the unredeemed body of Adam, as opposed to the 'new man' made through the spiritual love of God in Christ.⁵² Just as the books of the 'Jewish' Old Testament could be read carnally or spiritually, so too, one might assume, can the old tales of the Pardoner. His likely false relics can be recognized as regular worldly stuff or read as relics that still convey the believer towards God. As is the case for the sacraments offered by a false priest, the wickedness of the clerical mediator can neither invalidate the essential reality of the God mediated nor make successful mediation impossible. In other words, the worldliness of the Pardoner can still be read correctly, just as he claims, as signs pointing to God. In fact, all worldly deviance can be read this way.

Although the Pardoner knows that he loves wrongly, he insists that the experience of his avarice can still profit the other pilgrims. In other words, he and his words can still be understood in a way that conveys those that encounter them to God:

Thus can I preche agayn that same vice
 Which that I use, and that is avarice.
 But though myself be gilty in that synne,
 Yet kan I maken oother folk to twynne
 From avarice and soore to repente.
 (VI.427–31)

The Pardoner reminds the audience, as if it required yet another repetition, ‘But that is nat my principal entente’ (VI.432). The wicked intent, led on by a wicked love, cannot escape the all-encompassing signification of a world written by one author. Like any force of division from God (the Devil, a demon, the Wandering Jew, the uncovered heretic), the Pardoner ultimately serves the divinity he attempts to oppose.⁵³ He is evil as absence, but his voice keeps shouting the possibility of fullness if one knows how to listen, if one knows how to love the correct way.⁵⁴

The negotiation between these possibilities, offered by the Pardoner, relies on the orientation of the pilgrims’ own love. The Pardoner brings these essential elements of Christian hermeneutics to the fore. The Pardoner offers such a choice to the Host when he, in language filled with sexual connotations, suggestively calls upon the Host to ‘kisse the reliques everychon’, and unbuckle his coin purse (VI.944–45).⁵⁵ The carnal possibility is alive in this evocative wording for what could also be a perfectly pious activity. In other words, the Pardoner highlights the ever-present tension between a spiritual and a carnal interpretation of human experience and the signs and symbols utilized as part of that experience, and he forces this tension to be acknowledged.

The final kiss of peace between Pardoner and Host is part of this acknowledgement, that the challenge of worldly love is ongoing in this world.⁵⁶ The kiss can be read in multiple ways: an emblem of charity, political peacemaking or carnal desire.⁵⁷ This ambiguity is enduring. As Glenn Burger has shown, this kiss that joins ‘like and unlike’ in an unstable union presents the pilgrims, and by extension the larger social body they represent, with a kind of spectre.⁵⁸ Speaking of the Pardoner, ‘the cupidity his audience attempts to fix in him alone actually fuels the discursive economy of the dominant culture’.⁵⁹ Chaucer’s pilgrims, from the middling orders advanced above all through contemporary economic growth, were heavily invested in the carnal world. The bad love of the Pardoner is always with the Christian; it must be resisted while being lived with.

Conclusion

The essential framework of the corporeal orientation continued to influence intellectuals and theologians into the early modern period, Catholic and Protestant alike. For example, in *Paradise Lost*, first published in 1667, John Milton recounts the Fall of humanity’s first parents, in large part through the displacement of love. Adam and Eve invested the love and obedience they owed to God in themselves, and in so doing lost paradise.⁶⁰ To take one example out of many, when Adam chooses to eat of the forbidden fruit, he does so, Milton tells us, because Eve already has. If Adam refused to share her Fall, he would lose her, and he loves her too much to let her go. Adam’s love of Eve is really self-love, since she was made from the physical stuff of his body, as he explains:

Should God create another Eve and I
Another rib afford, yet loss of thee
Would never from my heart. No! No! I feel
The link of nature draw me, flesh of flesh,
Bone of my bone thou art and from thy state
Mine never shall be parted, bliss or woe.⁶¹

Eve, of course, if understood correctly, was really made from the image of God in Adam, and when Adam chooses to love Eve to his own destruction he chooses to rejoice in this image not as a sign pointing towards God as its signified but rather to love his own image as reflection, like Narcissus. Adam chooses to love himself as a good in-and-of himself. This choice is the Fall, and it is itself the image of Satan's original sin.

In the misunderstanding of images, self-love, as portrayed in *Paradise Lost*, is an example of hermeneutical failure. It is, in a sense, misreading. When pre-lapsarian Eve is momentarily entranced by the sight of her reflection in water, she is warned that what she sees is only herself, and that she should seek out Adam, 'He | Whose image thou art, him thou shalt enjoy | Inseparably thine'.⁶² In loving Adam, Eve really loves Adam's divine purpose, the 'God in him' for which she was formed.⁶³ In the Fall, Eve disrupts the proper order of signification, taking signs for signifieds. The disruption of signification results from disordered love, and all negative human experiences and emotions that their descendants experience ever after come from it. In the confusion of images and meanings, Milton replicates what was the heart of Hugh of St Victor's torment of souls, encased in the misunderstood images of worldly things.⁶⁴ Even more, it is just such a love for creation that traps Satan himself in an eternal hell, regardless of his location. It is Satan's pride, his love of self, that creates 'The Hell within him' from which he 'One step no more than from Himself can fly'.⁶⁵

In this brief foray into what I have called the corporeal orientation, I have attempted to clarify some key points of a vitally important premodern theory/ideology of the emotions. Community is formed through the orientation of the emotions, led chiefly by love. This orientation is also a direction of travel. The emotions, most importantly love, should be focused on the source of everything, and this focus allows the eventual return to that source. There is only one right or straight direction to love, and deviation from this path leads to a hell of misreading, an eternal turning into the created self. Deviant directionality is the way of the past, both for the individual and also for human society historically. The bad love of the past is not dead, but constantly with the human, tempting, haunting, ready to imprison the human being in a system of signs whose signification is lost.

The alignment of love allows successful hermeneutics, and loving rightly allows signs to be matched to their signification. The corporeal orientation implies the taking of signs as signifieds. It is an imprisonment in meaningless discourse. The potential – perhaps even likely – disturbance in human understanding between sign and signified that results from an imperfect alignment of love has something queer about it. Tied to this carnal love is a complex bundle of deep-seated cultural notions whose influence intimately touches the modern. The cupidity of the Pardoner is the same 'foul love' that conveys one to Hell, and the challenge this Chaucerian character poses to audiences is very close to that of the threat posed by a final punishment that is in fact created through the wrong kind of love. It is in this infernally tinted space that the ideology that I have called the corporeal orientation groups together various species of transgressive difference.

Notes

This chapter uses the following abbreviations: CCCM: Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis; CCSL: Corpus Christianorum Series Latina; PL: Patrologia Latina.

- 1 On the bent direction of love, and the other emotions determined by it, see Bonaventure, 2.26.2, *Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum*, in *Opera Omnia*, Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1885, 2:636A: 'Affectus enim hominis recurvus est et mercenarius, quantum est de se'.
- 2 Broadly, my approach is influenced by the construction of identity through exclusionary means; see J. Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'*, New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 8. Other theoretical frameworks will be cited below.
- 3 W.M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 57.
- 4 Ibid., pp. 104–9; 128.
- 5 Ibid., p. 129.
- 6 Ibid., pp. 61–2.
- 7 B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, p. 2.
- 8 Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling: A History of Emotions, 600–1700*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 316.
- 9 Ibid., p. 319.
- 10 Ibid., p. 9.
- 11 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 14.28, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb, CCSL 48, Turnhout: Brepols, 1955, p. 451.
- 12 D. Nirenberg, *Anti-Judaism: The History of a Way of Thinking*, London: Head of Zeus, 2013, p. 3.
- 13 The function of Jews as a foil to Christian exegesis has been termed the 'hermeneutical Jew'. See J. Cohen, *Living Letters of the Law: Ideas of the Jew in Medieval Christianity*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999, pp. 2–3.
- 14 A distinction laid out in the fundamental idea that the Old Testament of the Hebrew Bible should be read allegorically to foretell the coming of Christ. See 2 Corinthians 3:6 and 3:14, Romans 7:6 and Hebrews 8:13.
- 15 A point emphasized in many accounts of heresy, for example the case of Eon of the Star; see J.B. Russell, *Dissent and Reform in the Early Middle Ages*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1965, pp. 288–9, n. 23; R.I. Moore, *The Origins of European Dissent*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1977, pp. 68–71.
- 16 M.D. Barbezat, 'Bodies of spirit and bodies of flesh: the significance of the sexual activities attributed to medieval heretics', *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 25, 2016, 387–418.
- 17 H. Puff, *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400–1600*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 13.
- 18 M.D. Jordan, *The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997, p. 176.
- 19 The intellectual achievements of Muslim scholars were highly regarded, while their spiritual blindness remained a key point of their presentation. Their sexual licentiousness, in particular, defined their carnal, as opposed to spiritual, outlook on the world. See S. Conklin Akbari, *Idols in the East: European Representations of Islam and the Orient, 1100–1450*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009, pp. 155–247.
- 20 See Romans 1:20.
- 21 Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, 1.22, ed. J. Martin, CCSL 32, Turnhout: Brepols, 1962, pp. 16–17.
- 22 Ibid., 1.35.39; trans. R.P.H. Green, *De doctrina christiana*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 49: 'Hoc ergo ut nossemus atque possemus, facta est tota pro nostra salute per diuinam prouidentiam dispensatione temporalis, qua debemus uti, non quasi mansoria quadam dilectione et delectatione, sed transitoria potius tamquam uiae, tamquam uehiculorum uel aliorum quorumlibet instrumentorum aut si quid congruentius dici potest, ut ea quibus ferimur, propter illud, ad quod ferimur, diligamus'.
- 23 Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 14.6, ed. Dombart and Kalb, p. 421.
- 24 See discussion in Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*, pp. 29–32.
- 25 In what follows I have been inspired by Carolyn Dinshaw's ideas regarding the 'queerness of time' and Jacques Derrida's Spectrality: Dinshaw, *How Soon Is Now?: Medieval Texts, Amateur Readers, and the Queerness of Time*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012;

- Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. P. Kamuf, New York: Routledge, 1994.
- 26 This position is especially important for Hugh of St Victor, as the analysis below will demonstrate. On the matter of the parent as the vehicle for original sin (a topic on which there was only broad agreement in the High Middle Ages and later), see Hugh of St Victor, *De sacramentis Christiane fidei*, 1.7.29–31, ed. R. Berndt, Aschendorff: Monasterium Westfalorum, 2008, pp. 184–8; Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet* 12, q. 21. art. 32, in *Opera Omnia*, Parma: Petrus Fiaccadorus, 1859, 9:630. D. Elliott, *Fallen Bodies: Pollution, Sexuality, and Demonology in the Middle Ages*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999, p. 138.
 - 27 S.F. Kruger, *The Spectral Jew: Conversion and Embodiment in Medieval Europe*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006.
 - 28 Hugh of St Victor, *De tribus diebus*, ed. D. Poirel, CCCM 177, Turnhout: Brepols, 2002, p. 9: ‘Vniuersus enim mundus iste sensilis quasi quidam liber est scriptus digito Dei’.
 - 29 Hugh of St Victor, ‘De unione corporis et animae’, PL 177, cols 285–9. Large portions of this work are also found in the influential Cistercian compilation *Liber de spiritu et anima*, PL 40, cols 779–844.
 - 30 Hugh, ‘De unione’, col. 287B–C.
 - 31 Ibid., col. 287C: ‘Postea eadem imaginatio ab anteriore parte capitis ad mediam transiens, ipsam animae rationalis substantiam contingit’.
 - 32 Ibid., col. 287C–D.
 - 33 Hugh’s exposition is close in some of its particulars to the Augustinian category of spiritual vision. A major difference lies in the corporeality of the sense impression that acts in the imagination. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL 28, s. 3 pt. 2, Vienna, 1894. B. Newman, ‘What did it mean to say “I saw?”: the clash between theory and practice in medieval visionary culture’, *Speculum* 80, 2005, 1–43.
 - 34 Hugh, ‘De unione’, col. 288A: ‘Ergo imaginatio nihil est quam similitudo corporis, per sensus quidem corporeos ex corporum contactu concepta extrinsecus, atque per eosdem sensus introrsum ad partem puriorem corporei spiritus reducta, eique impressa’.
 - 35 Ibid., col. 288B: ‘Rationalis autem substantia corporea lux est; imaginatio vero, inquantum corporis imago est, umbra est’.
 - 36 Ibid.: ‘Et idcirco postquam imaginatio usque ad rationem ascendit, quasi umbra in lucem veniens, et luci superveniens, inquantum ad eam venit, manifestatur, et circumscribitur; inquantum illi supervenit, obnubilat eam, et obumbrat, et involvit, et contegit’.
 - 37 Ibid.
 - 38 Ibid.: ‘Si vero etiam delectatione illi adhaeserit, quasi pellis ei fit ipsa imaginatio, ita ut sine dolore exui possit, cui cum amore inhaesit’.
 - 39 Ibid., col. 288C: ‘Hinc est quod animae corporibus exutae, corporalibus adhuc passionibus teneri possunt, quia videlicet a corruptione corporalium affectionum nondum munda-tae sunt. Habet namque et ipse spiritus quamdam in sua natura mutabilitatem, secundum quam corpori vivificando appropinquat, in qua illa spiritualis et incorporea substantia nonnihil suae puritatis deponit’.
 - 40 Ibid., col. 288D: ‘Ipsa quippe anima, inquantum delectatione corporis afficitur quasi quamdam corpulentiam trahens, in eadem phantasiis imaginationum corporalium deformatur, eisdemque alte impressis etiam soluta corpore non exuitur’.
 - 41 This way of imagining Hell had a long pedigree in the Middle Ages. For example, Bernard McGinn argues that Hell for John Scottus Eriugena was really ‘the continuing existence in the minds of the wicked of the fantasies of the things that mislead them during their time on earth’. *Periphyseon* 5 [977AB], in *The Growth of Mysticism*, New York: Crossroad, 1994, p. 112. Eriugena’s Hell is very different from that of Hugh of St Victor, but in this thematic idea the two men agree.
 - 42 Reddy, *Navigation of Feeling*, p. 76. See the critique of queer theory by Donald Morton: ‘desire has displaced need, the signifier has displaced the signified’, in ‘Changing the terms: Virtual desire and actual reality’, in D. Morton (ed.), *The Material Queer: A LesBiGay Cultural Studies Reader*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996, pp. 10–11.
 - 43 Hugh, *Miscellanea*, 1.173, ‘De naturis ignis et speciebus’, in PL 177, col. 571A.

- 44 W.S. Babcock, “‘Caritas’ and signification in “De doctrina christiana” 1–3’, in D.W.H. Arnold and Pamela Bright (eds), *De doctrina christiana: A Classic of Western Culture*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995, p. 157.
- 45 Augustine, *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 35, ed. A. Mutzenbecher, CCSL 44 A, Turnhout: Brepols, 1975, p. 50.
- 46 Aelred of Rievaulx, *Compendium speculi caritatis*, 16, ed. C.H. Talbot, CCCM 1, Turnhout: Brepols, 1971, pp. 197–8.
- 47 Peter Lombard, ‘Collectanea in Omnes Pauli apostolic Epistulas, I ad Timotheum’, 6, PL 192, col. 357.
- 48 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IaIIae.84.1.
- 49 R.P. Miller, ‘Chaucer’s Pardoner, the scriptural eunuch, and the Pardoner’s Tale,’ *Speculum* 30, 1955, 180–99.
- 50 All quotations from the *Canterbury Tales* are from Larry D. Benson (ed.), *The Riverside Chaucer*, 3rd edn, London: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- 51 In my analysis, I have been influenced by G. Burger, *Chaucer’s Queer Nation*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003; C. Dinshaw, ‘Chaucer’s queer touches/A queer touches Chaucer’, *Exemplaria* 7, 1995, 75–92; Dinshaw, *Chaucer’s Sexual Poetics*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989; D.R. Howard, *The Idea of the Canterbury Tales*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976.
- 52 Miller, ‘Chaucer’s Pardoner’, p. 188.
- 53 This is a standard explanation for how the presence of deviance actually serves the normative. On the wicked becoming tools of divine righteousness, see Augustine, ‘On Grace and Free Will’, 21.42. For example, heretics and heresy for Bernard of Clairvaux are tools for the correction of the faithful that are to be discarded after use: ‘De gratia et libero arbitrio’, 13.45. In *Sancti Bernardi Opera*, ed. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais, vol 3, p. 198: ‘Utitur creatura rationali, sed malevola, quasi virga disciplinae, quam correpto filio, in ignem proiciet tamquam sarmentum inutile’. Perhaps modelled on Proverbs 3:12.
- 54 For evil as a privation, a lack of good, see J.B. Russell, *Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 162–8.
- 55 Dinshaw, ‘Chaucer’s queer touches’, p. 89.
- 56 G. Burger, ‘Kissing the Pardoner’, *PMLA* 107, 1992, 1146.
- 57 Howard, *The Idea of the Canterbury Tales*, p. 369.
- 58 Burger, *Chaucer’s Queer Nation*, pp. 143–6.
- 59 Ibid., pp. 149–50.
- 60 As Raphael explains, obedience to God comes from love of God: ‘Freely we serve | Because we freely love as in our will | To love or not: in this we stand or fall’. John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, 5.538–40, ed. G. Teskey, New York: Norton, 2005, p. 121.
- 61 Ibid., 9.911–16, pp. 221–2.
- 62 Ibid., 4.471–3, p. 91.
- 63 Ibid., 4.299, p. 86.
- 64 Milton replicates Hugh’s explanation for human suffering and affective misreading of the book of the world, not his concept of Hell, because Milton did not believe that human souls remained independent and aware between death and the resurrection.
- 65 Milton, *Paradise Lost*, 4.20–2, p. 78.

EMOTIONS AND SEXUALITY

Regulation and homoerotic transgressions

Umberto Grassi

In this chapter, I will analyse the way in which focusing on same-sex attraction can shed new light on how we conceive love and desire in the late medieval and early modern period. Firstly, I will re-examine the extensive historiographical debate on the social and cultural history of homoeroticism in late medieval and early modern Europe through the lens of emotions. This perspective allows us to go beyond some of the conundrums in which historians of homosexuality working ‘from below’ have sometimes found themselves tangled. I will then analyse the diverse and often overlooked emotional lexicon contained in the judicial reports of trials against sodomites. From this vantage point, we can have a glimpse not only into what people felt for each other, but also into the way in which unconventional desires affected their self-perception and their positioning within society.

In a diachronic perspective, I will examine how social control of sexual behaviours changed through time. The ways in which homoerotic feelings were perceived by common people and religious and civic institutions were indeed related to broader understandings of love and affection within the family. Conversely, I suggest that, by reflecting on transgressive affects, we can also see the history of marital love in the late Middle Ages and early modern period from a different perspective. Finally, I will point out how the increasing rigidity of sexual morality in the post-Reformation period stimulated forms of resistance from below. From then on, questioning the narrow-mindedness of Catholic and Protestant ‘emotional regimes’ played a crucial role in the broader political critique of the hypocrisy of institutionalized religions.

Writing history from below: emotions and the limits of criminal sources

When we look away from the learned elites, we find that we do not have many alternatives in exploring sexual transgressions other than to inspect criminal sources. In this first section, I will give an overview of the methodological problems discussed in the past by historians of transgressive sexualities working on these documents. I will point out how even before the history of emotion established itself as an autonomous field of research, the history of lesbianism had already brought about a decisive change in approach, placing love and affection at centre stage. However, as we will see, the recent debates on emotions in history may provide

historians with a clearer theoretical framework to re-interpret homosexual desire in a historical perspective.

The legal punishment of the religious sin of sodomy, dating back to the Justinian Code (sixth century CE),¹ resulted in extensive prosecutions that started from the late Middle Ages and intensified at the beginning of the early modern period.² As a result of this unprecedented attention, thousands of depositions, interrogations, confessions and convictions have been preserved in historical archives across Europe. From the early 1980s onwards, historians have produced a wealth of studies on same-sex desire and practices using these sources, reconstructing the social and cultural history of the (mostly male) sodomitic sociability that flourished at this time.³

These sources raise many methodological problems. They cannot be read as mere testimony of the events they recount; rather, historians must read between the lines in order to decipher their multi-layered meanings. In a report of a trial, the complex legal and theological background of the judges overlaps with the cultural milieu of defendants and witnesses, who often belonged to lower social ranks. Although strongly related, the moral values of prosecutor and prosecuted sometimes expressed radically different cultural horizons.⁴

Historians of homosexuality working on criminal sources have sometimes been excessively influenced by repressive discourses. In the past especially, their studies have often reflected the major preoccupation of the judges: that is, finding evidence of the way in which sexual acts were consummated, so as to determine the mitigating or aggravating circumstances that accompanied them. Not all forms of nonprocreative sex were deemed equally serious offences. Only anal penetration with ejaculation in the 'improper vessel' constituted 'perfect sodomy'.⁵ In the case of female same-sex intercourse, that which came under scrutiny was either the possible use of a dildo or medical proof that one of the partners was the bearer of an 'abnormally' enlarged clitoris, which would have allowed an actual penetrative act.⁶

As far as sexual mores were concerned, common people were constantly forced in their daily life experiences to negotiate their sexual desires with the moral injunctions imposed by religious and secular authorities. Both women and men, however, worked out their own creative and strategic defences, original adaptations and adjustments. Sometimes they even decided to overtly question the limitations imposed on their sexual conduct by the current moral codes. In these cases, the defendants failed to match the judges' expectations, refusing to fit into the categories in which the legal discourse wanted to frame them. In other cases, witnesses and suspects provided the judges with information that was apparently irrelevant in the economy of the judicial proceedings but is now precious for historians. Through these cases, we can take a fresh look at the everyday life of people which took place in crowded streets, between the market stalls, in the wharves of commercial ports, or in the alleys of a busy neighbourhood.

Ignoring the discrepancies between the views of prosecuted and prosecutor distorts our perception of past sexual lives. While the reports often render, without any kind of emotional involvement, a rough depiction of serial acts that were committed, this hypersexualized and mechanical representation likely reflects the exclusive interest of the prosecutors in the material circumstances in which the acts were performed. We ought to take into account the fact that it was far more likely for abusive and violent sexual intercourse to attract the attention of the public officers. The same can be

hypothesized for false accusations, intercourse consummated in public spaces, and commercial sex. In all likelihood, a wide range of emotional and relational experiences did not leave any traces in the archives because magistrates were not as interested in them as they were in the acts committed.

For these reasons, female homoeroticism was largely disregarded. Although criminal law did not ignore it,⁷ the number of trials prosecuting female-to-female sexual intercourse is markedly lower in comparison to the charges of male homosexual transgression.⁸ This gap has raised many methodological issues, not the least of which is the question of how to write the history of female homosexuality when the proof of actual sexual intercourse is so scarce. It is worth pointing out that this question partially reproduces the dilemma that tormented (male) theologians, moralists and jurists between the Middle Ages and the early modern period. As we have already mentioned, without penetration, sex was either inconceivable or a matter of minor interest. It is therefore legitimate and historically productive to investigate to what extent this 'invisibility' might have opened up spaces of freedom and autonomy to same-sex-attracted women. Where were opportunities of proximity available to them? What possibilities did they have of avoiding marriage? What was their emotional lexicon? Were they able to resist gendered social expectations? What circumstances could have allowed them to make a life together?⁹ From the works of Adrienne Rich and Lilian Faderman onwards, the theme of friendship has played a central role in the history of lesbianism,¹⁰ in particular with reference to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹¹ This historiography has sometimes been criticized for offering an excessively idealized and desexualized image of lesbian desire.¹² Valerie Traub has pointed out that the spectre of sapphic love and tribadism has haunted the literary imagery of female friendships since early modern times, thus calling into question the idea that, before the nineteenth-century medicalization of homosexual desire, same-sex-attracted women could express their feelings without arousing excessive suspicion.¹³ Moreover, faith in the universality and 'naturalness' of female bonding and solidarity has been questioned in light of the successive development of feminist discourses, now attentive to race and class issues in their analyses.¹⁴

The history of lesbianism has thus been the testing ground for a shift in focus from acts to feelings in the historiography of homosexual desire. Indeed, the focus on homoerotic friendships has deeply transformed the approach of historians to male homoeroticism. In *The Friend* (2003), Alan Bray explicitly expresses his dissatisfaction with the obsessive need for scholars working in this field to 'prove' the occurrence of actual sexual intercourse. Bray points out the great extent to which past societies recognized a noble social function in homoerotic friendships. Marriage obviously constituted the basic unit of society, ensuring the biological reproduction of the species and the transmission of religious, moral and civil values. Nevertheless, although the importance of spousal affection was not disregarded, spiritual commonality, reciprocal recognition and intellectual exchange were believed to be a prerogative of the cultural codes governing same-sex friendships, until the eighteenth century.¹⁵

As has been acutely noted, the image of the good and noble friend was constructed in opposition to its negative reversal, the sodomite. By warning women and men who were cultivating same-sex friendship not to indulge in excessive physical demonstrations of love and affection, the manuals and handbooks that detailed such codes

of conduct point to the fact that the boundaries dividing ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ same-sex unions were perceived to be dangerously porous at that time.¹⁶

As I will show in the following sections, in the attempt to integrate emotional, intellectual and relational experiences into their narratives, historians of female and male homosexualities may profit in manifold ways from the new methodological perspectives opened up by the recent debate on emotions in history. Thanks to these theoretical insights, we can have a glimpse into what people felt about their acts and desires, and how these feelings affected their social performances and self-perceptions.

Cultures of male sexual transgressions: emotions as social practices

I will start by pointing out the extent to which reflecting on emotions can change our approach to late medieval and early modern urban male homoerotic sociability. For a long time, the analysis of homoerotic gatherings in European cities has been used as a case in point to show that, in the past, sodomy was just an act and ‘the sodomite’ was not perceived as an individual characterized by specific identity-making traits.¹⁷ Monique Scheer’s reflections on emotions as social practices provide us with powerful theoretical tools to revise this interpretation.¹⁸ It allows us to question the supposed neutrality of these performances for the self-perception of those who engaged in homosexual acts, while reframing in more general terms the problem of identity-making processes in the late medieval and early modern period.

In whichever context it has been studied, male homoerotic sociability demonstrates many common features across late medieval and early modern Western Europe. Same-sex-attracted men were forced to hide themselves in order to negotiate their sexual relationships. Taverns, inns, fencing schools, pastry shops, communal spaces such as covered walkways, small alleys, public bathrooms and steam rooms, markets, wharves, secluded gardens and dark areas along the city walls, parks and open fields in the countryside: these and other similar spaces often constituted the backdrop against which a lively clandestine sociability was staged.¹⁹

Speaking openly could have led those involved in these transgressive networks to a judicial proceeding or, in the worst-case scenario, to the death penalty. The use of coded language thus facilitated the acts of enticing partners and negotiating sexual intercourse. We may assume that learning this encrypted idiom, like iterating specific gestures and habits, contributed to the reinforcement of a sense of belonging to a proscribed community. This language, made up of bodily communication as well, constituted an unwritten common heritage that had to be transmitted in order to preserve its effectiveness. We can hypothesize that the systematic repetition of similar rituals of seduction, the search for cruising areas, reciprocal recognition amongst regulars, eye contact and the codification of a bodily language, the acknowledgment of certain particular sartorial details,²⁰ and, last but not least, the shared fear of prosecution, were all factors that played a role in the construction of the subjects’ sense of self, even in the absence of a conscious reappropriation of the meaning of the actions performed.

Monique Scheer’s methodological reflections can provide historians with a solid ground on which to articulate a more precise understanding of what these ritualized performances may have meant to the individuals involved in them. Inspired by Pierre

Bourdieu, Scheer has investigated the role played by social practices in shaping and interiorizing emotional codes. Through repetition, practices forge perceptions and reinforce automatic responses as well as unconscious emotional reactions. Multiple formal and informal social institutions use rituals to facilitate the internalization of their systems of values. This process may raise multiple conflicts. Within complex societies, people grow up under the influence of not only their families but also numerous religious, educational, political and/or military institutions, as well as a handful of other more or less formalized associations conveying the most disparate sets of beliefs and principles. Every life trajectory is made up of the intersections and overlaps of these often-conflicting group identities. Although resulting from predetermined factors (depending on what is on offer in any given society), individuals are nevertheless the unique and unpredictable result of these multiple interactions.²¹

The act of taking part in urban homosexual male sociability was thus likely to influence the self-perception of those who became involved in it; in fact, this sociability was probably one of the many tiles that made up the multifaceted mosaic that constituted their sense of self. Between the Middle Ages and the early modern period, identity was determined primarily by the position one occupied in more or less formalized groups and associations. People could be gathered together on the basis of their social rank, neighbourhood, job, parish, military company, cultural, religious and ethnic background and – within the same religious confessions – specific forms of devotion and piety. In all likelihood, belonging to the proscribed sodomitic networks led to something much more than a mere repetition of meaningless acts: it was one of the elements constituting a complex social identity.

The love that dared speak its name

In a minority of cases, judicial documents sometimes went far beyond the cold-blooded report of mere serial acts committed without any kind of emotional involvement. In some inquisitorial cases from the Spanish city of Valencia, defendants and witnesses qualified male-to-male homoerotic experiences with locutions like ‘falling in love’, ‘speaking in loving terms’, ‘requesting love’, ‘making merry and love’.²²

A concept like love, however, needs to be handled with methodological awareness. For the learned elites, love was not merely an emotion. It was rather a sophisticated philosophical concept, implying a distinction between noble and gentle love, that can be related to the classical notions of *agape* and *caritas*, and passionate love, *eros* or *passio*, which, for its part, could be either earthly or divine.²³

As we have sketched out above, this complex ideal of love was related to friendship and, via this medium, it had a complicated relationship with homoeroticism. When we look at judiciary sources, however, the vocabulary used to express same-sex love and affection is often modelled on the prototype of heterosexual spousal relationships, which occupied a rather different position in the premodern economy of affection and desire. For instance, two young Valencian bakery servants named Nofre Masquero and Salvador Villalobos (aged fifteen and sixteen respectively) found themselves caught in the mesh of Inquisitorial justice when their masters heard them addressing each other as husband and wife while allegedly having sex in the bed they used to share.²⁴

If people engaging in homosexual acts often borrowed the emotional vocabulary of familial affection available at that time, what did this mean for them? The ideal of

spousal romantic love we are used to in today's Western societies has its own historical genealogy and cannot be uncritically projected unto the past.²⁵ The concept of marrying *for love* is strictly related to the construction of discourses on individual rights and personal freedom. That factors other than love played an equally relevant role in orienting the choice of a partner for life, led historians to draw the conclusion, for a long time, that premodern marriages were 'low affect' social constructions. Moreover, the profoundly unbalanced distribution of power between spouses in patriarchal societies has been viewed as incompatible with our modern understanding of love.²⁶

While the ideal of romantic love that sounds familiar to us sprang up in eighteenth-century aristocratic and bourgeois environments, in the last decades historical research has shown how expressions of love and affection were not alien to late medieval and early modern familial interactions, although conveyed by different expressive codes.²⁷ Furthermore, scholars have recently questioned the idea that the unprecedented modern emphasis on spousal love has reduced power inequalities between women and men, suggesting that this process has instead been a vehicle to confirm patriarchal values.²⁸

By shaping their utterance of love and affection on the model of the heterosexual spousal relationship, same-sex lovers tended sometimes to reproduce the gender imbalance attached to it, reiterating stereotypical binaries. Some late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Florentine sources refer to homosexual intercourse as 'knowing' a male partner 'ut feminam' (like a woman). At other times, the Florentine informers reported that someone was keeping a boy to use him 'like a woman'.²⁹ The homoerotic relationship was often 'heterosexualized', with a supposed 'passive partner' identified as being the 'woman' in the pair. 'To use a man as if he were a woman' was a popular way to refer to homosexual intercourse, as was the expression that two men had slept together 'like husband and wife'.³⁰

In these instances, one should not assume that the subjects were consciously subverting the gender norms established at that time. Social assumptions turned the passive subjects into symbolic females, without implying that they perceived themselves as such. Nevertheless, other cases clearly testify that gender subversion was sometimes actively pursued by same-sex-attracted persons. In a trial held by the Inquisition of Valencia in 1572, a witness reported that a friar named Pedro Pizarro was known in his community for his feminine manners, which earned him the nickname of 'La Pizarra'.³¹ As testified by many studies, cross-dressing and the use of female nicknames were common features of Western European and colonial urban sodomitic cultures.³² The transgression of gender norms, however, was severely rejected by society. There are scattered references in the sources to the derogatory use of the term 'maricón' to label passive sodomites, an expression that, according to seventeenth-century dictionaries, alluded to effeminate men.³³

Other documents associated the term 'love' with its embodied expression in the carnal union between same-sex partners. A Valencian case from 1601 stands out for the complexity of the emotional lexicon employed by the notaries who transcribed the interrogations. Witness Miguel Marin denounced Luis Coxet and Gaspar Emça, two 'Moriscos' (Muslims recently converted to Christianity) who had reportedly had sex in the same room in which he was sleeping after a dinner at a mutual friend's house. The somewhat voyeuristic description of their sexual intercourse abounds with expressions of tenderness, love and affection. Marin reported to the judges that

he heard the couple 'making merry and love'. In the semi-darkness of the room, he saw and heard their 'bare flesh and legs', movements, strokes and breaths, which clearly showed, in his opinion, that they were having a 'carnal union'. Caressing Luis's face, Gaspar allegedly whispered some words in 'algaravio': this was the term that 'old Christians' used to describe the language spoken by recently converted Muslims, which was incomprehensible to them, but which Marin nevertheless understood well enough to know that the words meant 'handsome and good man'.³⁴ It seems that the witness forged the accusation motivated by anti-Islamic prejudices.³⁵ Yet what it is relevant here is not the adherence of the documents to a supposed 'reality' that exists beyond the narrative, but the terminology with which homosexual intercourse was able to be described and conceived of at that time.

Recent research has opened up the range of emotions associated with family life. By pointing out the complex interactions between power and love in heterosexual relationships, historians have explored the role played by anger, jealousy and violence within the household.³⁶ Negative feelings constituted a part of the emotional code embedded in passionate homoerotic attachments, and these relational dynamics deserve a closer look. Luiz Mott has studied a collection of letters preserved in the Portuguese archives of *Torre do Tombo*. These epistles are perhaps the most powerful early modern criminal sources that bear witness to homosexual love. They were written in 1664 by Francisco Correa Netto, a sacristan of Silves Cathedral, in southern Portugal, and are addressed to lutenist and guitarist Manuel Viegas. It is clear that Francisco, who sometimes adopted the female nickname of Francisquinha, was madly in love with him. Manuel, despite his relationships with women, apparently made some promises to the churchman, perhaps moved by the generous gifts he had made him. Francisco's letters contain a wide range of emotive expressions, ranging from hope to despair, from unconditional adoration to violent hatred. More than once, Francisco referred to himself using the motto 'he who loves the most, merits it least' ('quem mais ama menos merece').³⁷

Following a number of testimonies against them, Inés de Santa Cruz and Catalina Ledesma were put on trial for sodomy in Salamanca in 1603. The couple managed to escape the death penalty twice, getting away with only minor convictions. In this case it is not easy to assess whether the accusations had a factual basis or whether they were merely slanderous stories made up by neighbours and acquaintances out of malevolence and resentment. Nevertheless, the record of the trial, which runs to over a hundred pages, evokes the way in which a female-to-female sexual relationship could take shape in the minds of the numerous witnesses, mostly women, whose accounts were heard by the judges. Inés and Catalina allegedly addressed each other as 'my love' and 'my life'. In the many fights overheard by their neighbours, they sometimes insulted one another with the term 'sométrica', a Spanish word that can be translated as 'female sodomite'. They were believed to have engaged in sexual relations using a dildo made of cane reeds, an opinion that led them to be known in the local community by the sobriquet 'las cañitas' ('the little cane girls').³⁸

In the anti-sodomitic rhetoric of that time, homosexual acts were deemed to be a monstrous and anti-social deformation of the purposes of nature. The fact that premodern people living in long-term relationships whose goal was not procreation chose to adopt the vocabulary available at that time to express love between grooms and brides also tells us something about how feelings and affections

within the family were viewed. Seeing the love between married women and men refracted in the mirror of same-sex couples suggests that, even at that time, this love could be viewed, beyond its social function, as an interiorized bond that involved deep affective dynamics. Conversely, this unconventional perspective highlights how people living in proscribed relationships tended, more or less consciously, to model their experiences following the dominant patterns that, at that time, shaped familial interactions.

Social control in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period

In the second part of this chapter I will focus on the way in which institutions dealt with transgressive sexualities in late medieval and early modern Europe. As William Reddy has pointed out, any political system that aims for stability must establish what he defines as an ‘emotional regime’; that is, ‘a set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them’. ‘Emotives’, in Reddy’s definition, are speech acts provided with a performative quality. The more rigid the emotional regime, the less likely is the political system to survive resistance coming from a society unable to fit into the models promoted and reinforced by the authorities.³⁹

Reddy’s theoretical framework effectively points out how shaping emotions plays a central role in the governance of political communities. It shows its limits, however, in the rigidity of its explanatory value and in its dyadic interpretation of ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ interactions within a given society. While retaining the focus on norms, practices and rituals, in the following pages I will not try to reduce complex processes to a single-sided explanation of historical change based on the conflicts between emotional regimes and the antagonistic opposition of ‘emotional refuges’. Neither will I reconstruct the history of the progressive demonization of homosexual practices in Western Christian tradition (a history that has already been written by several outstanding scholars).⁴⁰ I will rather focus on the rich historiography on the control of sexual transgressions to understand why some expressions of homoerotic desire were partially accepted in late medieval and early modern societies. In doing so, I will highlight the tensions between religious beliefs and social practices, pointing out how the regulation of emotions was the result of a multi-centred negotiation between diverse powers and social actors. In this context, systems of beliefs were strongly influenced by economic and social structures that limited and constrained the choices available to both rulers and ruled.

The abundance of criminal sources focusing on sexual crimes is a consequence of the increasing attention that was paid to sexual morality by secular and religious institutions between the late Middle Ages and the early modern period. This is not the place to reconstruct a detailed history of the diverse religious and civic criminal courts that dealt with sodomy in early modern Europe; instead, I would like to focus on the reasons that led these institutions to increase their level of activity at this historical juncture.

The Italian situation stands out amongst the others, in part due to the quantity and quality of the historical research that has been carried out in its archives. In the Italian peninsula, a territory politically fragmented in a multiplicity of small territorial states, historians have thus far investigated the activities of three major

magistracies that were exclusively devoted to the control of sodomy in Venice, Florence and Lucca. Their archives constitute one of the major sources for the history of past homosexualities.⁴¹ What has come to light, thanks to this research, is that the increased surveillance of sexual transgressions occurred hand in hand with some forms of (conditioned) social tolerance. In fact, the intense scrutiny of sexual mores partly reflected the will to come to terms with deeply rooted social habits, in spite of the religious interdictions.

Religion played a crucial role in reinforcing the cohesion of social and political communities. Political authorities cooperated with religious institutions to bolster people's sense of belonging to the social body by emphasizing a set of shared values and beliefs. Complex public ceremonies and liturgical celebrations punctuated the passing of days, weeks and months, embedding the perception of time in the everyday lives of the people. Moreover, public rituals enabled authorities to depict an ideal order with which they encouraged the community to identify. In such celebrations, each person was assigned a place according to the position they occupied within the social hierarchy. Ranks, professional guilds, military companies and brotherhoods were some of the pieces that composed this complex jigsaw. Moreover, by cultivating devotion to saints and patrons, and through other forms of local piety, the community was integrated within a wider horizon, gaining an otherworldly protection.⁴²

Understanding this osmosis between religious and secular spheres is the key to comprehending the contradictory coexistence between the widespread and minute control of sodomy and the relatively tolerant attitude towards it. In urban settings, the wide involvement of lay associations in the spiritual and civic life of the city created the appropriate conditions for a relatively flexible approach to religious beliefs. Religion was deeply rooted in the governing of the most trivial aspects of everyday life within the community. It responded to the needs of a complex society with ease, alternating severe proclamations, terrifying references to Hell's eternal sufferings, and acceptance of human frailty. Within the framework of a negative anthropology that considered human beings indelibly marked by original sin, pastoral activity favoured a mediation between tolerance and repression that took into account not only the potential social impact of 'sinful' behaviours, but also the consequences of their being controlled.⁴³ This approach is clearly attested by the public management of prostitution. Confining prostitutes to assigned districts reduced their visibility and favoured their reclusion for public health reasons in case of plague epidemics. Moreover, by taxing the sex industry, public institutions gained an additional, and substantial, source of income.⁴⁴

Many factors justified a tolerant approach towards sexual transgressions. At that time, urban communities were overflowing with a male population that could not access marriage for a long period of their adult lives. This was mainly due to the specific demographic pattern of these communities, which was in turn a result of economic structures. For the ruling classes, marriage was a key part of their networking strategies, creating bonds between families that facilitated political and economic interactions. Moreover, due to the increasing value of dowries, it often took a long time for households to accumulate the money needed to chase their ambitions. Many girls were in fact destined for a life of seclusion in cloisters. Conversely, to preserve the integrity of familial assets, the system of inheritance – based on primogeniture – excluded many male heirs from the right to marriage. Among people of lower rank there were also substantive reasons for postponing the

age of marriage. Artisans, for example, had to wait for their apprenticeship to be concluded, and the training could take a long time, while peasants often did not have the means to start a new family.⁴⁵

Many erotic and sexual tensions were therefore not able to be expressed within the only frame that, at that time, was believed to be legitimate: marriage. This circumstance generated tensions that religious and secular authorities were forced to handle with tact and circumspection. While control was highly recommended, repression could have led to unpredictable consequences. Holiness was believed to be the major way to attract God's blessings and prosperity, but the pursuit of holiness had to take into account the material needs of the people.

Moreover, older men managed to snag a large portion of the women available on the marriage market. The risk of a potentially disruptive generational conflict was constantly present. Local institutions tried to channel these energies not only by promoting diverse forms of juvenile association, but also by tolerating the fact that some of their manifestations were marked by anti-social attitudes. Besides these semi-institutionalized gatherings, other informal groups conveyed even more radical practices such as gambling, roughhousing, fighting and mimicking blasphemous religious rites, some going so far as to commit homicides and gang rapes.⁴⁶

As for sodomy, this transgression was apparently among those that society was inclined to remit, although only under certain circumstances. As noted by Michael J. Rocke in his studies on Renaissance Florence, what made this behaviour partially acceptable was that it contributed to the reinforcement of the hierarchical bonds that cemented male sociability. Sodomy was part of the initiation rites to adulthood. Sodomitic intercourse often reflected the dominion of an older partner over a younger one. In this frame, active and passive roles (tops and bottoms) were meant to mirror the social positions of the partners.⁴⁷ If it was not to be encouraged, sodomy, when expressed in this form (and we have seen that it was not always the case), was at least worth tolerating; homoerotic bonds strengthened the perception of a hierarchically ordered society.

Silencing the unmentionable vice

The mediating approach that shaped late medieval and early modern anti-sodomitic policies disappeared during the sixteenth century when, with the explosion of the Protestant Reformation, the unity of Western Christianity was definitively lost.⁴⁸ Conflicts in the religious and political sphere brought about significant changes in the way in which emotions were shaped, encouraged and repressed by spiritual leaders and, subsequently, by civic and religious institutions. Martin Luther questioned the principle of ecclesiastic celibacy, denouncing it for hypocrisy. Sexual misconduct was a consistent part of the accusations Lutherans made against Roman Catholicism, with celibacy deemed to be one of its major causes. This attack against sexual abstinence represents a major shift in the history of Christianity. For centuries celibacy had symbolized the superiority of the clergy over lay people. So, to understand what this shift meant, we need to look back at the long-term history of celibacy in the wider context of Christian theories about passions and affects.

In his groundbreaking work *From Passions to Emotions* (2003), Thomas Dixon reconstructed the genesis of the concept of 'emotions' as a psychological category.⁴⁹ As he

pointed out, before the eighteenth century, there was nothing comparable to such a wide-ranging ‘umbrella-term’, and several different psychological phenomena we now label as ‘emotions’, although related, had their own epistemological status.

One of the most common terms used to describe passions in the Septuagint version of the Old Testament was *epithumiai*, translated in the Latin of the Vulgate as *concupiscentiae* or *desideria*. In later Christian writings, we also find terms like *motus*, *affectus*, *passiones animae*. In Dixon’s interpretation, this rich vocabulary made room for a more nuanced approach to the emotional life of human beings than the post-eighteenth-century dichotomy between emotions and rationality. Movements of the soul were not just passively perceived by the subject. They were also a result of the orientation of the will. Good will produced good emotional habits, while perverted desires were the consequence of an ill-oriented *voluntas*. Rather than being opposed to rationality, emotional reactions were part of what we would call today ‘cognitive processes’. Being the result of mental procedures, positive affects were to be encouraged in order to sustain the psychological and spiritual growth of the believer. Other passions were instead to be controlled, suppressed or re-channelled, through working on the goals the subject voluntarily chose to pursue in her or his life.⁵⁰

If we take a closer look at sexual desire, however, we cannot help noticing that relatively few canonical Christian thinkers recognized a positive role for this unsuppressible component of psychological life. The Christian theological approach to sexual desire has been largely determined by the works of Augustine of Hippo (354–430). Augustine never suggested to eradicate feelings and passions in order to achieve spiritual realization.⁵¹ He distinguished a *concupiscentia bona* (spiritual desire leading to God) from a *concupiscentia naturalis* (a proclivity towards wellbeing and happiness, which included the desire to marry and have children), but located the *concupiscentia carnalis* outside the realm of nature as a by-product of the corruption of the will resulting from Original Sin.⁵² Sexual desire per se was a symbol of the decayed state in which humanity found itself after the Fall from Grace. Even within wedlock, sex without the purpose of procreation was a sin,⁵³ and abstinence was recommended as a superior choice for married couples.⁵⁴

Sexual desire thus represented an anomaly in Christian theories of emotions.⁵⁵ We ought not think, however, that Luther’s stance against ecclesiastic celibacy was inspired by a radically innovative consideration of sexual pleasure. Although he used this trope to question the superiority of the clergy, Luther was an Augustinian friar and his pastoral activity was strongly influenced by the teachings of the bishop of Hippo. What changed in his view of sexual desire was not the belief that it was sinful, but the fact that he thought it was not possible to expect a humanity indelibly stained by Original Sin to rise above its decayed condition.⁵⁶ Despite reaffirming the tradition, the revolution he brought about within Christianity had some positive repercussions on the status of marital couples and on the role that sex was believed to play in reinforcing their affective bonds. Although marriage ceased to be a sacrament, in line with the process of dogmatic and liturgical simplification promoted by the Reformers, Luther re-evaluated the role of marriage as the foundation of civil society and the most effective remedy for human concupiscence. In spite of some differences, mostly related to the value that should be accorded to marital sex, this shift occurred consistently across all of the major Reformed confessions.

Conversely, in Catholic Europe, the church strongly reasserted the sacramental nature of marriage as a response to the polemical stances taken by Protestants. Even though this major difference cannot be underplayed, historians have also highlighted many common features between Catholic and Protestant approaches to marriage.⁵⁷ Within Christianity generally, moral theology and pastoral practice began to devote more attention to the condition of married couples, increasingly celebrating their charismatic dignity within the Christian community. Both the Reformed and Roman churches fought against traditional beliefs and rites, in an attempt to standardize the procedures that led engaged couples to achieve the spousal state.⁵⁸

Both Catholics and Protestants maintained the patriarchal assumption of the previous Christian tradition about the inferior status of women. At the same time, chastity and virginity continued to be assigned a major role in Christian morality, and for lay people that meant that sex was allowed only within marriage. While Luther, Huldrych Zwingli and John Calvin all questioned the cult of Mary, they nonetheless reaffirmed the doctrine of the Mother of Christ's perpetual virginity, even though it contradicted their approach to scripture.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, this re-evaluation of marriage (and of sex within marriage) brought about a significant shift in the way that Christian authorities all over Europe regulated the wide range of emotional bonds that took place out of wedlock. Protestant and Catholic authorities progressively abandoned their proclivity to turn a blind eye to relationships between unmarried women and men, even those that had been relatively well tolerated in the past. During this process, the proscription of extra- or pre-marital sexual activity also became more cogent. This shift was implemented not only through campaigns to re-educate the populace, but also, in the Protestant world, through the foundation of specific Marriage Courts that controlled a vast range of (mis)behaviours related (but not exclusively) to marital status.⁶⁰ In Catholic and Protestant countries prostitution was subjected to an increasing level of control, and an unprecedented moral stigma became paired with more coercive attitudes towards those who transgressed the line dividing 'prostitutes' and 'honest women'.⁶¹

This emphasis on marriage had serious repercussions for how Christian society dealt with homosexual attraction. If in the past some room was left for negotiation, from then on civic and religious institutions took a more radical stance against unproductive sexuality. These changing patterns did not always result in an increase in judiciary prosecutions.⁶² Rather, those involved now tended to keep silent. Up to this time, priests, preachers and confessors had addressed sexual themes using an explicit and coarse language, often reflecting the content and style of the manuals attached to their training. This expressive code was progressively emended. Particularly in the Catholic world, after the Council of Trent, preachers and authors of devotional manuals were strongly warned against accidentally enticing people to sin with their words. Keeping people ignorant by generically alluding to lust was encouraged as a more cautious way to prevent them from indulging in sexual temptations.⁶³ Historians have noted that, in this respect, Catholic and Protestant countries adopted similar strategies.⁶⁴ They have also pointed out, however, the extent to which sexual discourses in Catholic countries, although silenced in the public sphere, were excited by the increasing emphasis on the practice of sacramental confession, and the simultaneous and thus related proliferation of manuals for confessors and texts of moral theology.⁶⁵

This increasing emphasis on the control of a vast range of emotional experiences that for a long time had been allowed to express themselves outside the prescriptive boundaries of marriage stimulated forms of resistance from below. Although it is sometimes difficult to deduce the ways in which people were able to manage the internal conflict created by their desires and the moral codes proscribing them,⁶⁶ in a few trials of the Spanish Inquisition, the defendants openly questioned the legal and theological frame in which homosexual practices were encoded. In some of these cases, they were charged for defending the idea that unproductive intercourse was ‘natural’. A singer from Toledo named Alonso de Ribera was jailed in Saragossa in 1559 for the charge of sodomy. He allegedly stated that two men who had sex with each other were not committing a sin against nature (*‘tener un hombre parte con otro no era pecado contra natura’*). Luca Daniel, who was born in Palermo, was forced to abjure his beliefs because he reportedly declared to a girl who refused to have anal sex with him that the latter was not a sin, but rather an act worth performing on the altars of Rome itself.⁶⁷ A ship’s boy stated that sodomy should not be forbidden because it was allowed by Nature (*‘la naturaleza lo permitía’*).⁶⁸ A Franciscan friar who was brought before the judges in 1591 publicly asked forgiveness for having allegedly held the heretical opinion that sexual intercourse ‘against nature’ was not sinful, nor was having sex with boys. He reportedly suggested that these behaviours were included in the injunction to ‘increase and multiply’ that God himself addressed to Adam and Eve. It was likely due to the aggravating circumstance of blasphemy that his punishment was particularly severe when compared to similar cases, eventually resulting in five years’ imprisonment.⁶⁹

From the sixteenth century on, the critique of Christian sexual prescriptions regulating sexuality played a relevant role in radical philosophical and political thinking, and was used in an unprecedented way as a tool to question the authority of the churches and, in a broader sense, of institutionalized religions. These elitist intellectual attitudes had their counterpart in an increasing popular opposition to the narrow-minded approach of the Christian confessions towards sexual pleasure. These forms of confrontation can be interpreted as a long-term underground stream of resistance against – as well as an attempt to fix – the ‘anomaly’ represented by sexual desire within the wider frame of Christian ‘emotional regimes’.⁷⁰

Merging the study of sexuality and emotions opens up manifold opportunities for historical research. In this chapter, I have highlighted only a few possibilities, in the hope that further studies will be carried out in the future. From the perspective of the history of sexuality, working on emotions has revealed how homosexual love is a topic worth studying beyond the cultures of learned elites. A focused analysis of emotional terms like ‘falling in love’ and ‘speaking in loving terms’ in judicial records proves that homosexual relationships could go far beyond the mere repetition of emotionless sexual acts, although that should not encourage a return to the sterile and now-outdated debate on ‘acts’ and ‘identities’. Furthermore, how the sense of self was constructed through affiliation to groups of belonging is better understood when we focus on the relations between practices and emotions. Homoerotic subcultures had their own rituals and jargons that played a role in shaping the self-perception and social identity of those involved in them.

Conversely, reflecting on transgressive sexuality sheds new light on our broader understanding of premodern emotions, how they were regulated, encouraged or

repressed. In interpreting homoerotic love, I have shifted the attention from the vocabulary of friendship to that of familial relationships. This shift allows us to understand the extent to which, in popular environments, proscribed and normative sexualities were inextricably entangled, and provides at the same time further proof that family itself was not necessarily a ‘low-emotion’ social institution at that time. Finally, we have seen how the re-evaluation of marriage that occurred after the Reformation and affected both the Protestant and Catholic world also impacted the way in which society and institutions dealt with sexual transgressions, putting any form of non-marital relationship and unproductive sexual intercourse outside the spectrum of social acceptability. This change, however, planted the seed of a reactive discourse that co-opted sexual transgressions within a broader critique of the hypocrisies and fallacies of revealed religions and society on the whole. I suggest that this historical turn needs to be contextualized in the long-term perspective of Christian understandings and regulation of emotions. As long as sexual abstinence and marital status were radically opposed, more room was left for negotiations with emotional and sexual experiences that took place out of wedlock. The more marriage was dignified, and along with that some positive role recognized for marital sex, the less other expressions of desire and affection could any longer be accepted by society.

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Notes

- 1 The collection of legal treatises issued by order of Justinian (*Corpus Iuris Civilis*), however, was the result of a long gestation. Religious injunctions and criminal regulation had already started to conflate in earlier Roman law. See E. Cantarella, *Bisexuality in the Ancient World*, trans. C. O’Cuilleann, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992, pp. 142–5; 173–86. On the Justinian codes see D. Masini, ‘Il diritto penale nelle Novelle di Giustiniano’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Padova, 2008. Although methodologically questionable, John Boswell’s pioneering work is still a landmark: J. Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980. For an updated introduction to ancient times up to early Christianity see T.K. Hubbard (ed.), *A Companion to Greek and Roman Sexualities*, Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.
- 2 Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, Homosexuality*; M. Goodich, *The Unmentionable Vice: Homosexuality in the Later Medieval Period*, Santa Barbara, CA: Ross-Erikson, 1979.
- 3 See note 20 below.
- 4 Carlo Ginzburg’s reflections on this subject are still enlightening: C. Ginzburg, ‘The inquisitor as an anthropologist’, in C. Ginzburg, *Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method*, trans. J. and A.C. Tedeschi, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, pp. 156–64.

- 5 Among others see J.J. Alves Dias, 'Prohibited sex in Portugal in the sixteenth century: an approach', in H. Johnson and F.A. Dutra (eds), *Pelo Vaso Traseiro. Sodomy and Sodomites in Luso-Brazilian History*, Tucson, AZ: Fenestra Books, 2007, pp. 49–61.
- 6 F. Alfieri, 'Impossibili unioni di uguali. L'amore fra donne nel discorso teologico e giuridico (secoli XVI–XVIII)', *Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica* 2, 2012, 105–25; V. Traub, 'The (in)significance of "lesbian" desire', in J. Goldberg (ed.), *Queering the Renaissance*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994, pp. 61–83.
- 7 L. Crompton, 'The myth of lesbian impunity: capital laws from 1270 to 1791', *Journal of Homosexuality* 6:1–2, 1981, 11–25.
- 8 J.M. Bennett, *History Matters: Patriarchy and the Challenge of Feminism*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, pp. 108–27; H. Puff, 'Female sodomy: the trial of Katherina Hetzeldorfer (1477)', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 30:1, 2000, 41–61.
- 9 Bennett, *History Matters*. See also: H. Puff, 'Same sex possibilities', in J.M. Bennett and R.M. Karras (eds), *Women and Gender in Medieval Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 379–95.
- 10 A. Rich, 'Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence', *Signs* 5:4, 1980, 631–60; L. Faderman, *Surpassing the Love of Men: Romantic Friendship and Love between Women from the Renaissance to the Present*, New York: Morrow, 1981.
- 11 M. Vicinus, *Intimate Friends: Women Who Loved Women, 1778–1928*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
- 12 E. Donoghue, *Passions between Women: British Lesbian Culture 1668–1801*, New York: Harper Collins, 1993.
- 13 V. Traub, *The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- 14 For an overview of this historiography see M. Vicinus, 'The history of lesbian history', *Feminist Studies* 38:3, 2012, 566–96.
- 15 A. Bray, *The Friend*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003; H. Puff, 'After the history of (male) homosexuality', in S. Spector, H. Puff and D. Herzog (eds), *After the History of Sexuality: German Genealogies with and beyond Foucault*, New York: Berghahn Press, 2012.
- 16 H. Puff, *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland: 1440–1600*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003, pp. 70–1.
- 17 A well-established historiographic interpretation has opposed a premodern paradigm, in which sodomy was simply considered a forbidden act, to a new model that has emerged since the nineteenth-century medicalization of homosexual behaviours. Homosexuality (a term coined in 1869) would at that point have become an identity. This strong thesis was inspired by Michel Foucault's reflections in *The Will to Knowledge*, the first volume of his *History of Sexuality*. Foucault described the way in which new sciences such as sexology, psychology and psychoanalysis contributed to the creation of the idea of 'sexual identity' as a fundamental category for constituting and understanding the 'self'. In this context, sodomy, previously 'a category of forbidden acts', became an identity, tantamount to a kind of 'interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul' (M. Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge*, trans. R. Hurley, London: Penguin, 1998, p. 43; the original French text, *La Volonté de Savoir*, was first published in 1976). Foucault himself partially reconsidered his positions (C. Dinshaw, 'Touching on the past', in M. Kuefler (ed.), *The Boswell Thesis: Essays on Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 57–73; see also D. Eribon, *Réflexions sur la question gay*, Paris: Fayard, 1999). Historians have largely revised this thesis (see, for instance, Spector, Puff and Herzog, *After the History of Sexuality*). The focus on emotions reinforces the notion that long before the medical creation of sexual identities, the expression of homosexual desire went well beyond the mechanical reiteration of sexual acts.
- 18 M. Scheer, 'Are emotions a kind of practice (and is that what makes them have a history)?': A Bourdieuan approach to understanding emotions', *History and Theory* 51, 2012, 192–220.
- 19 B.-U. Hergemöller, *Sodom and Gomorrah: On the Everyday Reality and Persecution of Homosexuals in the Middle Ages*, trans. J. Phillips, London: Free Associations Books, 2001, pp. 39–65. For a comparative perspective: K. Gerard and G. Hekma (eds), *The Pursuit of Sodomy: Male Homosexuality in Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe*, New York: Harrington Park Press,

1989. On Florence: M.J. Rocke, *Forbidden Friendships. Homosexuality and Male Culture in Renaissance Florence*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. On Venice: G. Ruggiero, *The Boundaries of Eros: Sex Crime and Sexuality in Renaissance Venice*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985; and G. Martini, *Il vizio nefando nella Venezia del Seicento. Aspetti sociali e repressione di giustizia*, Rome: Jouvence, 1988. On Spain: R. Carrasco, *Inquisición y represión sexual en Valencia. Historia de los sodomitas (1565–1785)*, Barcelona: Laertes, 1985; F. Garza Carvajal, *Butterflies Will Burn: Prosecuting Sodomites in Early Modern Spain and Mexico*, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003; T.A. Mantecón Movellan, ‘Los mocitos de Galindo: sexualidad contra natura, culturas proscritas y control social en la temprana edad moderna’, in T.A. Mantecón Movellan (ed.), *Bajtín y la historia de la cultura popular*, Santander: Ediciones de la Universidad de Cantabria, 2008, pp. 209–40; C. Berco, *Sexual Hierarchies, Public Status: Men, Sodomy and Society in Spain’s Golden Age*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. On Germany, besides the aforementioned Hergemöller, see M.R. Boes, ‘On trials for sodomy in early modern Germany’, in T. Betteridge (ed.), *Sodomy in Early Modern Europe*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001, pp. 27–45. On Switzerland: Puff, *Sodomy*, and W. Naphy, ‘Sodomy in early modern Geneva: various definitions, diverse verdicts’, in Betteridge, *Sodomy in Early Modern Europe*, pp. 94–111.
- 20 On dress codes see P. de León, *Grandeza y miseria en Andalucía. Testimonio de una encrucijada histórica (1578–1616)*, ed. P. Herrera Puga, Granada: Facultad de Teología, 1981, p. 435; in the colonial world: F. Molina, ‘Los sodomitas virreinales: entre sujeto jurídicos y especie’, *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 67:1, 2010, 23–52 (p. 44).
- 21 Scheer, ‘Are emotions a kind of practice’.
- 22 ‘Enamorarse’, ‘decir amores’, ‘requerir amores’, ‘haciéndose fiestas y amores’. Carrasco, *Inquisición y represión sexual*, p. 102.
- 23 D. Kambasković, ‘Love’, in S. Broomhall (ed.), *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 53–6.
- 24 ‘Mujer mía – Marido mío – Estáte quieto y ensancha las piernas – Sí esté bien [. . .] ya está dentro’. AHN, Inq., lib. 940, fol. 307^r sq. (1633), cited in Carrasco, *Inquisición y represión sexual*, p. 101.
- 25 M. Daumas, ‘Cœurs vaillants et cœurs tendres: l’amitié et l’amour à l’époque moderne’, in G. Vigarello (ed.), *Histoire des émotions. 1. De l’Antiquité aux Lumières*, Paris: Seuil, 2016, pp. 333–50 (pp. 345–50).
- 26 K. Barclay, ‘Marriage’, in Broomhall, *Early Modern Emotions*, pp. 217–19 (p. 218).
- 27 S. Ozment, *Ancestors: The Loving Family in Old Europe*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. The founders of the historiographical thesis that familial affection is a modern construct are: P. Ariès, *L’Enfant et la vie familiale sous l’Ancien Régime*, Paris: Plon, 1960; and L. Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500–1800*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977.
- 28 B. Taylor, ‘Feminists versus gallants: manners and morals in Enlightenment Britain’, in S. Knott and B. Taylor (eds), *Women, Gender and Enlightenment*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2005, pp. 30–52.
- 29 Rocke, *Forbidden Friendships*, p. 108.
- 30 ‘tantas caricias i puterías como si el fuera una doncella’. AHN, Inq., leg. 840, n° 50, 1625; *ibid.*, leg. 844, n° 3, 1572; *ibid.*, leg. 550, n° 17, cited in Carrasco, *Inquisición y represión sexual*, pp. 107–8.
- 31 ‘tiene ordinaria costumbre de hablar muy afeminadamente e imitar las cosas de mujeres e así le tienen puesto por nombre la Pizarra’. AHN, Inq., leg. 844, n° 3, 1572, cited in Carrasco, *Inquisición y represión sexual*, p. 135.
- 32 Garza Carvajal, *Butterflies Will Burn*; S. Gruzinski, ‘The ashes of desire: homosexuality in mid-seventeenth-century New Spain’, in P. Sigal (ed.), *Infamous Desire: Male Homosexuality in Colonial Latin America*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003, pp. 197–214.
- 33 de León, *Grandeza y miseria en Andalucía*, pp. 435–7; Garza Carvajal, *Butterflies Will Burn*, pp. 68–71.
- 34 AHN, Inq., leg. 550, exp. 17 (fols not numbered).
- 35 Luis Coxet defended himself by reporting that the accuser had told another witness, ‘how I crave to send two Moriscos to the stake’ (‘Que deseo tengo de hazer quemar dos moriscos’).

- AHN, Inquisición, leg. 550, exp. 17, defense of Luis Coxet. Sexuality played a crucial role in conflictual relationships between faiths in the Mediterranean area. From a normative perspective, it was used to reinforce boundaries, but sexual transgressions often facilitated cultural crossings. See D. Nirenberg, 'Religious and sexual boundaries in the medieval Crown of Aragon', in M.D. Meyerson and E.D. English (eds), *Christians, Muslims, and Jews in Medieval and Early Modern Spain: Interaction and Cultural Change*, Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1999, pp. 141–60; D. Nirenberg, 'Conversion, sex, and segregation: Jews and Christians in medieval Spain', *American Historical Review* 107, 2002, 1065–93. See also S. Barton, *Conquerors, Brides, and Concubines: Interfaith Relations and Social Power in Medieval Iberia*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015; R.J. Zorgati, *Pluralism in the Middle Ages: Hybrid Identities, Conversion, and Mixed Marriages in Medieval Iberia*, London: Routledge, 2012; S.F. Kruger, 'Conversion and medieval sexual, religious and racial categories', in K. Lochrie, P. McKracken and J. Schultz (eds), *Constructing Medieval Sexuality*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pp. 158–78. On the early modern period: E. Dursteler, *Renegade Women: Gender, Identity, and Boundaries in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011. For a specific focus on homosexuality: U. Grassi and G. Marcocci (eds), *Le trasgressioni della carne. Il desiderio omosessuale nel mondo islamico e cristiano, secc. XII–XX*, Rome: Viella, 2015.
- 36 Barclay, 'Marriage', pp. 218–19. See also K. Barclay, *Love, Intimacy and Power: Marriage and Patriarchy in Scotland, 1650–1850*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2011.
- 37 L. Mott and A. Assunção, 'Love's labors lost: five letters from a seventeenth-century Portuguese sodomite', in Gerard and Hekma, *The Pursuit of Sodomy*, pp. 91–101. Another collection of letters studied by Mott is just as interesting for the study of emotions: L. Mott, 'My pretty boy: love letters from a sodomite friar, Lisbon (1690)', in Johnson and Dutra, *Pelo Vaso Traseiro*, pp. 231–61.
- 38 S. Velasco, 'How to spot a lesbian in the early modern Spanish world', in E.L. MaCallum and M. Tuhkanen (eds), *The Cambridge History of Gay and Lesbian Literature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 179–96 (pp. 184–6).
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- 40 See D.S. Bailey, *Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition*, London: Longmans, 1955; G.W. Olsen, *Of Sodomites, Effeminate, Hermaphrodites, and Androgynes: Sodomy in the Age of Peter Damian*, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2011; M.D. Jordan, *The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997; and Goodich, *The Unmentionable Vice*.
- 41 On Florence: Rocke, *Forbidden Friendships*. On Venice: Ruggiero, *Boundaries of Eros*; Martini, *Il vizio nefando*. On Lucca: U. Grassi, *L'Offizio sopra l'Onestà. Il controllo della sodomia nella Lucca del Cinquecento*, Milan: Mimesis, 2014.
- 42 O. Niccoli, *La vita religiosa nell'Italia moderna. Secoli XV–XVIII*, Rome: Carocci, 2008, pp. 42–5. On the social meaning of religion between the late Middle Ages and the early modern period see J. Bossy, *Christianity in the West, 1400–1700*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. On rituals in urban public life see R.C. Trexler, *Church and the Community 1200–1600*, Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1987; R.C. Trexler, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1980; on brotherhoods: N. Terpstra, A. Prosperi and S. Pastore (eds), *Faith's Boundaries: Laity and Clergy in Early Modern Confraternities*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2013.
- 43 This paragraph draws upon Grassi, *Offizio*, pp. 65–73.
- 44 J. Rossiaud, *Medieval Prostitution*, trans. L.G. Cochrane, New York: Blackwell, 1988; see also M. Berengo, *L'Europa delle città. Il volto della società urbana europea tra medioevo ed età moderna*, Turin: Einaudi, 1999, pp. 638–45; R.C. Trexler, 'La Prostitution florentine au XV^e siècle. Patronages et clientèle', *Annales, E.S.C.* 36, 1981, 983–1015.
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- 47 Rocke, *Forbidden Friendships*, pp. 148–91.
- 48 On the Protestant world see: D. MacCulloch, *Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 1490–1700*, London: Allen Lane, 2003; and U. Rublack, *Reformation Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. On Catholic Europe see: R.P.-C. Hsia, *The World of Catholic Renewal, 1540–1770*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
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- 50 Ibid., pp. 1–25.
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- 53 Augustine, *De bono coniugali*, 5.5. In Lamberigts, ‘A critical evaluation’, p. 181.
- 54 Lamberigts, ‘A critical evaluation’, p. 185.
- 55 Ibid., pp. 176–77. See U. Grassi, ‘Il frutto proibito. Eresia, peccato originale ed emozioni nell’Italia moderna’, in F. Alfieri and V. Lagioia (eds), *‘Infami macchie’. Sessualità maschili e indisciplina fra XVII e XVIII secolo*, Roma: Viella, 2018, pp. 51–86.
- 56 M. Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World: Regulating Desire, Reforming Practice*, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 62–3.
- 57 I use the adjective ‘Protestant’ to refer to the Protestant confessions that were eventually recognized as state religions.
- 58 Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality*, pp. 60–140; D. Lombardi, *Storia del matrimonio. Dal medioevo a oggi*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008, pp. 83–171.
- 59 MacCulloch, *Reformation*, p. 613.
- 60 Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality*, pp. 67–72.
- 61 Ibid., pp. 86–87, 124–6. This also occurred in England: MacCulloch, *Reformation*, pp. 634–5.
- 62 Death penalty rates increased in Spain and Portugal: Carrasco, *Inquisición y represión sexual*; L. Mott, ‘*Justitia et misericordia*: the Portuguese Inquisition and the repression of the nefarious sin of sodomy’, in Johnson and Dutra, *Pelo Vaso Traseiro*, pp. 63–104. In Italy the number of trials quantitatively decreased, but qualitatively the crime was treated overall more harshly. On the situation in Venice: Martini, *Il vizio nefando*, p. 56; on Lucca: Grassi, *Offizio*, pp. 153–73; in Florence severe legislation was approved but apparently not enforced: Rocke, *Forbidden Friendships*, pp. 233–5.
- 63 R. Canosa, *La restaurazione sessuale. Per una storia della sessualità tra Cinquecento e Settecento*, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1993, p. 117.
- 64 On the Protestant world see Puff, *Sodomy*, pp. 75–104.
- 65 This process of internalization and its deep consequences are analysed by Foucault in *The Will to Knowledge*. On the role of confession in post-Tridentine Catholicism see A. Prosperi, *Tribunali della coscienza. Inquisitori, vescovi e missionari*, Turin: Einaudi, 1996.
- 66 See. A. Bray, *Homosexuality in Renaissance England*, London: Gay Men’s Press, 1982, pp. 63–80.
- 67 AHN, Inq., Sicilia, libro 898, fols 415^v–416^r, 426^{r-v}.
- 68 AHN, Inq., Sicilia, libro 899, fol. 227^r.
- 69 AHN, Inq., Sicilia, libro 898, fol. [no. illegible] and fol. 523^v.
- 70 P. Cryle and L. O’Connell (eds), *Libertine Enlightenment: Sex, Liberty, and Licence in the Eighteenth Century*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; R. Darnton, ‘Sex for thought’, in K.M. Phillips and B. Reay (eds), *Sexualities in History: A Reader*, New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 203–21; L. Hunt (ed.), *The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the Origin of Modernity, 1500–1800*, New York: Zone, 1993.

SENSING AND FEELING

Lisa Beaven

The last two decades have been characterized by a rapid increase in the number of publications considering aspects of the history of emotions and sensory history in the medieval and early modern period.¹ What these approaches have in common is an interest in the history of the body. The senses are traditionally considered to be stimuli demarcating the border between the body and the broader world which provide a stream of information to the brain, which processes the information and generates emotional responses. In spite of this symbiotic relationship, which invites a consideration of how the body and the broader world interact, these two approaches emerged from different intellectual genealogies and have largely developed along separate academic trajectories. The history of emotions is regarded as a new field, positioned within the coordinates of history, psychology and neuroscience, and consequently its definition has been much discussed. Sensory history,² on the other hand, is closely tied to anthropology, and as Mark Smith has described it, is better understood as a ‘habit of thinking about the past’.³ The aim of this chapter is to question the separation of these approaches and to explore areas where they intersect in research into the medieval and early modern past.

Annales School

The stimulus for a renewed interest in the history of emotions and the senses in the twentieth century can be traced back to the ‘*Annales School*’ of social history, founded by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch. Febvre encouraged the growth of the history of *mentalités*, a holistic approach to the sensibility of the past. Febvre was himself influenced by the emotions theories of earlier historians, specifically Norbert Elias and Johan Huizinga. Huizinga’s *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, first published in Dutch in 1919, examined the emotional tenor of life in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, concluding that people were often violent and had poor impulse control.⁴ In *The Civilizing Process* Norbert Elias built on the work of Huizinga to develop a complex thesis about emotional behaviour over five centuries, from uncontrolled and uninhibited in the Middle Ages to increasing emotional restraint and development of sophisticated manners and etiquette in the eighteenth century.⁵ Elias’s synthesis was contested by a number of medieval scholars, especially Barbara H. Rosenwein, who argued that Elias and Huizinga subscribed to a ‘hydraulic’ model of emotions, one that resembled a liquid under pressure, ready to boil over in unrestrained passions.⁶ Instead, Rosenwein proposed a model of intersecting emotional communities,

constituted by ‘constellations – or sets – of emotions’ and shared values. In essence, for Rosenwein, what was to be uncovered by the researcher were systems of feeling, often shared feeling, which could exist within social communities. The social dimensions of her interpretation, and the ability of an individual to inhabit a number of emotional communities simultaneously, made this theory a flexible tool for scholarship and proved highly influential for a whole generation of scholars of the history of emotion and the Middle Ages. However, a theory of emotions that relies on social interaction can run the risk of overlooking the interiority of emotion and the role of the senses in the liminal zone between the body and the social.⁷ Criticism of Elias from the perspective of the history of emotions has overlooked his ability to think inclusively about the emotions and the senses in social terms. The emotions resist definition because of their fluidity and plasticity, and much of what interests Elias, such as distaste, disgust and revulsion, defies clear categorization, existing in the transitional zone between sensory reaction and affective response, perception and evaluation. Scientific disagreements over whether distaste and disgust are emotions or senses, for example, simply reveal how inextricably they are bound together.⁸

By contrast sensory historians objected to the sensory determinism originally displayed by Febvre. In his 1942 work *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais*, Febvre suggested that while people in the medieval and Renaissance periods had relied more on smell, touch and taste, by the time of the scientific revolution sight overwhelmingly had become the dominant sense.⁹ Febvre identified the seventeenth century as the moment when this shift occurred, with its full impact felt in the following century, when the power of vision ushered in modernity. His views were taken up by Marshall McLuhan and Walter J. Ong, both proponents of the ‘great divide’ theory of literacy.¹⁰ This proposed, essentially, that a culture dominated by the ear, and to some extent the senses of touch and taste, was replaced by one dominated by visuality with the advent of writing. McLuhan was interested in media histories and the intersection of oral and written traditions, and drew parallels between the oral poetry of Homer and Plato’s philosophy, the manuscript and print culture of the Renaissance, and the division between print and electronic media in the twentieth century.¹¹ Highly relevant to this discussion was McLuhan and Ong’s claim that sound was an affective and intimate sense, one that invaded the body, while sight involved distance from the body and was perceived as more impartial.¹² Ong highlighted major sensory distinctions between speech and script, and both scholars proposed that for non-Western oral cultures, sound became more dominant, binding the other senses together into a communicative framework.¹³ A number of scholars, particularly David Howes and Smith, objected to the dichotomous nature of the ‘great divide’ literacy theory. Their arguments about this model’s reliance on intellectual histories of the Enlightenment, rather than a broader range of sources, echo those of medievalists objecting to Elias’s account of the civilizing process.¹⁴ While acknowledging that the introduction of printing enhanced the power of vision, they argue that these regimes were not mutually exclusive. Howes also contested McLuhan’s trajectory of sensory development across time, demonstrating that the senses of proximity, such as touch, taste and smell, became more, rather than less, dominant in Europe from the end of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth centuries.¹⁵ In taking this position he was, somewhat confusingly, building on the work of Ong himself in *The Presence of*

the Word, in which the author proposed an intersensorial model of the senses and revealed the continued significance of tactile and olfactory senses in the culture of the Enlightenment.¹⁶ Constance Classen objected to the broad cross-cultural claims contained in McLuhan and Ong's model, arguing that each culture had to be approached by means of its own sensory codes, in order to draw out the diversity of sensory perceptual systems operating in non-Western cultures.¹⁷

Science

The history of emotions and sensory history has in both cases been informed by rapid advances in the scientific understanding of the brain and the body. These findings have encouraged a reconsideration of the body in history. But if neuroscience has made major advances in revealing the crucial role emotions play in cognition, overturning centuries of artificial division between thinking and feeling, it has also complicated the model of how the senses and the emotions work together. For example, the cutaneous senses (everything felt through the skin), traditionally thought to consist of four submodalities that convey tactile, thermal, painful and pruritic information to the central nervous system, are now believed to include a fifth submodality that exists solely to convey the affective or pleasant properties of touch.¹⁸ The revelation of a possible emotional facet of tactile sensation subverts the cause and effect model of the relationship between the senses and the emotions by suggesting that an affective response might be built into the sensory pathway itself. These admittedly speculative findings nonetheless suggest that a sustained separation of emotion and the senses, both structures of feeling, may ultimately prove to be as arbitrary as the traditional division between thinking and feeling.

Many humanities scholars reject the insistence of science and psychology on a set of universal innate emotions, and argue instead for their cultural and historical specificity. They argue that a universalist approach, by concentrating on emotions as states, fails to account for the process of emotional identity formation that is subject to social and cultural practices, as well as variations over time.¹⁹ David Konstan's research into the emotional frameworks of the ancient Greeks, for example, has demonstrated the cultural specificity of ancient Greek emotions, noting that sadness and grief are absent from ancient Greek lists of emotions.²⁰ Peter Burke has highlighted boredom's emergence as a fashionable emotion in the nineteenth century.²¹ He wonders whether its appearance at this moment was the result of more leisure time, or whether it existed prior to this without being named. Science's taut binary of biology and emotion also fails to satisfactorily explain the chronological and cultural distribution of certain emotions more broadly, such as sympathy and sociability in the eighteenth century, or the instrumentalization of feelings in political and national agendas.

For those whose research is informed by the senses, understanding the implication of scientific advances has been more straightforward. Despite a lack of consensus on how many senses there are, and some ambiguity about where responses such as disgust and distaste belong, the sophisticated structure of sensory modalities is now being recognized. The traditional number of five senses (sight, sound, touch, smell and taste) that has existed since classical times has been extended to at least nine. Pain now is accepted as a sense in its own right, with its own complex history,

and intersects with touch as a submodality of the cutaneous senses. Touch is now recognized as the most complex of all sensory modalities, able to be broken down further into proprioception (an awareness of the position of the body), equilibrioception (sense of balance) and thermoception (perception of temperature).²² The scientific expansion of touch is particularly interesting in the light of Aristotle's discussion of the sense in *De anima* and *De sensu*. Aristotle distinguished touch from the other senses, noting its difficulties – the dilemma of whether it should be classified as a single or multiple sense and the difficulty of identifying its organ.²³ The complexity of touch, and its operation through the expanse of the skin, imparts to it the role of mediating between the body and the outside world, whereas Aristotle believed that the medium for sensory perception had to be external to the body. As Carla Mazzio pointed out, the representation of touch for the early modern period was difficult, as it could not easily be objectified.²⁴ Touch was sometimes represented by a hand, although this failed to convey its reciprocal nature.²⁵ One Renaissance drama about the five senses presented characters for each which were named 'Eye' for sight, 'Ear' for hearing, but 'Touch' for touch, because it was a sense 'without a synecdoche, a mode without a metonymy'.²⁶

In underscoring the sophistication of sensory modalities, science has also demonstrated that they operate overwhelmingly in a multimodal or intersensorial way. The multiple sources of sensory information have to merge in order to perceive the external environment.²⁷ Traditionally studied as separate threads, it transpires they are better understood as an interwoven texture of sensation, or as Michel Serres described them in *The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies*, as a knot.²⁸ Tangled together, each sense can affect the operation of another to alter perception. The most famous example of this is Spence's dry hand test, which revealed the effect of sound on its subjects' perception of the texture of their hands.²⁹ It is also now widely understood that tasting is made up of taste sensations and olfactory ones, which combine in order to produce the perception of flavour.³⁰ The scientific understanding of the intersensorial operation of the senses correlates approximately with the anthropological view of how they operate. As Howes expresses it, 'No matter how culturally prominent a particular sensory field may be, it always operates interactively with other sensory domains and hence cannot reveal the whole story about the social sensorium'.³¹ Currently, synesthesia – a momentary alteration of the limits between senses to create spontaneous links between them – is the most fashionable theoretical model of this intersensoriality.

Senses and emotions: language and the fugitive nature of the evidence

One of the obstacles to studying emotions and senses in the past has been the impossibility of locating and retrieving them. As a consequence, historians of emotions have foregrounded the language of emotion. The difficulty of equating the words for emotions in different languages is magnified for the past, when 'emotion' was not a 'meta-concept', as Jan Plamper puts it.³² Much of the complexity around the language of emotion also hinges on the innate difficulty of expressing feelings in words. As Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan put it, 'all attempts to articulate inward feelings involve a certain degree of translation or metaphorical conceptualization'.³³ When such words are expressed they can generate emotion, and be self-altering.

Although assumptions about the lexical equivalence of emotional terms between different languages in the past are necessary in order to conduct historical research, in reality, as the research of Anna Wierzbicka has demonstrated, this equivalence often does not exist.³⁴ The inability to find emotion terms in other cultures that map effectively onto English words has led psychologists to focus instead on words salient to individual cultures rather than terminology reflective of Western values.³⁵ Even when words survive unchanged into the present, their meaning may be foreign to our lived experience, or may have altered. Rosenwein reminds us that when the word 'emotion' was first recorded in an English dictionary in 1579 it was defined as 'social agitation', with connotations of public violence.³⁶

Sensory historians have been influenced by major interventions in the field such as Serres's *The Five Senses*, which represents bodily experience as fundamentally different from language. While acutely aware of language, anthropologists have argued persuasively for its spoken significance as sound,³⁷ and the importance of non-verbal communication in non-Western cultures, such as ritual, gesture and dance. They stress the cultural embeddedness of sensory experience, emphasizing that communication is broader than language. For sensory history a major issue is the fugitive nature of the evidence, and the difference between lived experience and the written record. How do we follow a taste or scent into the past? Smith cautions against doing so, maintaining the aim of sensory history is not to make the past come alive, but rather to radically historicize it.³⁸ In seminal works, Alain Corbin, Howes, Smith and Classen have maintained that it is not enough to try to recover the wealth of sensory evidence associated with life in the past; rather it is necessary to analyse 'the social ideologies conveyed through sensory values and practices'.³⁹ For these scholars any discussion of the senses must take place in very precise social and cultural contexts, with Classen stating that 'sensory perception is a cultural as well as a physical act'.⁴⁰ Their research has also emphasized the impossibility of tracking changes across time, in favour of sensory histories grounded in local contexts, in direct contrast to scholars of the emotions, who have been preoccupied with new theories of emotion, and the tracking of emotional change.

Medieval and early modern emotional and sensory regimes

Medieval sensory systems were understood as open perceptual frameworks, as distinct from post-Enlightenment closed ones, allowing materials, images and sounds to be transmitted and received.⁴¹ As a result there was a prevailing notion of each sense as a form of interface, bridge or portal. In antiquity the senses had been ranked in a vertical hierarchy, as in Aristotle's account, where sight and hearing are considered to be the higher and more intellectual senses, smell occupies a middle ground, and taste and touch are considered to be lower order senses. In addition to the usual five external senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste, a number of internal senses were added. In the medieval period these consisted of common sense, imagination and memory.⁴² The outer senses conveyed information from the external world to these inner senses, which functioned as a kind of intelligent inner sensorium. Common sense was considered a master sense, able to transform the sensory information into distinct acts of perception, its authority evident from Helkiah Crooke's description of it in 1612 as 'Censor and Judge'.⁴³ Touch, taste and smell were considered proximate

senses, closely tied to the body. Perfume not only functioned to create an aura of scent around the body which masked bad smells, but in humoral theory was believed to be powerful enough to purge or destroy them. One nun sent presents of perfumed pomanders to her friend and children to protect them from the poisonous vapours of the plague.⁴⁴ Theories of vision during the medieval period were complicated, with Arab opticians following the Aristotelian model of intromission, understood as the reception of tiny replicas of the object of vision.⁴⁵ The Galenic theory of vision, following Plato, conjectured that the seer sent out rays from the eye to the object, so that the object was perceived through direct contact.⁴⁶ The Stoical view was slightly different, maintaining that material transmitted from the eye changed the surrounding environment, transforming the air. For medieval theologians, sight in the form of spiritual vision could be directed internally, to lead to knowledge, and ultimately faith. The competing theories of vision are a reminder of the extent to which theories of the senses were in a state of flux throughout the period. Whichever theory was subscribed to, vision was understood to involve a transfer of qualities, explaining why so many people were preoccupied with the evil eye. The concept of 'fascination' or bewitchment by means of eye contact was a commonly held belief in medieval and early modern Europe, with later writers being informed by Plutarch, who saw the eye as a vehicle for transmission.⁴⁷ A seventeenth-century physician, Cornelius Agrippa, highlighted the power of looking: 'in the vapours of the eyes there is so great a power, that they can bewitch and infect any that are neer [sic] them'.⁴⁸ A commonly held belief was that the plague could be transmitted by a look from the eyes of the sick, which was why Charles Delorme, the physician of Louis XIII, wore crystal spectacles when he visited plague patients.⁴⁹

Traditionally, studies of medieval and early modern emotion have emphasized the dominance of Galenic humoralism, and owe much to the cultural history of medicine and the development of physiology.⁵⁰ The origins of this theory can be traced back to Hippocrates, who posited that the body was governed by four humours: blood, yellow bile, phlegm and black bile. For a healthy body, these humours were held in equilibrium, but a surplus or deficiency of humours could lead to a range of physical and mental ailments. As the humours fluctuated in each individual according to age and sex, they needed to be supplemented with the correct diet. Each humour was linked to one of the four elements, and each of those was characterized by a combination of heat and moisture. Health and ideas about living well were centred on the concept of the human body as a microcosm, likened to the wider macrocosm of the world and the heavens as they were understood by Christian philosophy. The temporal movements of the cosmos corresponded to the human life cycle, and the actions of individual planets could affect lives. Arab philosophers, for example, connected the symptoms of melancholy to the influence of Saturn and an excess of black bile.

The religious wars of the sixteenth century changed sensory hierarchies and emotional regimes at a time when humoral theory was under direct challenge from scientific and medical breakthroughs. Tommaso Campanella, for example, questioned the separation of the senses into those that were considered more cerebral (sight and hearing) and those that were more physical (taste, smell and touch), and denied the concept of inner senses altogether.⁵¹ Physicians became critical of the concept of heat as the essence of the body. William Harvey's demonstration of the circulation of the blood in 1628 led to intense debates about the role of the

heart, and the brain.⁵² Andreas Vesalius's research transformed medical thinking about the brain, and his results ultimately undermined belief in the inner senses.⁵³ Publications such as Everard Maynwaring's *Pains Afflicting Humane Bodies* (1682) explicitly critiqued the Galenic theory of pain as humoral imbalance, arguing that it should be understood instead as a distinct medical condition.⁵⁴ In the seventeenth century, skin emerged as an independent object of study, rather than as an envelope enclosing the body, in large part due to the rapid development of microscopy. Smith has observed that the introduction of new technologies in relation to vision, such as the microscope and the telescope, which allowed people to see things that had previously been too small or too distant, while reinforcing the power of sight, also had the effect of undermining faith in the quality of observations made with the naked eye.⁵⁵ Optics was also being transformed, by astronomers such as Johannes Kepler and Galileo Galilei. Galileo's observation of the moon led to his reassessment of vision, and a rejection of the extramission theory of sight. In time he also came to reject Aristotle's belief in the 'sensibles' and asserted that the senses had 'no existence in the absence of the individuals endowed with sensory capabilities'.⁵⁶

A sensory division emerged between Catholics and Protestants, with the latter questioning many of the material aspects of traditional religious practice, such as the cult of the saints and their relics, and the role of images and music. Protestant reformers attacked the intense sensory engagement with religious material culture within Catholic culture. While at the Council of Trent Catholics reaffirmed the importance of saints, relics and particularly images in devotional practice, Protestants were wary of images and the primacy of sight as a vehicle for emotional response. Instead they elevated hearing in the hierarchy of the senses, arguing that it was the ear that provided the pathway to God. The concept of differentiated hearing was adopted by preachers in England, with scholars identifying passages in sermons that urged followers to a directed kind of listening, even criticizing various categories of mishearers. The role of the ear was to lead directly to the heart: 'to attend with the eare, to receive with the heart, and to conuert in the life'.⁵⁷ Scholars such as Susan Karant-Nunn have argued that the Reformation strove also to create different emotional regimes, those that were focused on quieter emotions and inner calm.⁵⁸ Post-Trent, Catholicism placed increasing emphasis on internalizing images of the suffering of Christ to intensify emotional identification with him, in ways that both resonated with medieval devotional practices, and also broke new ground. Renewed emphasis on meditative tracts such as Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* saw paintings functioning explicitly as prompts for imagining the Passion of Christ, in adaptations of medieval meditative frameworks, in which images were understood to be reviewed, analysed and modified by the inner senses of the memory and imagination, to facilitate union with God. The need for sensory discipline was shared by both confessions, with a number of texts and preachers characterizing the senses as instruments of sin, leading directly to lust. Luis de Granada, for example, described the eyes as being 'like a great door, through which vanities enter our soul'.⁵⁹ But the relationship of the senses to spirituality was also vital to the reformed Catholic church, and Catholic leaders and Spanish mystics revived the concept of spiritual senses, in particular a spiritual form of taste, which were deeply rooted within the medieval Christian tradition. According to this theory, humans are endowed with five bodily senses that allow them to know the world and, similarly, with five spiritual senses through which the soul seeks communication with God.⁶⁰

In recent years belief in the dominance of humoral theory in accounts of the meaning and significance of early modern emotional experience has been reassessed. Rather than acknowledging a master discourse based on humoral theory that remained fixed and unchanging during this time, research has revealed a plurality of intellectual and creative frameworks that co-existed.⁶¹ Galen's treatises were translated piecemeal and incorporated into other manuscripts in the Latin West, and other traditions such as that of classical rhetoric also informed the medieval view of emotion, particularly Cicero's *De inventione*. Aristotle's concept of *pathos* and his classifications of the faculties of the soul remained important. Another influential philosophical discourse was the Stoic, which promoted reason above all and advocated regulating and circumventing the disturbances of the soul before they became passions, yet neo-Stoicism, which became very popular across early modern Europe, still had vocal critics, as Richard Strier has shown.⁶² The Augustinian conception of the passions conceded some had virtue, and emphasized that all had to be considered in relation to the will.⁶³ Platonic philosophical inquiry and the rise of humanism, particularly the writings of Petrarch, also represented a challenge to humoral theory. Theological and devotional frameworks are seen as critically important to mind-body relations during the period, with spirituality and religious emotion the focus of a widening range of studies.

The rise of sensory scholarship in the last decade has also contested the absolute hierarchy of the senses in the period, noting that it was repeatedly challenged and undermined, with philosophers like Avicenna ranking touch and taste first, and other medieval writers arguing for the primacy of hearing, particularly in religious contexts.⁶⁴ Perhaps the most attention, though, has been devoted to recuperating the importance of touch in the past. A wide range of new studies highlighting the importance of tactility in early modern Europe has emerged in the last twenty years.⁶⁵ As E.D. Harvey notes, tactility is closely associated with 'authoritative, scientific, medical and even religious knowledge'.⁶⁶ Deference to touch was a recurrent trend in the Renaissance, with plays and literary works questioning the hierarchy of genres, while in art the *paragone* debate focused on the status of touch and its critical importance for comprehending sculpture. It was also central to accounts of miraculous healing, with pilgrims' behaviour in religious spaces underlining their determination to touch relics, sacred sculpture and icons.⁶⁷ The authenticating role of touch in spiritual contexts is attested to by the objects themselves, worn away in areas by talismanic touch. Touch was also promoted to a pre-eminent position in relation to medicine. Classen, Howes and Synnott foregrounded the importance of smell in premodern society, noting its suppression in contemporary culture, in which the widespread presence of artificial smells has diminished the status that smell retained in the past as proof of a material presence.⁶⁸

Religion and material culture

Recent studies of religion and material culture have revealed the fluid alignment of sensory and emotional engagement in relation to material objects. The study of saints and the cult of relics has rapidly become one of the most prominent fields of scholarship within the study of Western religion, and scholars of the history of emotions and material culture have played a conspicuous role in this resurgence.

A new generation of scholars of art history and religious history such as Jeffrey F. Hamburger and Caroline Walker Bynum have disrupted the traditional separation of emotion and the senses to demonstrate that religious devotion was an experience that involved the whole person, and that individuals and objects could recursively shape each other.⁶⁹ New art historical approaches also explore paintings, statues and architecture as objects that possess agency and invite a complex experience that involves the entire body, not just the eye. Allie Terry-Fritsch has neatly summarized this embodied or somaesthetic response in relation to devotional images: ‘Not only did individuals pray in front of images . . . they also touched, kissed, caressed and even sometimes ate holy images’.⁷⁰

Examining embodied and active forms of worship in relation to objects has highlighted the extent to which emotions and material culture were mutually constituted. Kathryn M. Rudy has categorized the marks brought about by the emotional intensity with which readers interacted with the manuscripts, identifying ritualized kissing, touching, rubbing with body parts and erasing areas of images and text.⁷¹ At times readers even scraped the paint off holy images, such as the veil of Saint Veronica, in order to consume them. Other manuscripts were customized in ways that reveal different sorts of emotional involvement, such as the addition or ornamentation of images. Medievalists interested in distinctions made by philosophers between humans and animals in the period have been inspired by the rise of material culture studies to investigate the ghostly lives and deaths of animals who relinquished their skin for the transmission of manuscript culture, and its transformation into a perfect, smooth parchment surface.⁷² Art historians are currently engaged in discovering the range of ways that artists stimulated senses other than the visual in paintings. François Quiviger has demonstrated the extent to which artists relied on an imaginative intersensorial response in the beholder by provoking the imagined senses of touch, smell and sound in Renaissance paintings.⁷³ Touch in religious iconography is being re-evaluated, particularly in relation to *Noli me tangere* images. Barbara Baert has argued that the prohibition on touch that is the subject of the painting becomes a ‘higher vision’ through an interpretation of scripture, and ultimately can be understood as a *sonoric* image.⁷⁴ Similarly, Henry Luttikhuisen analyses the tension around tactility in Jacob Cornelisz van Oostsanen’s remarkable and jewel-like painting *Noli me tangere* in relation to the spatial dynamics of love.⁷⁵ He restructures the encounter between the Risen Christ and the Magdalene as one of intimacy and distance, a separation that reveals the limitations of sense experience and can only be bridged by spiritual love.

Food culture and intersensoriality

Eating invoked the entire sensorium: sight, sound, taste, smell and touch. Even more than touch, taste was a direct sense, which involved taking foreign matter into the body and touching it with the tongue, locating it ‘at the threshold between “inside” and “outside” the body’.⁷⁶ Long associated with hazard in relation to the body, taste was also associated with endangering the soul, due to its association in Christian thought with Eve and the Garden of Eden. A pairing of taste with sexuality reinforced the certainty it was a corporeal sense, with no intellectual dimension, but approaches taken in recent studies have attended to the broader and multifaceted nature of

food culture, including the evolution of systems of appreciation and belief around it. As Bourdieu put it, 'Eating habits, especially when represented solely by the produce consumed, cannot of course be considered independently of the whole lifestyle'.⁷⁷ Recent research has focused on how taste and sight combine to appreciate dishes, exploring a space between gastronomy and aesthetics, what Viktoria Von Hoffmann has described as the '*taste of the eye*'.⁷⁸ These studies raise the issue of whether taste itself can be understood as cognitive.⁷⁹ Investigations into the culture of food have also corrected long-held beliefs about medieval eating habits that subtly reinforced the 'othering' of the past. For example, the view that medieval people spiced their dishes in order to mask the rottenness of the meat has been proven to be a myth. Anyone who could afford the exorbitant price of the spices could certainly afford fresh meat.⁸⁰ Instead, Wolfgang Schivelbusch has argued that spices were used so extensively as a sign of status, with their prestige tied to their exemplification of exoticism and the Orient, and ultimately to 'the vision of Paradise as a real place somewhere in the East'.⁸¹ Flavours often had affective meanings ascribed to them, such as hope in relation to sweetness, and the belief that spices could counteract evil.⁸² The symbolism of food extended to Neoplatonic ideas on the hierarchy of nature, which stipulated that food sources closer to the heavens, such as songbirds, were appropriate for elites, while root vegetables were fit for consumption by peasants.⁸³ The colour of food was also closely linked to the humours, and to alchemy, with melancholics advised to avoid eating anything black.⁸⁴

The intimate connection between nourishment and emotion, particularly pleasure and desire, is profiled in Teofilo E. Ruiz's analysis of Boccaccio's descriptions of a range of responses to the coming of the plague in Florence, some of which were directly focused on the embrace of sensory pleasures as a form of escape.⁸⁵ In addition to religious observance such as praying, taking part in processions, and pilgrimage there were two other behavioural reactions to the event noted as significant by Boccaccio. One of these consisted of isolation and denial: small groups shutting themselves up in houses eating fine food and excellent wines and listening to music and ignoring the plague. The other means of coping was to indulge to excess, travelling from tavern to tavern, in the belief that 'satisfying in every way the appetites as best one could, laughing, and making light of everything that happened was the best medicine for such a disease'.⁸⁶

Sound, soundscapes and the early modern city

A proliferation of studies that foreground sound, and its reception, listening, reflect the influence of another movement, the 'spatial turn' in sensory history.⁸⁷ Auditory history, a melding of sound and space, has proved extremely popular with a wide range of disciplines.⁸⁸ Alain Corbin's influential study of bells in the French countryside⁸⁹ revealed daily routine divided by the tolling bell, which marked a complex range of rituals, from religious ceremonies to warnings about impending weather events. Corbin demonstrated the extent to which the bells created urban communities, with much of their acoustic message decipherable only to locals. His point, though, is a broader one about how this form of sensory reception triggered emotional responses. As he put it: 'Any collective emotion that ran deep involved use of a bell be it the threat of fire or bloodshed'.⁹⁰ Bells were perhaps the loudest sounds

heard in the medieval and early modern period, and were highly suggestive. Studying sounds, which have the ability to travel a considerable distance, necessitates a consideration of the spatial environment, incorporating both the origin of the noise and the audience who hears it. The study of 'auditory landscapes', 'soundscapes', 'sonic environments' and even 'sensespaces',⁹¹ has traced 'the increasing significance of the acoustic as simultaneously a site for analysis, a medium for aesthetic engagement, and a model for theorization'.⁹² From this approach has emerged the concept of 'regimes of listening', focusing on the interaction of the sound with the listener.⁹³ What is heard, as Corbin has demonstrated, depends on lived experience. Niall Atkinson has analysed the sound of the civic bells within the built environment of Florence in the context of social and political relations rather than religious ones, from the perspective of how successive governments attempted to implant their influence sonically within the city.⁹⁴ Exploring the urban space as an acoustic phenomenon reflects the growing interest in studying place as a process, an idea that can be traced back to Henri Lefebvre's conception of space as constituted by social relations.⁹⁵ We owe to Lefebvre the idea that the city is better understood as movement, rather than a thing, a position that closely aligns with the approach of cultural geographers such as Neil Smith, who have argued for a relativist rather than absolute concept of space.⁹⁶ Sensory historians have foregrounded the concept of 'emplacement' as a means of considering cityscapes and landscapes as sensuously encountered material forms, personalized by individual movement.⁹⁷ Sound has proven a rich medium for connecting the built environment of a city with its inhabitants, but it is not the only approach. In *Hubbub: Filth, Noise and Stench*, Emily Cockayne focuses on the regulation of sound and smell in the early modern London, with an emphasis on multisensory immersion.⁹⁸

Scholars of the history of emotions have also been interested in exploring emotions within cityscapes, particular in relation to violence, but also in a variety of political and ritual contexts.⁹⁹ Lefebvre's theory of space intersects with the history of emotions through its contingent character, continually produced through individual actions and shifting movement. This contingency links it to performance theory, and the performance of emotion which depends on learned expectations of behaviour, and an individual's ability to understand 'feeling rules'.¹⁰⁰ The concept of practising or performing emotions is one that is swiftly gaining traction with scholars, as it suggests that, as Katie Barclay expressed it, '[t]he self, and emotion as an act of self, become things that we "do" and which through doing, construct identity'.¹⁰¹ Studying the performance of emotions rather than trying to isolate the emotion itself also has the advantage of removing the element of translation. While the sources may be symptomatic of the emotion and thus 'secondhand', they are nonetheless direct evidence of the performance of that emotion.¹⁰² In the past, the field of the history of emotions has not embraced spatial theory, preferring to ground studies in social rather than spatial contexts. But emotions not only take place in distinct and specific social contexts, they are also situated, and are affected by sensory input. The porous nature of space in the medieval and early modern city, and the ability of sounds and smells to penetrate houses, means that olfactory and auditory stimulus was a part of daily existence, and like architecture, cannot easily be extracted from the felt experience. Woolgar and others have emphasized the blending of emotion and the senses in medieval religious buildings, such as cathedrals, which were designed to enhance acoustics.¹⁰³ Rosenwein has emphasized the

extent to which an individual could pass through different emotional communities in the course of a day, but many of these frameworks were shaped by the quality and resonance of the places in which they occurred. Scholars of the history of emotions are now considering the spatial aspect of emotion, but it remains under-investigated within the field. Mark Seymour coined the phrase ‘emotional arenas’ to study emotional regimes in specific architectural settings.¹⁰⁴ While the specific intention of an architect of a particular building is easily subverted by those inhabiting it, adaptation of a building to a new purpose can carry with it emotional residues of its former function, as Seymour’s exploration of an individual court case in a courthouse that was previously a baroque oratory has demonstrated.¹⁰⁵ His study is highly suggestive, implicating space in the creation of emotion.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to identify some areas where the history of emotions and sensory history meet. The extremely close relationship between senses and emotions biologically has not been matched by intellectual approaches, which continue to separate them, to the detriment of both. The success of areas where they intermingle, such as medical histories of the body and pain, religion and materiality, and auditory history, tantalisingly suggests that it is possible to study the past in an inclusive way, reaching across disciplinary boundaries to create a richer, messier and more complicated idea of what it meant to live in medieval and early modern Europe.

Notes

- 1 I am using ‘emotion’ throughout as an umbrella term to encompass all aspects of feeling in the past. On the anthropology of the senses in general, see P. Stoller, *The Taste of Ethnographic Things: The Senses in Anthropology*, University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989; C. Classen, *Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and across Cultures*, New York: Routledge, 1993; M. Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses*, New York: Psychology Press, 1993; M. Serres, *Les Cinq sens*, Paris: Grasset, 1985; D. Howes, *Sensual Relations: Engaging the Senses in Culture and Social Theory*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003, and his edited volumes *The Varieties of Sensory Experience: A Sourcebook in the Anthropology of the Senses*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991; and *Empire of the Senses: The Sensual Culture Reader*, Oxford: Berg, 2005.
- 2 I will be using the term ‘sensory history’ rather than ‘historians of the senses’ throughout, as the second designation is more widely used to describe scholars who have studied the history of a single sense.
- 3 M.M. Smith, ‘Producing sense, consuming sense, making sense: perils and prospects for sensory history’, *Journal of Social History* 40:4, 2007, 841–858 (p.842).
- 4 J. Huizinga, *Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen: Studie over Levens- en Gedachtenvormen der veertiende en vijftiende Eeuw in Frankrijk en de Nederlanden*, Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1919. The first English translation is *The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries*, trans. F Hopman, London: Arnold, 1924. A more recent translation is *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*, trans. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- 5 N. Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, first published in two volumes as *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation*, Basel: Haus zum Falken, 1939, the first volume was translated into English as *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969, and the second as *The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilization*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982. See also N. Elias, *The*

- Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, ed. E. Dunning, J. Goudsblom and S. Mennell, trans. E. Jephcott, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
- 6 B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, p. 13.
 - 7 This point is derived from Herman Roodenburg's observation: 'As, however, suggested by Monique Scheer, in detaching the emotions from the body, her [Rosenwein's] own approach has limitations as well'; see H. Roodenburg, 'The senses', in S. Broomhall (ed.), *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction*, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 42–45 (p. 43).
 - 8 J.A. Toronchuk and George F.R. Ellis, 'Disgust: sensory affect or primary emotional system?', *Cognition and Emotion* 21:8, 2007, 1799–1818.
 - 9 L. Febvre, *Le Problème de l'incroyance au XVI^e siècle: la religion de Rabelais*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1942; translated as *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais*, trans. B. Gottlieb, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
 - 10 See W.J. Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1958; and M. McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962.
 - 11 M. McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994. On McLuhan, see M. Ciascellardi, C.M. de Almeida and C.A. Scolari (eds), *McLuhan Galaxy Conference: Understanding Media Today*, Barcelona: Universitat Oberta Catalunya Press, 2011, particularly the chapter by T.G. Gibson, 'Tradition into text: Plato's *Dialogues*, the literate revolution and the foundations of media theory', pp. 32–44.
 - 12 For a concise summary of McLuhan and Ong's position, see M.M. Smith, *Sensing the Past: Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching in history*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007, p. 10.
 - 13 See W.J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the World*, New York, 2002 (first pub. 1982). McLuhan wrote that 'non-literature cultures experience such an overwhelming tyranny of the ear over the eye that any balanced interplay among the senses is unknown at the auditory extreme': McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, p. 28.
 - 14 Smith, for example, writes: 'But we should be careful not to allow intellectual discourses on the senses to be our sole guide. Many – although, as I'll suggest, by no means all – seventeenth- and eighteenth-century intellectuals were inclined to see events through Enlightenment eyes and they tended to privilege sight even as they discussed in meaningful fashion the function of the senses': *Sensing the Past*, pp. 13–14.
 - 15 D. Howes, 'Sensorial anthropology', in Howes, *Varieties of Sensory Experience*, pp. 167–91. See also D. Howes, 'Olfaction and transition: an essay on the ritual uses of smell', *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 24:3, 1987, 398–416.
 - 16 M.M. Smith provides an excellent summary of the complex model proposed by McLuhan, and the sometimes shifting positions taken by McLuhan and Ong, in *Sensing the Past*, pp. 8–11.
 - 17 C. Classen, 'McLuhan in the rainforest: the sensory world of oral cultures', in Howes, *Empire of the Senses*, pp. 147–163 (p. 148).
 - 18 See F. McGlone and D. Reilly, 'The cutaneous sensory system', *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews* 34:2, 2010, 148–59.
 - 19 B. Mesquita, N. Frijda and K. Scherer, 'Culture and emotion', in J.W. Berry, P.R. Dasen and T.S. Saraswathi (eds), *Handbook of Cross-cultural Psychology: Basic Processes and Human Development*, vol. 2, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1997, pp. 255–297 (p. 259).
 - 20 D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006, pp. xi, 16.
 - 21 P. Burke, 'Is there a cultural history of the emotions?', in P. Gouk and H. Hills (eds), *Representing Emotions: New Connections in the Histories of Art, Music and Medicine*, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 35–48 (p. 37).
 - 22 F. Macpherson, 'Taxonomising the senses', *Philosophical Studies* 153:1, 2011, 123–42.
 - 23 E. Sears, 'Sensory perception and its metaphors in the time of Richard of Fournival', in W.F. Bynum and R. Porter (eds), *Medicine and the Five Senses*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 17–39 (p. 24). See also Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 2.8, 419b–424a,

- in Aristotle, *On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath*, ed. and trans. W.S. Hett, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935.
- 24 C. Mazzio, 'The senses divided: organs, objects, and media in early modern England', in Howes, *Empire of the Senses*, pp. 85–105 (p. 88).
 - 25 See C. Nordenfalk, 'The five senses in late medieval and Renaissance art', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 48, 1986, 1–22.
 - 26 Mazzio, 'The senses divided', p. 88.
 - 27 For a scientific explanation of how the senses merge to perceive the world see M.O. Ernest and H.H. Bülthoff, 'Merging the senses into a robust precept', *Trends in Cognitive Science* 8:4, 2004, 162–9.
 - 28 Serres's seminal work, a poetic defense of the lived experience of the senses which was published at the height of post-structuralism and deconstructive criticism, constituted a carefully directed attack on the dominance of language.
 - 29 C. Spence, 'The multisensory perception of touch', in F. Bacci and D. Melcher (eds), *Art and the Senses*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 85–106.
 - 30 L.M. Bartoshuk and V.B. Duffy, 'Chemical senses: taste and smell', in C. Korsmeyer (ed.), *The Taste Culture Reader: Experiencing Food and Drink*, Oxford: Berg, 2005, pp. 25–33 (p. 27).
 - 31 D. Howes, 'Introduction', in Howes, *Empire of the Senses*, p. 12.
 - 32 J. Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 12.
 - 33 R. Meek and E. Sullivan, 'Introduction', in R. Meek and E. Sullivan (eds), *The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, pp. 1–22 (p. 2).
 - 34 A. Wierzbicka, *Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
 - 35 Mesquita, Frijda, and Scherer, 'Culture and emotion', p. 289.
 - 36 Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, p. 3.
 - 37 D. Howes, *Sensual Relations*, Ch. 2, particularly pp. 33–7.
 - 38 M.M. Smith, 'Producing sense', p. 847.
 - 39 See A. Corbin, *Time, Desire and Horror: Towards a History of the Senses*, trans. Jean Birrell, Cambridge: Polity, 1995; Classen, *Worlds of Sense*; C. Classen (ed.), *The Book of Touch*, Oxford: Berg, 2005; Howes, *Sensual Relations*; Howes, *Empire of the Senses*; M.M. Smith, *Sensing the Past*. The quote is from Howes, *Empire of the Senses*, p. 4.
 - 40 C. Classen, 'Foundations for the anthropology of the senses', *International Social Science Journal* 49:153, 1997, 401–42 (p. 401).
 - 41 C.M. Woolgar, *The Senses in Late Medieval England*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 2.
 - 42 While the precise number of internal senses fluctuated, the most influential version of the inner senses was that described by the medieval Arab physician Avicenna. He proposed five internal senses to match the five external ones: imagination, the imaginative faculty, the estimative power, and memory, as well as common sense. See S. Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 220.
 - 43 S. Rosenfeld, 'On being heard: a case for paying attention to the historical ear', *American Historical Review* 116:2, 2011, 316–34 (p.326). See also H. Hunt, *On the Nature of Consciousness: Cognitive, Phenomenological and Transpersonal Perspectives*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995, Chapter 9, pp. 179–96. In this chapter Hunt argues for the concept of a master common sense which controls the others has parallels in contemporary neuroscience.
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 - 45 The theory of intromission became more viable as a result of the contribution of the Islamic philosopher Alhazen, who developed a geometrical basis for visual field based on ray geometry. See G.C. Hatfield and W. Epstein, 'The sensory core and the medieval foundations of early modern perceptual theory', *Isis* 70:3, 1979, 363–384 (p. 367).
 - 46 For more on this see F. Salmón, 'The many Galens of the medieval commentators on vision', *Revue d'histoire des sciences* 50:4, 1997, 397–420.

- 47 B. Weingart, 'Contact at a distance: the topology of fascination', in J. Weber and R. Campe (eds), *Rethinking Emotion: Interiority and Exteriority in Premodern, Modern, and Contemporary Thought*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014, pp. 72–100 (p. 78).
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- 49 M. Porter, *Windows of the Soul: Physiognomy in European Culture 1470–1780*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 104.
- 50 See N. Arikha, *Passions and Tempers: A History of the Humours*, New York: HarperCollins, 2007; L.I. Conrad, M. Neve, V. Nutton, R. Porter and A. Wear, *The Western Medical Tradition: 800 BC to AD 1800*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; P. van der Eijk (ed.), *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen: Selected Papers*, Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- 51 Tommaso Campanella was a Dominican scholar, theologian, philosopher and astrologer, who wrote an important utopian book, *The City of the Sun*, in 1602. For his statement on the separation of the senses see R. Jütte, *A History of the Senses: From Antiquity to Cyberspace*, trans. J. Lynn, Malden, MA: Polity, 2005, p. 52.
- 52 L.J. Rather, 'Old and new views of the emotions and bodily changes: Wright and Harvey versus Descartes, James and Cannon', *Clio Medica* 1, 1965, 1.
- 53 S. Kemp and G.J.O. Fletcher, 'The medieval theory of the inner senses', *American Journal of Psychology* 106:4, 1993, 559–576 (p. 565).
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- 55 M.M. Smith, *Sensing the Past*, p. 34.
- 56 M. Piccolino and N.J. Wade, 'Galileo Galilei's vision of the senses', *Trends in Neurosciences* 31:11, 2008, 585–590 (p. 589).
- 57 Richard Crooke, 'Foreword', fol. A4, in S. Egerton, *The Boring of the Eare*, published posthumously by Crooke, London: W. Stansby, 1623, quoted by J.R. McDermott, '"The melodie of Heaven": sermonizing the open ear in early modern England', in W. de Boer and C. Göttler (eds), *Religion and the Senses in Early Modern Europe*, Leiden: Brill, 2013, p. 185 (the full chapter is pp. 177–97).
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- 61 See, for example, Meek and Sullivan, *The Renaissance of Emotion*, for a critique of humoral theory as a master discourse.
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- 64 Jütte, *History of the Senses*, p. 67.
- 65 These include Classen, *The Book of Touch*; M. Paterson, *The Senses of Touch: Haptics, Affects and Technologies*, Oxford: Berg, 2007; J. Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture*, London: Routledge, 1995; D. Hillman and C. Mazzio (eds), *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*, London: Routledge, 1997; M. O'Rourke Boyle, *Senses of Touch: Human Dignity and Deformity from Michelangelo to Calvin*, Leiden: Brill, 1998; K. Rowe, *Dead Hands: Fictions of Agency, Renaissance to Modern*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999; E.D. Harvey (ed.), *Sensible Flesh: On Touch in Early Modern Culture*, University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.
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- 74 B. Baert, '"An odour. A taste. A touch. Impossible to describe": *Noli me tangere* and the senses', in de Boer and Göttler, *Religion and the Senses*, pp. 111–52. For a longer discussion of this iconography, see B. Baert, *To Touch with the Gaze: Noli me tangere and the Iconic Space*, Ghent: Sintjoris, 2011.
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- 76 C. Korsmeyer, 'Introduction', in Korsmeyer, *The Taste Culture Reader*, pp. 1–9 (p. 5).
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- 79 For an interesting discussion of this issue see C. Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, Ch. 4.
- 80 Spices imported from the Orient were among the most precious substances known in the Middle Ages, and were often bequeathed in wills along with other heirlooms. See W. Schivelbusch, 'Spices: tastes of Paradise', in Korsmeyer, *The Taste Culture Reader*, pp. 123–130 (pp. 124–5).
- 81 Ibid., p 125.
- 82 T.S. Peterson, 'Food as divine medicine', in Korsmeyer, *The Taste Culture Reader*, pp. 147–155 (p. 153).
- 83 See S.T.K. Walker, 'Appetites: food, eating and the senses in sixteenth-century Italian art', in A.E. Sanger and S.T.K. Walker (eds), *Sense and the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice*, Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012, pp. 109–128 (pp. 110–11).

- 84 Peterson, 'Food as divine medicine', p. 153.
- 85 T.E. Ruiz, *The Terror of History: On the Uncertainties of Life in Western Civilization*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011, pp. 83–5. Bocaccio described the first group as follows: 'so they gathered in small groups and lived entirely apart from everyone else. They shut themselves up in those houses where there were no sick people and where one could live well by eating the most delicate of foods and drinking the finest of wines (doing so always in moderation), allowing no one to speak about or listen to anything said about the sick and the dead outside; these people lived, spending their time with music and other pleasures that they could arrange': trans. Ruiz, *The Terror of History*, p. 84.
- 86 Ibid., pp. 84–5.
- 87 R.M. Schäfer, *The Tuning of the World*, New York: Random House, 1977; A. Corbin, *Village Bells: Sound and Meaning in the Nineteenth-Century French Countryside*, trans. M. Thom, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998; B.R. Smith, *The Acoustic World of Early Modern England: Attending to the O-Factor*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999; J.H. Arnold and C. Goodson, 'Resounding community: the history and meaning of medieval church bells', *Viator* 43:1, 2012, 99–130; D. Garrioch, 'Sounds of the city: the soundscape of early modern European towns', *Urban History* 30, 2003, 5–25; N. Atkinson, 'The republic of sound: listening to Florence at the threshold of the Renaissance', *I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance* 16:1–2, 2013, 57–84; S. de Blaauw, 'Campanae supra urbem: sull'uso delle campane nella Roma medievale', *Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia* 47, 1993, 367–414; T. Knighton and A. Mazuela-Angueta (eds), *Hearing the City in Early Modern Europe*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2018. There are also a large number of studies of sound in relation to the French Revolution, and in modernity, which fall outside the chronological range of this chapter.
- 88 See V. Erlmann (ed.), *Hearing Cultures: Essays on Sound, Listening and Modernity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004; P.A. Coates, 'The strange stillness of the past: toward an environmental history of sound and noise', *Environmental History* 10:4, 2005, 636–65.
- 89 See note 87 above. Corbin's study was influential: see C. Prochasson, 'La Politique comme "culture sensible": Alain Corbin face à l'histoire politique', *French Politics, Culture & Society* 22:2, 2004, 56–67 (this entire issue was devoted to Corbin); S. Godfrey, 'Alain Corbin: making sense of French history', *French Historical Studies* 25:2, 2002, 381–98.
- 90 Corbin, *Village Bells*, p. 288.
- 91 McDermott, "'The melodie of Heaven'", pp. 184–5.
- 92 J. Drobnick, 'Listening awry', in J. Drobnick (ed.), *Aural Cultures*, Toronto: YYY Books, 2004, pp. 9–18.
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- 94 Atkinson, 'The republic of sound', pp. 57–84.
- 95 H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
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- 97 Howes, *Empire of the Senses*, p. 7.
- 98 E. Cockayne, *Hubbub: Filth, Noise and Stench in England 1600–1770*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.
- 99 See S. Broomhall and S. Finn (eds), *Violence and Emotions in Early Modern Europe*, London: Routledge, 2016; K. Gilbert and S.D. White, *Emotion, Violence, Vengeance and Law in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of William Ian Miller*, Leiden Brill, 2018; J. Spinks and C. Zika (eds), *Disaster, Death and the Emotions in the Shadow of the Apocalypse, 1400–1700*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.
- 100 This is a quotation from Rosenwein, who in turn borrows the phrase from Arlie Russell Hochschild. Rosenwein writes: 'No one is born knowing appropriate modes of expression, or whether to imagine emotions as internal or external, or whether to privilege or disregard an emotion. These things make up the "feeling rules" that societies impart': Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, p. 15.
- 101 K. Barclay, 'Performance and performativity', in Broomhall, *Early Modern Emotions*, pp. 53–6 (pp. 53–4).

- 102 I am paraphrasing here Rosenwein's discussion of the difficulty of 'emotions always being delivered "secondhand"', Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, p. 27.
- 103 Christopher Michael Woolgar, *The Senses in Late Medieval England*, p. 67.
- 104 See M. Seymour, 'Emotional arenas: from provincial circus to national courtroom in late nineteenth-century Italy', *Rethinking History* 16:2, 2012, 177–97. See also A. Reckwitz, 'Affective spaces: A praxeological outlook', *Rethinking History* 16:2, 2012, 241–58; M. Pernau, 'Space and emotion: building to feel', *History Compass* 12, 2014, 541–9; B. Gammerl, 'Emotional styles, concepts and challenges', *Rethinking History* 16:2, 2012, 161–75; R. Boddice, *The History of Emotions*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2018, Ch. 7, pp. 168–89.
- 105 For more on this see Boddice, *History of Emotions*, pp. 170–1.

LEARNING AND TEACHING PAIN

Javier Moscoso

Pain is not only a feeling, but an emotion, a complex experience whose historical appraisal involves the study of it as a form of theatre. Far from lacking a voice, or posing a challenge to language, pain may be studied through the analysis of the rhetorical and persuasive means historically employed to generate conviction, to persuade others about the reality of our feelings, sensations or emotions. The history of pain aims to unravel the persuasive procedures that have historically been used to make sense of the experience of harm.¹ From the point of view of its theatrical form, pain is a drama: it displays a dynamic structure that includes a moment of rupture that demands reparation. Those in pain live in a liminal space, in an indeterminate region where they wander between separation and reconciliation. It was the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey who first sought ways of applying social research to what he called the sphere of pre-predicative experience: that is, experience prior to all expression and sensation.² Unlike Kant, who considered that objects had to be felt through sensitivity prior to being thought of through understanding, Dilthey argued that all experience included a moment of reflexivity: a demand for meaning preceded by a temporal delimiting of the flow of life. To affirm that pain exists under the form of a social drama means that its historical variations manifest elements in common; it implies recognizing that, independently of its cultural expressions, there is a constant form of travelling down the path of suffering.³ Since the mere presence of nociceptive (or harmful) stimuli does not necessarily imply the appraisal of a painful experience, and, on the contrary, since there are also pain experiences without visible or invisible lesions, the history of pain will have to take into consideration that pain is not a given. In the case of medieval and early modern Europe, there are, at least, two elements that should be taken into consideration. First, we will have to explore, and eventually explain, some of the most apparent contradictions regarding the representations and enactments of pain, either in the context of the visual arts or in penance and ascetic practices. Second, we will have to explore the way in which pain was linked to penance and retribution. Unlike contemporary conditions, where only the least possible amount of pain is accepted, and where the emphasis is usually placed on the distinction between necessary and unnecessary pain, the medieval attitude to physical suffering often regarded it under the form of the worst possible experience. This does not mean that learned medicine and healing practices did not attempt to provide remedies and treatments to ease sufferings of different kinds. Quite the opposite was true.⁴ But it suggests that the way in which pain was understood, represented, felt, expressed or repressed also depended on a

strong connection with the logic of salvation, on the one hand, and damnation, on the other. Finally, as in the more general field of the history of the emotions, we will have to examine the historical continuity or discontinuity of pain and suffering.

Representing and enacting pain

The visual representation of violence experiences a remarkable increase from the fifteenth century onwards. The invention of the printing press, and the consequent iconographic explosion, played a central role in the understanding and uses of physical suffering. The visualization of harm and cruelty, essential to many religious practices, was also featured in the art of war, in political diplomacy and in the development of new professional activities, such as anatomy.⁵ From the Castilian plateau to the Carpathians, and from the Southern Mediterranean to the North Sea, many artists dedicated masterpieces to the representation of pain.⁶ It was not the first time that various experiences and practices were displayed through the ritualized representation of bodies in pain, but it was in this period that these rituals came to be accompanied by large-format images and sculptures, or engravings reproduced through mechanical procedures.

The explosion of such images that took place during the late Middle Ages had numerous antecedents. In 1350, for example, a crucified Christ of an extraordinary kind was produced in Breslau. Known today as *crucifixio dolorosa*, this Polish figure makes a dramatic use of blood and wounds. There is another older example in the Church of St Mary in Köln, Germany, dating from the beginning of the fourteenth century.⁷ The altarpiece of the hermit of Sant Quirze i Santa Julia de Durro, in modern Catalonia, also displayed an unusual array of physical torments, including the *passio clavorum* and the sawing of St Quirico (Figure 11.1). Produced in the second half of the twelfth century, these representations were not uncommon.⁸ Many other examples can be found in capitals, stained glass and, more frequently, illuminated manuscripts. Also from the twelfth century, the second archivolt of the portico of the Church of St Domingo, in Soria (Spain), depicts in great detail the Massacre of the Innocents, and the codex known as *Beatus of Osma*, produced at the beginning of the tenth century, includes scenes of gruesome cruelty and violence as part of its commentary on the Apocalypse.

The search for pain as a way of salvation also increased after the twelfth century. The mortification of the flesh, which had been expressly rejected by the Benedictine orders, came to occupy a central place in all Christian religious practices, beginning with the communities and processions of flagellants.⁹ From the time of Francis of Assisi (1181–1226) onwards, the *imitatio Christi* reached a notable level of intensity, especially after the fourteenth century, and spread through the hagiographic reconstruction of the lives of the saints.¹⁰ Giuseppe di Copertino (1603–1668), for example, managed to reduce himself to a skeleton through penance. His rigorous view of life led him to a systematic destruction of his body, flagellating himself to the bone.¹¹ Likewise, Francesco di Girolamo (1642–1716) beat himself with such force that he frequently lost a great deal of blood.¹² In the context of this ‘holy vehemence’, blows could be administered using whips, bars, sticks or iron chains. Some burned their skin with boiling water or oil. The intensity of the examples varies, but not their intention.¹³ Henry Suso



Figure 11.1 The martyrdom of St. Cyricus and his mother, Julitta. Altarpiece of the hermit of Sant Quirze i Santa Julia de Durro, twelfth century, National Museum of Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain. Photography by J. Moscoso

made up his bedclothes with barbs on the inside. According to Catherine of Siena (1347–1380), who ended her days feeding herself exclusively on consecrated communion wafers, nuns should actively look for suffering through the punishment of the flesh.¹⁴ In Spain, where there is an abundance of works dedicated to penance, the first mystics of the sixteenth century also described earthly existence in terms of torment.¹⁵ In the *Agony of the Passage to Death* by Alejo de Vengas in 1537, life is interpreted as a ‘long martyrdom’, a theme expressly pointed out in the *Third Spiritual Alphabet* by Francisco de Osuna. The *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius of Loyola added ‘interior’ penance – the experience of blame and guilt – to the three forms of exterior penance – fasting, staying awake and the punishment of the flesh. The last of these should ‘reach the flesh without touching the bones, so that it gives only pain and not illness’.¹⁶ The *Life* of Henry Suso (c. 1295–1366), the *Book of Margery Kempe*, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, and the life of Catherine of Siena (1347–1380) set the models. Names such as these, some mentioned by Theresa of Avila (1515–1582) in her autobiography, would lead to the formation of an imagined emotional community of sufferers.¹⁷

Both the visual arts and ascetic practices emphasize the ritual dramatization of violence.¹⁸ Many spectacles staged in the Toledo cathedral in the fifteenth century, for example, included text, music and theatre. The most elaborate among them used machinery and technological resources to simulate the apparition of a saint or the

flight of an angel. Those actors playing the parts of demons were dressed in animal hides while the others were costumed according to their characters. Throughout Europe, mainly in the representation of the Passion or the saints' martyrdoms, these effects were so realistic that substitutes for human blood often splattered church floors. Animal entrails replaced the organs of the martyrs, and actors, sometimes putting their lives at risk, simulated beatings and torments.¹⁹

Both the use of images and penitent practices faced different forms of regulation. After the Council of Trent (1545–63), uses of images were partially regulated. Many Lutherans fought against the proliferation of religious images and liturgical dramas.²⁰ The Calvinists soon followed this trend: 'the Holy Bible was not given us to serve us as a pastime', stated the Synod of Nîmes in 1574.²¹ In Spain, in the context of the condemnations of the Council of Trent, the Provincial Council of Toledo drew up a decree in 1565 for regulating spectacles, and the Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1536–1623), magister at the powerful Collegio Romano, denounced the theatre in his *De spectaculis*, a recreation of the classical text by Tertullian. The reference to the spectacle of pain is not coincidental. On the contrary, the word 'theatre' appears in some of the most relevant works on the spectacle of violence in early modern Europe, such as Giovanni Luychen's *Il Teatro della crudeltà* or Richard Verstegan's *Le Théâtre des cruautés*. The theatre and the altarpiece shared the same pedagogical function.²² The visual representation of pain helped a largely illiterate public to understand the mysteries of the Passion or the lives of the saints. In this sense, they serve as mirrors of geographical, historical and moral knowledge. But they also make the representation of a drama possible; they allow for the remembrance of an experience through a ritual exercise that was, in turn, based on the premise that 'only what does not cease *to give pain* remains in one's memory'.²³ This connection between pain and memory was also part of the propaganda issued by the different factions during the religious wars of the sixteenth century. The *Theatrum crudelitatum haereticorum nostri temporis* (*Theatre of the Cruelties of the Heretics of Our Time*), initially published in Latin in 1587 and later translated into French, included twenty-nine engravings very similar to those produced by Théodore de Bry for the illustrated edition of Bartolomé de las Casas's *La destrucción de las Indias*, and the engravings of Perrisin and Tortorel of wars and massacres in France.²⁴ On many occasions, the figures were divided into different numbered scenes that, in turn, refer to an explanatory text. Some authors have suggested that the use of these numberings might be related to the specific structure in which the Jesuit students of the Roman College numbered their materials of study.²⁵ This same correlation between images and texts can also be found in some of the frescoes that adorned Jesuit colleges during the second half of the sixteenth century. One of the most notable cases is *Pomaracio*, a set of hagiographical scenes painted by Niccolò Circignani, in the church of Saint Stefano Rotondo, in Rome, with which Verstegan was probably familiar. There are, however, many similar examples of similar numerations in the context of the representation of the Christian martyrs' torments. In Antonio Gallonio's *De sanctorum martyrum cruciatibus*, for example, a treatise published in Cologne in 1602, the correspondence between image and text also relies on visual prompts, very much like endnotes.²⁶

In this relationship between pain and memory, the hurtful body was called to become a model or to serve as an example. As in the case of the 'Furias' of Titian,

commissioned in 1548 by Mary of Hungary, depicting Tityus, Tantalus, Sisyphus and Ixion, the representation of physical pain holds a clear political message. Each one of these later figures was associated with the German princes who had rebelled against Charles V. The sister of the Emperor wanted these paintings to decorate the audience room of her palace at Binche (in modern Belgium) as a clear indication of the kind of punishment that awaited those who dared to rebel against imperial authority.²⁷ There is nothing surprising in this connection between the arts and the representation of pain. The best engravers of the early modern world – such as Peter Brueghel, Jacques Callot, Lucas Cranach or Dürer himself – participated in this technological implementation of the spectacle of violence.²⁸ There have been a few historians who have assumed that these representations emerged as a reflection of the violence experienced in punitive practices, wars of religion, popular revolts or public executions. For the art historian Lionello Puppi, for example, the violence represented should be understood as a mere expression of religious atrocities or the punitive arts developed in a time of apocalyptic anguish, endemic famine and frequent outbreaks of plague.²⁹ Men and women at the end of the Middle Ages found these images above all in churches, but also in many other places connected in one way or another with the world of the spectacle.³⁰ For Mitchell Merback, on the other hand, the realism of these images cannot be considered a mere reflection of criminal justice. On the contrary, painting presented itself as an ideal model in which it seemed possible to merge the past and the present, the before and the now. Far from being a reflection or expression of lived experiences, the representation constructed an iconic model of high pedagogical content.³¹ Pain had to be learned, but also taught.

I have argued elsewhere how images of extreme violence do not accurately reflect the world, but rather construct it or, using a more adequate expression, dramatize it.³² Both the representation and the experience of violence were governed by the same rules. The pain of the martyr was expressed in a theatrical context in which the scenes depended on norms, conventions and ritualized acts.³³ Whether we speak of the violence represented or the representation of violence, blood and pain govern the rules of memory: *Littera enim intrat cum sanguine*. Only through this cultural form, in which experience is clearly determined by cultural figurations, can pain be reinterpreted and felt in more mundane scenarios. As the story of Anne of Austria suggests, pain not only varies its form of expression, but its own experience, through the crystallization of collective and cultural meanings. The mother of Louis XIV, who died of breast cancer in 1666, was able to reinterpret her disease as part of a new *Imitation of Christ*, a devotional book. Her understanding of the disease was framed within a religious context. She had, in fact, first encountered cancer when she observed how some nuns at Val-de-Grâce had died rotten ('toutes pourries'). From that moment onwards she had been deeply frightened and horrified by this malady so dreadful to her imagination. The logic of imitation, the understanding of the disease as a form of retribution, but also as a way of penance and salvation, configured the way in which pain was felt and understood. The way in which Anne was prepared to cope with the pains of the disease, or with the gnawing pains of its treatments, cannot possibly be understood without this religious framework that turned physical suffering into an opportunity for repentance and salvation.³⁴

Rules of pain

As Caroline Walker Bynum and other scholars have shown, the cult of blood became increasingly popular in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, due to many different factors, including theological issues, but also deeper concerns with race and gender.³⁵ From the point of view of the development of punitive practices, the studies of Michel Foucault, Pieter Spierenburg, Richard J. Evans and Edward Peters, among others, have traced the tortuous history of execution procedures from the Middle Ages to the penal reforms of the late eighteenth century.³⁶ Some time ago, the historian Natalie Zemon Davis considered the roots of violence in the sixteenth century within the context of purification rituals,³⁷ positing that violence should not be considered in terms of religion, but anthropology. Research on rituals, beliefs and institutions, as well as on moments of crisis and revolution traditionally considered minor by social history, also formed part of the intellectual climate in which the so-called Annales School developed.³⁸ Both Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch shared an anthropological conception of history that came mainly from the influence of Lévy-Bruhl and his studies on the 'primitive mentality', as well as the influence of Durkheim's work on the elementary forms of religious life. The influence of both authors was so great that emotions, representations or collective memories were incorporated into the programme of *historical psychology* proposed by Lucien Febvre. Following their work on the 'collective mentality', both Robert Mandrou and Robert Muchembled defended a clearly disruptive position, where the early modern and medieval worlds seemed to be governed by uncontrolled passions and violent emotions.³⁹ From this point of view, historical psychology referred to mental tools, to a story of the inarticulate and irrational. The climate of insecurity of the peasant, victim of a world that he could not understand and could not influence, was described in emotional terms related to pain, anxiety and fear. Following the tradition explored by Huizinga, many of these authors considered that men and women of 'premodern' Europe lived in terror, subjected to the merciless action of pains, spirits, monsters or unpredictable agents. In this irrational universe, human beings found themselves trapped in their violent and morbid passions, and with an absolute absence of self-control.⁴⁰

And yet, medieval and early modern uses and representations of pain were performed within a set of rules and well-defined structures. Despite its apparent irrationality, the dramatization of pain was far from incoherent and a mere show, but rather a logic of liminality. Like the virgins of medieval altarpieces, the martyrs portrayed in martyrological books inhabit an emotional and cognitive frontier. They are neither alive nor dead. They are neither one nor many. The textual narrative merges with the visual resources as a means of ennobling emotion and facilitating memory. From this point of view, it is irrelevant to emphasize the torments suffered by the Catholics at the hands of the Protestants after the Reformation or, as in the case of *History of The Martyrs Prosecuted and Killed for the Truth of the Gospel* by Jean Crespin, focus on the crimes committed by the Church of Rome against the Protestants. In either case, the representation of the massacre follows the same pattern.⁴¹ These texts were not written to inform, but to move. The verisimilitude of the events is of less interest than the visualization of suffering. The scenes that accompany Pérrissin's work on the massacre of the Huguenots, for example, clearly possess these characteristics. Dozens of indistinguishable bodies are beaten to death and thrown into the river. Many others are knifed. Some are

tortured. The indiscriminate violence extols the innocence and purity of heart of those who, in themselves, count as nothing. The number of bodies mutilated for the sake of faith, despite seeming excessive, is never enough. One of the most striking cases in this respect is the publication, in 1634, of the *Sacrum sanctuarium crucis et patientiae*. In this work, the Jesuit Father Biverus described all testified forms of crucifixion with the aid of engravings.⁴² Throughout its almost 700 pages, his account includes more than 100 different ways of fixing a body to a pole. Martyrs appear tied, nailed, shredded on vertical, horizontal or inverted crosses; on ships, in deserts, on trees, on palm trees; naked, clothed, mutilated, burnt, pierced with arrows, decapitated, clamped, lanced; with their bodies upside down or in the ground, stoned or impaled. Collective crucifixions are added to the individual ones, increasing the horror of the massacre and the multiplication of innocence: women, children, the elderly. In a few cases, the crucifixion of the martyr takes place atop the image of an already crucified Christ. In one of the strangest cases, the arms of Tarbula and her maids are nailed to one cross and their legs to another. Their bodies had already been sawn apart.

Despite the cruelty of the chosen punishments, the body is not victimized, but rather extolled. Its mournful yet calm face does not follow any natural logic. Its most immediate imitative model could be found in other paintings and engravings, but the contrite attitude that uses pain as a process towards salvation has a very different reference. Both as a whole and taken individually, the martyr exemplifies a correspondence between pain and salvation, a relationship that was strengthened after the twelfth century, when the birth of Purgatory coincided with the first great appearance in the West of moral suffering described in terms of physical ailments.⁴³ It would not be until the seventeenth century that theologians would question the supposedly eternal nature of the punishments of Hell, and not until the eighteenth century that political philosophy would endeavour to establish a principle of proportion between crime and punishment. Meanwhile, cruelty was expressed in literary and artistic forms by means of an imitative and disproportionate repetition of punishments, with a performative purpose and a highly dramatic content, not only in the overwhelming reiteration of scenes but through a prose that frequently tends towards the endless concatenation of adjectives:

This is how you will see the heretics in this Theatre, bloodied, dirty and dusty, returning from the hunting of Catholics, blood pouring from their mouths and ears, as, having defeated, disemboweled and flayed them, they bury themselves in their blood, they dive in up to their ears turning them to pulp, feeding on their flesh and, when they are satiated, they call the beasts to make the most of the massacre.⁴⁴

The reiteration of the greatest possible pain, in words as well as images, turns the narrative into an abusive display, a never-ending enumeration of a sequence that comes across as overwhelming and inconclusive.

Many of these elements, related to dramatization and iteration, also form part of the representation of Hell.⁴⁵ From the thirteenth century, what had survived during the High Middle Ages as a mere figurative indication of the evils of the afterlife became a detailed description of their pains and rigours. In the tympana of churches, and in illuminated manuscripts, stained-glass windows, chalices and

frescoes in sacred buildings throughout Europe, scenes of extreme violence, mutilation and bodily torment were multiplied. This change began mostly in Italy. In the church of San Petronio, in Bologna; in the baptistery of Pisa; in the mosaics of the church of San Giovanni, in Florence; in the Last Judgement of the Camposanto, also in Pisa; in the frescoes of the cathedral of San Gimignano; and in the gilded tempera panels of Fra Angelico, Hell was made present to the world.⁴⁶ The vernacular translation of the so-called *Apocalypse of Paul* also contributed to putting flesh on the bones of an imaginary representation of what was merely evoked in sacred texts.

In 1492, the French bookmaker Anthoine V  rard published a small text that included a detailed description of the geography of an unknown world. The author of this *L'Art de bien vivre et de bien mourir* also included an illustrated appendix on the topology of Hell. Under the title *Treatise on the Penalties of Hell and Purgatory*, this exposition of the punishments of the afterlife exerted an extraordinary influence on the collective imagination of the late fifteenth century. The Parisian printer Guyot Marchant, for example, who had already given the printing press a *Danse Macabre* in 1485, used these images for his *Shepherds' Calendar*, which in turn served as a model for the decoration of the Last Judgement of Saint Cecilia Cathedral, in Albi, Southern France.⁴⁷ This fifteen-metre fresco exhibited the eternal relationship between sin and penance through a distribution of spaces and communities: the sinners of lust are consumed in boiling water; gluttons swallow rats and snakes; those condemned by envy are writhing in an icy sea. As on many other occasions, no apparent relation can be discerned between the magnitude of the sins of the condemned and the dimension of their punishment.⁴⁸ On the contrary, the corrective is given *sub specie aeternitatis*, so that those condemned will never be at rest or get used to their sufferings. Rather, they will continually undergo renewed pains, experiencing, for all eternity, the same effects as the first time.

As in many other representations of Hell at the end of the Middle Ages, the Cathedral of Albi's fresco, like the work of V  rard that served as its source of inspiration, combines the depiction of extraordinary punishments with the intervention of fantastic creatures. There might not be a greater testimony to medieval corporeality than this carnal orgy that encompasses the most outrageous fears and the most horrible wounds.⁴⁹ In spite of its chaotic character, this late medieval inferno is constructed on well-established rules. Beginning in 1493, the frescoes of the cathedral of Albi provided the first great representation, outside Italy, of the typology of punishments of Hell. The central figure of Christ-as-Judge was lost from the cathedral's Last Judgement at the end of the seventeenth century. Of the original work only the lateral scenes remain, with their corresponding divisions between the high and the low, the right and the left. Around the symbols of the Apocalypse, the dead leave the earth, bearing around their necks the story of their own actions. This pitiful procession corresponds to what anthropologists call a 'social drama': a process of rupture and reconciliation.⁵⁰ As in the ceremonies of birth, marriage or death, the road towards damnation begins with a physical and moral separation of family referents and community bonds. Once out of the body, the sinful souls inhabited a liminal state between the mundane and the supernatural: they seem to float between two worlds.⁵¹ In this intermediate space, the real coexists with the immaterial, the natural with the supernatural, and the dead with the living. Once arrived in Hell, their representation remains faithful to two guiding principles. In the first place,

pain becomes repetitive, monotonous and endless. Secondly, suffering occurs with the maximum pain possible.⁵²

Although the scheme of the cathedral of Albi is reproduced frequently, not all representations of Hell share the same hierarchy. In Dante's *Divina commedia* (c. 1308) for example, the distribution of sinners obeys a different logic. To the traditional capital sins, he also added other evils borrowed from Aristotle's *Ethics*: heresy, suicide, hypocrisy and treason, among many others. But both in the case of Dante and in the most common distribution of capital sins, the representation of pain is controlled by strict rules. Some are geographical in nature, while others are historical. The former concern the distribution of space, the latter the order of events. In either case, sinners are distributed according to a single feature. It matters little whether the lustful were greedy, or those condemned for gluttony were also choleric; punishment transforms them into a single species that adheres to a single logic and refers to a single sentence. Sinners are reduced to one dominant reading of their own lives, and must lose any hope of another possible history. Their white bodies are redirected, against their will, to an eternal pain, expressed through a range of colours, from the darkness of the abyss to the red of the eternal flames.⁵³

Continuities and discontinuities

The continuities and discontinuities in the history of emotions have been a real issue in recent decades. In their seminal paper of 1985 on 'emotionology', Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns proposed a timeline of historical changes in 'emotional standards'.⁵⁴ By this expression, they referred to the written or non-written rules that determined the way in which emotions had to be expressed, or repressed, within certain cultural settings. Following closely in the steps of Norbert Elias, this new 'emotionology' attempted to clarify how changes in the regulation of emotional expressions could account for other social changes, or, conversely, how social changes, such as those related to social and economic diversification, for example, could be held responsible for the social conventions of the emotional life. From the point of view of these early proponents, the attempt to produce a social history of emotions had to clarify the extent to which modern emotional parameters had changed in relation to the premodern world. Whether these changes could be interpreted as responsible for other historical modifications, or as reflecting earlier modifications, they argued 'emotional change needs to be woven into the historical fabric'.⁵⁵ Secondly, it was essential to discern whether social history was anchored in a purely rational explanation of collective action.⁵⁶ Opposing the previous ideas of George Rudé and Charles Tilly, who considered the role played by emotions in human actions irrelevant, and instead explained collective agency in terms of rational motivation, Stearns and Stearns argued that the historical study of social protest, as well as the forms of collective action – of the mass, the people, the populace – seemed to require more than a purely rational adaptation of means to ends.⁵⁷ It also became apparent that interpretive conflicts related to the history of affective life could only be resolved to the extent that it was possible to distinguish between normative systems and emotional experiences.⁵⁸

Much of Stearns and Stearns' discussion, including their interest in differentiating between (hidden) experiences and (public) expressions, led to a critical

re-evaluation of some of the seminal works on the history of childhood, violence, family or love.⁵⁹ In relation to the problem of continuity or emotional discontinuity, the last century produced an enormous amount of works that tended to emphasize the elements of discontinuity between the modern and the premodern.⁶⁰ In a pioneering study, the historian Edward Shorter, for example, considered that there was a clear dividing line between the coldness of the premodern world and the affective explosion that took place from the Enlightenment, a point of view that was later developed by Elisabeth Badinter and, above all, by Philippe Ariès. Needless to say, the publications of these authors were followed by an equally great number of studies advocating for continuity between the old and the new regime.⁶¹

The history of pain cannot remain aloof from these debates about continuity or discontinuity, in the same way that it cannot remain untouched by the expression versus experience issue. Since the mid-1980s, and especially since the work of David B. Morris, pain has become susceptible to historical and anthropological research. The interest does not lie, however, in clarifying only the cultural forms of pain, but also the rhetorical rules of experience. Halfway between the world of emotions and that of sensations, the history of pain refers back to the history of experience: that is, to the history of what is at once familiar and strange, one's own and another's, individual and collective. After all, pain is a complex phenomenon that, in most cases, mobilizes a large number of bodily reactions. Since there is no human activity that does not involve some form of suffering, since people's lives gravitate between fears and expectations that, one way or another, refer to the history of pain, it is not difficult to find elements of continuity. After all, the rhetorical strategies employed to make sense of pain have accumulated in layers rather than being totally substituted. And yet, the rules of teaching and learning pain have also been subjected to thematic variations. The representation of eternal pains shared characteristics with the cultural forms of the suffering of martyrs, including their lack of proportion and violent representation, but they also differed in many other regards, such as the expressivity of the sinners vis-à-vis the impassivity of the martyrs. The same concerns about continuity and discontinuity apply to diachronic analyses. The universality of pain does not imply the homogeneity of the experience. On the contrary, historical research provides enough evidence to conclude that the emotional regime of this experience has been subjected to marked differences. Since pain is truly subjective, we will never be able to grasp how it was felt during the Middle Ages, but we may very well understand the cultural configurations that make that experience possible.

Notes

- 1 J. Enders, *The Medieval Theater of Cruelty: Rhetoric, Memory, Violence*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. See also A. Kubiak, *Stages of Terror: Terrorism, Ideology and Coercion as Theatre History*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, p. 22: 'The present work suggests a history of pain displayed as theatre before the subject of culture'. For the concrete case of contemplating harm, see J. Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, London: Verso, 2009.
- 2 J. von Kries, *Allgemeine Sinnesphysiologie*, Leipzig: F.C.W. Vogel, 1923, pp. 15–18, quoted by F.J.J. Buytendijk, *El dolor. Fenomenología. Psicología. Metafísica*, Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1958, pp. 68–9. C.J. Troop, 'Experience, coherence, and culture: the significance of Dilthey's "descriptive psychology" for the anthropology of consciousness', *Anthropology of Consciousness* 13:1, 2002, 2–26.

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PART 4

COMMUNITIES



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THE EMOTIONS OF HOUSEHOLD ECONOMICS

Katie Barclay

The family has long been located as a key site in the intersection of emotion with economics. If liberal economic theory was haunted by emotions that disrupted its rational – and implicitly unfeeling – modelling, it was the individual's emotional engagement with, and as part of, families that frequently troubled theoretical assumptions and demanded alternative explanations for human behaviour.¹ This was a dynamic even more pressing for economic historians due to the central role the family-household played in the economy of the medieval and early modern world. Here the household was not a space of consumption situated beyond the productive world (if it ever was), but the location of work, of management, of financial negotiation and decision-making.² In many, perhaps most, times and places in medieval and early modern Europe, the family was the heart of the productive enterprise, with the household functioning as the basic unit of economic life. Understanding economy therefore required understanding the operation of families, where emotion might play no small part.

Early work on household economies often tried to separate out emotions from the economic, attempting to find the rational in the complex interplay of family life. Yet, as early as 1984, Hans Medick and David Sabean suggested that a more fruitful line of inquiry was to explore the engagements between the economic and emotional, and particularly the ways that economics produced emotions and emotions disrupted economic rationality.³ Scholars like Medick and Sabean were particularly influenced by work from sociology and anthropology that was interested in how social structures produced or shaped emotions. Following an intellectual tradition that incorporated ideas from Marx and Weber, emotions here were often placed as secondary to broader structures, particularly economics, and to a lesser extent demographic regimes (following Malthus).⁴ Emotions and emotional lives were products of superstructures. Some even went as far as to suggest that the emotions of individuals could be predicted through an exploration of societies and economies.⁵

Contemporary researchers have resisted such reductionism from a number of perspectives. Scholars such as David Lemmings and Ann Brooks seek to foreground emotions as active phenomena capable of producing change and shaping behaviours.⁶ William Reddy has taken this further to the possibility of emotion as a form of resistance to social and political structures, enabling an 'emotional liberty'; he places emotion as a form of agency.⁷ Emotions have also been theorized as part of

structures, coming to shape the individual through regimes or an embodied habitus.⁸ This model locates emotion as a form of social structure that can sit alongside economy or politics in shaping human behaviour. These various positions foreground emotions as active phenomena but take a range of different positions on emotions' relationship to social structure. In many respects, the boundaries of this debate track closely with arguments around individual agency and its relationship to wider power structures, where emotion can move from being a site of personal agency to a power structure in its own right.⁹

As with histories of power, this has led to explorations of emotion that seek to interrogate and explore how different people, societies and cultures understand, express and experience emotion, and its implications for the operation of social structures.¹⁰ More recently, some have also suggested taking phenomenological and performative approaches that seek to integrate the different components of social and emotional life through a less dualistic frame.¹¹ One of the key interventions of such work is to rethink causation, so that rather than seeking to explain emotion as either a product of structure or as a structure that shapes, the emphasis is on continuous interactions that produce change through a cascade. Sara Ahmed argues that 'economy' itself is a good metaphor for this relationship, where it is through the circulation of emotion across domains – through their social and economic engagements – that value and meaning inhere in them.¹² These are models that wish to take seriously the operation of power and money and emotion, but to root this operation in social practice and human engagements.¹³ It is an approach that might be particularly fruitful for a study of the household, where the causal relationship between the economic and the emotional is perhaps more usefully thought of in terms of integration and reciprocity.

This chapter explores the relationship between economics and emotion in the medieval and early modern European household, rethinking what we know about household practices and emotions from a phenomenological perspective. One of the key challenges of this work is that whilst we have increasingly rich histories of household structures and economic behaviours, the motivations behind that behaviour and the emotional worlds that intersected with and informed them have been much harder to access. This is a problem that is exacerbated the further back in time we go. If structures did produce predictable emotions – if economies made emotions – then a study of household structures and productive activities might usefully be studied for feeling. If this is not the case, then the emotional world of the family might need to be looked for elsewhere, perhaps in the cultural record – art, literature, religion.¹⁴ Yet, an exploration of the household that views its components through a lens of cascading engagements is also suggestive of the capacity for a study of the economic to give insight into the emotional, if in a less causal fashion. Exploring how this might be done forms part of the enquiry of this chapter. To do so, it explores three key areas in the history of household economics – the household as economic unit, marital choice and reproductive labour.

Household economics

The household was a key site of economic productivity in medieval and early modern Europe. Whilst economies varied enormously across the continent, large-scale

economic enterprises were relatively rare until attempts at global expansion in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and most businesses were closely tied to households, typically operating on the same premises or nearby.¹⁵ Until the eighteenth century (and longer in many areas), the majority of Europeans lived and worked rurally, often directly in agriculture. A typical life course might involve living in the parental home until early to mid-teens, before moving into service in another household, marrying and setting up a family home, and employing children and servants to support the enterprise. In rural areas, this work might largely support the functioning of farms; in towns and cities, both men and women could be apprenticed or put into service, before running their own small businesses.¹⁶

Of course, such a life course could be disrupted. Lifetime domestic service was a significant feature of some economies (especially where marriage rates were low).¹⁷ Family businesses were not always successful, with bankruptcies and poverty impacting on the ability of the family to remain in homes or together as units.¹⁸ Others could experience significant social mobility. In earlier centuries, this often meant transforming business wealth into land and moving into the ranks of the gentry.¹⁹ When land became less accessible (especially from the eighteenth century), this could entail investing in buildings, expanding enterprises, and a growth in conspicuous consumption that was to transform the functioning of many homes.²⁰

This was a story that was strongly influenced by demography. The accessibility of land and labour – whether it was cheap or expensive, whether opportunities were local or required movement – was shaped in significant ways by the size of population. Families with a large number of children may have had to send them to work elsewhere: others had to buy in labour. After key demographic events, notably the Black Death in the fourteenth century, or the famines of the seventeenth century, significant declines in population size could transform the logic and functioning of European economies, modifying cultural work practices and systems of inheritance.²¹ Indeed, even without such interventions, high death rates meant that many families became extinct across the period, especially in legal regimes that only recognized male heirs.²² The family as an economic enterprise could therefore be vulnerable to disruptions that were not only economic, but familial.

Acknowledging this context has led to one of the key insights of business historians: the medieval and early modern family did not serve the business – the economic enterprise – but the reverse. The purpose of household economies was to ensure, at a minimum, the survival, at best the economic and political success, of the family unit. Economic decisions therefore were not necessarily driven by economic imperatives – what made the best financial sense – but by the needs, desires, contingencies and structure of the household.²³ Importantly, this could mean that the function of the family business was not to survive the family but to serve the duration of a particular household or marriage – something suggested by the number of businesses that were dissolved at the death of a major partner in early modern England.²⁴ This was a fundamental reverse of an understanding of the economy as something that shaped people and emotion to an economy that served the ‘structure’ of the family and their goals and emotions.

Understanding the family, then, has been crucial to understanding the past economy. Yet who the family was could vary enormously over time and place. On the one hand, demographers have suggested that the nuclear household (parents and

children) with servants was a relatively stable norm from the medieval period across western and northern, as well as large parts of southern, Europe. In this regime, people often married late, after having earned enough to establish a home or after inheritance.²⁵ It has been contrasted with parts of Italy, rural France and eastern Europe, where extended families were more common, allowing a lower age of marriage as the new couple lived with parents or other kin.²⁶ On the other hand, a more fine-grained analysis of household behaviours has suggested that familial life was much richer than this suggests, with families extending and contracting over the life course, significant regional and occupational variation, large numbers of never-married people, family cooperation across households and the involvement of fictive kin.²⁷ Moreover, the household – including its non-kin members – was construed as a form of ‘family’ for many Europeans.²⁸

Gender historians have also warned against assuming that the family had a single interest. Whilst understanding ‘the family’ as a unit with a shared goal can be helpful to elucidating some economic practices as well as ideas of self and relation, individuals within particular families did not always agree with each other on economic strategy or anything else.²⁹ Indeed, the ways that economic decisions – who to send on a business trip or how to divide economic roles – were inflected by interpersonal relationships have been observed. Families could also feature important economic divisions, whether through the separate businesses that many married couples ran but where both contributed to the household income, or because many families raised their children to be economically independent through placing them in apprenticeships or giving sizeable dowries on marriage.³⁰ The operation of power, particularly patriarchal power, should not be forgotten here, with the ability to influence economic decisions and choices constrained by one’s position in the family and social hierarchy, whether as wives or children or in the case of the medieval peasants whose economic and emotional decision-making was constrained by their lords.³¹

As these factors suggest, significant aspects of the economic and emotional lives of families may be lost to the historical record, overlaid by decisions reached after negotiation or debate or implemented despite objections. What is available for medieval and early modern Europe are sources outlining the legal and customary frameworks that constrained personal choice, notably surrounding inheritance law. Inheritance practices vary over time and place, although Roman and canon law were influential across Europe.³² Partible inheritance, where property was divided equally amongst heirs (usually the biological children of the testator), was common in much of mainland Europe in the medieval period. This was particularly true of moveable property (that not attached to land).³³ Britain, Scandinavia, parts of France, and southern Europe often used a combination of partible inheritance with limited freedom of the testator. A typical model was that the law directed a third of property to the spouse, a third to children, and a third to bequeath freely.³⁴ Spanish testators, for example, had a choice between a third designated to a single heir or a *quinto*, twenty per cent, to be used without constraint.³⁵ From the early medieval period, unigeniture systems for landed property, where a single heir inherited all, also became significant across Europe, especially as the opportunities to purchase additional land became rare. Primogeniture that favoured male heirs was particularly prominent amongst elite families.³⁶ What inheritance law applied to particular individuals was shaped by their geographical location, place in the family, gender and the type of property being dispersed.

Inheritance law can be understood as a form of structure that shaped the emotional world of medieval and early modern families. If inheritance practice was seen as a symbol of testator affection then the conveyance of property can be read as a measure of emotional relationships, whether that is love, loyalty or obligation. This is an assumption that is remarkably common in the historiography of will-making practices, particularly in relation to property where the testator had free choice.³⁷ Indeed, it is an assumption that may be borne out in the logic of the early modern family. That money followed emotion is an idea that was popular in the writings of seventeenth-century natural law theorists who argued that the law followed the affections expected by ‘nature’; it was for this reason that the law was seen to privilege blood relatives, particularly biological children, in lines of succession.³⁸ It competed with critiques of inheritance practices – notably primogeniture – that disrupted customary ideas about a fairness, born of love, that all children in a family were entitled to.³⁹ It can also be situated alongside studies of the treatment of children that are highly suggestive that place in the family – notably the position of heir – was influential in how children were cared for and thus loved, as well as others that see other relatives, particularly mothers, contesting the poor or unfair treatment of non-heirs.⁴⁰

As the household was an economic, as well as emotional, unit, family relationships were construed through both lenses. The relationships that bound families together were deeply embedded in the economic practices that ensured survival; for some people, this connection was so explicit that individuals withheld labour when their familial relationships were breaking down.⁴¹ Economic and emotional dependence were interwoven, so that financial dependence was accompanied by appropriate emotional engagements with benefactors – gratitude, loyalty, love.⁴² Conversely, and although not necessarily desired by the families involved, there was also a strong relationship between family breakdown and poverty for many medieval and early modern families; it is notable that many institutions were comfortable removing children or splitting up family units when providing charity.⁴³ Without material underpinnings, the emotions of family life could be fragile. Rather than economy and emotion competing, emotions and economy were entwined, made in relation to each other and constantly informing the practice of both. How these interconnections evolved reflected the array of economic and emotional practices ongoing across different types of family and household as well as individual dynamics playing out across the medieval and early modern world.

Marital choice

These interconnections are particularly borne out in a study of marital choice, a key area for historians exploring the relationship between economic and political pragmatism and emotional liberty. For early historians of the family, particularly those who worked on the social elite, that many marriages in the medieval and early modern period appeared to be made for dynastic or economic reasons was used as key evidence of the ‘low affect’ nature of family relationships.⁴⁴ As this idea was increasingly contested by social historians who demonstrated the deep affective ties of families, marital choice remained a thorny topic of debate.⁴⁵ What role did love play in elite families, and was its seeming absence just peculiar to the politically ambitious or important? What role did it play for those further down the social ladder?

A study of elite marriages across Europe (indeed often focusing on pan-European royal marriage) highlighted that many were arranged between couples who spent little time together, and where the benefits to wider kin, as well as the marrying pair, were a central part of marital negotiations. Historians seeking to soften this picture of authoritarian families emphasized the right of individuals to veto particular matches.⁴⁶ Here choice was often tied to sexual desire (not love), with such decisions based on brief meetings or images in a context which gave weight to physical desirability.⁴⁷ Others have suggested that many couples had more opportunities to develop relationships before marriage than is often thought, especially for those outside of royal families.⁴⁸

A similar discussion was also happening for the lower orders. An initial assumption that free, and implicitly love-based, choice was available to ordinary people was disrupted by studies of courtship that were suggestive that family control, economic pragmatism and significant social control over morality and courtship rituals constrained personal marital choice. The significant role that being able to set up an independent household played in many economies ensured that couples often prioritized financial security, and a partner with the potential to maintain this, over more abstract or emotional concerns. Those who desired social mobility may have had a particular eye for matches that would enable this ascent. People who required or desired dowries, apprenticeship fees or inheritances from their parents had to ensure that their marital choices conformed to the needs and desires of wider kin.⁴⁹ If elopement was common amongst all social classes, love appeared to have been located relatively low down the list of priorities when making a marriage, which is not to say that many lower order couples did not engage in courtship rituals with the expectation of marrying for love. Yet, if that did not happen, love could form after marriage and this was largely socially acceptable.

This historiographical discussion was for a long time underpinned by some key emotional assumptions that have only recently been queried. The first is a normative assumption that it is more desirable to marry for love than for economic, political or familial reasons. The second is that love is associated with greater formal or informal equality within marriage; that equality within marriage was the best marital arrangement; and that thus love enabled people to exercise a particular 'emotional liberty' that marrying for other reasons did not.⁵⁰ For one historiographical tradition therefore, marrying for love was a product of modernity, associated with the eighteenth century, and a requirement for a modern liberal society.⁵¹ Again, work by social and gender historians complicated these claims, demonstrating that whilst love was an important value in medieval and early modern Europe, not everybody thought marrying for love was desirable (and some quite the reverse), and indeed most believed a strong gender and social hierarchy was vital to a successful marriage.⁵² Historians of later periods were also quick to point out that a greater emphasis on marrying for love in later centuries was not coupled with a reduction in patriarchal power; nor was an absence of love necessarily evidence of lower rates of marital equality.⁵³

A large part of this conversation was enabled by the idea that distinctions between emotional and economic motivations could be clearly established, even if they were sometimes opaque to the historian. Yet, given that the household was both an economic and emotional unit, marital choice can be rethought through a lens of reciprocal engagement and interaction across these domains. If economic

decision-making within households can be interpreted as an emotional activity, driven by the needs and desires of families, then marital negotiations are inherently emotional practices. This is particularly the case if we follow the assumption made for will-makers that the transfer of property reflected the emotional life of the giver. In this context, the provision of dowries and jointures for brides and settlements on grooms and the children of a marriage can be interpreted as acts of familial care and support designed to ensure successful relationships, often across several generations. Thus a good marriage settlement enabled the foundation of the economic success of a new household, and so supported the emotional-economic success of the marriage; it demonstrated the love and care of parents for their children, reinforcing affective ties across generations; and it built connections of obligation, often laden with a language of love and gratitude, across the two families that came together through such a match.⁵⁴ For those passing on land or small businesses to heirs, it might also affirm the terms of an older generation's retirement, acting as an assurance of the ongoing love and support from child to parent.⁵⁵ Moreover, within such negotiations, emotion itself received an 'exchange value', as Ahmed suggests.⁵⁶ Emotion was a resource, alongside land or labour, that was employed in the production of family.

There is good evidence that an association between economic activity and emotion persisted across medieval and early modern Europe. Gift-giving played a significant role within courtship practices across time, with physical goods understood to be able to represent emotional commitments or desires.⁵⁷ It is perhaps unsurprising then that money was one of the most popular courtship presents in medieval and early modern England (and also in other exchanges such as gifts to the monarch at New Year).⁵⁸ Elite brides in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scotland saw the provision settled on them by husbands as a marker of future affection; marriages could falter over stingy suitors as it was suggestive of a similar lack of investment in the match. Conversely, poor suitors who were willing to stretch their means could be desirable because they suggested the value in which they would hold brides during the marriage itself.⁵⁹ The use of marriages to stabilize political and economic relationships, which happened across the medieval and early modern world both for the elite and for many business families, was predicated on the emotional connections that marriage created across family networks.⁶⁰ It was because marriage inhered obligations of trust, loyalty and love – that economic and political obligations were experienced as emotional practices – that it was able to play this role.

As this suggests, marriage settlements were not simply economic negotiations: they enabled the establishment of emotional norms within marriage and family life. By explicitly determining the economic relationship between family members, marriage contracts, like inheritance law, promoted a particular vision of the well-functioning family, which included the display and experience of appropriate emotions amongst members.⁶¹ That contracts could be imagined in affective terms is not particularly surprising. Marriage itself was understood as a contract that, according to most regular forms of religious ceremony in Christian Europe, entailed emotional, as well as practical, obligations on couples.⁶² More broadly, vows of service to families or monarchy often placed demands not just on labour, but appropriate loyalty and commitment.⁶³ Thus, such contracts were evidence of not just the economic underpinnings of households and families, but the ways that economic and emotional life

were intertwined and reinforced each other. This is not to say that everyone lived up to the economic or emotional terms of the contracts they signed, but it is suggestive of both a willingness to make such commitments – to actively commit to particular emotional expectations – and the ways that medieval and early modern peoples made economic and emotional life cohere.

Understanding the history of marital choice as conflict between love and money, or even as an economic negotiation that underpinned an affective partnership, misses the important emotional dynamics of household economies for medieval and early modern people. The economic was not construed separately from the emotional, but, if the family-household functioned well, each should reinforce the other. This meant that a careful attention to the household economy was as vital to marital success as that invested in a family's emotional life. Thus, marriage settlements provided a key foundation for a happy marriage by developing structures that acted to control some of the key areas of economic conflict in family life from the outset. It was a contract designed to enable a particular emotional-economic regime.

Reproductive labour

Reproductive labour can perhaps be understood as the manifestation of this emotional-economic regime, a location where the relationship between emotion and work, and emotion *as* work, has long been recognized.⁶⁴ Reproductive labour here can incorporate not only the work of giving birth to and raising children, but managing and resourcing households, and performing domestic and 'body' work. This latter might include cleaning up after bodies (removing bodily waste or laundry), dressing and washing people, nursing and wet-nursing, beauty work (such as hairdressing and perfumery), sex work and similar intimate services. As services that were so closely related to the maintenance and preservation of the body, reproductive labour has been understood in recent times as both work and work that produces particular emotional engagements and intimacy.

The latter has been closely tied to discussions of power, providing sites that disrupt, complicate or reinforce traditional hierarchies. This has been particularly evident in discussions of domestic service and colonial intimate relationships, including cross-race concubinages and sexual exploitation.⁶⁵ Such histories have drawn attention to the ways that the close connections and shared spaces of reproductive labour produce intimate knowledges. Access into 'private' spaces can be used to exploit the vulnerabilities of the powerful, or can themselves enable exploitation of those made invisible to wider social disciplinary forces.⁶⁶ The production of family through reproductive labour – literally giving birth to a new generation – can create new obligations that tie people together for extended periods – obligations that may not be desired by the actors themselves. As evidenced in the marriage contract, such labours can extend outwards into wider economic and political relationships, so that colonial concubinage can form the basis of trade networks; wet-nursing can enable fictive kin ties that make black servants part of white families, and the children of slaves and their masters can collapse the boundaries between family and property.

It is notable that many early economists, mostly famously Marx, excluded reproductive labour from their analyses of economy. Work that was performed for the household was located in the sphere of consumption, rather than production; a logic

that had particular implications for women's work.⁶⁷ Yet if such a division of labour was hard to sustain for the modern, this is even more the case for the medieval and early modern world where the household stood at the centre of the economy. The importance of 'service' to the construction of the European economy blurred the boundaries of types of labour. Service incorporated a wide range of individuals from those who worked for others to the service that individual households owed their lords (often in the form of annually performed labour). Servants worked as agricultural labourers, in trades, producing food, cleaning, caring for bodies, making and selling clothes; they sold goods and bought them. They also worked as clerks and secretaries, gentlemen and women of the royal bedchamber and political staff.⁶⁸ Their work enabled the reproduction of the household, the production of the household economy, and the functioning of early modern states.

Agricultural servants produced food that was for the household and for sale; indeed, for many cottagers and small farmers the marketization of their product was intended to enable the subsistence of the family.⁶⁹ Moreover their range of employment tasks might not be restricted to the field, but incorporate cleaning and maintaining buildings, preparing food and caring for children. In larger households, there may have been a much clearer division of labour between men and women, and people in different roles, but these were not necessarily split along the boundaries of production and reproduction. The responsibility of provisioning households could often fall to male staff, as could caring for the male body; female domestic servants often found themselves responsible for certain types of animal husbandry and dairy work that produced goods for market.⁷⁰ Urban households supported through trade were similarly complex, with caring for the home and managing the shop often performed as dual activities in the same place.⁷¹ Nor were children easily located as consumers, often being integrated into household production activities at young ages.⁷²

Notably all of these activities could be performed by contracted employees, who expected to be paid for their services, as well as family members. The increasing use of contract relationships over the medieval and early modern period – a seemingly modern phenomenon that can be discovered in every century – has been located at the heart of a changing and modernizing society.⁷³ Contract relationships, it has been argued, reduced the intimacies of earlier households, formalizing staff–servant boundaries and reducing expectations that individuals have emotional investments, notably loyalty, in their employers.⁷⁴ There is certainly evidence that contractual relationships were not regarded in the same light as family ties, as the ubiquitous servant–master contract disputes since the medieval period suggest.⁷⁵ Yet such legal arguments also highlight the ways that service contracts were imbued with expectations of certain forms of care, obligation and intimacy from both masters and employees, and the ways that a failure in emotion, as well as in labour, could be cause for concern and the dissolution of contract.⁷⁶ Like inheritance law or marriage contracts, the contract of service was designed to promote particular forms of affective household that varied across time, place and social group.

Rather than viewing reproductive labour as the intimate exception to the rational working of the productive economy, the emotions and intimacies that such labour produced and constrained can also be seen as part of the functioning of an economic system rooted in the household-family. The ways that

reproductive labour enabled and destabilized certain relationships, certain emotions and certain economies, and the ways that law and contract helped to manage them and were in turn products of them, provide key insights into how the economy was imagined that can also be applied more broadly to our understanding of economy as emotional. Importantly, this is a story that does not rely on strict structural explanations for the production of emotion, or indeed economy, but rather relies on the close interweaving and exchange of both.

Conclusion

It is not just that a study of economic life is incomplete if it does not account for emotion, but that for economies rooted in family-households, the economy cannot be understood without the emotional relationships that produce it and give it meaning. For medieval and early modern European people, economic and emotional exchanges were designed to enable the survival or success of household-families, and were justified because they did that. Given this, models that explain emotion as a product of economic structures miss the important ways that emotion can precede economic decision-making. At the same time, to place economy as secondary to emotion does a disservice to the important structuring effects that economic engagements can play in the emotional life of families. This is particularly evident when we explore the key historical sources for the economic life of the family – inheritance law and practices, marriage contracts, and the surviving traces of labour found in the financial records of estates and businesses. Such sources not only evidence the emotional and economic practices of past societies but exist because of the important role they played *as part of* those practices. Contracts, financial records and labour itself were designed to reinforce particular affective and economic dynamics within family-households – dynamics that could vary between families, occupations, regions and periods. Rather than artificially separating emotion from economy, or attempting to produce strict causation, it becomes more fruitful to think of the complex interplays between labour, money and emotion in the production of household dynamics. Moreover, doing so reinforces the artificiality of certain divisions in our imagining of economic life – those between production and consumption, reproductive and productive labour, work and emotion. Exploring how these domains constantly feed into and produce each other enables the vision of a much richer and more dynamic medieval and early modern world.

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DEATH AND DYING

*Gordon D. Raeburn***Introduction**

Death has been a subject of fascination for all of human history, and evidence of its grip on the human imagination can be seen from *The Epic of Gilgamesh* to the present day.¹ It is not hard to see why the subject has continued to fascinate people from all walks of life. Death is, after all, the great leveller. In this respect it is then unsurprising that the subject of death has been approached from many disciplines; history, theology, philosophy, *et cetera*. What should be surprising, however, is the lack of focus from a scholarly perspective on the emotional aspects of death until very recently. For a bewildering length of time studies of death attempted a clinical approach, focussing more upon practice or belief than upon the emotional reaction to the subject, with the one exception to this trend coming, perhaps, from literature studies. This has begun to change, of course, and this chapter offers an investigation of the theories and methodologies of the various approaches to the subject, the particular challenges posed to them by the shift from late medieval to early modern, and how various disciplines have tackled these challenges.

From a modern perspective the most common place to find studies of death and emotion was initially in the work of anthropologists such as Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown² and Arnold van Gennep,³ and sociologists such as Émile Durkheim⁴ and Robert Hertz.⁵ In many cases these early works can be classed as very colonial in their outlook, studying as they were some of the more remote communities in the world, and there is a marked trend in these works implicitly to describe the emotions of these communities in comparison to the emotions of the West, with the emotional restraint of the West given the upper hand. Despite attempted objectivity in their studies, on occasion deeply held beliefs can be read into their assessment of the practices of other cultures. Van Gennep, in his discussion of death and liminality, noted,

Mourning, which I formerly saw simply as an aggregate of taboos and negative practices marking an isolation from society of those whom death, in its physical reality, had placed in a sacred, impure state, now appears to me to be a more complex phenomenon. It is a transitional period for the survivors, and they enter it through rites of separation and emerge from it through rites of reintegration into society (rites of the lifting of mourning).⁶

There is little indication here that van Gennep saw many parallels between the practices of the peoples he studied and contemporary Europeans, despite his revelation that these, as he saw them, 'semicivilized' practices could contain subtlety and nuance. This is not to say that no comparisons were made: he subsequently noted,

for Catholics, children who die without baptism forever remain in the transition zone, or limbo; the corpse of a semicivilized infant not yet named, circumcised or otherwise ritually recognised, is buried without the usual ceremonies, thrown away, or burned – especially if the people in question think that he did not yet possess a soul.⁷

Van Gennep may well have been otherwise respectful of the cultures studied, but it is hard to ignore the implication here that all of these groups were inherently superstitious or credulous. Van Gennep was not alone in propagating certain stereotypes despite attempted objectivity. Durkheim, undoubtedly influential in the development of sociology, could now be considered problematic in certain respects, particularly as he never personally interacted with the cultures he described. For Durkheim, mourning rituals were societal requirements that neither contained nor displayed true emotion. In his discussion of indigenous Australian cultures studied by others he noted,

In central Victoria, 'when death visits a tribe there is great weeping and lamentation amongst the women, the elder portion of whom lacerate their temples with their nails . . . The mother sits by the fire and burns her breasts and abdomen with a small firestick. Sometimes the burns thus inflicted are so severe as to cause death.'⁸

Durkheim did not witness this first-hand, and could not have had a full experiential understanding of that time and place, yet subsequently stated:

One initial fact is constant: mourning is not the spontaneous expression of individual emotions. If the relations weep, lament, mutilate themselves, it is not because they feel themselves personally affected by the death of their kinsman. Of course, it may be that in certain particular cases, the chagrin expressed is really felt. But it is more generally the case that there is no connection between the sentiments felt and the gestures made by the actors in the rite. If, at the very moment when the weepers seem the most overcome by their grief, some one speaks to them of some temporal interest, it frequently happens that they change their features and tone at once, take on a laughing air and converse in the gayest fashion imaginable.⁹

Indeed, he even went so far as to dismiss others who interpreted mourning as genuinely experienced emotion.¹⁰ As with van Gennep, however, it is once again the implicit condescension that, while admittedly difficult to quantify, is nonetheless present in these works, that speaks to the authors' views of their subjects. This can be seen quite clearly in Durkheim's work, where he noted that the death of an individual

would provoke the coming together of the family as a reaction to their feelings of being lessened. He noted '[w]e have even seen this need for concentration affirm itself with a particular energy: they embrace one another, put their arms round one another, and press as close as possible to one another'.¹¹ He noted that while close family relations may be experiencing genuine sorrow, 'society exercises a moral pressure over its members, to put their sentiments in harmony with the situation'.¹² In his clinical description of societal expectation of individuals and families on the occasion of a death Durkheim makes no mention of the fact that the same patterns can be seen in any society, even within modern Europe.

Of course, this is not to suggest that the interpretation of public mourning as distinct from private grief is incorrect. Peter Metcalf and Richard Huntington would subsequently develop these notions, suggesting that 'the psychic process of grieving only partially intersects with the performance of death rites. As we plainly say, it may be that ritual sometimes aids the process, but it could as easily be no help at all, or even an extra burden to bear'.¹³ The presence of societal expectation does not limit the personal experience of emotion, even if different cultures express emotions differently, a concept with which Durkheim *et al* perhaps initially struggled.¹⁴

It was not just cultural expressions of grief that were of interest to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars. In an interesting parallel to the works just addressed, Charles Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* traced the physiological expression of emotions across cultural and racial boundaries. Discussing grief in particular, Darwin noted how in prolonged episodes 'the eyelids droop; the head hangs . . . all the features are lengthened', and mentioned examples seen among the indigenous populations of Tierra del Fuego and Australia.¹⁵ He noted, 'the expression of grief, due to the contraction of the grief-muscles, is by no means confined to Europeans, but appears to be common to all the races of mankind'.¹⁶ Despite the development of cultural differences in language and societal expectations, there were, for Darwin, clear similarities to be found at a more basic level.

In terms of the development of the study of death and emotion it is also important that the work of Philippe Ariès be noted, as well as David Stannard's work on Puritan New England.¹⁷ The works produced by these individuals were crucial to the development of the *longue durée* approach to the study of history in general, but also to the study of the history of emotions and the history of death more specifically. Two of Ariès' works in particular, *Western Attitudes toward Death from the Middle Ages to the Present*,¹⁸ and *The Hour of Our Death*,¹⁹ were central to the development of future methodologies applied to the study of death, and are two of the few volumes to tackle the transition from medieval to early modern, as will be noted below. Although these volumes are not specifically aimed at the emotions surrounding death and dying, they both do interact with the subject of mourning, and the intricacies of emotion that can be seen on the occasion of a death. Ariès approached his work thematically, naming various forms of the human perception of death and dying over the centuries. This approach was subsequently adopted and adapted by later scholars, and similar groupings can be seen in the work of Douglas Davies, among others.²⁰

Of course, the categorization of types of death was nothing new when Ariès embraced it, and such categorizations can be seen in late medieval and early modern *Ars Moriendi* works.²¹ Yet, for the *longue durée* approach to the subject, breaking

death up into specific aspects allowed for clarity when dealing with centuries of material. Ariès did receive some criticism of his work. He was accused of being poorly balanced in his selections of material, for providing few counter examples to his focus on Catholicism, and for largely ignoring geography and culture.²² As Roy Porter would later note, ‘his selection of evidence is sometimes wilful, and questions of cultural diversity are not addressed: is Ariès writing, as he declares, about Europe at large, or, as it seems, essentially about Catholicism?’²³ Yet the fact remains that Ariès was an important pioneer for the subject of death studies and the inclusion of histories of emotion. Indeed, despite the problematic nature of his work, when viewed closely, Ariès ‘remains the doyen of the historians of death’, as Porter ultimately concluded.²⁴

Coming to terms with death and emotion

Dealing with emotions and death in any period does necessitate some definition of terms. Some of the emotions provoked by, leading to and surrounding death are easily identifiable: fear, grief, anger, on occasion joy. Others are less simple. Is satisfaction an emotion? Suspicion? Confusion? Curiosity?²⁵ We are, after all, moved to these sensations. They affect us. They are our moods. Indeed, as will be seen below, all of these can be treated as emotions involved with death in the medieval and early modern periods. But emotions are not just experienced. They can be used by individuals or groups towards specific ends, particularly when the death in question is scripted or staged, such as in an execution. On these occasions perhaps the most common path, or at least the most readily identifiable, is a top-down transmission of emotion, from the authorities to the community. William M. Reddy has developed the idea of emotional regimes, in which a specific regime attempts to dictate and regulate the presence and expression of emotion, examples of which will be seen below.²⁶ However, as can be seen in Barbara H. Rosenwein’s notion of emotional communities, the communities themselves were not simply passive recipients of instruction.²⁷ Within the towns and cities of medieval and early modern Europe certain sub-sets of society, occasionally transcending traditional borders, reacted emotionally in similar fashions, valuing specific groupings of emotional modes over others, and using these emotions to their own ends, often in opposition to the attempts of the regimes.²⁸ Furthermore, the areas in which these two groups interacted – the town squares, the churches, the cemeteries – have been described by Mark Seymour as emotional arenas.²⁹ They became the stage for specific emotional performances, as I discuss below.

Emotional snapshots: themes in time and space

When dealing with emotions and death between 1100 and 1700, a *longue durée* study is not always necessarily the best approach. Death, as a subject, is too big. Frequently smaller, more tightly focussed investigations can provide more valuable information, specifically when applied to themes, distinct periods or well-defined geographical locations. As noted at the start of this chapter, death and emotion is certainly not a limited field in which to work. Following the ninth *Death, Dying, and Disposal* conference, held at the University of Durham in 2009, Douglas Davies wrote, ‘the focus on emotions and identity was chosen because “emotions” currently hold a

significant profile in numerous academic disciplines from cognitive psychology and evolutionary biology to a concern for “spirituality” as a perspective on the depth of human self-appreciation and mutual interaction’.³⁰ Davies highlighted just how varied the study of death and emotion could be, with periods and topics ranging from the early medieval to the present day, and spanning the entirety of the globe. As such it is no small wonder that, from an introductory point of view at least, many studies have taken the form of snapshots, in that they focus closely upon smaller themes or moments in time. Of course, this can be somewhat limiting in terms of our wider understandings, but when these various snapshots are combined, a much fuller picture can emerge.

The emotions of death

As noted above, whether or not certain sensations such as confusion or curiosity are emotions can be debatable, yet these are very common reactions to death, and their study can often lead to interesting results. In the introduction to his work on suspicion, Franck Collard has suggested, perhaps erroneously, a surprising paucity of researchers willing to confront suspicious death in the medieval and early modern periods.³¹ Collard goes so far as to call out Rosenwein for using ‘Confronting Death’ as a chapter title in *Emotional Communities*, but noting ‘there is no discussion of the problems possibly generated by confronting certain deaths’.³² Of course, this is not to suggest that no scholars have tackled such issues. Rebecca McNamara in particular has worked on medieval attitudes towards suicide, noting that, perhaps contrary to expectation, these deaths were frequently treated with compassion, and in certain cases provoked medical curiosity as to the root cause.³³ Even when medical curiosity was not forthcoming, compassion was still a common response to attempts at suicide, and in at least one instance Jean Calvin showed compassion to an individual afflicted by thoughts of suicide, acknowledging the overwhelming influence of demonic forces in these situations.³⁴

Collard, however, focusses specifically on suspicion rather than curiosity, suggesting that curiosity in turn allowed for the development of suspicion regarding death. Medieval communities desired comprehension of the causes of death, and on occasion did not simply accept death at face value.³⁵ Cultural change is gradual, however, and Collard cites several examples of the tension this could foment, such as the ridicule of the villagers of Saint-Sever in southwest France in the anonymously authored late twelfth-century text *Miracles de Notre-Dame de Rocamadour* for their suspicions concerning a recent spike in deaths. For the author of the *Miracles* the deaths were clearly the product of original sin, and the only appropriate terms in which to discuss death were spiritual.³⁶ Collard goes on to suggest, however, that by the 1300s suspicion of the circumstances surrounding death was becoming more commonplace and accepted, using as evidence of this the spread of rumour and gossip.³⁷ He notes how in Paris in 1276 news of the suspicious death of the duke of Bavaria was spread by street singers; that popular rumours spread throughout France in 1392 following the death of Amédée VII de Savoie; and that in 1461 rumour spread like wildfire following the suspicious death of a Cistercian monk.³⁸ For Collard ‘the unbridled rumours of collective talk took the place of the ritualised, seemly words of mourning, and could turn into “belief”’.³⁹ Of course, the licence given to suspicions concerning

medieval death did have some unfortunate by-products, in that it ultimately resulted in the criminalization of suspicious death. In 1463 Conrad Vendl wrote a work on poisons and plague partly in order to protect servants from accusations of having a hand in the deaths of their masters.⁴⁰ In the emotional arenas of courts and cities suspicion could flourish, often to the detriment of those less able to defend themselves against accusations of evil intent. Yet, for Collard, this was a step towards the eventual medicalization of death, and his ultimate suggestion is perhaps that suspicion was in fact a healthy emotion for the development of Western science.⁴¹ It is an interesting approach, and serves to highlight that certain emotions provoked by death can have both constructive and destructive consequences, although a clearer distinction between the two could also prove useful.

Other studies have taken a different approach, in that they have tackled the issue of the effect of specific emotions upon death. The emotional state of an individual at the point of death was of great concern in the medieval and early modern periods, as attested by the various *ars moriendi* works of the time. Yet these works were concerned with the spiritual effects of a good or bad death, as opposed to the physical. Fears of vampires and revenants were far from unknown at this time, and methods by which the undead were prevented from rising have been fairly well studied elsewhere. Kirsi Kanerva has taken this research in an interesting direction, noting that the restless dead were frequently the product of an angry life and death. Kanerva notes the tale of Glámr the Revenant from the medieval Icelandic *Grettis saga*, in which Glámr is portrayed as an irritable person in life. Kanerva states, 'Dying in an angry mood could be the cause of posthumous restlessness, and anger was construed as a substance of at least partly material nature that could remain in the corpse and through this contribute to its reanimation'.⁴² We have seen how death can provoke specific emotional responses that, over time, can affect whole societies, but here it is being highlighted that, in essence, the inverse was also held by some to be true. Specific emotions could affect the death of an individual, and the fate of their body and soul in the afterlife. Yet not only in the commonly understood Christian sense of salvation and damnation. Emotions and death were tied up in older folk-beliefs that to this day have left their mark on art and culture. The approach undertaken by Kanerva once again highlights the benefits of a snapshot approach to the study of death and emotion, allowing for greater depth to be found from tightly focussed studies.

Emotion and the *ars moriendi*

As noted above, during the late medieval and early modern periods a new genre became popular that dealt with how to die well. The *ars moriendi* genre has been well studied from many angles, including theology and literature studies, and some excellent work has been undertaken into the approach towards emotion in these texts. Perhaps understandably the main emotional concern of the *ars moriendi* was addressing the fear of death. In her work on late medieval Scotland Mairi Cowan has noted that the fear of death was of course widely held, but suggests that in many ways this anxiety was a product of the fear of the pain of death, rather than of death itself.⁴³ She goes on to suggest, however, that the fear of death also stemmed in large part from uncertainty as to the soul's ultimate destination. As such, a fear of death was really a fear of pain on the way to eternal damnation.⁴⁴ Death itself was

not the issue. This could be seen in the fact that death could also provoke a longing for salvation.⁴⁵ Indeed, the pains associated with death could be endured if the dying had some hope of avoiding hell. In pre-Reformation Europe, as just noted, one's emotional state at death was important, as it could influence the death itself, and also the fate of body and soul. A good death required a very specific emotional state. To that end arose the *ars moriendi*.

Over time these works developed greater emotional complexity, and they aimed at heightening 'the emotional context of imminent death',⁴⁶ but prior to this they were somewhat heavy-handed with their use of fear as a teaching tool, which could on occasion result in a crippling fear of death, rather than an acceptance of it.⁴⁷ The need for emotional balance in these texts came to be recognized, and over the early modern period the authors of some of these works attempted to develop them accordingly. In this regard the Reformation resulted in a great variety of approaches to these texts, and scholars of this area of death and emotion are not limited in material with which to work. Indeed, comparative approaches to this material can prove very enlightening, and both recent and forthcoming works have taken such a tack.⁴⁸ Focussing on works produced towards the end of the medieval period, Juanita Feros Ruys noted in 2014 that many initial attempts at controlling the fears of those facing death took an approach, not of reducing fear, but altering it,⁴⁹ which, as just noted, when done carefully could shift focus from an imminent death to an eternal afterlife, as suggested by Cowan. Ruys' study of various texts, and the methods by which they attempted to guide the emotional state of the dying, highlights not only the differences, but also the threads of similarity running through works that inevitably drew upon earlier texts, and influenced later texts.⁵⁰ This influence and development is also addressed in my own work on early modern Scotland, wherein it is suggested that Scottish examples of *ars moriendi* texts drew upon earlier English material, taking a Protestant view that death is a blessing, and salvation from a miserable life.⁵¹ In this regard death should not have provoked fear, but inspired anticipation of the joy to come.⁵²

Death and childhood

Ariès famously suggested that in the medieval and early modern periods the death of a child in the early stages of life was not as emotionally troubling an experience as it was for those in the modern day. This controversial interpretation is one area of his work that has been consistently challenged, and has in fact become one of the key focal points of the study of death and emotion throughout history. However, even the briefest survey of works such as the diary of Nehemiah Wallington swiftly dispel such notions. Following the death of his daughter, Wallington noted 'The greefe for this childe was so greate that I forgoote myself so much that I deed offend God in it'.⁵³ Earlier still the traumatic nature of infant mortality was given vivid display in Hans Holbein the Younger's 1538 woodcut *The Death of a Child*. In truth, challenges to Ariès' ideas were swiftly given voice. Anne Laurence, for instance, demonstrated that the emotional result of a child's death was the same in the medieval and early modern periods as it is now: depression, melancholy and emotional devastation.⁵⁴ Yet there was, perhaps, a more immediate consolation offered by beliefs in the Resurrection, and as such eventual reunion. As suggested elsewhere, 'resignation in

the face of death was a strategy of coping with inevitability'.⁵⁵ Along these lines Alec Ryrie has drawn attention to the efforts of spirituality and faith in reining in sorrow, particularly in Calvinist England. He draws attention to the complex reasons for restraint upon these occasions, noting how the 'utilitarian argument' that 'earthly life is full of pain' and as such the 'early ascent to heaven is a cause for rejoicing', was bolstered by the need for public witness of faith in the Resurrection and predestination.⁵⁶ Clearly, this would have come together to temper outward grief, even at the death of a child.

The seeming outward resignation just noted may also shed some light on how medieval and early modern emotional reactions to the death of a child might have been misinterpreted, in that the reliance on structures of belief, as well as strict social codes, may not have been taken into consideration. After all, grief not displayed does not necessarily imply grief not experienced. Indeed, grief is intensely personal under any circumstances, and the death of a child must have sparked an emotional reaction that, should wider society have expected restraint, would have been a struggle to contain, let alone come to terms with. Social status was no barrier, nor was geographical location, and neither the *ars moriendi*, seen above, nor the various gender roles of the period, seen below, would necessarily have helped prepare everyone for such a wrenching, traumatic event.

It is no surprise then, that familial grief at the death of a child would find outlets in a variety of forms, although perhaps not in ways immediately recognisable to modern audiences. Some, such as Wallington's diary, are clear expressions of emotion, but others require a somewhat more nuanced reading. Viktor Aldrin has noted expressions of grief in medieval Swedish miracle tales that, although recording miraculous events, can be used as an indicator of believable reactions to the death of children. He notes the father 'half dead in pain at seeing his son' crushed by a sack of malt, and highlights that both mothers and fathers wept for their dead children.⁵⁷ Philippa Maddern also noted depictions of familial grief in late-medieval English miracle tales. She noted the father who, finding that his daughter had been crushed by a tree, 'found his face grow pale, and his heart wrung with an agony of grief'.⁵⁸ And it is not just parental grief represented in these tales, as young siblings are also shown to experience horror at the sudden death of one of their own.⁵⁹

But what of non-accidental death? Katie Barclay and Kimberley Reynolds have vividly shown that in early modern Scotland communities were expected to react to the intentional death of children with abhorrence, in a highly visible display of disgust and revulsion that did nothing to allay the social conditions that may have led to such an unpleasant event.⁶⁰ Yet there were still instances throughout the early modern world in which sympathy for the mother was evident. Susan Broomhall has highlighted the complex nature of emotional reactions to such events and the people involved, who could still be condemned for their actions, despite obvious sympathy for their situation. In a 1583 pamphlet regarding Marguerite Haldebois' murder of her husband and children it was highlighted that the husband had been a drinker and gambler, and had neglected her and her children. Her emotional reaction to this ongoing situation led her to kill all three of them. Yet this did little to allay the fact that she had sinned, and her execution was still viewed as just.⁶¹ Garthine Walker, in her study of England and Wales, has taken this investigation further, noting that modern perceptions of this phenomenon are largely influenced through

contemporary sensationalized narratives.⁶² She has highlighted how illegitimacy was common, yet infanticide was not, and the vast majority of people would never have experienced a case in their lifetimes.⁶³ Yet the visceral reaction to cases of infanticide also serves to highlight, once again, that high rates of infant mortality did not lead to indifference.⁶⁴ Nor was the discovery or sight of a dead baby taken in stride. Rather, this was a profoundly horrifying experience for those concerned, provoking strong emotional reactions.⁶⁵ However, as seen in early modern France, there was evident sympathy for the women involved in these cases, and often those facing death for their actions would be reprieved or pardoned.⁶⁶ It was largely recognized that these women had acted the way they had from desperation, and that they were not alone in responsibility. Indeed, one reason so few men were held accountable was the inability to prove complicity.⁶⁷

Gendered death and gendered emotion

As with the majority of snapshots it is very difficult to keep the themes discrete, and there will almost always be some degree of overlap, which when dealing with death and emotion can frequently be seen in the related aspects of gendered emotion and childhood death. In relation to early modern Sweden Viktor Aldrin noted that the death of a child would often produce emotional responses that were perhaps less strictly regulated in terms of gender roles than may have been the case in Britain or Europe, highlighting that both men and women cried.⁶⁸ Of course, the assumption in the West is that ordinarily men would be more restrained on these occasions than women. However, although in many instances weeping was a learned response,⁶⁹ so was restraint. Several hundred years earlier William the Conqueror was noted to have displayed profound public grief following the death of his wife, a display taken as genuine emotion.⁷⁰ Conversely, Louis IX of France, almost two centuries later, was condemned for his public display of grief following the death of his mother.⁷¹ In the span of two hundred years what was expected of men in relation to emotions had changed, and certain emotional displays were no longer considered seemly.

Interestingly, the two cases just noted did involve different relationships, in that William lost a wife, whereas Louis lost a mother. The impact of specific relationship types upon gender roles can become particularly fascinating when looking at marriage. How did husbands and wives react to the death of their spouse, and did the manner of death affect these reactions? Eivor Andersen Oftestad narrowed the focus of these questions in an investigation of death in childbirth in early modern Denmark-Norway, addressing how the impending death of the mother was approached and presented, how it was handled after the fact and how these deaths were interpreted in the wider community. Examining the polemical shift over time towards the view of death in childbirth as a religious ideal, Oftestad highlighted how such a death could be interpreted by the community as a warning from God.⁷²

In some cases the loss of a spouse could provoke emotional displays in more lasting forms, such as artwork in churches. Bridget Heal has noted that all too often Protestant memorials are interpreted somewhat coldly, and as a counterpoint to this interpretation she has shown how these memorials could offer consolation to the bereaved, who would likely view these pieces on a weekly basis. Describing the memorial to Anna von Einsiedel in the village church in Prießnitz, near Leipzig,

following her death in 1616, Heal notes how it ‘offers consolation to Anna’s grieving husband, consolation that derives above all from the promise of her resurrection and their eventual reunion in heaven’.⁷³ Heal goes on to note ‘Hans’ quest for consolation is immediately evident. The inscriptions that he composed give eloquent expression to his sorrow’.⁷⁴ Through a combination of text and image the emotional state of Hans was laid bare for all to see. Yet it was not just his grief that was on display: ‘Through the death of his beloved, God has clothed Hans with fear and sorrow [. . .] In his hour of need, Hans depended on the daily consolation sent to him by God and on his heart being refreshed by God’s word’.⁷⁵ Heal notes how the notion held by some scholars, such as Joseph Koerner and Susan Karant-Nunn,⁷⁶ that Lutheran art is bereft of emotion is proven wrong through Hans’ heartfelt tribute to his late wife. That he held to *sola fides* and her eventual resurrection in no way changed the fact that his was a profound grief, but due to his faith it was a grief tempered with hope: ‘Hans’ texts speak frequently of the heart, of fear, of suffering, of sorrow, of hope and help’.⁷⁷ This was not a man denied the outpouring of emotion, but a man who had found balance between faith and love. It is important to note, however, that this remained a very Protestant act of tribute. That Hans hoped for Anna’s eventual resurrection is undeniable, but he did not attempt intercessory action. Instead he objectified his pain in art, and in that respect left a far more enduring legacy for Anna.

One very important takeaway from these views of female death during childbirth is the fact that the women themselves had very little agency, in that they were representative of something other than themselves. They had been transformed into wives and mothers, and were, in a sense, no longer individuals. Yet, as Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly points out, for some women at least, their individuality could be regained through widowhood. Watanabe-O’Kelly has used printed funeral sermons to show that certain women in early modern Saxony could receive instructions as to how to be exemplary widows, and to regain, or retain, a certain status within the community.⁷⁸

Across Europe there were certain roles that women were expected to fill, frequently involving the expression of grief and mourning on behalf of the community. Cia Sauter, in her study of Christian, Jewish and Muslim mourning practices in medieval Spain, has noted their catalytic and cathartic nature. By performing these laments the community was given ‘permission to formally weep, embrace, and recognise community loss [. . .] the physicality of their performances allows for an embodied response from their audience, with the viewing of actions of grief releasing emotions of grief in observers’.⁷⁹ Very similar practices could be seen across the continent in the medieval and early modern periods, and perhaps later still in the more remote fringes. Practices such as the *caoineadh* in Ireland, studied by Patricia Lysaght,⁸⁰ and the *coronach* in Scotland, tackled in my own work,⁸¹ also embodied the grief of the community, channelling it through otherwise taboo practices such as bared breasts, self-inflicted wounds and the drinking of blood.

Emotions and the geography of death

As can be seen from the works considered above, there is great potential for the study of death and emotion across Europe, yet few studies actively tackle comparative approaches. As will be seen shortly in relation to *longue durée* studies of the subject,

this is likely due in large part to the massive scale of such an undertaking. In my own forthcoming work I have addressed comparative aspects of death and emotion in early modern Europe, but this is of necessity a brief survey, and far more remains to be done on the subject.⁸² There are, indeed, few limitations. Cultural and confessional differences give myriad opportunities for study, both within and without geo-political boundaries; the landscape itself, and the vagaries of geography and geology also offer rich potential.

Of course, it cannot be suggested that geography is limited to landmass. It also constitutes space, such as towns or cities, or marketplaces and town squares. James Davis has engaged with the subject of capital punishment, an act that took place in public in order, in part, to provoke an emotional reaction from the community. He has noted the influence of Michel Foucault upon the idea that capital punishment was intended as a deterrent, instilling terror and highlighting the pain of death in order to maintain an orderly society.⁸³ Una McIlvenna has also studied emotions and public executions through the lens of the dissemination of the events through ballad and song. She notes how these ballads facilitated the vicarious experience of emotions such as fear and remorse, and could serve as a warning to others not to stray towards the same end as those executed for their crimes.⁸⁴

There were other aspects to public executions, of course. Davis also notes the need within communities for redress and satisfaction, incidentally emphasizing the difference between emotional regimes and emotional communities, both of which interacted in these emotional arenas. As Davis notes, 'retribution was probably most important for victims or their families and friends rather than the authorities'.⁸⁵ Of course, the authorities are unlikely to have been blind to the importance of satisfaction, as it would likely have reduced vigilante-style justice, or vendettas.⁸⁶ For others, however, it could be suggested that the emotions involved were perhaps more 'positive', in that a public execution could also be seen as redemptive for the soul of the condemned, and as such it was important for them, as the community, to witness this final act of atonement. Indeed, 'execution rituals thus become a form of healing for the communal body, aiding [a] social harmony' that had been injured by the actions of individuals.⁸⁷ For some to heal would have involved being present at the removal of the disruptive element. Yet there was more involved than the removal of an offensive individual. Execution would have been viewed by many as potentially a good death, as long as the condemned played their part:

A condemned felon who played the role of the penitent may have thus aroused the sympathy of onlookers, even their prayers. It is unlikely that the crowd was passive, particularly given the emotions that the rituals were intended to elicit, so they might have encouraged the offender's acquiescence in spiritual submission.⁸⁸

Some communities, such as could be found in late medieval Italy, even went so far as to attempt to comfort and distract the condemned from their looming fate.⁸⁹ Clearly, public executions provoked and inspired emotions across the spectrum, both intentionally and incidentally. Emotional regimes used emotions strategically, while emotional communities reacted in ways that serviced their own needs and ends.

Medieval to early modern: abrupt change or gradual shift?

As noted above, Ariès was one of very few scholars who took an ambitious *longue durée* approach to the subject of death, attempting as he did to paint a picture of the development of reactions to and preparations for death and dying from a Western perspective from the medieval to the late twentieth century. As just seen, more recent studies have tended towards snapshots of history, looking at one or two geographical areas, and more often one individual country, and when they do take a *longue durée* approach they tend to avoid the difficulties presented by the shift from medieval to early modern.⁹⁰ Of course, the shift from medieval to early modern is not clearly delineated, and a monograph has to start and end somewhere.

However, a study of death and emotion crossing the medieval to the early modern need not take a *longue durée* approach, and the period in question can be tackled in a similar fashion to the above mentioned more tightly focussed approaches to the subject. Barbara H. Rosenwein has addressed this issue elsewhere within the study of the history of emotions, noting the tendency of scholars to stick to traditional historical periods.⁹¹ Stating that no individual article has tackled the medieval/early modern divide, Rosenwein set out in *Generations of Feeling* to do just that. In it she states her intent 'to show how later communities drew on the emotional repertoires of past communities', and how this 'continued across the divide that historians still assume between the medieval period and the modern'.⁹² She goes on to note that, rather than provide a case study of a period of gradual change, the Reformation era has been studied as an abrupt event which suddenly instituted new emotional control from the top of society down.⁹³ This, for Rosenwein, is problematic. But as she states, 'the study of emotions has unusually good potential to knit together the two sides and yet point up their differences'.⁹⁴ Personally, I have to agree. Death and the emotions that surround it are a fascinating field of study for the shift from medieval to early modern, particularly when the various reformations are considered.⁹⁵ A central tenet of all European reformations concerned addressing death, dying and burial, as well as a stricter control of the emotional practices and displays involved. Yet this was one aspect of community life that was to prove incredibly resistant to change. Death, and particularly burial, is frequently intertwined with notions of communal identity. The way in which a community buries its dead cements its identity in this life and the next. As a result, throughout Europe communities at all levels of society resisted imposed alterations on these rituals and practices. Consequently it is difficult to define the medieval/early modern divide in this regard as either gradual or abrupt, as certain emotional regimes were attempting abrupt change, whereas the emotional communities resisted as much as possible, leading to a far more gradual shift in practice. And yet changes did take place, and not necessarily in the ways one might assume. Rosenwein, for instance, notes that by the period of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, particularly in England, attitudes towards certain displays of grief had changed, in that 'although Timothie Bright earlier had associated tears with women, [Henry] Walker saw them as manly and useful. Gender did not always count'.⁹⁶ But Walker did not approve of emotional displays across the board.⁹⁷ Then, as now, attitudes towards emotions were complex and specific to the individual.

Conclusion

As noted at the start of this chapter, death is a subject that can be studied from any discipline. In certain respects this is a good thing, as it means there are very few limitations to what can be done with the subject. In other respects, however, it could be considered a hindrance. The subject is too big to be tackled in any other way than through snapshots. Even *longue durée* studies must limit themselves in many respects in order to be comprehensible. There is simply no way that death and emotion in Europe over a six-hundred-year period can be studied as a single phenomenon. The development and abandonment of rituals, practices and superstitions, the reform of theological approaches, the geographical changes, all combine to make a labyrinthian diagram, where the wood cannot be seen for the trees, to mix a metaphor. To understand what was happening it is necessary to go into the detail.

In the decades since Ariès' work, scholars have developed a willingness to acknowledge and utilize more wide-ranging sources, including those which may at first seem devoid of emotion, such as legal documents. Other, non-textual sources, such as art, gravestones and architecture, are also more commonly seen side by side with archival materials and documentary evidence. There is a slow but steady embrace of interdisciplinarity. The strength of these various approaches lies in the fact that human experience has always been varied, yet only certain social strata are regularly preserved in the documentary evidence. By looking elsewhere, to song or art, to graves and architecture, a more rounded picture of the emotional responses to death in the medieval and early modern periods is allowed to emerge.

Notes

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- 5 R. Hertz, 'A contribution to the study of the collective representation of death', in R. and C. Needham (eds), *Death and the Right Hand*, New York: Free Press, 1960, pp. 27–86.
- 6 van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, pp. 146–7.
- 7 Ibid., p. 153.
- 8 Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 438.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 442–3.
- 10 Ibid., p. 442, n. 27.
- 11 Ibid., p. 445.
- 12 Ibid.
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- 14 For more on the effect of language and culture on the expression of emotion see A. Wierzbicka, 'Human emotions: universal or culture specific?', *American Anthropologist*, 88:3, 1986, 584–94.
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- 16 Ibid., p. 187.
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- 23 R. Porter, 'Classics revisited: the hour of Philippe Ariès', *Mortality*, 4:1, 1999, 83–90 (pp. 84–8).
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- 26 W.M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001, pp. 122–30.
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- 28 In my own forthcoming research ('Emotions, mortality, vitality' in G. Raeburn and N. Warne (eds), *A Cultural History of Death*, vol. 3, London: Bloomsbury) I have interacted with these notions, exploring the historical interactions between emotional regimes and emotional communities in early modern Scotland and in early modern Europe more widely.
- 29 M. Seymour, 'Emotional arenas: from provincial circus to national courtroom in late nineteenth-century Italy', in B. Gammerl (ed.), *Emotional Styles – Concepts and Challenges, Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice*, 16:2, 2016, 177–97.
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- 31 F. Collard, 'A dead zone in the historiography of death in the Middle Ages: the sentiment of suspicious death', in J. Rollo-Koster (ed.), *Death in Medieval Europe, Death Scripted and Death Choreographed*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017, pp. 186–208 (p. 187).
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- 34 J. Calvin, Testimonial Regarding the Suicide of Pierre Vachat, 23 January 1545, Musée international de la Réforme, Geneva.
- 35 Collard, 'A dead zone', p. 187.
- 36 Ibid., p. 188. See also *Miracles de Notre-Dame de Rocamadour au XII^e siècle*, ed. and trans. E. Albe, Paris: 1907; Toulouse, 1996, p. 276.
- 37 Collard, 'A dead zone', p. 190.
- 38 Ibid., p. 195.
- 39 Ibid. This is perhaps an indication that for Collard there is a significant difference between ritual grief and individually experienced emotion, as noted above in the work of Durkheim.
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- 41 Ibid., p. 208.
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- 45 Ibid., p. 20.
- 46 Ruys, 'Dying 101', pp. 55–6.
- 47 Ibid., p. 56.
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- 86 Ibid.
- 87 Ibid., p. 137.
- 88 Ibid., p. 138; See also McIlvenna, ‘Singing of executions’.
- 89 Davis, ‘Spectacular death’, pp. 138–9.
- 90 See, for instance, A. Appleford, *Learning to Die in London, 1380–1540*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015; Cowan, *Death, Life, and Religious Change*; Kate Cregan, *The Theatre of the Body, Staging Death and Embodying Life in Early-Modern London*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2009; Vanessa Harding, *The Dead and the Living in Paris and London, 1500–1670* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- 91 Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*, p. 11.
- 92 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
- 93 Ibid., pp. 249–51.
- 94 Ibid., p. 252.
- 95 This is not to suggest that the various reformations should be taken as the defining point at which the medieval became the early modern, not only due to the staggered change across the continent that would result from this. They do, however, provide an occasionally useful focal point for discussion.
- 96 Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling*, p. 271.
- 97 Ibid.

EMOTIONS IN PUBLIC

Crowds, mobs and communities

Una McIlvenna

A distinctive feature of life in medieval and early modern Europe was the communal nature of existence: modern ideas of a boundary between public and private were largely non-existent as the entire community shared information in bustling streets and involved itself overtly in the management of households and the policing of behaviour deemed anti-social. In a predominantly illiterate society, entertainment, news and moral lessons were delivered in visual and aural media that encouraged crowds to gather in the town square, church and marketplace. Whether buying goods and services from ambulant vendors in the streets, or watching executions and joining in charivaris (public shaming rituals), crowds regularly formed, producing emotions that need to be considered in their group context. This chapter explores how this ever-present crowd participated emotionally in the many kinds of urban ritual found in early modern Europe, from religious procession to public punishment. It also looks at when the emotions of the crowd could turn to violence, transforming it into the ‘mob’, and threatening those same religious and civic rituals that were supposed to create and reinforce the community. Natalie Zemon Davis noted back in 1973 that ‘the literature on crowds and violence is vast’, and so rather than cover that well-trodden ground, this chapter instead provides where possible an overview of more recent scholarship on early modern urban history that has focused on both spatial dynamics and the study of soundscapes, allowing us to understand how emotions were produced, manipulated and managed on the streets and squares of early modern Europe.¹

Almost all contemporary visitors to early modern cities talk about the noise and congestion, the bustling activity of the throngs that filled the streets. A seventeenth-century commentator remarked of London in 1632 that:

She is growne so Great, I am almost affraide to meddle with Her; She’s certainly a great World, there are so many little worlds in Her: She is the great Bee-hiue of Christendome, I am sure of England: Shee swarmes foure times in a yeare, with people of al Ages, Natures, Sexes, Callings.²

Pictorial depictions often evoke these multitudes, such as Nicolas Guérard’s engraving ‘L’Embaras de Paris’ (Figure 14.1) which depicts a chaotic scene on the Pont Neuf, newly opened in 1604, filled with carriages, sedan chairs, booksellers, street vendors, and an array of animals including cattle and sheep. The engraving was meant



Figure 14.1 Nicolas Guérard, *L'Embaras de Paris*, Paris, 1690–1710. Etching, 191 × 300 mm
The British Museum, London. © Trustees of the British Museum

to inspire fear and trepidation of the crowds, which threaten an unwary visitor with the danger of being hit by a carriage, kicked by an animal, or ripped off by a pickpocket or dubious vendor. The accompanying verse confirms these dangers:

Pour marcher dans paris ayés les
yeux alertes,
Tenez de tous côtes vos oreilles
ouvertes,
Pour n'être pas heurté culbutté ou
blessé,
Car si vous n'écoutez parmi le
tintamarre
Garre garre la bas Garre reñgez vous
garre,
Ou du haut ou du bas vous serez
écrasé.

If walking in Paris keep your eyes
alert,
On all sides keep your ears open,
So as not to be hit, overturned or
injured,
Because if you don't hear among the
din
'Careful, watch out over there, get
out of the way!'
You'll be wiped out either above or
below.

Guérard's brother François also satirized the chaotic and sometimes violent nature of city life. His engraving, also called 'Les Embaras de Paris' (Figure 14.2), features burglars being arrested with their loot in sacks; a family fleeing a burning house; an overturned coach; parents calling for help for their son who has fallen into the river; a group of men defending themselves from a rabid dog, and everywhere people are fighting. Although these are satirical prints, they present an image of chaotic urban life that would have resonated with those who visited these cities.



Figure 14.2 François Guérard, *Les Embaras de Paris*, Paris, 1680–1700. Hand-coloured etching, 290 × 185 mm. The British Museum, London. © Trustees of the British Museum

I have begun with two images deliberately, in order to emphasize the non-textual and non-literate manner by which early modern people tended to make sense of the world they lived in. Although both images contain text, for most contemporary viewers of these engravings that text would have been read out loud by someone else, and the images were the primary medium of information. Thus, this chapter will focus on how recent research into soundscapes and performance studies informs us in new ways about how crowds and communities in early modern Europe were stirred to specific emotions and expressed those emotions. For example, how can we analyse the audible aspects of early modern life – aspects that would seem to be no longer accessible to us – to understand the emotional responses of the past? Similarly, how can we understand rituals of the early modern urban setting that are no longer performed? As we shall see, much recent research has exploited the newest digital technologies to make these emotional sounds, practices and worlds come to life today.

Soundscapes

Some of the most fascinating recent work on early modern Europe that allows us to think about emotions in their historical circumstances has been on soundscapes, research which helps us understand what David Garrioch calls the ‘complex semi-otic system’ of this oral and aural society, made up of the sounds of humans, animals and human-driven actions.³ Since R. Murray Schafer’s pioneering work on the soundscape as a historical and sociological category, work such as Garrioch’s on early modern France and Bruce Smith’s on early modern England remind us that what we hear and how we interpret it are historically and culturally determined.⁴ Bells everywhere marked the passage of time, and the early modern ear was very attuned to the pitch, volume and frequency of bells ringing from specific churches and town halls. Dolly MacKinnon reminds us that ‘[i]n rural and urban settings all those who lived within earshot of church towers knew the particular sounds of their parish bells or bell’.⁵ While the sound of bells was ubiquitous, certain performances of bell ringing were highly emotive, such as the bell that announced (usually in the early morning) the beginning of the drawn-out execution ritual for prisoners. The manual for lay comforters of the condemned in Bologna notes that ‘[w]hen the bell of the Podestà [chief magistrate]’s Palace first rings in the morning, you must be very strong, for you will find many of them become completely overwhelmed, and that many grow faint’.⁶ This aural signal, found throughout Europe, would not only inspire fear in the condemned prisoner, but also be the sign for those in earshot to come on to the main street of the city to join the crowds witnessing and participating in the ‘drawing’ of the prisoner to the execution site. The emotions of the crowd would vary depending on their sympathies for the condemned: they could jeer, pray or sing; indeed, an early modern writer observed about the London route from Newgate Prison to Tyburn that ‘[s]ongs were sung and the ballads sold at the corners of the streets all along Holborn, St. Giles’s and Oxford Street’.⁷ Public execution was everywhere primarily intended as a visual deterrent. In the ballad about one execution, *By the example of Alice Davis who for killing of her husband was burned in Smithfield the 12. of July 1628. to the terror of all the beholders*, the final expression ‘to the terror of all the beholders’ neatly encapsulates the primary function of executions.⁸ It was expected

that such a spectacular display of torture and death would frighten everyone away from sin. It therefore had to be carried out in places where it would get the biggest crowds, which inevitably means the places in cities where people already congregated in huge numbers. Smithfield was one of London's busiest marketplaces, and it was usually chosen for the executions of political prisoners and traitors – having murdered her husband Davis was convicted of 'petty treason' for killing her lord and master. Executions that could regularly attract crowds of tens of thousands, depending on the condemned's identity, were the state's attempt to evoke both terror and compassion on a vast scale. Bells, ballads and the final speech of the prisoner on the highly visible scaffold worked together to create a spectacle that was intended to provoke a range of lasting collective emotions.

As Mackinnon notes however, bell-tolling did not only bring crowds together; it could prove highly contentious for a different emotional community. Bells were the catalyst for the 1561 Saint-Médard riot in the Parisian faubourg of Saint Marceau, where Huguenots, provoked by the sound of church bells being rung by the Catholic church of Saint-Médard trying to drown out the sounds of their service, went over to the church where they began to riot and commit acts of violence and iconoclasm.⁹ Natalie Zemon Davis's seminal essay on the 'rites of violence' reminds us that regular citizens were expected, whenever they saw a crime being committed, to ring the tocsin, or alarm bell, so it is unsurprising that, given the confessional tensions across late sixteenth-century France, the sound of the tocsin being rung after a Protestant baptism resulted in a three-hour battle in Nemours.¹⁰ Barbara Diefendorf notes that 'in September 1562 the officers of the Hotel de Ville boasted that, "if some disturbance took place in a part of the city, the tocsin would be sounded in the parishes, and in one hour 50,000 armed men would be out in the streets of the city ready to use their weapons"'.¹¹ Early modern life was so guided by the sound of bell-ringing that any unexpected ringing signalled potential serious trauma: when, in July 1378, disenfranchised wool industry workers set off a continuous ringing of the church bells of Florence, it signalled the beginning of the Ciompi Revolt. Niall Atkinson describes it as 'a terrifying acoustic siege' that brought thousands of workers, artisans and guildsmen to the city's main square, who toppled the government by keeping up continuous noise outside the Palazzo della Signoria.¹²

Early modern Europe was still a profoundly oral and aural culture, and so important information was delivered in places where it would receive the largest audience. In Paris, there was a fixed itinerary for royal proclamations, whose designated stops were the major ports and markets of Paris (the *apport de Paris*, les Halles, the *apport Baudoyer* and the *place de Grève*), the key areas of the intellectual quarter (the *place Maubert*, the *rue Saint-Jacques*, the university), and the busiest bridges and buildings on the *île de la Cité*.¹³ Another major source of news and information in the early modern period were preachers' sermons, which were listened to (sometimes outdoors) by large audiences. Recent advances in digital technology are helping us experience these now-vanished phenomena in their original soundscapes. The Virtual Paul's Cross Project is a digital humanities project that uses 3D visual and acoustic modelling technology to recreate the two-hour sermon delivered by John Donne outside St Paul's Cathedral on 5 November 1622. It allows users to hear the sermon from eight different locations in the churchyard, and in the company of four different sizes of crowd, from 500 to 5,000 people,

accompanied by the ambient noise of the many animals that were farmed within the city walls. The project permits users to experience what would have been a common sight in the early modern period – huge crowds gathered to listen to preachers and praying together – and to understand the range of emotions that a preacher could inspire in his listeners.¹⁴ Donne's sermon, on the anniversary of the Gunpowder Plot, exhorted the crowd to mockery and contempt, but also fear, of Catholics who threatened the kingdom; across the Channel, Diefendorf has shown how Catholic preachers incited their flocks with vicious polemic 'to hate passionately the [Protestant] heretics that disturbed the peace of the kingdom'.¹⁵ Thus, the many simultaneous sounds of bells, animals and preachers, sounds now usually unfamiliar in most modern urban settings, can be conceived of in their original surroundings and locations, helping us to understand how emotions in the premodern era were subject to so many circumstantial influences.

Key urban locations

Just like the research into soundscapes, the recent spatial turn in history has allowed us to understand more about the relationships that early modern people had with specific locations in their urban environments and how those locations played a key role in shaping emotional reactions. St Paul's, like all cathedrals, played a crucial role in the city as the centre of city life. The most recent research on these emotionally laden spaces has explored not only grand institutions like cathedrals and palaces, but also those that appear mundane or everyday, looking at how the average person used them on a daily basis. Filippo de Vivo has shown how in Renaissance Venice, where the ruling patriciate forbade public discussion of state information, the barbershop became more than simply a place of hygiene for men, but rather a central location to learn about news and politics.¹⁶ Pharmacies and apothecary shops were also crucial places for the circulation of news along with medical information, especially for women who were generally excluded from other locations.¹⁷ Taverns were also important locations for men of all classes to gather, and the Intoxicants and Early Modernity project (www.intoxicantsproject.org/), which focuses on England 1580–1740, has demonstrated how taverns were places which could, due to the heady mixture of alcohol, gambling, prostitution and occasionally political or religious unrest, result in a crowd filled with anger and violence. Angela McShane explores the way in which the new political parties of the seventeenth century used the medium of song to encourage excessive drinking, thereby creating communities of loyal obedience.¹⁸ Adam Fox notes that almost all libels and songs of ridicule were composed, handed out and repeated in taverns and inns: '[T]he alehouse offered a sanctuary for relative freedom of speech, for cathartic release in story and song, jest and mockery; it provided the chance to ridicule in private those whom it was an offence to challenge in public'.¹⁹ In their collection on taverns in early modern Europe, Beat Kümin and Ann Tlustý remark that '[t]he semi-public space of taverns was the ideal location for meetings of all kinds, giving them a role in the development of the public sphere'.²⁰ Tlustý studies the very real threats presented by a particular community often housed in taverns and inns: soldiers. Given that there were few standing armies in early modern Europe, the majority of wars in this period were fought through the hire of mercenary soldiers, who needed to be provided with

food and board as they moved across territories. While soldiers could be quartered in private homes, the concentration of them in larger groups in inns increased the potential for disorder and violence. Contemporary commentators regularly bemoan the ravages caused by groups of pillaging soldiers. The Parisian diarist Pierre de L'Estoile usually described the mercenary soldiers hired by various groups in the religious wars of sixteenth-century France as 'brigands' and 'thieves', and included a verse by his friend Claude Marteau that bewailed the state of the kingdom, especially the evil acts committed by them:

la plus par des Soldas
Ravit, rançonne, vole avec toute
license.²¹

most of the soldiers
commit rape, extortion, and steal
without restraint.

Meanwhile in London, the new playhouses that proliferated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were portrayed by their critics as dens of iniquity where pick-pocketing, prostitution and disease were caused by the mixing of crowds of various social classes. A virulent critic of the playhouse, the puritanical William Prynne, bemoaned that 'our common strumpets and adulteresses after our stage-plays ended, are oft-times prostituted near our play-houses, if not in them'.²² That these playhouses were located outside the city walls, where brothels and bear-baiting venues were also located, means that these criticisms were not entirely unfounded. The location of such potentially troublesome venues means that scholars must be aware of the emotional associations that landmarks such as gates, bridges, public squares and piazzas had for their contemporaries. Operating as a boundary between civic order and the foreign unknown outside the walls, gates to the walled city were often used as gaols, which could be filled with both hardened criminals and those who had simply fallen into debt.²³ Gates were also the site where those who had been banished would often gather on the occasion of royal and ducal entries, desperately hoping for a pardon from the visiting dignitary and the chance to once again enter civil life.²⁴

The complex emotional meanings of such places for the urban populace means that we need to understand how they related to each other spatially, physically and emotionally. The spatial turn in urban history has been accompanied and improved by innovations in urban mapping and the application of geographic information systems (GIS) to early modern cities, which allow us to identify key sites where emotional communities gathered. With this technology we can learn more about not only where these streets and landmarks were situated in relation to each other, but also who used them and in what way. The Map of Early Modern London (<https://mapoflondon.uvic.ca/>), which situates its data on the Agas map of 1561, offers a 'Placeography' and a 'Gazetteer' which are being populated with informative material from primary and secondary sources, thanks to an innovative crowd-sourcing technique which uses research conducted by undergraduates around the world. A similar project for a later period in London's history is Locating London's Past, which uses the Rocque map of 1746 (www.locatinglondon.org/). For Italy, the Visualizing Venice project (www.visualizingvenice.org/visu/) uses digital visualization tools to show how that city constantly responded to social, economic, religious and political change. And the multiple projects that have begun in the Center for Spatial and Textual Analysis

at Stanford University, such as the ‘Mapping Old Regimes of Movement’ project and the ‘Forma Urbis Romae’ project, which will eventually allow scholars to study the urban fabric of Rome over three millennia, promise a new direction for scholars researching how communities formed in the early modern period. These projects, based as they are on the physical form of these cities in the early modern period, allow us to understand how people moved around and engaged with cities that may now look very different. By conceiving of the physical locations in which people gathered and the often very different manner in which early modern people used them – whether it was the execution of justice on a bridge, entertainment by singers and jugglers in a piazza, or political machinations in a tavern – we are better able to understand how the repeated uses of a specific site informed the user’s emotional responses to it and the events which took place there.

Street performance and street selling

This focus on location as a medium for thinking through how premodern emotional practice differs from our modern one is related to another common premodern practice: singing and performance in daily life. It would likely surprise a modern person to hear how musical the early modern urban environment was, and what topics were seen as appropriate for songs. Singing was also closely tied to location, in many ways. Shopping, for example, was an activity that, as Evelyn Welch and Donatella Calabi have each shown, was a noisy, musical affair that was largely conducted in the public space of streets and squares.²⁵ A recent special issue of *Renaissance Studies* on street singers in early modern Europe reveals the ubiquitousness of singers in busy marketplaces and intersections, and of the crowds that would gather round to listen to them, join in the singing and buy their song sheets and pamphlets.²⁶ Singers tried to market their wares over the din of other ambulant vendors, also calling out their goods for sale. This incessantly mobile workforce and its resulting cacophony was immortalized in the many ‘*cris de Paris*’ and ‘*cries of London*’ pictorial series and even in a sixteenth-century song by Clément Janequin.²⁷ Across Europe, the majority of songs on any topic open with a line designed to attract crowds of listeners, such as ‘Come all ye young Christians’ or ‘Approchez-vous hommes, filles, et femmes’. No matter what the topic, songs were marketed to sell and were therefore full of sensationalist language that attempted to provoke heightened emotions in their listeners. Bridges were key sites for street-singers to perform, capitalizing on the inevitable bottlenecks that would occur, and in Paris the licensing of *colporteurs* required that they keep themselves to specified locations, usually at the end of certain central bridges.²⁸ From Salanio’s question ‘What news on the Rialto?’ in *The Merchant of Venice* we learn that the Rialto bridge is where one goes to hear the news, and Rosa Salzberg has shown how booksellers and sellers of cheap print were densely located near the Rialto to capitalize on the foot traffic that moved across this central thoroughfare.²⁹ As we’ve seen, from its opening in 1604, the Pont Neuf was immediately the site par excellence for street performers of all kinds, where crowds would watch mountebanks selling quack medicines, jugglers and news-singers. Its popularity was probably because it was the first bridge of its size to have no buildings on it. The dense crowds that bridges attracted meant that they were also used to warn the masses against crime through the display of the corpses of hanged prisoners,

which were found on the Ponte Sant'Angelo in Rome, or of the heads of traitors on London Bridge.

Not only were street songs able to attract crowds in busy areas, but those of a political nature could inspire strong emotions in those gathered. Jessica Herdman has shown how Catholic street songs, keyed to popular dances, incited their listeners to sectarian violence.³⁰ These were sung in response to the novel spectacle in the sixteenth century of Calvinists singing psalms in the vernacular, a deliberately provocative activity repeatedly banned in France. Collective singing was used on both sides of the confessional divide to unify each group against its enemy. Kate van Orden notes that '[a]t the height of the religious wars, Charles IX, Henry III, and Henry IV ordered the singing of the Te Deum hymn more and more often at Notre Dame de Paris and throughout the realm to celebrate victories and to reconsecrate the country after Protestant disturbances'.³¹ Huge processions of Catholic pilgrims moved through the countryside, at times with the king participating, singing Ave Maria and other hymns. Similarly, the Pilgrimage of Grace, a revolt in northern England in 1536 by nobles opposed to Henry VIII's Protestant reforms, featured processions with ballads that exhorted the people of the north to march to London to flush out the evil heretics there.³² The procession or parade, a traditional feature of early modern life, was revamped with songs targeted at enemies, to encourage crowds to rise up in hatred and violence towards a common threat. Songs with choruses were especially effective in unifying a group through communal performance, such as the ballad celebrating the imminent execution of Thomas Cromwell, *Trolle on Away*, which rejoices at the beheading of Henry VIII's powerful minister by enjoining singers to 'troll', or to sing in a round:

Whosoever did win thou would not lose;
Wherefore all England doth hate thee, I suppose,
Because thou wast false to the redolent rose.
Sing troll on away, sing troll on away.
Thou mightest have learned thy cloth to flock
Upon thy greasy fuller's stock;
Wherefore lay down thy head upon this block.
Sing troll on away, sing troll on away.³³

Songs could therefore be political and provocative, or simply a form of advertising, but they were ubiquitous in the streets of premodern Europe. Lyrics and familiar tunes were deliberately exploited to encourage specific emotions in their listeners – fury at those who threatened the body politic, shock at the disastrous news from abroad, or simply the desire for juicy melons – and those emotional responses were often closely tied to the places in which the songs were heard.

Public and religious processions

The complex emotional layering of the various aspects already mentioned – aural, song, and location – were all brought together in the regular public rituals that helped to organize the emotional world of premodern Europe. Public processions were a regular feature of early modern life, often tied to key dates in the religious

calendar such as Carnival or Corpus Christi, and as a visual and aural spectacle they were intended to unite communities through physical participation in an emotional ritual. From the grand Holy Week processions of Seville to the smaller scale events such as marriages or funerals, early modern people regularly joined together in the streets to celebrate and participate in communal ritual. Royal and triumphal entries were major public events that deployed thousands of citizens, often through their guilds, in the construction and performance of costumed and sumptuous displays. The coronation procession of Anne Boleyn, somewhat controversial since Henry VIII's first wife was still alive, relied on the active participation of the different trades and schools of the city to legitimize her status, and they organized six different pageants to salute her on this progress.³⁴ Importantly, the route incorporated detours to avoid certain locations such as Smithfield, infamous as a site of political executions, and instead used streets less emotionally charged. In a valuable review essay on street life in early modern Europe, Fabrizio Nevola comes to the conclusion that 'the street emerges as a prime performative urban space, where individual and collective actions and behaviours inscribe spaces with meaning that accumulates over time'.³⁵ Understanding these actions and behaviours requires an interdisciplinary approach to early modern sources, an approach undertaken in the essays edited by Nevola and Georgia Clarke in a special issue of *I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance* on the experience of the street in early modern Italy. An investigation of these layers of meaning can explain the emotional reactions that crowds were expected to have. For example, that public executions were often conducted on the same scaffolds where Passion plays had recently depicted the performed torture and execution of martyrs can help us to understand why compassion was an emotion so often mentioned in accounts of executions, whether in prose or song form.³⁶

Instituted in Liège the thirteenth century, Corpus Christi processions would quickly develop into one of the major public events of the religious calendar, with vast public spectacles and dramatic performances including floats, *tableaux vivants* and plays, often organized by guilds and confraternities. Processions were not simply passively watched, however: after the clergy at the head, members of the community formed the rest of the procession itself, reflecting the social structure of the city (guilds first, women last), and crowds were known to rush from one church to another to witness the elevation of the exposed Eucharist several times.³⁷ The processions also quickly became an opportunity for the authorities to secure legitimacy through links with collective faith: in Germany the mayor and priest would beat the boundaries of the village followed by huge crowds to bless vital locations such as mills, bridges or orchards.³⁸ Major play cycles on biblical stories or the lives of the saints were performed over four to five days by large casts watched by thousands. Protestant attempts to shut down this celebration of transubstantiation met with resistance from guilds, who had made considerable long-term investment in this public performance of their status. The emotional significance of the procession in the minds of its participants can be seen in the dispute over the ritual in Halle in the early 1450s. An Augustinian reformer, Johann Busch, tried to stop the four churches of the city each carrying a separate monstrance with a host inside, claiming it was contrary to the Catholic faith. The burghers of Halle threatened to break into the houses of the mayor and provost and pour their wine out over the pavement.³⁹

Carnival was another major moment on the religious and civic calendar that required the entire community to perform in urban rituals of belief. A week of self-indulgence and gluttony culminating in Mardi Gras (Shrove Tuesday, Fastnacht) the day before Lent started on Ash Wednesday, Carnival also featured processions, pantomimes and plays, where giant mannequins featured prominently and nonsense was the order of the day. As both a time of excess and a time when traditional social roles were temporarily inverted, Carnival was universally considered to be a time of potential danger: Siena's night patrol was considered especially important at this time because Carnival time was 'when scandals occur'.⁴⁰ Florence had thirty to forty artisan *potenze* (powers), brigades that carved up the city into 'kingdoms' and then skirmished over the borders during the Carnival period.⁴¹ The traditional Carnival procession was, however, subverted during the German Reformation, when reformers began a tradition of mocking the Catholic ritual: in December 1520 student supporters of Luther in Wittenberg set up a float with a giant papal bull and processed it through the town, whereupon laughing spectators tossed firewood into the wagon which was used later to burn the books of Luther's enemies while the crowd sang songs around the bonfire. This kind of communal ridicule of the old faith and its rites continued over decades: Bob Scribner counts 24 such incidents.⁴² These kinds of ritual, which played on the elements of the ancient processions while mocking their origins, reveal the emotional connection participants and spectators shared around the places and spectacles of the procession. Although many of these premodern rituals are no longer conducted, an investigation of the many ways in which they encouraged meaning, through location, song and performance, allows us to understand the multiplicity of emotion they could create for their participants and viewers.

Public policing and shaming

This shared and layered knowledge of the features of the procession found its way into the public policing of behaviour that was out of the jurisdiction of the legal courts. Shaming penalties such as charivaris relied on publicity, so the communal and audible aspects of these punishments were central to their effectiveness, and they often featured a public parade or show which allowed all members of the community to join in the ritual (see Figure 14.3). Zemon Davis argues that the 'Abbeys of Misrule' served as rites of passage for young men who policed their communities: in rural areas these were unmarried men who publicly shamed neighbours who had morally transgressed through adultery or marital transgressions (for example, marriages where there was a notable difference in the spouses' ages or second marriages by widows) by charivaris.⁴³ These public rituals, known in English as a 'skimmington ride', in German as *das Haberfeldtrieben*, and in Italian as a *mattinata*, usually involved a procession, often with the offending party riding backwards on a horse or donkey, and were always accompanied by discordant music played with drums, whistles, animal horns, bells and pot lids. The impact of the entire community making this cacophonous 'rough music', or *Katzenmusik*, in what was still a predominantly aural culture would have made the shameful nature of the deed and its punishment difficult for any observer to forget. The targets of the rituals were expected to offer payments to the crowd to end the protest. In urban areas these 'Abbeys' or 'merry

companies' were often populated by older, married men, and their processions were more likely to target prominent politicians or civic leaders, who were attacked via the means of effigies, placed on large floats, that passed through the city. While these extra-legal rituals were intended to shame their targets into modifying their behaviour through light-hearted ridicule, the multiple suits brought by victims and the fines meted out by the authorities reveal that at times charivaris and skimmingtons could turn violent.

The pillory was used largely for crimes related to dishonesty, such as seditious words, extortion, fraud and perjury.⁴⁴ The pillory was set up in busy places such as the areas adjacent to markets, and exposures were scheduled when the streets were busiest. In London, the pillory itself was meant to revolve, so that the culprit – arms and head restrained – could turn to face every member of the crowd, who could respond by throwing anything from mud to rotten food to rocks.⁴⁵ Robert Shoemaker's study of the pillory reveals the range of responses that could be expected, from 'applauded by crowd' to 'severely pelted' to 'deaths caused by crowd'. One of the pillory's most famous occupants was Titus Oates, whose exposure as the fabricator of a Popish Plot between 1678 and 1681 resulted in scores of ballads celebrating his punishment, and one gives a sense of the crowd gathering below to hurl things at him: he was to be pelted with eggs, wild locust honey, and even turnip-grenades. Another Oates ballad reminds us that the shame and scorn of the pillory also had an audible aspect:

Then to the Pillory his Front of Brass,
And Face of Steel in solemn Tryumph pass.
Exalted here to all the Gazing Crowd
(No Shame too Publick, and no Scorn too Loud)⁴⁶

Most memorably, when the writer Daniel Defoe was pilloried in July 1703 for authoring a libellous pamphlet, crowds turned up to pelt him with flowers rather than rotten food, an indication that the 'mob' could manage justice in a sophisticated manner. Much like the regular processions, these kinds of rituals of justice contained their emotional significance in the locations, sounds and behaviours of the participants, which were understood through years of repetition of those behaviours. Juxtaposing them with their religious counterparts such as the Corpus Christi processions allows us to understand the layered emotions of the crowd in these ritualized events.

'Mobs' and violence

However, when premodern crowds are conceived of in the popular imagination, it is usually not in terms of a sophisticated group of people re-conceiving ancient rituals of performance, but instead as an uneducated 'mob', using violence and rioting in order to express itself. Much recent work has tried to problematize older, simplistic notions of 'riot', especially the food riots and grain riots, which portrayed insurrectionists as a mob driven purely by hunger. E.P. Thompson's seminal essay on the moral economy of the English crowd noted that these riots were highly complex and disciplined forms of direct action that defended traditional rights or customs against engrossers who attempted to fix markets, hoard produce, or engage in practices that threatened the common weal. A 1631 sermon described corn-hoarders as 'these



Figure 14.3 William Hogarth, *Hudibras encounters the Skimmington*, London, 1726. Etching and Engraving, 268×504 mm.
The British Museum, London. © Trustees of the British Museum

Man-haters, opposite to the Common good, as if the world were made onely for them, would appropriate the earth, and the fruits thereof, wholly to themselves'.⁴⁷ Thompson notes that there had been laws since the reign of Elizabeth I to prevent such manipulation of the markets, but that the people felt that authorities were not enforcing the legislation. Thus, in 1693 at Banbury and Chipping Norton the crowd 'took away the corne by force out of the waggon, as it was carrying away by the ingrossers, saying that they were resolved to put the law in execution, since the magistrates neglected it'.⁴⁸ Repeatedly the crowds formed at the sound of horns being blown: 'On Friday last a Mobb was rais'd in these parts by the blowing of Horns'; 'Early on Thursday Morning, by Sound of Horns, they met again'; 'the colliers from Broseley &c assembled with horns blowing'.⁴⁹ William Beik carefully delineates the various kinds of violent insurrections in France, noting that there was an element of vengeance in this 'culture of retribution'.⁵⁰ Thus, the collective violence of the Revolution, which seemed unprecedented, was in fact tapping into long-standing traditions of collective protest that incorporated violence towards those who by their corrupt actions threatened the 'commune'. In the Grande Rebeine riots in Lyon in 1529, crowds made up of women, men and children rang the tocsin and then looted and destroyed the houses of rich citizens, eventually spilling the grain from the municipal granary onto the streets. In many similar examples, the violence is more about retribution than about securing food. In many cases the worst violence was carried out on corpses, and the causes of the intense hatred could be over taxes, food or religion. In the late sixteenth century, there were multiple instances of Protestants being executed for heresy, where the spectators grabbed the newly-hanged corpse, mutilated it and dragged it through the city streets, often bringing it to the city dungheap and other key locations in a procession that mocked the official and religious processions so common to early modern life.⁵¹ In Paris in 1617, the corpse of the hated minister of Marie de Medici, the maréchal d'Ancre Concino Concini, was treated to a similar procession, this time dragged to the various traditional sites of execution before being chopped up, burned and thrown in the Seine. In 1675, the same kind of treatment was forced on the mutilated corpse of a tax-collector in Bordeaux.⁵² In each example, the significance of the public display of the offending party through a specified route echoes the official judicial practices of the period. Thus we can use recent research into the traditional routes, rituals, performances and sounds to understand the complex and layered ways in which early modern people responded emotionally to the circumstances in which they found themselves. These were not uneducated 'mobs', but rather groups of people who expressed their strong emotions at the injustices that they witnessed through a sophisticated reconception of rituals and performances learned over centuries.

Conclusion

Early modern cities could be dangerous places: congestion from crowds, carriages and animals presented a threat to those who were unfamiliar with the bustling activity of urban life. They were noisy too, full of the sounds of people singing and selling their wares on the street, of proclamations being announced to the sound of trumpets, of preachers giving sermons in the open air, of animals grunting and squealing, and of people fighting. The recent research into soundscapes has offered us

a whole new way of thinking about how early modern people engaged aurally and emotionally with their surroundings; how, for instance, the sound of a bell tolling could mean a range of things, depending on its pitch, melody and distance. Bells marked the news of executions, of funerals, of worship, all times in which the community was expected to gather together to perform pre-set rituals. But bells could also mark danger: the tocsin sounding in France was the alarm signal that caused crowds to gather and often engage in violent defence of their interests. Similarly, bells created auditory communities based on confessional belief: Catholics and Protestants recognized the bells of each other's churches and could exploit this sound aggressively. The density of the urban environment forced people to live cheek-by-jowl, which could cause tensions that often erupted to the sound of horns or other audible warnings. Over time, the events which occurred at certain public locations provided them with multiple meanings and purposes. Communities gathered in key places in the city for company: the barbershop and the pharmacy not only provided their stated services but were also sites of news and information, while the tavern and the playhouse were frequented for entertainment but were also sites of potential unrest and crime, frequented as they were by troublesome soldiers and dubious prostitutes. The many festive processions on religious holidays that punctuated and gave rhythm to the year, like Carnival and Corpus Christi, were occasions for communal participation in joyful performance. That the routes these various processions took were then emulated in the charivaris and other kinds of public shaming rituals reveals that the crowd was aware of the emotional significance of these routes, and exploited them for publicity. The communal nature of early modern society allowed each member to participate in the policing of the unwritten rules of conduct, each rule learned over time through repeated public performance. That we now have the technology to experience more of these complex soundscapes, rituals and places than ever, promises great progress for our understanding of the layered emotional associations that early modern crowds and communities brought to the places they lived in.

Notes

- 1 N. Zemon Davis, 'Rites of violence: religious riot in sixteenth-century France', *Past & Present* 59, May 1973, 51–91 (p. 53n).
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EMOTIONS, EXCLUSION AND WITCHCRAFT IMAGERY

Charles Zika

Emotions are fundamental to the creation and maintenance of communities. They are employed to establish the various feeling rules, cultural scripts, norms and practices that define communities, to identify the individuals and groups to be considered its natural members and to designate those to be excluded. Through the performance of emotions members of a community demonstrate their membership and identity, and the regulation of such performances helps ensure communities remain unified. This link between emotions and community has been integral to studies of emotions over the last several decades, and can be fruitfully applied to the visual imagery of witchcraft that emerged within European societies from the mid-fifteenth century.

The new imagery of witchcraft was not completely novel. It drew especially on images of heretics and Jews, which provided rich models for the different ways in which witches could be depicted as marginalized and excluded. The dramatic cultural changes brought about by the development of print and print-making from the later fifteenth century facilitated the dramatic increase of such images through the sixteenth century and made them more widely accessible and culturally significant. But from the turn of the seventeenth century, I would claim, after six or seven decades of almost endemic confessional conflict and warfare throughout Europe, new strategies were required to emphasize the threat witchcraft posed to communal identity and stability. Witches were now increasingly depicted as constituting an alternative community which gave free rein to a level of aggression and uncontrolled sexuality that endangered the moral and political order. This chapter aims to explore how the insights gained from the relationship of emotions, community and exclusion in recent research, assist us in uncovering the emotional strategies found in witchcraft imagery through this period, and thereby help us document broad cultural and historical developments.¹

Exclusion

Over the last two to three decades social inclusion and exclusion have been central to social psychology research. The study by Richard Baumeister and Mark Leary on the critical need for human beings to belong, to form groups and relationships, and to be accepted by others, constituted a critical moment in this development.² This

was followed by numerous more detailed studies: of the various motivations used to establish mechanisms for social exclusion and ostracism against any real or imagined potential competition or threat, and of techniques developed to minimize the impact of ostracism and exclusion, and the especially dire impact of persistent and long-term ostracism.³ A recent summary of much of this research by Michael North and Susan Fiske elaborates how social sorting and differentiation of the included and excluded is enacted through at least five core social motives: belonging, understanding, controlling, enhancing self and trusting others.⁴ Emotions, either individual or collective, are critical to such social differentiation. The desire to belong underlies the other four motivations, and feelings of loyalty, attachment, shared understanding and norms serve to strengthen belonging by shaping a common identity, as do feelings of control, security, competence, social efficacy and trust. Social exclusion, on the other hand, shatters assumptions across each of these social domains, generating feelings of alienation and isolation and a lack of shared understanding, control and trust. If self-esteem is threatened, sadness, anger and shame often result; if there is persistent and long-term social exclusion, the response is more likely to be aggression, helplessness or withdrawal.⁵ The insights from such research on community formation, exclusion and ostracism can help us identify the various exclusionary strategies embedded in the visual media employed to represent groups in the past such as witches; a focus on the emotional dynamics helps us read such visual images with a view to their potential impact on viewers and readers.

In medieval and early modern Europe exclusion took many forms, and it is important to clarify the differences. Exclusion could mean the loss of the protection of communal law and civic rights by rebels, political opponents or convicted criminals – as well as their families and even descendants – either directly through confinement to a particular location, or indirectly through the use of heavy fines. Both actions usually resulted in physical expulsion and exile from the commune or city. In Italian cities such strategies were regularly used by factions and families from the thirteenth century on, in order to acquire and maintain political power or establish a particular social order.⁶ Defamatory paintings were used to reinforce and provide public evidence of the existence of such bans, making the exclusion of those individuals, now absent, very visible to the community as a whole.⁷ Bans were also regularly enforced within the Holy Roman Empire, prohibiting authorities and individuals from providing the banned person, now deemed an outlaw, with any form of support. Similar to ecclesiastical interdict, such instruments were attempts to exert pressure on those over whom authorities could not exercise direct control, as well as to enforce obedience and extract loyalty from subordinates and allies.⁸

Such exclusion was sometimes publicly amplified and the defamation extended beyond the individual to families, relatives and supporters through shaming and dishonourable punishments, such as mutilation of the body of the criminal with red-hot pincers and the dragging of it by a horse to the place of execution, severing of body parts and breaking on the wheel before execution, public display of the severed head on public buildings such as town halls, or burning of the corpse and scattering of the ashes after execution. By the seventeenth century, ‘pillars of shame’ or infamy monuments were erected in order to damn ‘for eternal memory’ the infamy of such criminals – often rebels or assassins – and broadsheets depicting such pillars served to make their infamy and subsequent defamation more widely known. This was part of

the so-called *damnatio memoriae*, the total and permanent obliteration of the criminal's name, family and criminal deed from communal and individual memory.⁹

Heretics

Similar approaches were taken towards those condemned as heretics, who were deemed to have offended the Church through their commitment to particular beliefs or actions, and, when accused, refused to submit to the Church's authority. As R.I. Moore argued thirty years ago, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw the emergence of a 'persecuting society' in Europe, and the confrontation with heresy in the eleventh century marked its first steps.¹⁰ Those who held dissenting beliefs were certainly pursued prior to this period, but their persecution was sporadic. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries persecution became more systematized, and particular groups defined by general characteristics such as race, religion or way of life became the objects of 'deliberate and socially sanctioned violence . . . by governmental, judicial and social institutions'.¹¹ This was achieved first of all by creating inquisitorial forms of justice: special ecclesiastical courts and legislation, judicial officers with the appropriate knowledge to prosecute and strong secular government support. Secondly, orthodox belief had to be articulated and promoted through both ecclesiastical and secular institutions as the basis for a unitary state, which would therefore need to be defended against the threats of heterodox or heretical belief and practice, from both forces outside it as well as within.

Moore claims the burning of a group of so-called Cathar heretics in Cologne in 1163 was the key initial turning point in this new war on heresy.¹² From this time such burnings became more frequent, targeting different sects of heretics in the first instance and then extending similar policies towards lepers, Jews and sodomites, and ultimately, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, witches. The members of these groups were declared evil, alien and other, either because of their articulated beliefs or the practices supported by such beliefs. Moreover, this development went hand in hand with the growing sense of a dualist cosmology, in which God and Devil, Christ and Antichrist were locked in deadly combat. So heretics were increasingly represented as groups in league with diabolic powers, as part of the Devil's tail. The first visual images of contemporary heretics appeared in the *Bibles moralisées* that were commissioned in the 1220s and 1230s for the kings and queens of France.¹³ Here heretics were associated with Jews and tyrants, and especially with the Devil. They were depicted worshipping the Devil in the form of a large cat or ram, and in several instances were shown performing the 'obscene kiss' on the cat's anus, a parody of the kiss of peace in the Catholic mass (Figure 15.1). They were also depicted engaging in various heterosexual and homosexual perversions, dominated by their uncontrolled passions and lusts – behaviour also spelt out in Pope Gregory IX's decretal of 1233, *Vox in Rama*.¹⁴ Dominique Iogna-Prat has shown how this focus on the exclusion of dissenters such as heretics and Jews was dependent on the transformation of Christianity from a spiritual community into the spatial, social and temporal structure of Christendom.¹⁵ Peter the Venerable was instrumental in defining this all-embracing and universalist notion of Christendom, which in turn predicated the need to purge dissenting and heretical elements within the Church.



Figure 15.1 *Four types of sin*: [from top left clockwise] *the infidelity of the Jews, the cruelty of tyrants, the hypocrisy of false brethren, the error of heretics (kissing a cat's anus)*, manuscript illumination, in *Bible moralisée*, Paris, 1225–1249. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Cod. 1179, fol. 171v, detail (bottom right roundel)

Protectors or defenders of heresies directed against the orthodoxy of the Church were a particular target of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. Such policies were acted on in a very practical way in the crusade waged against the Cathars or Albigensians for twenty years between 1209 and 1229, and in the attacks on the Waldensians, Fraticelli, Templars and Brethren of the Free Spirit, in the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The power of ecclesiastical and secular courts, the intellectual might of the new theological schools and the compulsive powers of local and regional governments were systematically directed against those who refused to subject themselves to the authority of the Church. As dissenting beliefs were now declared heretical, those professing or supporting them were excluded from society's protection, as threats to social cohesion. The manner in which they

were depicted was meant to emphasize this otherness and threat, through a display of perverse ritual practices that demonstrated their alternative loyalties and would generate mistrust and rejection by the broader Christian community.

Jews

The model for the stereotyping of heretics as members of a group that threatened society's integrity were the Jews. But Jews embodied an ambivalent form of exclusion: they held an accepted, even if highly marginal, position within medieval Christian society. The Jews were the chosen people from whom the Christian redeemer and saviour had sprung, but as in the common figure of Synagoga, which together with the victorious Ecclesia graced the walls of so many Christian churches, they wore a blindfold that prevented them from recognizing Christ as the Messiah. Only at times were they physically excluded from the dominant Christian community, either by exile from an entire territory or restriction to a particular city quarter. Therefore, in visual representation ways were devised to accentuate and perpetuate Jewish difference and otherness, to clearly demonstrate Christian dominance and internalize Jewish subjection and shame. Jewish humiliation was signified by their large conical hats, crude physical features – large hooked noses, enlarged bulging eyes and fleshy fat lips, with devils often ministering to them, and from the time of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, displaying their distinguishing public 'badge of shame', whether in the form of the Mosaic Tables of the Law in England or a yellow, round- or oval-shaped badge found elsewhere in Europe.¹⁶ For Jews were also figured as Christ-killers, a role annually retold and performed in the liturgies and passion plays of the Easter period, a role at the centre of the Christian story of redemption. Through this association in particular, they were allied with the Devil and Antichrist and stereotyped as aggressive and cruel, driven by avarice and greed, captives to sensual pleasure and lust, mistrustful and traitorous, unfaithful idolaters and cat-worshippers (like heretics), locked in an ongoing cosmic struggle with the adherents of the Christian faith.¹⁷

But even more powerful than such 'spectacles of alterity',¹⁸ which revealed the hateful and cruel nature of Jews through their physiognomy, their diabolical association through their idolatry, and their stubbornness in refusing to recognize the true Messiah through the blindfold and broken staff of Synagoga, were the new stories and graphic representations of Jewish blood libel. From the time of the murder of the boy-saint William of Norwich in 1148, Jews were periodically accused of kidnapping and murdering Christian children for the use of their blood in Jewish religious rituals such as the baking of matzos for Passover.¹⁹ More than thirty other such accusations of Jewish ritual murder followed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, totalling approximately one hundred by the end of the sixteenth century.²⁰ These accusations of attacks on Christian children produced stories and also visual images of Jewish cruelty: a group of Jews, sometimes named, shown stabbing their innocent victims repeatedly, often in a recognizable location.²¹ These were complemented by stories of a boy thrown into an oven by his cruel Jewish father for taking Christian communion, only to be saved from a terrible death by the Virgin Mary. The story featured in numerous images through the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in manuscripts, stained glass windows and frescoes, and also became linked to stories of Jewish ritual murder and host desecration (Figure 15.2).²²



Figure 15.2 Jean Pucelle, *A cruel Jewish father throws his son into an oven*, manuscript illumination, in Gautier de Coinci, *Les Miracles de Nostre Dame*, Paris, c.1330–1340. Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris, nouv. Acq. Fr. 24541, fol. 35r

These rich narrative depictions added to signs of Jewish otherness a concrete demonstration of active and continuing Jewish cruelty and hatred of all Christians. In contemporary settings they enacted the aggressive emotions that Jews were said to have directed towards the Christian saviour, and now continued to direct at contemporary Christians. As Monique Scheer has argued, we need to think of emotions as things people do in a performative sense, as a kind of practice involving body, mind, language, artefacts and people.²³ These hateful and cruel practices then served to embed the emotions of hatred and cruelty deep within Jewish nature, or, as we might say, the Jewish psyche. Viewers would have read these destructive emotions as what Jews felt, thought and did: the narrative structure of the images would have helped draw them into the emotional dynamics of the story, feeling the horror of the boy's mother as she sees him thrown into the oven, the extreme sense of relief and intense gratitude for the compassion shown by the Virgin Mary, thereby heightening the sense of the father's mad cruelty and reinforcing views of Jews as merciless killers of

Christian children. Together with the narrative, the visible imagery helped create emotional scripts for the imagined behaviour of Jews – and that imagined behaviour was then transferred to those accused of witchcraft.

Witches – fifteenth and sixteenth centuries

Witchcraft was deemed a form of heresy by ecclesiastical commentators, and by virtue of its rejection of the divinity and the Church's authority, also a form of apostasy. But the visual representations of witchcraft that began to appear from the mid-fifteenth century drew much on anti-Jewish polemic, and those same strategies were often used to ensure that those accused of witchcraft were excluded from the benefits of Christian society. Witches were presented as the very inverse of Christian society in their beliefs, practices and norms, and as lacking the capacity or willingness to foster feelings of competence and trust. The ways in which this exclusion and ostracism were enacted correspond with the findings of recent social psychology research.²⁴ The supposed aim of witches was to destroy society rather than to foster attachment or loyalty; their sexual liaisons with the Devil were seen to promote unregulated bodily desire; their diabolical pacts would further division by wreaking harm on any who opposed the Devil's interests. Through the repetition and circulation of such images in a variety of media and formats, the emotional meanings embedded within the key visual codes gradually 'stick', as Sara Ahmed has argued, combining with individual and group memories and cultural histories, generating emotion in the viewers who are drawn into the complex and dynamic emotional exchange within the visual narrative. It is this 'sticking together' of visual code, pictorial narrative and varied associative links, as well as the different personal and social contexts that shape their reading, that provides the weight and currency for intense feelings and emotional investments and understandings to grow. Emotions emerge and are performed in the social and psychological spaces these interactions create.²⁵

The link between the new imagery of witches and earlier representations of heretics and Jews is all too evident in depictions of so-called *vauderie* or Waldensian witchcraft, of which 34 persons were accused – and 12 of those executed – in the northern French city of Arras in 1459–60. The name given to them referred to the thirteenth-century heretical reform movement of Peter Waldo, but these Waldensians were described as a sect that rode animals and objects through the air at night to assemblies they called 'synagogues', where they worshipped the Devil in the form of a cat, goat or other animal, abjured their faith, and engaged in sexual intercourse and other evil rituals. Three manuscript versions of a *Treatise against the Sect of the Waldensians*, written by the Cologne theologian Johannes Tinctor in 1460, featured Flemish miniatures depicting such scenes, which were very similar to the description of a group of Rhineland heretics in the 1233 decretal letter of Pope Gregory IX, *Vox in Rama* (Figure 15.3).²⁶ A group of men and women are shown worshipping the Devil in the form of a goat, while in the background figures are carried by demons, or ride strange beasts and implements through the air. In order to emphasize the group's idolatry, worshippers are depicted in reverent pose with hands joined in prayer, and two images depict them holding candles. All three, moreover, depict the ritual of the obscene kiss – an inverse parody of the liturgical kiss of peace in the Catholic mass.²⁷




Figure 15.3 Bruges Workshop of the Master of Margaret of York, *Waldensians worshipping the Devil*, manuscript illumination, in Johannes Tinctor, *Tractatus contra sectam Valdensium*, Bruges, c.1470–1480. Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris, MS fr. 961, fol. 1

As well as drawing on medieval images of both heretics and Jews as servants of the Devil, such scenes also drew on the obscenities in anti-Jewish polemic related to the so-called *Judensau*, the large sow from whose teats Jews were believed to suck, in mockery of the Jewish prohibition of eating pork.²⁸ In the Oxford manuscript illumination of Waldensian worshippers, the goat is actually shitting, while the brown coloured lips of the female kneeling before it, indicate that she has been kissing shit. This matches a fifteenth-century woodblock of the *Judensau* in which a Jew holds up the sow's tail, while another sticks out his tongue as though to lick it – a scene also described in contemporary popular plays, and in a Savoyard work concerning sorcery from the late 1430s, the *Errores Gazariorum*. This accentuated the totally alien nature of such devil-worshipping sects. As the Strasbourg cathedral preacher Johann Geiler of Kaysersberg put it in one of his cathedral sermons of 1509, in contrast to God's sacrament the Devil has his excrement.²⁹ This Waldensian communion ritual represented witches as members of a wholly alien and diabolical anti-church.

Such imagery was also meant to arouse deep feelings of revulsion and disgust in viewers, as they imagined these events through their senses of smell, touch and taste, as well as through sight. As Sara Ahmed has argued, such objects do not create an emotional response in any simple functional fashion.³⁰ The confrontation of an individual with the image in prints or sculptures through a range of different senses certainly creates strong sensations; but these do not cause such emotions themselves. Emotions are the outcome not only of contact between subject and object, but also of the subject and the subject's memories with the object's past histories. The disgust is shaped by the social circulation of such histories and memories as well as by the immediate individual sensation. Otherness, feelings of mistrust and fears of insecurity all combine to produce disgust, while disgust simply amplifies and extends the range of other responses.

However, the predominant technique used to communicate the nature of witchcraft in images through the sixteenth century was the creation of discursive links to established motifs and visual codes that carried with them strong emotional resonances. Witchcraft was figured as an act involving individuals or small groups. The most important link was that between the witch and a devil, as we have already seen – in some cases displaying that devil as a lusty figure with a sly and leering grin, or as a much more aggressive figure enacting violence on the person of the witch, or forcing the witch to carry out violence on others.³¹ A 1544 woodcut of a devil embracing a witch riding on a cooking stick combines both common attributes, while also strongly supporting the belief that witches' rides on sticks, implements and animals through the sky was only possible through diabolical power (Figure 15.4). Witch and devil are inextricably linked. Even when the witch is clearly a victim, it is the emotional association with the diabolical that is key.

The depiction of an actual devil figure in scenes of witchcraft is frequently absent, or at least not overt, in images created prior to the seventeenth century. In early woodcuts of women out in the country, eating, drinking and having a good time – very suspicious in itself, the accompanying text tells us – grass, birds, indecipherable objects on the ground, can take on a threatening, uncanny, and possibly even diabolical resonance.³² In other images it is darkness, an eerie forest setting, a turbulent sky, the presence of skulls and bones, and especially animals such as cats and goats, that suggests malevolent or diabolical associations. Yet even then, the Devil can be



Figure 15.4 Witch riding a cooking stick and embraced by the Devil, woodcut, in Ulrich Molitor, *Hexen Meysterei . . . ein schön Gespräch von den Onholden*, Strasbourg, 1544, sig. Cii recto. Leipzig University Library, Geogr.84-o/3

an almost shrouded presence, which nevertheless signals (in the new iconography created by the south German artist Hans Baldung, for instance) that the attractive female bodies of witches are instruments of human seduction and sin.³³

Wild flying hair was another very prominent visual code for a witch. It drew on the association between loose female hair and prostitution, and in the work




Figure 15.5 Hans Baldung, *A group of female witches*, 1510, chiaroscuro woodcut (grey and black). Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 41.1.201. Gift of Felix M. Warburg and his family, 1941. Public domain

of Hans Baldung created further associations with goat's hair and billowing smoke, bringing together notions of unbridled animal lust and diabolical illusion (Figure 15.5). In this way the wild hair linked witches with threats to the moral order by prostitutes, who in times of crisis were ritually removed from communities in order to avoid divine punishment. Moreover, for Baldung and his teacher Albrecht Dürer, the two artists who effectively shaped the iconography of witchcraft for the sixteenth century, this moral threat was paralleled with claims of their social and economic threat. This was registered for sixteenth-century agricultural communities by the storms, hail or meteorological disturbances which so frequently accompanied the depiction of witchcraft – as depicted, for instance, in both Figures 15.4 and 15.5.³⁴ Yet such storms remain visual codes, pictorial associations divorced from any narrative. The viewer's involvement is simply that of an observer, who needs to piece together the pictorial, conceptual and emotional links between this small group behaviour on the edges of society and a broader socio-economic danger. A pattern or history of such meetings, a sense of broader outreach or larger membership, is at best only hinted at. The impact and threat remain circumscribed.

Witchcraft – seventeenth century

The imagery of witchcraft changed significantly from the 1590s. Large numbers of witches began to be depicted in the one scene, engaged in a variety of collective actions. Witchcraft took on the shape of an alternative diabolical community, a counter-society not only excluded from the Christian state, but dedicated to its overthrow. The studies of Barbara H. Rosenwein have suggested ways in which we might also explore communities in terms of their emotional association, as emotional communities that exhibit 'particular values, modes of feeling, and ways to express those feelings'.³⁵ In many depictions of witchcraft scenes produced in the seventeenth century we see witches engaged in group rituals through which they manifest the collective emotions which identify and help bind them together as an emotional community. These are complex depictions of witches' assemblies, commonly called Sabbaths, in which artists take a new interest, possibly stimulated by the detailed descriptions found in the late sixteenth-century witchcraft manuals by Jean Bodin, Nicolas Remy and Martin Delrio. These performances include the cooking up of salves and ointments with which to hurt and damage victims, the transmission of secret knowledge to advance the witches' goals into the future, a communal meal demonstrating their fellowship, sexual intimacy and the offering up of children as confirmation of their close personal ties and commitment, and participation in dances with devils as celebrations and affirmations of communal identity and loyalty. It is significant that a witches' meeting is now often simply called a Witches' Dance (*Hexentanz*) and their meeting place is the place where witches dance (*Hexentanzplatz*). Also new in this focus on witches' dances is the way the emotional dynamics work in a number of images: they are directed to fellow dancers within the pictorial narrative as much as to the viewers outside the picture frame. In this way the witches' emotions are brought into direct focus for viewers, and viewers are drawn into the action.



Figure 15.6 *The so-called witches' Sabbath in Trier* (detail), engraving, in Thomas Sigfrid, *Richtige Antwort auff die Frage: ob die Zeuberer und Zeuberin mit ihrem zauber Pulfer, Kranckheiten, oder den Todt selber beybringen können . . .*, [Erfurt, 1593]

The first depiction of a massed assembly of witches at a Sabbath occurs in an engraving inserted in the 1593 and 1594 editions of a treatise on witches by a virtually unknown Leipzig author Thomas Sigfrid (Figure 15.6).³⁶ The inscription below the print claims that it depicts the witches' meeting that took place in the Electoral principality of Trier, but the scene has little in common with the actual evidence produced in trials within the Trier region. The varied activities include a central cameo of witches dancing around a tall column, on top of which sits a toad. At least two of the female dancers are virtually naked and are dancing with a skeletal figure of death and an animal demon at the lead. The way the dancers kick up their legs and raise their arms suggests a wild and uninhibited witches' dance. Moreover, the dance draws directly on contemporary images of the idolatrous Israelites dancing around the golden calf (Exodus 32), except

that the idol here is a diabolical toad. Such images had been widely disseminated through the sixteenth century in illustrated Bibles, catechisms and the numerous versions of the extremely popular *Ship of Fools*, originally written by the German humanist Sebastian Brant in 1494, and then reprinted, expanded and translated into many vernacular languages over the following century.³⁷ The dancing is described as lewd and voluptuous, an opportunity for the Devil to steal one's soul – a view demonstrated in the Trier Sabbath by the naked dancers. The print as a whole, and this cameo in particular, represents witches as driven by their lustful passions, while the reference to the Israelites casts them as a sect of idolatrous devil worshippers.

In a large etching of 1613 by the Polish artist Jan Ziarnko, which illustrates a description of the Sabbath in the second edition of Pierre de Lancre's account of Basque witchcraft, *Description of the Inconstancy of Evil Angels and Demons*, the performance of the witches' dances also helps reveal the witches' inner moral turpitude and lack of emotional control (Figure 15.7).³⁸ Amongst the tableaux depicted



Figure 15.7 Jan Ziarnko, *Description and Depiction of the Witches' Sabbath*, etching, in Pierre de Lancre, *Tableau de l'inconstance et instabilité des mauvais anges et demons*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1613, between pp. 118 and 119. By permission of University of Glasgow Library, Special Collections, Sp Coll Ferguson Al-x.50

in this Sabbath are two representations of dancing witches. The depiction of a ring dance at centre left seems to match what de Lancre calls a half-demonic, gipsy-style dance – in which the female dancers dance with their backs turned to the centre, and ‘their stomachs sticking out, swelled up in front of them’. Such dances ‘stir up and torment the body, and those that disfigure it the most’ are ‘acts of incest’³⁹ – a possible reference to pregnancy as the inevitable outcome of their lasciviousness.

The dance at centre right depicts female witches, three of them already disrobed, dancing in an extremely vigorous and erotic manner with naked male devils. This seems to be a type of saraband dance, which de Lancre describes as performed with hands joined, one person facing one way and the other in the opposite way, but ‘so close together that they touch each other, every man touching a woman . . . [they] wantonly bring their backsides up against each other’.⁴⁰ De Lancre describes the saraband as ‘the most lewd and shameless dance that one could ever see . . . the most violent, animated and impassioned dance whose gestures while silent, seem to ask with silence more of what the lustful man desires of the woman than any other gesture does’;⁴¹ whereas the key for the print describes it as performing ‘the most indecent and filthy movements possible’.⁴² The tree around which this group dances links them to stories of witches dancing naked around the Walnut Tree of Benevento, known in Italian trials and treatises since the early fifteenth century;⁴³ while the naked satyr-like devil who looks directly out to the viewer creates a link with Bacchic orgies. But the flagrant eroticism of the dance is communicated primarily through Ziarnko’s dancing bodies.

De Lancre makes a second major claim in his text about witches’ dances that may well have added a bellicose emotional register for viewers: that ‘the passion and excitement of war first created dancing’.⁴⁴ Dancing stoked the energy of warriors and allowed them to perform with greater intensity, de Lancre writes; dances helped increase strength and also the accuracy of their weapons. In this he echoes the views of Nicolas Rémy, the privy councillor to Duke Charles III of Lorraine and supervisory judge at the ducal court in Nancy from 1576 to 1591, who wrote in his *Demonolatriy* of 1595 that the loud, discordant cries, chants, dances and leaping of witches ‘have the power to drive and goad even the most peaceful into a frenzy . . . whetting their warriors’ zeal with shouts and trumpets’,⁴⁵ for their main aim

is to exclude from them all human sympathies (even if they are at all touched by such emotions), and to make them the more ready and eager to compass the downfall and destruction of the human race, which is the Demons’ one purpose and intention. . . . Therefore all is done to a marvelous medley and confusion of noises, and it is beyond the power of words to describe the uncouth, absurd and discordant sounds that are uttered there . . . and the whole mob with roaring and harsh cries make the heavens echo, and frenziedly rage, shouting, hissing and yelling.⁴⁶

As well as representing the dancers on the right of his print as performers in a filthy Bacchanal, I’d suggest that Ziarnko has picked up on the bellicose registers in de Lancre’s text (and may well have also known of Rémy’s, to which de Lancre often refers). His dancers are making ready for war, stifling any compassionate feelings and uniting in their common resolve to destroy Christian society. To read this

depiction of the Sabbath as witches priming their bellicose emotions for war, and doing so on each occasion they meet at the Sabbath, makes perfect sense once we acknowledge emotions as practices of the body and mind created through regular ritual performance, as formulated by Monique Scheer. These lewd and violent dances define witches as an emotional community that meets at regular times in order to replenish and restore its commitment to all manner of violence and disorder, with the single focused aim of bringing harm, and ultimately total destruction, to the members of Christian society.

The representation of witchcraft as a disordered and destructive sect is even more evident in a 1620s print by the Nuremberg artist Michael Herr and the well-known engraver Matthäus Merian of Frankfurt, created at the very time when the most extensive and fierce campaign against witchcraft was being mounted in the nearby ecclesiastical principality of Bamberg (Figure 15.8).⁴⁷ The print depicts the world of witchcraft as a massive wild and frenzied movement, and its emotional pull is intense. This is especially conveyed through the wild dancers on the left side, where masses of male and female witches are shown swarming around and up a mountain, following their satyr-like leader, Satan, depicted with raised flaming arms. Interspersed in this gyrating column, and accompanied by a bagpiper and other musicians in the crowd, are individual devils, one of them in full frontal naked pose, with whom female witches dance wildly and perform sexual acts. This is witchcraft in action, represented



Figure 15.8 Matthäus Merian, after Michael Herr, *A Precise Sketch and Depiction of an Ungodly and Cursed Witches' Festival*, etching, c.1626(?) Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Graphische Sammlung, HB25872

as an alternative society linked to images of drinking and sex. It is witchcraft performing moral disorder, with its upturned and partly disrobed witches and goat propelled through the air by vapours spewing out of the cauldron below, and the cacophony and turbulent movement of the spirits raised up through the invocations of a learned magician on the right. Moreover, the performance takes place on what appears to be a theatrical stage, emphasizing the need for the viewer to look closely and understand the threat and provocation – a message further underlined by references to the terrible miseries delivered by these wild and raging hordes in the verses below.

The power of the Herr/Merian print is reflected in the influence it exercised on visual representations of the Sabbath over the next century. That power rested on its capacity to project witchcraft as a morally depraved and dissolute society under diabolical control, a moral and social threat to Christian community. It is remarkable that the individual iconographic components of the print continued to be deployed by artists as they also introduced satirical and carnivalesque elements into their particular versions, testifying to the emotional resonance these elements must have exercised regardless of how seriously the threat was considered. One such print was a frontispiece engraving to *Performance on the Blocksberg*, written by the prolific Baroque poet and author, Hans Schulze, known as Johannes Praetorius, and published in Leipzig in 1668 and 1669 (Figure 15.9).⁴⁸ The central feature of the scene is the Blocksberg (today called the Brocken), a mountain in the Harz mountains of Central Germany that became known from the later sixteenth century as the location of witches' dances, and especially on Walpurgisnacht, the eve of 1 May. As in the Herr/Merian print, scores of female dancers and their devils, many fully or semi-naked and some clearly sexually aroused, weave their way around the hill led by the Devil, to the music of a bagpiper and crumhorn player, while witches and goats career topsy-turvy overhead, one of them salaciously baring her genitals to those below. Beneath, a large winged devil defecates theatrically into a chamber pot, and allusions to drunkenness and lechery underscore the centrality of sensual excess.

Two small but critical changes differentiate the Praetorius frontispiece from the Herr/Merian broadsheet print. First, the diabolical has now been positioned front and centre through use of the centuries-old motif of the obscene kiss ritual, suggesting it is the destination and also motivation for the performance, a focal point for both dancers and viewers. Second, the gyrating dancers have been paired off, each witch now accompanied by a devil. This witch society projects limited order and rule, rather than utter disorder and misrule – a counter-society on display, performing its communal rituals in an orderly, even if somewhat carnivalesque, fashion against a foreground and background of sensual and corporeal excess intended to elicit titillation and disgust. This combination of the diabolical and the carnivalesque stimulated two quite different responses in its continuing representation over the following half century and more. As I have argued elsewhere, some artists deployed the scenario to elicit fear and disgust in support of their defence of Christianity against the activities of the Devil in a world lurching towards 'atheism'.⁴⁹ Other artists turned disgust into ridicule by parodying the witches' dances depicted in these prints as little more than the fantasies of fertile imaginations and deranged minds, and by encouraging viewers to laugh at such childish claims.⁵⁰

A graphic example of the latter approach is a crude frontispiece print in *A Clear Presentation of the Falsity of the Claims of Witchcraft*, written by the Halle jurist Johann



Figure 15.9 *Witches' Performance on the Blocksberg*, engraving, in Johannes Praetorius, *Blockes-Berges Verrichtung*, Leipzig and Frankfurt am Main, 1668, opposite title page. Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden/ Digital Collections/ Hist.Sax.inf.353, misc.1

Christoph Franck and published in 1720 under his pseudonym, Gottfried Wahrlieb (Figure 15.10). The artist has slightly rearranged the key elements from the left side of the Herr/Merian print, so that the Satan figure with flaming hands leading the




Figure 15.10 Witches' Sabbath, engraving, in Gottfried Wahrlieb, *Deutliche Vorstellung Der Nichtigkeit derer vermeynten Hexereyen*, Amsterdam, 1720, frontispiece, right scene. Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Munich, 4 Phys.m. 98, urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10058102-0

dancers becomes very prominent, as do the group of raging dancers below fronted by the totally naked devil. Sexual couplings can be seen, as well as bodies depleted by dance, drink and sex; a cauldron belches smoke in the background; witches and goats career through the sky above. Below the wild scene, under an embankment covered by foliage, two female peasants lie sleeping, their work tools by their sides, oblivious to the pandemonium above. The artist's message is gently revealed by the caption: in the upper section are the words 'they climb and they fly', and in the lower below the sleeping women, 'and then just continue to lie'. Witches' Sabbaths are nothing but the stuff of dreams. As the contemporary bizarre and grotesque parodies of the Sabbath created by Claude Gillot claimed, these figures of horror are nothing but tricks and illusions created by fear, chimeras that disappear with the light of day.⁵¹

Conclusion

So, can recent scholarly approaches to emotions bring additional and enriching insight to a reading of the exclusionary strategies deployed in visual representations of heretics, Jews and witches between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries? I offer three broad points in response. Firstly, emotions certainly can, on condition that they are understood as social and cultural practices rather than simply individual psychological states. I am to some extent persuaded by Sara Ahmed's framing of 'the sociality of emotion', her willingness to consider emotions as created in the space between the psychological and the social, as 'an effect of the impressions left by others'.⁵² These impressions, with their capacity for heightening sensation, circulate and 'stick' to various objects, thereby generating emotion. Such a model is attractive in refusing to locate emotions in either the psychological *or* the social realms, or indeed, in the psychological *and* the social. It helps privilege the object, in this case the image of the witch, as the circulating object to which emotions 'stick' and through which memory and history extend, shape and deepen emotion.

Secondly, the weakness of Ahmed's formulation is that it appears to diminish the critical role of bodies in the making of emotion, my second general point: the fact that emotions are almost always embodied, that they operate and are registered through the materiality of the body in the world. This seems especially pertinent when considering the imagined practices of Jews and witches in past histories, and the way their emotions were evoked for viewers, primarily through contact with the materiality of their bodies, whether sculpted in stone, engraved on paper or transmitted via some other medium. For that reason, Monique Scheer's approach to emotion as embodied practice, intertwined with the 'speaking, gesturing, remembering, manipulating' and mindful body,⁵³ seems especially pertinent for any analysis. With respect to the powerful visual rhetoric of seventeenth-century witches as members of an alien and hostile emotional community, it reminds us not to ignore the emotional dynamics at work between the bodies within the frame, as well as the interaction between those imaged bodies and those of their viewers outside the frame.

Thirdly, recent studies of the role played by emotions in processes of exclusion and ostracism are certainly helpful in pinpointing some of the emotional, rather than simply intellectual and social, factors and dynamics which shape the representation of individual and group images of witchcraft. The depicted and imagined collective practices of witches at the Sabbath provide us with insight into how witches were seen and responded

to: not only as wholly other, but also as a group that performed its rituals in order to generate emotion – hostile emotion, such fear, disgust and hostility – among the broader Christian community. The aims of individual artists in creating witchcraft images were extremely varied, of course, and some were highly complex. But what is even more significant historically is how and to what ends their images could be used, how they could be deployed to persuade viewers to support policies which promoted the trials and eradication of a growing number of individuals as adherents of a witchcraft society. To understand this we need to consider the emotional dynamics by which belonging and connectedness were created, and the practices through which ongoing belonging and connectedness could be performed and maintained – such as trust, competence, loyalty, the sharing of common knowledge, values and norms. Only then can we discern how visual imagery, how depictions of witches' Sabbath rituals, were imagined as capable of targeting, weakening and breaking up these critical underpinnings of community. My analysis of changing visual representations of witchcraft has endeavoured to uncover the role of emotion in some of these mechanisms and processes, which have not been the focus of scholarly attention. It has focused on the represented behaviour of witches within their pictorial and narrative frames, what their depicted behaviours might reveal about the imagined emotional life and collective dynamic of witch communities, and how such representations could serve as grounds for the often ruthless zeal with which the claimed adherents of witchcraft on earth were pursued and excluded, to the point of banishment and even death.

Acknowledgements

My thanks to Julie Davies and Jenny Smith for their assistance with this chapter.

Notes

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- 27 See Zika, *The Appearance of Witchcraft*, pp. 59–68; *The Arras Witch Treatises: Johannes Tinctor's Invectives contre la secte de vauderie and the Recollectio casus, status et condicionis Valdensium ydolatrarum by the Anonymous of Arras (1460)*, ed. and trans. A. Gow, R. Desjardins and F. Pageau, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2016; F. Mercier, *La Vauderie d'Arras: une chasse aux sorcières à l'automne du Moyen-Âge*, Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2006; R. Vervoort, *Bruegel's Witches: Witchcraft Images in the Low Countries between 1450 and 1700*, Bruges: Van de Wiele, 2015, pp. 62–7.
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 - 30 Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, pp. 5–8.
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 - 40 Ibid., p. 225.
 - 41 Ibid., p. 219.
 - 42 ‘ils dansent, trepignent et tripudent, avec les plus indecens et sales mouvemens qu’ils peuvent’: Pierre de Lancre, *Tableau de l’inconstance et instabilité des mauvais anges et demons*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1613, between pp. 118 and 119.
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 - 44 Williams, *On the Inconstancy of Witches*, p. 215.
 - 45 N. Rémy, *Demonolatry*, Bk 1, Ch. 19, trans. E.A. Ashwin, Secaucus, NJ: University Books, 1974, p. 64.
 - 46 Ibid., pp. 64–5 (Bk 1, Ch. 10).
 - 47 There is a second version of the broadsheet, entitled *Zauberey (Witchcraft)*, with Latin verses below by Johann Ludwig Gottfried, and German verses by an unknown author.
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 - 53 Scheer, ‘Are emotions a kind of practice’, p. 209.

LETTER-WRITING AND EMOTIONS

Carolyn James and Jessica O'Leary

Shortly after her forty-seventh birthday, Marie de Rabutin-Chantal, the Marquise de Sévigné, was asked in a letter sent by her beloved daughter, Madame de Grignan, whether she was still fond of life. She replied on 16 March 1672 in the following terms: 'I admit that I think it has some acute sorrows. But I am even more repelled by death and I feel that I am so unfortunate to have to finish all this by death, and that if I could go backwards I would ask for nothing better'. Madame de Sévigné's reflections on her mortality were occasioned by the illness, and likely imminent demise, of an aunt to whom she was close. Her anxiety is communicated in the string of questions which follow the passage cited above:

And how shall I leave it? Which way? Through which door? When will it be?
In what frame of mind? Shall I suffer thousands and thousands of pains and
die in desperation? Shall I have a stroke? Shall I die in an accident? How
shall I stand with God?¹

This was a personal and confessional letter, meant only for the eyes of her daughter, but other letters, written to friends, reached a wider audience. The facility with which Madame de Sévigné translated a kaleidoscope of feelings, her vivid personality and colloquial French vernacular onto the page in a compelling and convincingly authentic way made her one of the most admired epistolary stylists of her day.² Beneath the apparent fluent naturalness of Madame de Sévigné's prose, there is much literary artifice. The impression that the very cadences of speech are captured in her writing is lent greater verisimilitude by the inclusion in many letters of conversations that the writer claims to have overheard, or participated in, and reproduced faithfully. The conveyance of emotions, such as her fear of death, is also artful, in this case achieved through the alliterative series of questions about the manner and timing of her ultimate destiny. These, and other rhetorical techniques, were the tools of a woman who had made letter-writing a powerful means of self-expression and of cathartic emotional release.

Few letter writers had the capacity to emulate the highly individualized and eloquent epistles of the literary elite. Nor did most people who lived during the late medieval and early modern centuries have the leisure and financial means to correspond with friends and loved ones as a form of recreation, or of intellectual exchange, as Petrarch and his disciples did in the fourteenth century and as many European humanists were inspired to do in subsequent generations. In any case,

the pragmatic and often instrumental nature of much correspondence did not invite a literary approach. Yet the communication of a range of emotions, especially sincerity, trust, respect and affection, was regarded as essential in a broad range of epistolary situations. But how were such sentiments to be conveyed convincingly by ordinary letter writers?

As Gary Schneider points out in a study focused on early modern England, but applicable more broadly across Europe, face-to-face interactions were regarded as offering far greater epistemological certainty than letter-writing. Talking directly with someone permitted the observation of facial expressions and provided access to the complex gradations of mood and sentiment that a voice provided to the listener.³ If forced to communicate by letter, individuals relied on schematic templates and a readily understood set of linguistic codes to minimize the misunderstandings that were regarded as an inevitable consequence of the absence of bodily cues. Aided by such guides, letter writers attempted to convey sincerity and to activate sympathy in the recipient(s) of their messages through formulaic rhetorical strategies that aimed to provide some of the perceived security and reassurance of oral communication.

Like other historical sources, correspondence written between 1100 and 1700 was shaped by the cultural, political and religious milieux in which it was produced. Letter writers were part of larger epistolary communities – clerical, chancery, mercantile, familial, literary, to name some of the more common categories. Historians must therefore be attentive to the variations of letter-writing traditions in these diverse groups and be prepared to examine the degree to which individuals adhered to, transgressed or reinvented epistolary prescriptions. An interdisciplinary approach is also often necessary, since analysis of sophisticated letters, such as those by Madame de Sévigné, requires sensitivity to the originality and bravura of such writing; less talented correspondents relied on rhetorical tropes that also invite linguistic and historical deconstruction. We explore below some of the ways in which emotions were expressed and deployed in a range of letter genres and in various geographical, social and chronological contexts, in order to point to the dynamic nature of epistolary culture as it evolved over the premodern centuries, and to emphasize that choreographed performances of sentiment were integral, even to the most mundane forms of letter-writing.

Emotions and the *ars dictaminis*

Letter-writing was almost entirely an elite affair in the late medieval centuries. The majority of the population was illiterate and even those who could write might still be excluded from formal letter-writing by a lack of knowledge of Latin – the *lingua franca* of European correspondents before vernacular languages began to be used more often from around the second half of the fourteenth century.⁴ Access to letter-writing was limited, too, by the fact that the materials associated with producing any written document were costly and formal postal systems were still in their infancy. The expense and logistical difficulties of sending letters meant that it is mainly in institutional contexts and in the specialized manuals devoted to the art of letter-writing (*ars dictaminis*) that we find evidence of late medieval epistolary culture. The first extant guide was written towards the end of the eleventh century by the monk and rhetorician Alberico da Montecassino and, as rhetoric became an ever more

fundamental part of university curriculums, the influence of *dictamen* was all but universal throughout Europe by the end of the thirteenth century.⁵

Loosely adapted from Ciceronian precepts about how a persuasive oration ought to be composed, the formularies offered guidance concerning how letters should be structured and how emotionally inflected rhetoric could be put to work to sway an addressee into responding positively to a letter's content.⁶ It was recommended that a writer should open with a greeting (*salutatio*), continue with a statement designed to promote a positive reception of the message (*exordium* or *captatio benevolentiae*), and then provide an outline of the background that prompted the communication (*narratio*). The core request or command (*petitio*) would follow, before the formal farewell (*conclusio*). Given that most letters would be read aloud by the courier who carried them to their destination, great emphasis was placed on the rhythm and mellifluousness of the prose, since a message that was pleasing to the ear was more likely to be persuasive. The hierarchical nature of medieval society also meant that it was particularly crucial to salute a person correctly, according to his (or sometimes her) station in life, and to make clear the relationship between the sender and the recipient of the letter. Thus, a petitioner seeking help from a powerful, or wealthy, patron had to express humility, while fulsomely praising a prospective benefactor's good character, using appropriate adjectives that foregrounded the addressee's high status and reputation for generosity.⁷ When correspondents knew each other and were of more equal status, requests for assistance and pledges of loyalty were couched in the language of friendship. Although the formulaic rules of the *ars dictaminis* guided the structure and general stylistic approach of these letters, the standard phrases associated with the expression of amity might be manipulated in subtly different ways by writers for a variety of purposes.

The friendly declarations of personal devotion that feature so prominently in the letters of twelfth-century religious leaders, for example, must often be understood as strategic techniques used within institutional settings to promulgate business, negotiate alliances, or resolve conflicts. Peter the Venerable, Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter of Celle frequently salute the addressees of their letters in loving terms that a modern reader might interpret as evidence of deep and intimate friendship with those individuals.⁸ However, as Julian Haseldine has shown in relation to the letters of Peter the Venerable, abbot of the Dominican abbey of Cluny between 1122 and 1156, the strongest invocations of friendship appear in correspondence addressed to virtual strangers. On the other hand, Nicholas of Clairvaux, a trusted confidant over many years, is nowhere referred to in Peter's letters as 'friend', despite the fact that mutual love is assumed in letters that discuss both lofty intellectual themes and ordinary practical matters.⁹ As Haseldine argues, rather than providing evidence of Peter the Venerable's actual feelings for those to whom he wrote, his letters document the social networks to which he and his correspondents belonged and the ways in which relationships between individuals and groups in monastic institutions across Europe were negotiated and intellectual ideas shared.¹⁰ Haseldine's analysis of the correspondence of Peter of Celle and Bernard of Clairvaux points to similar conclusions.¹¹

The letters of John of Salisbury to Gerald Pucelle, sent between 1166 and 1168, demonstrate another use of the rhetoric of friendship. The two men achieved high-profile careers, ending their lives as bishops, and knew each other well. However, their relationship was frequently combative. Indeed, as Yoko Hirata

points out, references in John of Salisbury's letters to the friendship he felt for Pucelle seem to have been intended to defuse escalating tensions between the two.¹² The insights of Hirata and Haseldine are the fruit of close study, not only of the circumstances that prompted particular letters, but of the entire correspondence of the writers concerned. Such thoroughgoing investigation has permitted them to show that the same standard epistolary tropes might be used and understood quite differently in one epistolary context than another. It is therefore necessary to follow their scholarly lead by being alert to the ways in which the rhetoric of affect was deployed for multiple purposes.

The categories of letter writers envisaged by the *ars dictaminis* did not include women. They had to improvise. Although the number of surviving letters composed by women in the late medieval centuries is small, there are some telling examples of how individuals exploited social expectations associated with their female gender to attempt to get their way. When Queen Eleanor of Aquitaine (c. 1122–1204), wanted to secure the release of her son, Richard, from a sixteen-month imprisonment by the Holy Roman Emperor, she wrote to Pope Celestine III in the following terms: 'Pitiful and pitied by no one, why have I come to the ignominy of this detestable old age, who was ruler of two kingdoms, mother of two kings? My guts are torn from me, my family is carried off and removed from me'.¹³ It is not known exactly how the collaboration between the queen and her learned scribe, Peter of Blois, worked. However, even if Eleanor delegated the entire composition of the letter to her secretary, the latter expertly took on the queen's epistolary persona, creating an authorial voice that at once evoked the pathos of a despairing mother and helpless old woman with the authoritative strength of a political figure of consequence, who had the right to command the attention and cooperation of the pope. The queen aimed to inspire pity, but also to intimidate.

The thirteenth-century English noblewoman, Aline la Despenser, was just as strategic in a petition to the Chancellor of England, Lord Walter de Merton, which requested a letter of patent to ensure wool to be exported to the continent reached its destination safely. The writer ignores convention by reminding the chancellor of the ties of 'dear friendship' that bound them. As Kathleen Neal points out in a penetrating analysis of this letter, although the references to amity were to some extent legitimized by the sender's aristocratic status as countess of Norfolk and her own personal links to Lord Walter, the invocation of friendship by a woman was likely to have been seen by the chancellor as startlingly novel. The countess's veiled promise that her husband's gratitude for a positive outcome of the petition would find expression in continued political support for King Edward I, and for the royalist cause, reveals her awareness of the need to present her request within a socially sanctioned framework. It also shows her knowledge of how patron-client negotiations functioned. Reciprocity would be accorded in due course: 'Lord, do this much for our prayer, if it should please you, that my lord should be grateful and thank you upon his return'.¹⁴ By dexterously navigating between ingratiating language and assertiveness and by speaking in her husband's name, not her own, in relation to the favour asked, Aline demonstrates a shrewd awareness of how contemporary understandings of the bond of friendship between political allies might be used to engender a sympathetic response from the chancellor.

By the middle of the fourteenth century, Italian merchants and guildsmen, and even well-educated professionals such as notaries and doctors, had embraced the

vernacular to conduct everyday business and to negotiate relationships with peers. They favoured a simpler epistolary template than that which still governed letters emanating from institutional contexts. We see evidence of this phenomenon in correspondence preserved within the large archive of the Tuscan merchant, Francesco di Marco Datini (c. 1335–1410).¹⁵ Letter-writing was fundamental to record keeping and the exchange of news, but it was also a means to build trust and to share the stresses associated with the risky nature of mercantile enterprises.

Unlike most earlier correspondence which has come down to us as copies, in many cases substantially edited, the Datini letters preserved in the state archive of Prato are predominantly those that were sent to their destination and then eventually returned to head office for filing. Thus, we can study the significance of holographs, as opposed to letters dictated to a scribe. The act of undertaking the burdensome labour of writing oneself was seen as a significant gesture to the recipient of the letter, creating as it did a point of physical contact between the sender's body and the paper on which words were inscribed. Datini and his colleagues wrote in their own hands when they particularly wanted to signal their emotional investment in the relationship with their correspondent. They also took account of the regularity of correspondence, the length of letters and the degree to which affection and fidelity were convincingly expressed in colloquial language. The spice merchant Iacopo del Nero, originally from Prato, wrote to Francesco Datini from Avignon, in July 1409, about the vital importance of the epistolary link to keep the bond of amity between them fresh and intact:

I beg you to write to me from time to time and I will do the same to you. I want you to know that I feel the same about you now as I always did and if it pleased God that we should be as close as when you were here, I would be with you day and night. Now it is not possible, but at least by writing to each other we will seem to be together.¹⁶

The Datini archive contains numerous other examples of such declarations of friendship, not all of them sincere, of course. Commercial colleagues were obsessed with whether they could trust each other. Indeed, Francesco Datini was accused of gross insincerity by a number of his colleagues, on the grounds that his epistolary expressions of love and loyalty belied the utter ruthlessness with which he sometimes treated his 'friends' in the hurly-burly of everyday commercial transactions.¹⁷ The use of the rhetoric of amity in mercantile exchanges shares aspects in common with its deployment by leaders of rival monastic orders in the twelfth century, the similarities reflecting the competitive and conflict-riven relationships within otherwise very different communities and the need to defuse tensions, or build alliances, through statements of affection and affinity.

However, a letter that appeared merely strategic and manipulative was unlikely to achieve its purpose. The Florentine proto-humanist circles, influenced by Petrarch's writings, described their love for each other in very idealistic terms, even if their letters were often no less instrumental in intent than those exchanged by commercial colleagues. Francesco Datini needed to be coached by his friend, the notary Lapo Mazzei, about how to declare friendship appropriately to the well-educated and politically active group of Florentines, whose patronage he sought.¹⁸ Thus, in the

contrasting ways in which the merchant described his love and loyalty to individuals of different social backgrounds and educational preparation, we can see how important it was for correspondents to be attuned to the cultural codes which governed the expression of sentiment within particular epistolary communities.

The point is essentially that it is methodologically perilous to take the amicable phrases of mercantile correspondence, or the letters of petition from clients to patrons, or the declarations of admiration and mutual devotion of rival clerics, at face value. It is necessary to analyse, as much as possible, how such phrases were used and understood within distinct social and political contexts and at different moments in time. Establishing and maintaining trust by means of letter exchanges, without the reassurance of face-to-face contact, was regarded as a volatile and dangerous exercise. We must therefore take account of the mechanisms that conjured up the absent body of a correspondent, through material or psychological means, and appreciate the degree to which relationships were measured not just by the words on the page, but also by the amount of effort that correspondents expended in maintaining epistolary contact by writing frequently and in their own hands.

Emotions in correspondence of the early modern centuries

Early modern epistolary culture might usefully be distinguished from its medieval counterpart, if only because the rapid uptake of letter-writing across Europe, as literacy and postal systems improved in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, permitted greater numbers of people to redress distance and maintain relationships by writing to each other.¹⁹ Epistolary manuals remained fundamental, not to teach individuals how to feel, but rather how to regulate and express appropriate sentiment, since there was still a lingering generalized anxiety associated with the letter as a form. Motifs of bodily contact, emotional closeness and gift-giving, inspired by face-to-face interactions, continued to be integral to the strategies used in letters to perform sincerity.²⁰ However, as in the medieval period, correspondents belonging to particular social classes, or religious communities, also developed their own epistolary conventions that circulated, either formally in letter-books, or informally through the use of shared emotional tropes. Modern scholars must read letter collections in sufficient depth to gain an idea of the interplay between formulaic and non-standard uses of emotional vocabulary. Where certain elements might be expected and yet fail to appear, this might point to a strategy by the writer to invoke surprise, apply emotional pressure or avoid conflict. Equally, adhering to a predictable emotional repertoire could be used to promote trust between correspondents by communicating a sense of shared assumptions.

Despite the increasing acceptance of the vernacular in letter-writing, Latin continued to be favoured by European humanists, who consciously sustained the Ciceronian tradition of the familiar letter well into the eighteenth century. Intellectuals such as Erasmus and his friends used Petrarch as a reference point to write letters within a closed circle of correspondents, both Catholic and Protestant, and only rarely including women.²¹ The Latin familiar letter was an intellectual joust and consequently its relaxed, informal dialogue between friends was entirely artificial. Erasmus championed the genre, but he regularized it, abandoning the structural informality so admired in Cicero's correspondence and insisting that friendly feelings and affection

should be expressed in codified forms that paralleled the civility and disciplined restraint he advocated in face-to-face encounters.²² Thus, his *De conscribendis epistolis* (1522) made it possible for intellectuals to reproduce the easy eloquence of the familiar letter through the use of formulaic tropes to guide composition.²³ Humanist letters were, nevertheless, subtly marked with anxiety, but not because their writers feared misinterpretation. They had the literary skills to communicate confidently and convincingly. Theirs was a fear of being forgotten, considered irrelevant, or perceived as not possessing sufficiently illustrious intellectual credentials.

Sixteenth-century Latin letter-writing manuals, such as that by Erasmus, were adapted for a wider and less well-educated readership in vernacular versions that were far less concerned with intellectual showmanship. These practically oriented guides achieved a significant degree of commercial success, particularly in France and later in England.²⁴ Linda Mitchell has shown that roughly 80 per cent of English early modern manuals share 75 per cent of their material in common.²⁵ Categories included parent-child relationships, educating children, marriage propositions, financial predicaments, friendship and commerce. Letters were listed with descriptive titles, such as 'father to a daughter about her virtue, with her reply', or 'widow asking her son to study, rather than gamble and drink'. Model commercial letters, directed to expediting business transactions, or to smoothing out conflict, were heralded equally specifically: 'London merchant to country tradesman about unsatisfactory goods', or 'tradesman to merchant, inquiring about delay of payment'. The most numerous examples involved parenting and resolving commercial strife, which suggests contemporary concerns with these issues.²⁶

Exemplary letters provided non-expert writers with the right emotional register to resolve conflict across distance, without alienating their correspondent, but also with the requisite amount of persuasion required to command attention. Sometimes advice was gendered – typically business correspondence was for men (although wives were instructed to write on behalf of absent or deceased husbands) and social pleasantries were supposedly reserved for women. Linda Mitchell puts it succinctly: 'men were given tools to make decisions; women were given strategies for following the rules made by others'.²⁷ However, the prescriptive rules did not prevent women, especially those in religious contexts, from exploiting traditional motifs of humility and vulnerability to achieve epistolary persuasion and induce sympathy. Teresa de la Valle y Cerda, for example, shrewdly used conventional female tropes of subservience to resist Inquisitional charges, while the German nun, Caritas Pirckheimer, utilized similar techniques during the Reformation to forestall the closure of her convent in Bavaria. Religious women owed responsibility to their sisterhood and used letter-writing as a defensive means to protect their interests. With very few resources at their disposal, emotional manipulation was often their most powerful weapon. The self-conscious and instrumental invocation of feminine vulnerability by these women aimed to persuade the recipients of their letters to react with appropriate recognition of their weaker state and to respond positively and promptly to their cause.²⁸

The patronage system was a vital feature of the early modern social fabric and, while letters of recommendation were not a new genre, the rise of literacy and the relative affordability of letter-writing materials enabled many more individuals to take advantage of letters for advancing their social standing. Yet, greater competition

for patronage inevitably involved an increase in rejections of requests for help and favour and such refusals required careful emotional care.²⁹ Words had to be carefully selected to avoid misunderstandings or lingering resentments.

The convincing conveyance of sincerity continued to be of critical importance to correspondents, since, without the perceived presence of a writer's emotional state, the letter's contents were considered insignificant. The art of persuasion was the primary pedagogical focus of most sixteenth-century letter-writing manuals. One of the first vernacular guides in English, Angel Day's *The English Secretary* (1586), was very popular because of its accessibility and practicality. Expanded in 1592, with a new section on useful tropes, it was republished in this larger form seven times between 1595 and 1635.³⁰ Day's manual provided reliable methods to ensure that correspondence was effective in conveying sentiment, while acknowledging the strict social hierarchy which governed Elizabethan England.

Explicit avowals of sincerity, through reference to God and to one's mortality, began to feature in early modern letters amongst the emerging middle class and within the elite throughout Europe as a linguistic gesture towards trust in a long-distance relationship. According to Graham Williams, it is no coincidence that the first recorded instance of the use of the word 'sincerity' in the English language was in the sixteenth century. Several 'macro-cultural' factors contributed to the significance of sincerity as a rhetorical manoeuvre which emerged both in early modern prescriptive manuals and in actual correspondence. Using the Corpus of Early English Correspondence, Williams found that early modern letter writers expressed sincerity using three separate linguistic techniques. Correspondents attempted to reinforce external expression by reference to internal personal elements, such as their 'good heart' and 'thoughts'. They deployed performative verbs such as 'protest' and 'profess' to underpin expressions of emotion, while vocabulary associated with trials was used to show that writers were ready for their love, duty and loyalty to be tested.³¹ These linguistic techniques were not limited to England, nor to specific classes of letters.

However, persuasion could also be achieved by other means. The manuals taught inexperienced letter-writers how to induce shame, or to activate another's happiness, to get their way. Formal guidance was critical because, while rhetoric was easily deployed in affect-laden situations where there was no conflict to resolve, inducing pity or compassion in words alone was an exceptionally difficult task without the aid of body language and facial expression. To this end, shame and remonstrance were emotions favoured by letter writers because the epistolary situation – the physical distance between sender and recipient – allowed individuals to use the force of shame to persuade their correspondent to change behaviour or indulge a request, while preserving civility.³² The vast majority of letters, therefore, were deployed to tug at the heart, or the purse strings, in order to elicit a certain desired response.

The inducement of shame and guilt was also used by elite parents to maintain authority over their children, once they were no longer within physical reach, so that the political and commercial interests of the family could continue to be pursued by all its members. Women were vitally important in this regard as they were often the nodes which connected families across physical distances. Once married, patrician women were expected to remain in contact with their natal kin to facilitate the instrumental outcomes that had prompted the marital alliance. For example, when

the fifteenth-century Neapolitan King Ferrante d'Aragona married his daughters, Eleonora and Beatrice, into political dynasties in Ferrara and Hungary respectively, he maintained a strict epistolary rhetoric of kinship that served to remind the women of their natal ties and of the obligation to continue to act in the collective interests of the group. In diplomatic situations, where the king needed the help of his daughters, Ferrante had no qualms about writing to them in terms that were at once affectionate and subtly threatening. He invoked dynastic blood ties as a unifying concept, but he also called on imagery of blood being spilled to put pressure on the women to obey his wishes.³³

While the gravity of familial fracture may have had more pressing consequences for a king, anxiety about the welfare of absent relatives stimulated a range of epistolary strategies to keep relationships intact within networks of relatives separated by marriage, commerce or migration in more middling social contexts.³⁴ William Fullwood's *The Enimie of Idleness* (1568) devotes almost an entire book to communicating with absent family members. Examples include a letter from a wife pleading with her merchant husband to come home.³⁵ This had become a new trope with the growth of the English mercantile class. A wife's tired lament was a cathartic measure, a means to release pressure through divulging her emotional state to her absent husband, which she may not have been able to do in person for lack of propriety. In France too, mercantile wives grew impatient with husbands abroad. In one mid-sixteenth-century example, Marie Teste pleaded with her travelling husband to write with updates on his health and business to relieve her worries about him.³⁶ Eventually, in the seventeenth century, writing manuals specifically addressed to a female audience, such as Jacques Du Bosque's 1638 *The Secretary of Ladies*, a translation of the French text, were published, but women mostly made do with their limited education and own intuition to convey their thoughts and feelings in writing.³⁷

The language of affect is particularly tied to the love letter, which became a genre almost exclusively associated with women towards the end of the seventeenth century, at least with respect to France. The seventeenth-century author Jean de la Bruyère argued that women were better suited to letter-writing because they effortlessly expressed emotion, while men were less adept. However, this was not a skill that could be honed through training, unlike literary talent, which was supposedly reserved for men.³⁸ According to Katharine Jensen, the feminine love letter was not a literary genre, but rather the textual expression of unbridled passion by the uneducated woman which only 'helped to glamorize its marginal status and encourage women to engage in a cultural practice to which they were purportedly naturally suited and that of course supported male literary and sexual hegemony'.³⁹ As Jensen, shows, the love letter had a circular structure. The female writer had constantly to perform her passion and her pain: she was not permitted to reach a conclusion of meaning and understanding – the letter merely stopped. She had to be trapped by her love, otherwise the letter failed its purpose. The connection between women and love letters was seen to be so strong that some male writers masqueraded as women, concocting fictional love letters to attract greater publishing success and financial reward.

The way in which women regulated how love was to be expressed through letter-writing constitutes an interesting reversal of the control men held over the familiar

letter. For example, the publishing phenomenon, the *Lettres portugaises* (1669), was more than likely fictional letters written by a man. However, they were no different than other woman's love letters, except that they were perceived as slightly more passionate. Nancy Miller argues that writing as a woman allowed a male writer to access passions and suffering which would have otherwise been precluded by contemporary notions of masculinity.⁴⁰ Yet, female superiority in the genre was restrictive: women were better letter writers because of *coeur*, while men's artistic superiority was a result of *esprit*.⁴¹ Editors praised women's eloquence, but recommend that they confine their writing to the epistolary mode – where such emotionality was to be expected. Even when salon culture faded after the mid-seventeenth century, epistolary manuals still show evidence of the prescription for females not to venture into other kinds of writing. Unlike men, women were expected to specialize in a genre that was seen as appropriate for their gender. Nonetheless, letters permitted women to sustain a kind of intimacy through revealing parts of their emotional lives otherwise hidden by the burden of societal expectation.⁴²

Conclusion

Understanding how premodern letter-writers employed emotional scripts offers an additional lens with which to understand the socio-cultural context in which letters were produced. By its very nature, correspondence is dialogic and generated by real or imagined physical distance. While many of the letters discussed here were triggered by pragmatic, day-to-day needs, they can tell us a great deal about how social relations were managed and how individuals related to each other when denied interactions in real time. Emotions were thought to be more easily expressed in person with the availability of facial expression, tone and body language. Committing emotions to paper required thought about how they might be represented and attentiveness to how these representations might be received. Thus, we gain insight into how correspondents in a range of contexts expected others to behave and how they sought to extract the responses that they desired. Human emotions are specific to time, location, age, class and gender (amongst other things). By closely examining emotional performances in letter-writing, we can extrapolate to understand how those same emotions might have been used in other social discourses, albeit with the required analytical caution that such a transferral requires.

We have seen that epistolary manuals were a vital source of models that served to guide the translation of emotion into a written form. The early modern period saw many new social groups participate in epistolary exchanges, but the novelty of this form of communication was a source of potential discomfort for those to whom written expression did not come easily. The collections of fictional epistles could be adapted to lived social relationships, while the real correspondence of highly skilled practitioners, such as Madame de Sévigné, showed that sentiment could be conveyed, not just through facial expression, voice and physical interaction, but in the artful selection of words that corresponded with a cultural code. Understanding how individuals worked with cultural assumptions concerning emotional expression grants historians access into their social world and how they understood their place in it.

Letters are a highly material source. Grasping the interaction between emotionality and materiality facilitates access to the letter-writer's voice and its reception. While

published and translated letter collections are certainly very useful primary sources, it is often important to go back to the archive and to investigate the physical dimensions and appearance of the originals. Holograph letters were used in affective correspondence as a means to express emotional proximity. Careful examination of the quality of the paper used, the handwriting, the signatures, the inkblots and perhaps even the evidence of tears shed during the process of writing provides a different perspective on the nature of the sentiments (and, therefore, of the relationships) expressed than a printed version of the text. A letter sent, using only the materials at hand, will preserve signs of emotion that cannot be inferred from a copy. Two letters, sent in 1647 and 1676 from missions in New France in Canada, are striking examples of how the material on which a text was inscribed might function as a guarantee of authenticity. Written on bark from local birch trees, the letters embodied, in a very literal sense, the place from which they were sent. The letter of 1676 was written by young indigenous women from the Ursuline seminary in Quebec and contained phrases in their own native language. Together, those words and the bark on which they were written spoke to the recipient of the letter of a faraway land and an unfamiliar people.⁴³ Thus, while words are the nucleus of any epistolary analysis, the letter as a material object must be kept in mind when considering the emotion invested within it.

When letters lacked vitality and evidence of the person's character, the recipient was often disappointed, or remained unmoved. The difficulty of communicating across distance required a degree of facility with emotional identification and expression to avoid giving offence and to ensure that sincerity was conveyed. While the form in which these anxieties manifested – feelings of love, anger, fear or otherwise – differed, their purpose often remained the same: to persuade a specific individual, or community, to undertake some kind of action. Without emotion, a letter was a simple transmission of information. Sentiment was critical to the letter as a form and to the genres that it produced.

Notes

- 1 Madame de Sévigné, *Selected Letters*, trans. L. Tancock, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1982, pp. 124–7 (p. 125).
- 2 See L.K. Horowitz, 'The correspondence of Madame de Sévigné: letters or belles-lettres?', *French Forum* 6:1, 1981, 13–27; and H.R. Allentuch, 'My daughter/myself: emotional roots of Madame de Sévigné's art', *Modern Language Quarterly* 43:2, 1982, 121–37.
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THE MATERIALITY OF EMOTIONS

An archaeological point of view

Jette Linnaa

This chapter aims to present the current state of research on the study of emotions in archaeology, and then set out some new paths in the study of emotions and materiality, using examples from my research area: the medieval and early modern period in Scandinavia. The intersection of the material and the emotional is an emerging research field in archaeology, and as a large part of the research in the history of emotions is based on language and images, the specific nature of the archaeological sources poses challenges. Our most important topics lie within the study of periods or groups for which no written sources are available, and thus the linguistic and behavioural articulation of emotions has been lost. This situation poses particular problems for the study of emotions in this field. Another difference is that while a history of emotions can be constructed from sources that deal with known individuals, like letters and diaries, we as archaeologists are usually dealing with unknown people. Furthermore, our material can only rarely be associated with an individual, but represents a collective, often a household, making the investigation of the emotions of individuals close to impossible.

Archaeology is a practice as well as a research field. The method by which we access our sources is well known – mostly archaeological excavations – but the practice of archaeology can be described as a discipline that explores the relationships between mentality and materiality. The thinking on materiality in this chapter owes a great deal to William I. Miller's *The Anatomy of Disgust*, where Miller writes about

the fetid ooze of what I call the life soup, the roiling stuff of eating, defecation, fornication, generation, death, rot, and regeneration. Even in the midst of unpleasant sensation, of bodies and their wastes and orifices, the larger cultural and moral orderings intrude and animate the ooze with spirit.¹

Miller deserves to be at the very start of this chapter, because he powerfully opens up the reality of materiality, stating that materiality is rarely static or eternal, but constantly under transformation from one form to another, one nature to another, and thus subject to changing emotions. Scholars studying materiality frequently talk about 'objects', but objects are not all there is in the world. Recently the

anthropologist Tim Ingold has called for researchers to think about the transformations and affordances of materials. Ingold points out that things are embodiments of ‘mental representations already solidified or precipitated out from the generative fluxes of the medium that gave birth to them’.² Ingold argued that the anthropological study of materiality frequently fails to take materials or their properties into question; his statements elicited a lively debate in archaeology on the standing of materiality versus materials, with contributions from Christopher Tilley, Carl Knappett, Daniel Miller and Bjørn Nilsson.³ Taking a practical approach, archaeologists are trained to take the physical properties of materials into consideration, and to think about how these physical properties may relate to emotions. Materials are varied – it is in their nature – some are soft or hard, some durable, others decomposing, some hard and others sticky, and all are encountered through the human senses, especially through touch. Significant new work has been created in the field of emotions and archaeology in recent years, including: Yannis Hamilakis’s monograph, *Archaeology and the Senses: Human Experience, Memory and Affect* (2014);⁴ Sarah Tarlow’s ‘The archaeology of emotion and affect’ (2012); Oliver Harris and Tim Flohr Sørensen’s ‘Rethinking emotions and material culture’ (2010); and Oliver Harris, Helen Cobb, Coleen E. Batey and Janet Montgomery’s ‘Assembling places and persons’ (2017). These give valuable and useful insights into materiality and emotions in archaeology.⁵ However, all these contributions take their starting point in case studies primarily ranging from the Mediterranean Bronze Age to the Viking Age in northern Europe. This chapter takes its starting point in a case study from another period – the early modern – and another geographical area – the combined kingdom of Denmark and Norway – and so may shed further light on how archaeology can contribute to the study of emotions on a wider geographical and chronological scale.

What, then, is an emotion, and how do we approach emotions in archaeology? Historians working in the field of emotions consider them to be constituted by social and cultural practices that change over time.⁶ Barbara H. Rosenwein’s definition of emotions as a product of both nature and culture is also of importance to the field. In Rosenwein’s view, ‘there is a biological and universal human aptitude for feeling and expressing what we now call emotions’. What those emotions are, what they are called, how they are evaluated and felt, and how they are expressed, or not – all these are shaped within ‘emotional communities’. Rosenwein defines emotional communities as groups – usually but not always social groups – that have their own particular values, modes of feeling and ways to express those feelings.⁷ These emotional communities are situational and constantly changing, and people can be partakers in several emotional communities simultaneously.⁸ The question is, how do we approach this in archaeology? There is little doubt that our ancestors, even our distant ancestors, were able to feel and express their emotions. One of the most well-known archaeological discoveries of emotions involves artefacts interpreted as traces of rituals surrounding the graves of Neanderthals, and thus as signs of feelings of grief and bereavement. Another involves discoveries of disabled Neanderthals who reached adulthood, leading archaeologists to conclude that compassion as an emotion has deep roots. Yet it remains a question how we can approach emotions from a time when no humans were able to leave written expressions of their emotions, and at the present time, no firm answers can be given.

It appears that our theory and methodologies must be adapted to the specific topics on which we want to shed light. For example, we might be interested in writing the history of anger, and that would call for one set of theory and methodology, or in analysing the emotions evoked in people encountering religious buildings, which calls for another set. We might even be interested in the emotional communities created through waste and consumption – expulsion and intake – which calls for different methodologies altogether. No matter the field of interest, the consensus is that emotions are created and recreated in humans through encounters with materiality, and that these encounters are mediated through the senses. Here we may consider emotions to be shaped by sensuous experiences transmitted through materiality; the triggered emotions form, create and recreate feelings, and their evaluation and expression shape and are shaped within emotional communities.

What archaeology can bring to the studies of emotions is an emphasis on four concerns: context, depth, a deep time perspective and how materiality has been mediated through the senses. First, context. By mentioning context first, I stress the importance of the complicated web of relations between humans and other objects in which an object is embedded. In archaeology to take an object in isolation is to reduce it to art. Second, depth. While many of the sources most frequently employed in the study of the history of emotions are elitist by nature, the sources most commonly used in archaeology are not. Writing letters, notes and accounts requires literacy and an equally literate audience. Paintings and prints require the means and networks to acquire artworks and an audience that appreciates them. In the particular context of Europe 1100–1700, this is also a matter of technological evolution: for example, while parchment was rare in the twelfth century, paper is widespread in the eighteenth. Nevertheless, archaeology is a democratic discipline: everyone, from the very top of society to the bottom, can engage with materiality and leave traces of those human–object encounters for archaeologists to read in their excavations. They may engage with different kinds of materiality, but with materiality nevertheless. By saying this, I do not reduce archaeology to the study of archaeologically recovered remains alone. Although the artefacts and objects retrieved through archaeological excavations are the source material most commonly attributed to and used by archaeologists, they are not the only ones. Archaeologists also rely on other sources when available. Among these are images and artworks, written documents of any kind, and objects preserved above ground, for example in museums or private collections, and even in music or sound accessible through sources like psalm books, church bells or musical instruments. Third: deep time. The study of materiality helps archaeologists confront the problems caused by the wide chronological variety of sources available from other kinds of records. Written and pictorial sources from the twelfth century are abundant in Great Britain but very rare in Scandinavia. It might be possible to study the life of ancient Greeks through art and literary sources, but to study their contemporaries in northern Europe from those sources is close to impossible. Thus, material culture is the only feasible way to explore emotions of the past when no written sources or living witnesses are available. Fourth, sensory mediation. Study of the tactile qualities of objects balances the prevalent modern emphasis on visuality, stressing the mediation of materiality through touch in the medieval and early modern worlds.

The historical and geographical context

This chapter deals with a particular historical and geographical context: Europe 1100–1700, and it is necessary to take shifts in this context into account. Over this period, the population in Europe grew from approximately 60 million people around 1100 CE to over 100 million in 1700 CE. Within this timespan, humans witnessed a profound technological revolution, in which materials that were rare beforehand, like glass, brick, tiles and various metals, became widespread. At the same time, technological evolution and new modes of production made mass consumption possible, just as increasing international trade meant that people continually encountered new materials and new objects, and new uses for them. As a result, people at the end of this period met with a much larger number and variety of objects than were available at its beginning. We can expect that their attitudes towards objects were just as varied as the materiality they faced. This historical development calls for consideration of the specifics of materiality and emotion at this time and place. The emotional responses of humans to objects cannot be considered static; they may change over time as the result of changes in the social, political and religious contexts, and thus may vary significantly in time and place.

Materiality is at the heart of any archaeological study. What characterizes materiality is that it is never stable but under constant transformation, because the materials that constitute materiality undergo constant change. These are materials that humans shaped, moulded or melted and combined with other materials into objects. These objects were transported, exchanged and used with other objects in various combinations in dwellings and workplaces, churches and castles. During use, this materiality was repaired, reused or changed in function before it was discarded and disposed of. The disposed objects changed owners and were reused or disassembled and reassembled in different constellations with other materials. Finally, when all use was over, the materials were discarded again and burned, rotted, rusted, dissolved or decomposed, and the core elements re-entered the great cycle of materials. Furthermore, materiality was not primarily engaged with intellectually, but was encountered in the most bodily fashion of all – through touch. Accordingly, we need to admit the tactile qualities of materiality and to see how emotions were embedded in materials and transferred or triggered through the senses. An archaeology of the senses is important, simply because materiality was taken in through the senses. The archaeology of emotions is not only possible but also essential and feasible, not as a representation of the past, but as an exploration of the range of sensorial possibilities and affordances in materiality.

Emotions in archaeology: love and friendship

Sara Ahmed has located emotions neither in the subject nor the object, but in the relational space between them.⁹ Central to this theory is that emotions are created and negotiated in meetings between humans and objects. Archaeologists may, therefore, use material objects as evidence for the emotions of the past, while at the same time the emotional history of an object is necessary to understanding its materiality. A further point here is that humans through time have had emotional responses to matter, not only to objects. To make this clearer I will call upon an early modern

example that shows specific emotions as embedded in matter, and then go back to an example from the early middle ages to see if this embeddedness of emotions in matter changed through time.

The first example revolves around a community of Dutchmen in the city of Elsinore between 1570 and 1650. The Dutchmen stand out as elite through their particular financial and mercantile position in the town.¹⁰ Many of the immigrants maintained close family and business ties with the homeland throughout generations. Rich archaeological and written records tell us of the fate of the inhabitants, most notably in this context of their possessions. Among these were plates or bowls of Chinese porcelain itemized in the surviving inventories of deceased estates.¹¹

Fragments of objects like the porcelain bowl pictured (Figure 17.1) were found in a rubbish pit in the Dutch-dominated part of the city, together with a rich assemblage of other objects: drinking glasses from Venice, Spanish jars for olive oil, Dutch pans for baking pies, bones from turkeys, oyster shells and much more. Objects like these were not for sale in the city: they are never found in the inventories of shops, so must have been acquired through other channels. In the records of deceased estates, which allow us to walk through the houses of the inhabitants, the porcelain and tin-glazed ware are found in the most intimate rooms: the private chambers or the office. Thus, these items show a spatial exclusivity that matches their rarity: a trace of internationalism that marks intimacy and binds the colony together. To judge by the available information, these things never left the colony: they were not used in exchange with the locals, nor were they ever sold in shops. My conclusion is that they played a part in the formation of emotional communities within the colony itself.



Figure 17.1 Shards of porcelain bowls, turkey bones, orange pips and fragments of pewter and glass were found among the remains in Elsinore. Pieter Claesz, *Still Life with a Turkey Pie*, 1627, oil on panel. 75 × 132 cm. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam

Other colonies of expatriate Dutchmen – in Hamburg, in Stettin – are characterized by similar finds of smooth, hard, colourful, fragile and translucent objects, showing up at the same time as they do in Amsterdam. Given the close family ties between the colonies and Amsterdam it is so tempting to see the exotic, fragile objects as carriers of love, unity and friendship from the homeland to the colony, and from the host to the other members of the colony he invited to dine with him.

Negative emotions in archaeology: hatred and anger

In unfolding an archaeology of negative emotions, my first example comes from the Danish town of Elsinore. On 14 June 1583, a Dutch-born citizen in the town was called before an assembly of citizens presided over by the town council and solemnly evicted from the city for doing the raker's job and emptying his cesspit.¹² The man refused to leave unless it was explained to him what offence he had committed. The town council asked the Danish citizens if they would allow the Dutchman to continue living in the city. The assembly replied that 'they in no way would agree to have him as a fellow citizen after such an action in which he had been doing the raker's work, and therefore had made a raker of himself'. We can note that the man was not evicted for breaking a city by-law but for violating the local custom that forbade honest men to do raker's work and thus come into contact with human waste. The court case demonstrates that the Danes in the city formed an emotional community with specific norms attached to particular kinds of materiality. For them, specific materials possessed the ability to pollute, degrade and corrupt those who touched them; this corruption of the handler brought out anger and disgust in others and made him a pariah who could not be tolerated but had to be expelled, just as the raker himself was excluded from the community.¹³

We may notice that the strong negative emotions that clung to human waste, and to the infectious nature of this matter, seem to have been culturally peculiar to the Nordic countries. The Dutchman in question did not share these norms: he belonged to a different emotional community, and did not share the beliefs of the native townsmen, with devastating results for him and his family. The case counts as an example of the ability of emotions to transfer from matter to humans through the sense *tactus*, through touch. This particular matter was thus held able to transgress the human-object divide and transform, even infect, the human through the senses. The matter in question did not represent disgust, fear and anger; it *did* disgust and anger and became one with the body social of the offending man, transferring these strong negative emotions to him and to everything he touched.

Few written sources are available for the elucidation of emotions surrounding excretion in the medieval period, but excavated town plots give some pointers. Firstly, pictorial and written sources indicate that human excrement embodied negative emotions in the Middle Ages as well as in the early modern period. Wall paintings in medieval Danish churches frequently depicted defecating devils, which suggest that this particular activity attracted negative emotions. Among the written sources mentioning a link between the underworld and excrement is Oluf Tryggvason's saga from the late fourteenth century.¹⁴ The devil on the latrine is one of the familiar literary tropes of the middle ages, and, as noted by Carolyn Larrington, this points to the toilet as a liminal space, an opening between hell and the human world.¹⁵ An



Figure 17.2 Meeting the devil in his own element. Sir John Harrington, *The Metamorphosis of Ajax*, 1596. Getty Images

excavation of the city of Aarhus offers an insight into the emotions surrounding this matter among the artisans who occupied the plot.¹⁶

The excavation (Figure 17.3) allows us to reconstruct a clear ground plan where the dwelling is situated closest to the main road, with the main hall, the kitchen and the storage areas placed in full view of an adjoining public road. The cesspits




Figure 17.3 Plan of mid-fourteenth century town plot in the town of Aarhus. The dwellings face the street below, while the cesspits are assembled in the backyards. Map: Moesgaard Museum

were placed at the opposite end of the plot as far away from the main hall as possible, hidden from view behind a stable. The cesspits themselves were constructed as wood-lined pits in the ground. The pits showed no traces of being emptied. Instead, a new pit was dug in the ground when one was full. The site itself saw frequent reuse of materials, but it seems that the particular matter in the pits was never reused, but left to decompose and disappear. That a nutrient which would have benefited the agricultural production of the town was not used but left untouched suggests that it was shunned for fear of a transfer of negative emotions from this material to the humans who touched it. This may indicate that negative emotions clung to this matter, and that it was able to transgress the human–object border through touch in the fourteenth century also.

The third example takes this matter further back in time, to the early eleventh century. No written or pictorial sources are available in this period in Denmark, so we are left with archaeology and in this case with an excavation of an early eleventh-century workshop and its surroundings near the town of Viborg in Jutland. The excavation has been published in great detail, and it has some potential to cast light on the relationship between humans and materiality in the early Middle Ages.¹⁷ On the plot, a workshop that once belonged to a magnate farm was excavated. The hall was not excavated, but from the layout of the area, it is clear that it had been situated some 100 yards (91 metres) to the west, so that the workshop was constructed in the outskirts of the fenced area encircling the magnate farm. A cesspit was excavated next to the workshop, only one metre distant. The cesspit was constructed a short while – probably a year – before the workshop, and both functioned for only a few years. A fence separated cesspit and workshop, and furthermore a screen had been constructed around the cesspit, shielding the users from plain sight. As in

the fourteenth-century example, this cesspit showed no signs of being emptied. The workshop itself was a light construction, a mere shack that occasionally functioned as a shelter for sheep. The placement of the workshop near an open cesspit is remarkable and may suggest that the matter of human excrement was free of any negative emotions or cultural taboos in this period. Nevertheless, the fence and the screen show that some separation or shielding between the two zones – the workshop zone and the cesspit – was desirable. In spite of their proximity, we might compare the spatial arrangement of the cesspit with the layout of the later medieval plot: in both cases, the cesspits are placed at the back of the plot, out of sight of the magnate farm. Just as at the fourteenth-century plot, the cesspit was not emptied and the contents not reused, which might suggest the material had similar significance, and indicate that negative emotions clung to it. Nevertheless, the placement of the workshop near the cesspit calls for consideration, as that placement would expose the artisan to contamination. This point can be elucidated through analysis of the activities in the workshop.¹⁸ The workshop was clean and ordered; the floor was frequently swept during use, and debris was deposited in pits at the back of the workshop. Furthermore, there were no traces of food debris or food preparation in the area. Nevertheless, an analysis showed that household waste – shards of cooking pots, animal bones, etc. – had been thrown from the outside into the workshop area while it was in use. The meticulous order of the artisan contrasts with the placement of the cesspit, as well as with the disposal of household waste – a waste that must have been decomposing while the artisans worked there. This contrast between order and waste may point to the existence of negative emotions towards the artisan in the minds of the people who threw the waste and who had ordered the layout of the plot. Given the social and historical circumstances, it is tempting to interpret this as the negative emotions of a slave owner towards a slave – many artisans were thralls in the late Viking Age. Perhaps this man, who may have been a thrall, had been infected with negative emotions through contact with the cesspit and the decomposing household waste.

Materiality and emotions in archaeology

In spite of the chronological differences, these examples show similar attitudes towards materiality in a long-time perspective. In all of them sensing and the senses transferred or even incorporated not only the tangible qualities in objects but also intangible or spiritual qualities within the same objects: embedded in materiality, changing the nature of things, blurring the boundary between materiality and spirituality. Mary Laven summarizes the emotions called out by the sight of devotional objects and writes of their power to ‘arouse sympathy, sorrow, pain and compassion’.¹⁹ She notes even the ‘feel’ of an object as a way of activating correct emotional responses. This is why holiness could be transferred to or incorporated into the body by touch, sight, hearing, smell and taste: by touching relics, seeing the holy light, hearing the holy words, smelling the sweet smell of holiness and by consuming the holy. Even the inevitable decay of matter could be transformed or halted through divine intervention, as seen in notions of the sweet smell rising from graves of bodies untouched by decay.²⁰ In the medieval world view discussed by Peter Brown and Mary Laven, materiality was seen as able to possess spiritual qualities, and it could be transformed through miracles, the most well known being the transubstantiation.²¹

The communion's essence was modelled on the shared meal, and just as the meal marked the inclusion of individuals into worldly communities, the communion marked the inclusion of an individual into the congregation. In a parodic contrast, which lies at the heart of premodern Christian attitudes to materiality, the absolute opposite of the divine transformation in the miracle is contamination by matter. The miracle of the Eucharist was able to transform humans and materiality alike to a higher level through divine intervention. Moral and physical corruption were also able to transgress the divide between human and matter, to degrade and corrupt to such a degree that the damage was irreversible. Following that logic, we can model the spatial structure of the town plots as an interplay of contrasts. Here we have a space for intake in the house, centred on the table, triggering emotions of unity, friendship and love, and a space of disposal in the backyard, as far away from the space of intake as possible, triggering emotions of anger and loathing.

Conclusion

Through the case studies in this chapter, I hope to have advanced a view that the controlled senses – gaze, touch, smell, selective hearing and so on – leading to controlled emotions, acted as markers of civilization, and underlay numerous behavioural norms and customs; these had to be integrated into the habitus from childhood, and they very much separated the civilized from the savage in the northern European world. The process is visible in behavioural manuals like the Norse *King's Mirror*, where the matter of how to behave in the company of the king is made clear.²² Behavioural manuals are one of the channels in which such knowledge can be transferred. Such manuals, and their present-day counterparts, are liberating, letting outsiders learn previously unspoken rules of conduct. An older example is something as straightforward and well researched as the introduction of the fork. While the fork can be seen as an instrument of the devil – it certainly was considered such in the early middle ages – it can now be seen as part of the civilizing process, as another layer of materiality put between the self and the world. But if we look at the fork as a medium, it is a democratic tool, and even an emotional tool, because it allows a user – any user – to forego the complicated etiquette surrounding eating with your fingers in a civilized way, thus giving the unskilled or newly emerging classes a way of participating in rituals surrounding consumption without triggering loathing and anger in their host and fellow guests: it is a way of shortcutting access to specific emotional communities. In that sense the development of screens around cesspits, of forks, and private chambers and individual pots and plates, and all the other goods that increasingly overwhelmed the world in this period are not the remains of a civilizing process, but a materialization of civilizing behaviour surrounding consumption, aimed at reducing the risk of triggering unwanted and negative emotional responses. As such, plates and forks become democratic goods, linked to geographic and social mobility, items that in their very essence are tied to negotiations of the boundary between clean and unclean; negotiations that have nothing to do with hygiene in our sense of the word but have everything to do with emotions.

These examples of the double-sided nature of consumption show that materiality can lead in opposing directions: one to order, and feelings of friendship, trust, acceptance and inclusion, and the other to hatred, loathing and fear. Here I have

used materiality mediated through touch as the prime example and concentrated on materials related to consumption. To my mind, there is little doubt that it is essential to incorporate a consideration of emotional values and understandings into our understanding of materiality in archaeological research, and this chapter is an attempt to do so, putting back the materials into materiality. The matter that lies at the core of materiality, what we might call the heart of the matter, is that we are dealing with a time where materiality was not objectified and not taken in primarily through the visible and sight, as in the present day. Instead, materiality was mediated through the body, primarily through touch. Through the medieval and early modern periods, the modes of mediated materiality changed – to literary sources, paintings, prints, lists and letters – and this may well have given rise to the development and implementation of different emotional responses. In fact, the elite and non-elite might not even have had the same perception of materiality. Therefore, we need to take the social and historical context of people into account when we talk about emotions in materiality. We also need to guard against treating objects in individual isolation if we are to grasp their position in the world of the past. There is no doubt that to succeed, we as archaeologists need a sense of historical variability and change. We also need to pay attention to the way that emotion works through materials themselves, as well as material things and places, both in relation to how emotional communities are created and recreated, and to how materiality and the emotions embedded in it structure the world.

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PART 5

ENCOUNTERS AND EXCURSIONS



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DIPLOMATIC EMOTIONS

International relations as gendered acts of power

Susan Broomhall

This chapter explores diplomatic emotions, by which I mean a wide range of affective and emotional behaviours performed in ceremonies, rituals, spaces and texts associated with diplomatic action – in this case, generally high-level political activity. Such behaviours were written into both publicly visible and closed-circulation forms of diplomatic documentation such as letters, treatises and peace agreements, and performed through bodily gesture and actions. These emotions included both staged performances and their lived experiences, both as consequences of the former but also as disruptive, unexpected emotional and affective expression. I explore a range of methodologies by which we can interpret diplomatic emotions and assess how contemporaries understood their influence on forms of power. This chapter examines how we can think about what diplomatic emotions achieved in particular analytical contexts of international relations, and within different kinds of diplomatic sources as they changed over the period 1100 to 1700.

An interest in the social and cultural contexts of diplomacy has been a key analytical component of the ‘new diplomatic history’ that emerged in the wake of John Watkins’s call for attention to these aspects.¹ At the same time, a series of scholars has provided new insights into the connections of contemporary diplomatic practices to literary production.² Study of the emotions in diplomatic forms and expressed by diplomatic agents can draw upon these analyses and methodologies to provide a new perspective on international relations.

The kinds of questions about emotions, specifically what I am terming ‘diplomatic emotions’, emerge from a number of important theorizations about emotions in recent years. Following work by William M. Reddy, Barbara H. Rosenwein and Sara Ahmed, I understand emotions, even disruptive expressions, as relational and social.³ Particular performances are embedded in specific contexts that give precise meaning to them. Moreover, among the forms of emotions of interest here are those expressed in corporeal gestures and affective performances, and through the demands on bodies to move and be moved in a wide range of acts required by diplomatic work. Bodies took centre stage in diplomacy, and bodies, as well as minds, produced emotions, as Monique Scheer argues, through habitual practices reflective of their social relations.⁴

This chapter explores approaches by which we can interrogate how such diplomatic emotions were understood to create forms of power; that is, what they were

perceived to have achieved, disrupted or entailed as consequences. Past emotions cannot be divorced from their contemporary gender ideologies; they are embedded in contemporary gender discourses that are essential to their analysis.⁵ International politics, and diplomatic practice, were gendered acts and relations of power: that is, this mode of communication is informed by contemporary gender ideologies and assumptions, including their expression of emotion. Moreover, in the context of diplomatic encounters and exchanges, emotional expressions were the product of intersectional identities: that is, of a range of social identities such as race, social status, age, faith and other social stratification that interacted with gender in complex ways.

This chapter understands power as relational and dynamic, as, for example, forms of domination and subordination of one individual or group to another, and considers the involvement of emotional expression in those processes.⁶ Feminist scholarship has, however, nuanced conceptualizations of power, arguing that it can also provide agency and capacity for change: that is, as potentially empowering.⁷ We can thus consider how affective rhetoric or action might transform the trajectory of a diplomatic engagement, and which diplomatic agents could successfully use emotions as a form of power in this sense. These scholars also reflect upon power in collaborative forms, through alliances that aligned people for common purposes. Such a conceptualization sits well with studies by Joanna Bourke on the capacity of emotions to align people, 'subjecting them to power relations'.⁸ This chapter thus aims firstly to consider how we can conceptualize and locate diplomatic emotions in the records of this period, from advice manuals for princes and the evidence of their international relations in epistolary and corporeal practice, to consideration of the feelings of subordinate officials involved in diplomatic labour, and of missionaries, mariners and traders conducting international relations through their cross-cultural encounters. Secondly, it will analyse how such emotional expressions can be interpreted for their shaping of forms of power and its consequences in such high-level political and diplomatic contexts.

Governing emotions: lessons for princes

Contemporary conduct books for princes provide models of ideal emotional behaviour in interactions with other rulers. A consistent feature of such literature was the need for leaders to govern emotional expression in their diplomatic relations, although how such affective experience was to be managed could vary widely in the opinions of this literature's authors, especially according to the gender of 'the prince'. Moreover, interpreting the perception of authors about the power of emotional display cannot be divorced from understanding the context in which such authors composed their recommendations, for the feelings of writers were deeply embedded in the politics of their environment and of their advice.

Among these was the work of Gerald of Wales, an experienced diplomatic envoy on behalf of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and as royal clerk and chaplain to Henry II before he became disaffected with the Plantagenet monarch's rule. The first distinction of his work *De principis instructione*, most likely completed after the death of King John of England, outlines a conventional series of moral virtues of the prince (gentleness, patience, clemency, prudence, devotion) but also includes affective

dispositions associated with men – boldness and bravery (*audacia et animositas*) – among the prince's ideal qualities.⁹ In the work's second and third distinctions, Gerald elaborates the merits of these through a critical analysis of what he perceived as the increasingly emotionally fraught behaviour of Henry II in his diplomatic interactions with contemporary rulers across Europe, and its disastrous consequences. Gerald of course was neither a neutral political bystander nor emotionally disengaged from his subject matter; his work performed his own loyalty to the Capetian dynasty that he hoped would come to rule England.¹⁰

While Gerald's writings focused on the ideal disposition of the male leader, other authors considered the distinctive emotional capacity of women for diplomatic labour. Notable among these are the series of works by Christine de Pizan that highlighted the important role of women as contributors to public life, presenting exemplars from scriptural, historical and fictional sources. Pizan adopted conventional assumptions of the emotional disposition of men ('more courageous' and 'more hot-headed') and women ('by nature more timid and also of a sweeter disposition') to argue for women's particular skill in diplomatic and intercessory roles.¹¹ In her *Epistre a la royne de France* (1405) Pizan emphasized the important peace-making work that Isabeau of Bavaria, Queen of France, could achieve through what she described as female emotional qualities: pity, charity and clemency.¹² Pizan's interpretation of diplomatic emotions appeared in genres that reflected her opportunities for both literary participation and personal political engagement. Her works were produced in the context of the French court where Isabeau acted as semi-regent for her incapacitated husband, Charles V.

Other writers reflected on their perception of European leaders' differing feeling codes, which clearly affected the quality and potential of their diplomatic interactions. Enea Silvio Bartolomeo Piccolomini, who spent some twelve years as secretary to the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III, disparagingly compared the feeling dispositions of Germans to those of Italians. In Germany, he suggested, 'princes choose to keep horses, dogs, lions, and bears, instead of poets' whereas in Italy, 'princes are not ashamed to listen to and themselves to know, poetry'.¹³ Frederick's lack of engagement with humanist feeling culture surely shaped Piccolomini's later, negative assessment (by then as Pope Pius II), of the emperor's 'ambitions, "rashness" and "avarice", although begrudgingly admitting that, in feats of arms, "his rashness sometimes brought him a reputation for courage"'.¹⁴ As with all these accounts, it revealed as much about Pius II as about Frederick, particularly as to the feeling qualities on which they placed value.

Recommendations about managing a prince's display of emotions were the focus of other contributions to this genre. Niccolò Machiavelli, diplomat of the Florentine Republic, achieved long-lasting fame with the frankness of *The Prince*, written in 1513. This work was composed during his exile from the Medici-ruled city and privately circulated, before being published posthumously in 1532. He recommended, for example, that the prince should appear 'compassionate, faithful, human, honest and religious, and at the same time be able to change to the opposite'.¹⁵ Yet such a proposal was not far removed from those expressed less bluntly by other contemporaries. The importance of controlled emotional behaviour, even sometimes a deliberate denial of lived feelings, was emphasized by other authors, many of whom knew at first hand of what they wrote. Anne de France, regent for her brother

Charles VIII of France, composed her *Enseignements* around 1505 for her daughter Suzanne, later duchess of Bourbon. This work addressing elite women, like many other fifteenth- and sixteenth-century diplomatic manuals, emphasized the necessity that their ‘conversation be honest and good and in all things courteous and amiable, so that you are pleasant to all’.¹⁶ Anne warned her daughter: ‘do not appear surprised, whatever rudeness one does to you’ for noble ladies would be rewarded for ‘their virtuous patience, humility and great constancy’.¹⁷ Patience and humility, while not exclusively female qualities, were hallmarks of this manual for women, but prudence was certainly a recommendation offered to both male and female leaders.

The emotional tone of such ‘mirror for princes’ literature shifted from recommendation to something closer to intimidation with the composition of *De rege et regis institutione*, by the Spanish Jesuit political philosopher, Juan de Mariana. This work written in the 1590s gained particular traction in the 1620s upon the accession of Philip IV.¹⁸ Mariana, an ardent Catholic who had studied abroad in Italy and France, cast a harshly critical eye over the recent history of the Habsburg kings and an increasingly bureaucratic monarchy that attempted to control the Church. Mariana’s emotionally provocative text presented a stern warning for his readers about princes who did not honour and protect the Church, particularly through recent case studies of the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots and the assassination of Henri III in France.¹⁹ Beyond its emotional charge for readers, the text sparked a major diplomatic incident for the Spanish after the assassination of Henri IV of France, widely understood as following Mariana’s programme. In Paris, the *Parlement* identified Mariana as personally responsible for the assassination and publicly burnt his book.²⁰ More than ever, the role of such literature in shaping emotional realities of political work was made visible.

A survey of advice literature for Europe’s leaders makes clear how their authors firmly identified emotional management as critical apparatus for a leader’s ability to liaise with his or her people and with others. For all authors, assumptions about gender shaped the affective and emotional qualities that could assist women and men in positions of power in these diplomatic exchanges. In interpreting the importance and nature of diplomatic emotions in such texts, we must remember that authors’ advice was oriented and informed by their own feelings and experiences, which was, in many cases, an explicit part of the purpose or authority of the arguments that they presented. Moreover, a number of such texts became strikingly influential in emotionally engaging readers and shaping how diplomatic and political work was conducted in the period.

Practising princely brotherhood and friendship

Advice literature for powerful women and men offers insights into expectations about how leaders might govern their emotions and manage those of others, but we can turn to other sources to examine how feelings were performed and expressed in practice. Studying emotions in diplomatic exchanges among leaders within and beyond Europe in the period requires attention to the ways in which emotional rhetoric and affective display constructed power for monarchs, consorts and regents, and governed their relations with each other.²¹ As this section explores, feeling rules for rulers were gendered, and operated through exclusionary terms and practices.

The implications of these modes of political practice for diplomatic exchange were profound; they foregrounded particular expressions and acts of emotion that were designed to emphasize equality, and equivalent affective agency, between nominally sovereign princes.

At the beginning of this period, it was often leading men of the court, even leaders themselves, who undertook diplomatic work, whose power was vested personally in their bodies, speech and actions. The emotional labour of this form of diplomatic work is visualized in the Bayeux Tapestry, in which Harold Godwinson's unfortunate landing in the territory of Guy I, Count of Ponthieu, is shown as resulting in him being obliged to undertake masculine sociabilities with and for William, Duke of Normandy, in exchange for his release. This included his participation in William's local military conflicts, acceptance of his gifts such as weapons, and possibly entering into a contract of marriage with William's sister, all of which locked him into subordinate, personal ties of obligation, alliance and loyalty to the ambitious duke. The *tituli* of the Bayeux Tapestry outline the series of acts by which Harold indicated his ties to William's service, while its images demonstrate these as intimate acts of sociability between the two men, and thus the enormous consequences for Harold of his refutation of them.

Discursive and performed concepts such as love and friendship were vital to political sociabilities across this period, but they were to be tested by new religious dynamics in the 1520s and 1530s as Ottoman and French leaders began to move towards an alliance against the Habsburgs.²² Feelings would be embedded at the heart of this international alliance that was framed as a relationship between individual men, as the instructions provided to the first official ambassador of François I of France to the Sublime Porte, Jean de La Forêt, written in February 1535, made clear. La Forêt was to convey François's thanks 'with all his heart' to the sultan, Süleymân I, for his letters that were 'full of good will, esteem, great affection, humanity and liberality' towards François, and to offer 'from his part the same, and to be his good brother and friend always in all things not derogating the Christian faith'.²³ The rhetorical framing of the two leaders' reciprocity of feelings was positioned as a conduit to reciprocity in further actions, as indeed came to pass, with Süleymân and François providing concrete military support for each other's geopolitical objectives in the region.

Having determined to support the French, it was also in the interests of the Ottomans for both their actions and their narratives to boast the qualities of their allies. The Ottoman historian *Djalâlzâde Muṣṭafâ Ćelebi* described the warm welcome given by officials at the Porte specifically to the French, by contrast with that accorded their Habsburg rivals.²⁴ Imperial envoys' attempts to demonstrate their willingness to engage with the Ottomans on their own terms of importance met with little result. As Cornelius de Schepper wrote to his master Ferdinand, the grand vezir *Ibrâhîm Paṣḥa* pointedly marked out his preference for the French and his irritation with François I's rival, Emperor Charles V.²⁵ Having been presented with the official missives from Ferdinand and Charles to him, *Ibrâhîm* highlighted what he found to be an undesirable affective tone within Charles' letter: '[it] is not from a modest and prudent prince, he enumerates his titles with pride'. *Ibrâhîm* added that when the king of France and the Sultan exchanged letters neither elaborated their titles, each writing instead as a 'much-loved brother'.²⁶ When Antun Vrančić and Ferenc Zay

arrived as special envoys of Ferdinand I in August 1553 to discuss a peace between Habsburgs and Ottomans, they described to their royal master their perception that Ferdinand was esteemed a prince 'whose even the slightest move is considered the gravest offence'. Explaining the failure of their mission, Vrančić and Zay concluded that the 'memories of bygone hatred are, you see, very strong'.²⁷ Rhetorical expressions of brotherhood and friendship expressed among leaders assumed positions of equality and intimacy between parties, to the exclusion of others, often with dramatic political consequences.

These new alliances were frequently articulated as threatening existing relationships and shared understandings between fellow Christian leaders, none more so than that between the Christian sovereign princes, Charles V and François I. Isolated by the Ottomans' attention to the French, Charles V expressed frustration among the Imperial diplomatic network about his own relationship with François I as a fellow Christian sovereign prince. In April 1535, he outlined a series of grievances against François to his leading statesman, Antoine Perronet de Granvelle: the king's trickeries, he lamented, could 'exhaust the patience of the world's happiest person'.²⁸ Charles complained that François had entered into an alliance that was 'so scandalous and pernicious . . . and with such terrible consequences to Christianity'.²⁹ As a result, François had refused assistance to a fellow Christian against Muslims, and 'expressly refused to help [Charles] even with his galleys, because he had signed a truce with him'.³⁰ Even so, the princely language of brotherhood was clearly complicated by differences of faith, and, notably, these quasi-familial expressions between French and Ottoman leaders did not lead to the marital alignments that so often characterized and reinforced similar emotional performances among Christians. By contrast, the apparent breakdown of friendship between these Christian princes occurred while they remained brothers-in-law, François having married Charles's sister, Eleanor, in 1530.

Female leaders, just as non-Christian rulers, presented complications to diplomatic engagements founded on emotional exchanges as brothers. Moreover, the conceptualization of their relationship through a familial lens would render women subordinate to men, even as sisters. The Latin epistolary relationship established between Elizabeth I and Sultan Murad III, which led to their signing of a charter of trade in 1580, thus necessitated the creation of an alternative common ground between the leaders that retained, and was sustained by, a powerful emotional charge while bypassing an impossible brotherhood. Their relationship was reframed as established upon a friendship forged by a shared rejection of Catholic religious values, particularly perceived idolatry, with Elizabeth positioned as Christian Europe's leading spiritual guide.³¹ Murad's letters to Elizabeth offered fulsome praise of her as 'the pride of women who follow Jesus, the most excellent of the ladies honoured among the Messiah's people, the arbitress of the affairs of the Christian community, who trails the skirts of majesty and gravity'.³² The textual community forged by these letters was followed up by official appointment of an ambassador from England to the Porte, William Harborne, selected by the Levant Company in 1583.

Moreover, friendship complicated dimensions that went beyond princely equality. In the political environment at the Porte, Christian princes from Western Europe soon realized that friendship and brotherhood with the pashas and other leading officials were just as significant as with the elusive Sultan. François I's instructions for

the emotional engagement he expected of his first resident ambassador were coupled with additional advice on how La Forêt was to treat the admiral of the Ottoman fleet, Khayr al-Dīn. Indeed, François's presentation of feelings for the latter was far more explicit than the friendship of brotherhood that he professed for Süleymān. Moreover, it was framed in La Forêt's instruction as a response to Khayr al-Dīn's own feelings for the French king, 'having understood and perceived the affection and desire that Haradin [Khayr al-Dīn] has to please the king, the great and beautiful offers he has made him, the good work that he has employed on the king's behalf with the Great Lord' resulting in the alliance 'in part thanks to the favour and persuasion of Haradin', a recognition of the senior advisor's powers of emotional influence with the Sultan, for which the king promised never to be 'ungrateful'.³³ He now asked Khayr al-Dīn 'to hold out for him his hand of good advice and power, which the king knows to be very great', and to write letters of support and encouragement in his favour where required.³⁴ These instructions carefully balanced authority and action, love and friendship with the Sultan and a key advisor.

The French were not alone in recognizing the persuasive power of the Sultan's subordinates in their diplomatic endeavours. In case Imperial envoys to the Porte in 1531 (or Ferdinand, the report's recipient) were in any doubt of the grand vezir's proximity to power and knowledge about such affairs, Ibrāhīm Pasha showed them a ruby on his finger that he claimed had been taken from the very hand of François I.³⁵ Whether or not this reflected François's impressions of the relationship he was fostering, Ibrāhīm's recollections left the Imperial representatives clear as to how he expected to be positioned in Western European hierarchies. In 1553, Vrančić and Zay discovered the power of another grand vezir, Rüstem Pasha, who interrupted their prepared speech and informed them that they were not to raise Transylvania with the Sultan. They quickly realized that his views would need to be accommodated, writing to Ferdinand how they went about '[d]emonstrating modesty with the expression of our faces and with the manner of our speech' and informing Rüstem Pasha how much they valued his advice.³⁶ 'The Pasha visibly gladdened upon hearing this, because we demonstrated how much Your Majesty appreciated him by wishing to rely on his advice when pleading for peace'.³⁷ Careful attention to the feelings of the sultan's leading officials became the bedrock of diplomatic engagement by Europeans at the Porte.

In summary, the assumption that rule was a predominantly male preserve clearly informed the manner in which leaders not only performed power but also how they engaged with others in diplomatic contexts. Alliances were forged through a conceptualization of diplomacy as emotional work, led by princely brothers, which involved gendered, exclusionary practices. The concept of friendship was likewise complicated for contemporaries by its inherent assumptions about the equality of affective agency of the partners involved, but did provide a framework in which relations with and between female leaders, non-Christian rulers and subordinate officials could be defined by an emotional engagement with each other in other terms than the familial.

Diplomatic bodies

Textual sources form a key focus of study for diplomatic emotions, but the behaviour of bodies, accessed through their interpretation in written, visual and material sources, is also an important source for understanding their force. Facial

expression, gesture and the action of bodies in diplomatic activities were carefully interpreted by eye-witnesses for their political meaning as well as in artworks in which such practices were visualized, but leaders' bodies were also engaged in diplomatic works in intimate ways that equally demand consideration as emotional, as well as physical, labour.

The brotherly love expressed between princes was often based in real kinship ties forged through dynastic intermarriages. Scholars have begun to focus upon the diplomatic work of elite women as a form of cultural encounter, as they married and moved to new courts under these arrangements. They represented, and offered ongoing opportunities for, their natal dynasty in these new environments, but in ways that occasionally raised questions among contemporaries about their loyalties in and to the courts where they had arrived.³⁸ In some cases, these suspicions were perhaps right. Although she was twice queen of France, Anne of Brittany left instruction that, at her death in 1514, while her body was buried with members of the Valois dynasty at the Basilique Saint-Denis, her heart was to be returned to Nantes in her native Brittany alongside the tomb of her parents. There, it was encased in a gold heart-shaped reliquary topped with a crown of lily and clover. The question of women's conflicted loyalties between natal and marital dynasties remained a persistent concern for contemporaries.

Foreign marriage partners had to be acclimatized to the local ceremonial, sartorial, gestural and feeling programmes of their new environment. Texts and the advice of senior courtly women within the household supported them to do so. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, Eleanor of Poitiers, a member of the household of Isabella of Bourbon, Duchess of Burgundy, compiled a handbook of courtly protocols for elite women that helped to outline the feeling rules of the new community. Her work demonstrated women's careful diplomatic work as newcomers to balance the rituals of honour and precedence at their new court, with other gender codes and expectations of wifely duty. For example, Eleanor's discussion of the rights to precedence of Beatrice of Portugal, Mademoiselle de Coïmbre, who was niece of Isabel of Portugal, Duchess of Burgundy, indicated that Eleanor had 'heard many times that one did wrong to Mademoiselle de Coïmbre and that she ought to go ahead', but that she was prevented from going ahead of certain other court ladies by her aunt. Eleanor revealed that Isabel invoked wifely obedience and respect for a husband over her niece's rights to honourable recognition, as she recorded 'that she did not want her niece to go ahead of those of Monsieur the Duke Philip her husband, in his household, to show that all wives must do honour to the relatives of their husbands before their own'.³⁹ The production of Eleanor's text, and its detailed explanations of her own sources of authority, suggest how significant honour codes were for women, and how highly valued were the attendant women who could settle courtly disputes and manage tensions with their knowledge of ceremony and ritual.

More complicated perhaps, and certainly less frequent, were royal marriages that entailed the movement of men to new courtly spaces. The husband of Mary Tudor, Philip, was made king of Naples and of Jerusalem by his father, to render him a suitable partner for a queen regnant. After much negotiation between English and Spanish officials, it was agreed that Philip would become *jure uxoris* King of England and Ireland upon his marriage, despite the attendant complications of how a regnant queen (and her nation) could suitably subordinate herself as a

dutiful wife to her foreign husband. In a contrast to attitudes towards the marriage of foreign princesses, few assumed, it seemed, that Philip's loyalty would be to anything other than his natal dynasty. Beyond this symbolic emotional code, Mary's show of lavish gifts for her spouse upon his arrival in England for the marriage, as well as her apparent delight in her new husband, were carefully observed and reported by ambassadors to their home courts. When Philip left on 29 August 1555 after a return visit to Mary, the Venetian ambassador Giovanni Michiel described what he termed 'grief appropriate for a wife',

when having returned to her own rooms, leaning on a window overlooking the river, thinking that she was no longer being seen by anyone, she dispelled her pain freely with tears. . . . [Philip] kept on taking off his hat, saluting her with most affectionate gestures.⁴⁰

Unlike most female consorts, Philip's time at his new marital court would be fleeting, and thus assessments of the couple's affections for each other during these short intervals were vital, in a context in which a pregnancy would have radical international consequences.

Something of the complex emotions of marriage partners whose intimate feelings and sexual matters were played out visibly for a wide-ranging audience was captured by William Shakespeare in *Henry V*. In Act 5, Scene 2, Henry, King of England, attempts to woo romantically the woman whose body is already his by the terms of a peace treaty negotiated after the 1415 Battle of Agincourt, and agreed with her father, Charles V, King of France. Catherine of Valois points as much out in her guarded responses to Henry's repeated requests for her to 'love me soundly with your French heart' (5.2.104–5), to which she responds: 'Pardonnez-moi, I cannot tell wat is "like me"' (5.2.108).⁴¹ Indeed, Shakespeare's Catherine notably separates her emotional life from the sexual and reproductive practices that her body will be expected to perform: the marriage 'is as it shall please de roi mon père' (5.2.261). Moreover, her speech highlights the very problematic nature of marriages forged as the diplomatic conclusion to deeply emotional conflicts: 'Is it possible dat I sould love de enemy of France?' (5.2.174–5). Catherine receives Henry's kiss, albeit unwillingly, but is silent about her feelings for her soon-to-be husband, carefully retaining control of at least one aspect of her corporeal and psychic experience. Shakespeare's work suggests that the feelings of leaders whose bodies were hostage to international agreements must have intrigued contemporary audiences, as they do us.

Shakespeare's depiction of this marital partnership as requiring positive emotional as well as corporeal participation reflected contemporary views that conception entailed the pleasure of both partners. Therefore, the emotional disposition of partners towards each other formed an important part of the discourse around elite marriage and was often employed as a strategic political mechanism to make or break dynastic commitments. Henriëtte Catharina, third daughter of Frederik Hendrik, Prince of Orange, and his wife, Amalia von Solms-Braunfels, had been engaged to a relative, Count Enno Lodewijk van Oost-Friesland (1632–1660), in December 1641, when she was five and he nine.⁴² Over time, Enno Lodewijk proved a less than desirable match for the ambitious Orange-Nassau dynasty.⁴³ By 1653, the family were keen to break the engagement, with Henriëtte Catharina's mother, Amalia, announcing

‘that to her regret, in this matter, the affection between the parties was not only not growing, but was decreasing ever more’.⁴⁴ On this particular occasion, it suited the House of Orange-Nassau to suggest that Henriëtte Catharina could not be forced to marry when her feelings for the potential groom were insufficient.

Could sexual relations between governing individuals create affection, could such affection produce children, and could children transfer a woman’s loyalty from her natal to marital dynasty? The bodies of women and men were intimately embedded in diplomatic endeavours, and their feelings of interest to all manner of onlookers, ranging from diplomatic personnel to those who considered their experiences on the London stage.

Surrogate feelings

Of course, it was not only the bodies of leading women and men that participated in diplomatic missions, but also those of the special envoys, diplomats, secretaries and ambassadorial staff who were engaged in the same endeavours. Emotions can be studied as a vital part of the expressive culture in which the letters and reports of diplomatic personnel were produced.

One aspect of the emotional disposition expected of such delegates was their loyalty to the superiors whom they served. Attestations of this kind are found repeatedly across the period, in different forms, in the exchanges between diplomats and their masters. Thus, the Archbishop of Seville, who had been sent on a diplomatic mission by Henry III of Castile to the King of Aragon from 1404 to 1406, emphasized in his correspondence that he had sought to achieve his task ‘diligently’, even dedicating his body to ‘the things for which you have sent me, God knows how I try to work at them even unto death’.⁴⁵ Devotion of mind and body to their superiors was an important part of the rhetorical emotional investment expressed by diplomatic personnel.

Instruction manuals produced for this gradually self-identifying community highlighted the need for controlled expressions of affective speech and gesture. These texts made clear that emotional dissimulation by diplomatic agents was vital to the discernment of others’ feelings and motivations. Considered as the first ambassadorial text, and written by an experienced diplomat himself, Bernard de Rosier’s *Ambaxiator Brevilogus* (1436) demanded that ambassadors mask their true feelings and ‘let outrage yield to friendliness’.⁴⁶ His appearance must remain ‘unmoved to those whose responses are less pleasant or negative’.⁴⁷ Étienne Dolet, who gained his experience as French ambassador in Venice in the late 1520s, argued in his *De officio legati* of 1541 that younger men were ill suited to the task, not simply because of their lack of experience but because they were possessed of ‘unbridled passions, arrogance, audacity – in short, every kind of rash and headlong impulse rules them’.⁴⁸ Emotional self-control was required, in part, because diplomats were expected to represent the feelings of the superiors who had sent them. Diplomatic envoys reminded their audiences of just this point, particularly when they perceived themselves at risk through the messages they conveyed. Gontier Col, in a report to Charles VI of France on the mission he had undertaken to John V, Duke of Brittany, in 1414 on behalf of the Duke’s mother Joan, Queen of England, reminded the king that he represented the queen, not himself:

I am just the organ or tool to proffer what was charged unto me, as Terence says: *Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit* . . . and I do not want to gain the hatred or enmity of anyone. Thus, I beg you humbly to pardon my blunt language, my nonsense and recklessness.⁴⁹

We might note, too, that this messenger's description of his message made clear his own thoughts about the quality of its content, and perhaps aimed, even in its ostensibly subordinate rhetoric, to distinguish the male representative from the woman whose speech he performed.

The ambassador's body – his facial expression, gesture, demeanour and speech – was thus expected to be a tool for diplomatic action. In practice, however, it could prove difficult to keep separate the emotions of the male diplomat from those of the leader he was to represent. Shakespeare problematizes just such a situation in his presentation of the verbal encounter between Margaret of Anjou and William de la Pole, Duke of Suffolk, in *Henry VI Part 1*.⁵⁰ In Act 5, Scene 3, in which Suffolk woos Margaret on behalf of his lord, Henry VI, Shakespeare depicts a Suffolk barely able to conceal his own attraction. He has to firstly remind himself of his own marital situation: 'Fond man, remember that thou hast a wife; | Then how can Margaret be thy paramour?' (5.3.81–2)⁵¹ but his speeches continue to highlight that his purported courtship of Margaret for Henry wrestles with his own feelings for her:

Suffolk: I'll undertake to make thee Henry's queen,
To put a golden sceptre in thy hand
And set a precious crown upon thy head,
If thou wilt condescend to be my—
Margaret: What?
Suffolk: His love. (5.3.117–21)

Shakespeare highlights, it seems, the inability of the diplomatic man, at least a great man such as Suffolk, to repress his own feelings to woo a woman on behalf of another and, over the course of the *Henry VI* plays, the disastrous consequences of this diplomatic encounter will be made clear.

Representing the emotions of a female leader might have produced some complications for male diplomats had they taken to heart the obligations to represent empathetically and corporeally the feelings she asked them to express. Certainly, some diplomatic staff expressed scorn for women's involvement in public political life and assumed the diplomatic community was best composed of men of shared understanding and feelings. For them, some emotional behaviours when expressed by a woman were simply proof that validated the political agency of a certain kind of man who was in control of his emotions. Moreover, interpreting women's emotions was something about which most male ambassadors felt quite certain, and documented in their reports as evidence of their own emotional acuity and political expertise.⁵² The Spanish ambassador at the French court during the mid-sixteenth century, Francés de Álava, wrote home to Philip II on many occasions of his complex emotional interactions with Catherine de' Medici. Interpreting her responses to his demands for answers about a possible diplomatic meeting between the French and Ottomans in 1565, Álava reported that Catherine 'burst into tears, and although

she does it easily, she certainly seemed pained'.⁵³ By this means, we might note, she avoided giving any response to his question. Álava described frequent emotional and verbal jousting with Catherine in which, at one meeting, she 'became angry with me, and I with her, to tell your Majesty the truth, because she did not answer me'.⁵⁴ It was a match in which Álava was certain he held the upper hand, assuring Philip that he was able to see through Catherine's emotional outbursts for Spain's diplomatic gain: 'when she is taken by surprise, her embarrassment is great, and we learn more of their mind'.⁵⁵ In Álava's presentation, his anger was not a lack of control but strategic and even an understandable outcome of dealing with a female leader, while Catherine's was a display born of her feelings.

Diplomats may have had trouble distinguishing their own emotions from those of the leaders whom they were sent to represent. However, there were reasons why individual feelings and personalized interpretations began to take centre stage in diplomatic letters by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One of the more significant transitions in diplomatic culture over the period was the shift from envoys sent for a specific political purpose to resident ambassadors, a model emerging from the Italian city states, and established in the context of the rise of centralized, sovereign states, operating in this new diplomatic system.⁵⁶ Recent studies have shown how the role of diplomatic personnel expanded from a task-based orientation and factual reports towards more narrative and anecdotal epistolary presentations of longer-term courtly experiences, including character assessments of leading individuals, and into which diplomatic staff inserted themselves as participants.⁵⁷ Moreover, diplomatic exchanges were increasingly produced over the period by men who had benefited from humanist education and were often involved in literary activities.⁵⁸ Like those who produced conduct manuals for princes, these eye-witnesses were political agents crafting their power, agency and identity in precise ways for colleagues and superiors, and their reports should be interpreted as careful textual and emotional performances of their own. Such developments had important ramifications in terms of the role of emotions in diplomatic endeavour and how we can access them in varied sources.

The shift to providing more personal information can be seen in the letters of Imperial diplomat Diego Hurtado Mendoza, sent to London to explore a marriage between Louis of Portugal and Mary Tudor. Upon his arrival in London in February 1538, he wrote complaining of his environs to Charles V's principal secretary, the High Commander of Leon, Francisco de los Cobos. 'I am in good health,' he wrote, 'and yet, though there has been no cold weather this winter, I am as frozen and dead with it as if I had been living in Russia . . . the sanitary conditions of this place have not improved'. In his reportage on the court and mood in England, Mendoza reflected to Los Cobos, 'although this is pretty good living for one who is somewhat used to it, I would much prefer being at Barcelona'.⁵⁹ Mendoza arrived in London to join his colleague, Eustache Chapuys, who had reported to the emperor on the remarkable events of Henry VIII's divorce from Charles's aunt, Catherine of Aragon. Chapuys had sought to convey to Charles the severity of the danger Catherine found herself in, as well as the dynamic, emotional response of the court and citizenry to Anne Boleyn's rise to power, as preachers began to name Anne as queen in their prayers, 'At which all people here are perfectly astonished, for the whole thing seems a dream, and even those who support her party do not know

whether to laugh or cry at it'.⁶⁰ Chapuys's sense was that Henry VIII was alert to the feelings of his people and aimed to assure them of Anne's support among other nobles and through magnificent celebrations: 'The King is watching what sort of mien the people put on at this, and solicits his nobles to visit and pay their court to his new queen, whom he purposes to have crowned after Easter in the most solemn manner, and it is said that there will be banqueting and tournaments on the occasion'.⁶¹ Chapuys was no disinterested observer on these matters. His letters cast him as emotionally engaged by Catherine's treatment. '[C]onsidering the very great injury done to Madame, your aunt', he wrote to Charles, he begged 'Your Majesty to pardon me if I venture too far on matters which are not my incumbence; but the great interest I take in Your Majesty's concerns compels me'.⁶²

Diplomats were expected to use more personal judgement as they learned more about the courts to which they were sent and to be adaptive to their behaviours. Chapuys employed his correspondence with the emperor to suggest his proximity to power through his intimate interactions with Henry VIII in lively exchanges. His reports documented Henry's emotional responses to Chapuys' provocation, especially when demanding on Charles's behalf better treatment for Catherine. On one occasion, Chapuys claimed to declare his own changing feelings about his appointment to Henry's court:

The better to gain his confidence I told him how happy I had once considered myself at being chosen by Your Majesty to represent your person near so great and magnanimous a king. . . . Now, on the contrary, affairs had taken such a disorderly turn, and were in such confusion that I considered myself unhappy in having to represent Your Majesty. . . . At these words, and without waiting to hear the rest, as if he wished to avoid all further conversation on this delicate subject, the King frowned, and moving his head to and fro, said rather abruptly: 'Before I listen to such representations, I must know from whom they proceed, whether from the Emperor, your master, or from yourself; for if they be private remarks of your own I shall know how to answer them'.⁶³

Henry demanded that Chapuys distinguish his own feelings from those he was expected to represent, but Chapuys – according to his own account – made no such simple distinction,

answering that it was superfluous to ask whether I could have received commission to complain of facts and things which had only taken place a week ago, the intelligence of which would require a full month to be transmitted . . . my general charge and instructions being to maintain by all best means the peace and friendship between Your Majesty and him.⁶⁴

By this account, Chapuys understood, and stated explicitly, that his over-arching commission from Charles gave him some degree of licence to pursue his diplomatic role according to his own immediate assessment of the situation at hand.

However, men such as Chapuys were also operating within a particular community in which their feelings variously performed their masculinity to colleagues and

their masters. Through the manner in which they described their challenges, their impressions and their joys and frustrations at particular outcomes, diplomatic agents signalled their dedication, their loyalty, and their belonging to shared faith, national and occupational communities. Imperial agents in the service of Charles V voiced their passion to limit French diplomacy with the Ottomans during the 1520s and 1530s in a series of letters exchanged among their network. In 1535, Lope de Soria, then Imperial ambassador in Venice, was following several men suspected of working to develop the Franco–Ottoman liaison. He recommended to Charles and his brother Ferdinand a series of violent measures to deal with one suspected agent: ‘[I]f I had it in my power,’ Lope de Soria opined, ‘I would not hesitate to stretch out his arms a little to make him tell the truth and for that I do not think I would be condemning my soul’.⁶⁵ Lope de Soria’s correspondence fused obsession and bravado in his dedication to uncover Franco–Ottoman networks in his midst. In 1535, he was tracking another suspected French agent, writing to the emperor, ‘I would cut off a finger from my hand to take him out of this State and give him to Your Majesty’.⁶⁶ Lope de Soria’s strongly emotive letters appeared designed to signal his passion and dedication to the emperor’s service, within a shared emotional community of diplomatic and administrative men. These forums, in which powerful but disruptive sentiments of frustration could be expressed, might have provided a site for circulating lived feelings that had no place in the official negotiations.

Diplomatic reports are a key source for analysing how contemporaries understood the import and consequences of diplomatic emotions. However, they need to be considered in the context of the ambitions of their authors, as part of diverse gendered communities of feeling that were national, faith-based and professional, and as these communities’ feeling practices informed their interpretation of the emotional behaviours and expressions that they documented.

Mission and trade diplomacy

Diplomatic engagements did not simply occur between rulers of Europe at this period, but were also happening in other contexts as Europeans aimed to further their power over other regions and peoples of the world. We can thus extend our consideration of how diplomatic emotions operated by analysing their function and impact in these different contexts, where similar emotional conceptualizations of speech, bodies and practices found expression, documented within the forms of the specific emotional communities of which they were part. Very often these negotiations were not undertaken by experienced administrators of European courtly structures, but were conducted by the mariners and missionaries sent by secular states, trading companies and churches. Gender ideologies remained significant in the interpretive frameworks of Europeans engaged in these exchanges, as they sought to understand the emotional capacity of other peoples.

Europeans and the populations that they encountered became entangled both psychically and corporeally in these complex diplomatic negotiations.⁶⁷ In the mid-1560s, for example, Philip II tasked Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, Captain General of the Spanish Fleet of the Indies, to assert Spanish and Catholic dominance on the Florida peninsula, where a French colony containing a sizeable Protestant population had taken hold, with what they understood as support from

local Timucua people. Menéndez warned Philip that the engagement between the French and Timucuans was emotionally robust and achieved significant practical benefits for their European rivals: ‘the friendship formed by them with the natives who would help them so that even if with great difficulty, cost and expense we could take it, the Indians would remain our enemies’.⁶⁸ Such a friendship was possible with a people he saw as inferior to Europeans, Menéndez opined, because Protestants were similarly debased: ‘Lutheran people, who, because the Indians and they are just about of one law, maintain friendship easily with each other’.⁶⁹ However, after Menéndez had led a massacre at the French colonies, he and his Spanish colleagues found themselves equally necessitous of the support of local peoples to establish their own settlements in the region. Menéndez’s attempt to gain the assistance of the rival Calusa people led him to accept a bigamous marriage with the daughter of the Calusa leader, named by the Spanish as Carlos, who demanded Menéndez ‘as his older brother, . . . he wanted to give him for a wife an older sister whom he loved’ as the price of his support.⁷⁰ Fashioning the event for his European readers as a sacrifice made for the nation’s greater ambitions, chronicler Gonzalo Solís de Merás documented the eventual resolution of Menéndez to ‘sleep with her, because this would be a great beginning to trusting him and other Christians’.⁷¹ As in this case, bodily diplomacy of both women and men – not simply of facial expressions and gesture but also of sexual interactions – continued to tie peoples together with the intention of creating communities of trust and shared motivations.

In its diplomatic engagements with the world, Europeans found that the concept of friendship remained a potent model of diplomatic engagement between men of power, and one which could sometimes be converted to alliances as kin through marriage. Governance structures with a powerful leader required Europeans abroad to produce letters and gifts from a similar figure in a position of authority who could viably perform the rhetoric of friendship between equals. From 1598, for example, Maurits, Prince of Orange, had lent his name to gifts sent to the Sultan of Ternate, Said ad-Din Berkat Syah, to assist the formation of military alliances against the Portuguese. In 1606, his letter spoke of his gifts as ‘a sign of proper affection, and friendship, requesting that you may accept the same in a like spirit’.⁷² Under the Dutch East India Company that emerged in the early seventeenth century, the key diplomatic advice that emotional dissimulation was a vital component of engagement with others remained present in its instructions. When Abel Tasman received his instructions for exploration of the southern coast of the Australian continent in 1642, his superiors in Batavia highlighted the importance of his emotional conduct in achieving the Company goals: ‘by shows of kindness gain them over to us, that you may the more readily from them obtain information touching themselves, their country, and their circumstances, thus learning whether there is anything profitable to be got or effected’.⁷³ Much of our knowledge of the results of these encounters was documented in a comprehensive archive of feeling produced by the Company, where we encounter distinct feeling performances that were reflective and reinforcing of men’s status within its complex hierarchy, as well as expressive of its corporate identity.⁷⁴

In sum, the emotional practices of European diplomatic exchange, and the gendered assumption that underpinned them, firmly informed how Europeans

engaged with new global communities during this period as traders and missionaries in particular. Like-minded feeling, affective agency and emotional equality in cross-cultural friendships remained an important conceptual foundation. Some cross-cultural friendships with others could be perceived to increase the feeling capacity of communities who shared the ambitions of the author, but as lowering Europeans to the base level of other peoples where they were in conflict with the author's view. Those at the frontline of European engagement in new regions found themselves intimately and corporally embedded in diplomatic negotiations to advance their missions, just as were the bodies of their leaders at home. As we read their interpretations of these emotional encounters, we must remember that their audiences were almost always European, and their experiences were presented accordingly in anticipation of these feeling communities.

Conclusion

There is no shortage of evidence of emotions in sources that can inform us about diplomatic interaction from 1100 to 1700. But in analysing this evidence, most importantly, we need to be clear what it is that we want to know and how we can use the available documentation with an eye to the contexts, including the affective contexts, in which their authors produced them. The emotions that these documents record include both staged performances and lived experiences. Emotions were not simply hollow expressions nor did their performance always follow the conventional diplomatic script. In all their forms, diplomatic emotions reflected and reinforced assumptions about women and men's distinct feeling capacities and their aptitude for power, and were thus critical in making the power dynamics of contemporary international relations.

Notes

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- 3 W.M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; S. Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, London: Routledge, 2004; B.H. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006; B.H. Rosenwein, *Generations of Feeling: A History of Emotions, 600–1700*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
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- 13 *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini*, 61.1.1, ed. R. Wolk, Vienna: Holder, 1909, pp. 329–30, cited in H.J. Cohn, 'The early Renaissance court at Heidelberg', *European Studies Review* 1:4, 1971, 295–322 (p. 295).
- 14 F.A. Gragg and L.A. Gabel (eds), 'The Commentaries of Pius II', *Smith College Studies in History* 35, 1951, 423; cited in Cohn, 'The early Renaissance court at Heidelberg', p. 297.
- 15 N. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Ch. 18, trans. R. Goodwin, Boston, MA: Dante University Press, 2003, p. 97. On emotions in Machiavelli's work, see N. Hochner, 'Love and the economy of emotions', *Italian Culture* 32, 2014, 122–37.
- 16 'vostre conversation soit honneste et bonne, et en toutes choses courtoise et amiable, que vous soiez à tous plaisante': *Les Enseignements d'Anne de France*, ed. A.-M. Chazaud, Moulins: C. Desrosiers, 1878, p. 31.
- 17 'les nobles et bonnes femmes, par leurs vertusueuse patiences, humilitez, et grans constances', 'vous gardez bien d'estre surprise en ce, quelque rudesse qu'on vous puisse faire', Chazaud, *Les Enseignements*, p. 58.
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- 23 11 February 1535: E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, vol. 1, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1848, pp. 255–63 (p. 259): 'de tout son cuer'; 'plaines de si bon

- vouloir, estime, grant affection, humanité et libéralité'; 'offrant de sa part le semblable, et d'estre tousjours son bon frère et amy en toutes choses non derogans à la foy chrestienne'.
- 24 J. Thury, *Török – történet irók*, vol. 2, Budapest: M. Tud. Akadémia, 1896, pp. 196–8.
 - 25 J. de Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, trans. M. Dochez, vol. 2, Paris: Imprimerie de Béthune et Plon, 1844, p. 15.
 - 26 Ibid., p. 16: 'un frère bien-aimé'.
 - 27 Z. Blažević and A. Vlašić (eds), *The Istanbul Letters of Antun Vrančić*, Istanbul: Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2018, p. 72.
 - 28 Barcelona, 19 April 1535; *Papiers d'état du Cardinal de Granvelle*, ed. C. Weiss, vol. 2, Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1851, p. 339: 'perdre la patience au plus contant du monde non seulement'.
 - 29 Ibid., p. 343: 'si scandaleuse et pernicieuse playde et de mauvaise consequence à ladite chrestienté'.
 - 30 Ibid., p. 342: 'a refuse expressément d'assister seulement de ses galères, à l'occasion signamment qu'il ayt tresves avec luy'.
 - 31 R. Allinson, *A Monarchy in Letters: Royal Correspondence and English Diplomacy in the Reign of Elizabeth I*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), Ch. 8.
 - 32 K.O. Kupperman, *The Jamestown Project*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, pp. 40–1.
 - 33 Charrière, *Négociations*, vol. 1, pp. 256–7: 'bien entendu et apperceu l'affection et désir que ledit Haradin a de complaire audit roy, les grandes et belles offres qu'il luy fait, le bon office dont il a usé pour ledit sr roy envers icelluy Grant-Seig.', 'ingrate'.
 - 34 Ibid., p. 258: 'de luy tenir la main de son bon advis et povoir, que ledit roy scait est très-grant'.
 - 35 A. von Gévay, *Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte der Verhältnisse zwischen der Österreich, Ungern und der Pforte, im XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderte*, vol. 1, Vienna: Schaumberg, 1838, p. 43.
 - 36 Blažević and Vlašić, *Istanbul Letters*, p. 73.
 - 37 Ibid., p. 84.
 - 38 T. Adams, 'Married noblewomen as diplomats: affective diplomacy', in S. Broomhall (ed.), *Gender and Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2015, pp. 51–65; H. Watanabe-O'Kelly and Adam Morton (eds), *Queens Consort, Cultural Transfer and European Politics, c. 1500–1800*, London: Routledge, 2017.
 - 39 Jacques Paviot (ed.), 'Eléonore de Poitiers, Les États de France (Les Honneurs de la Cour)', *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France*, 1996/98, 75–137 (p. 85); and S. Broomhall, 'Gendering the culture of honour at the fifteenth-century Burgundian court', in S. Tarbin and S. Broomhall (eds), *Women, Identities and Communities in Early Modern Europe*, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 181–93.
 - 40 *Les dépêches de Giovanni Michel, ambassadeur de Venise en Angleterre*, ed. P. Friedmann, Venice: Imprimerie du Commerce, 1869, pp. 114–15: 'quel dolore que si conveniva a moglie'; 'Ma ritornata alla sue stanze, accostatasi ad una finestra, che riguarda sopra il fiume, non credendosi piu esser veduta ne considerate da alcuno, all' hora si vidde che liberamente con le lagrime sfogava il dolore . . . levandosi anco di discosto il capello con dimostrazione di grande affetto di salutarla'.
 - 41 In-text references are to W. Shakespeare, *King Henry V*, ed. J.H. Walter, London: Methuen, 1977.
 - 42 L. van Aitzema, *Historie of verhael van Saken van staet en Oorlogh: 1633–1644*, vol. 2, The Hague: Johan Veely, 1669, pp. 803–5.
 - 43 T. Jorissen, 'Een vorstelijk engagement', *Historische bladen* 1, 1895, 83–119 (pp. 88, 89).
 - 44 'dat sij tot haar leedwesen, dagelihks zag, dat de affective en genegenheid van de toecomende controrale niet aleen niet was angewassen, maer zelfs meer en meer afnaam', cited in Jorissen, 'Een vorselijk engagement', p. 118.
 - 45 10 June 1405, Genoa: 'diligentemente'; and 20 May 1405, Barcelona: 'de las cosas porque me embiastes, sobre las quales sabe Dios que entiendo trabajar fasta la muerte', docs 64 and 65 in L. Suárez Fernández, *Castilla, el Cisma y la crisis conciliar (1378–1440)*, Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, 1960; cited in S. Péquignot, 'Figure et normes de comportement des ambassadeurs dans les documents de la pratique: un essai d'approche comparative (ca. 1250–ca. 1440)', in S. Andretta, S. Péquignot and J.-C. Waquet (eds),

- De l'ambassadeur: les écrits relatifs à l'ambassadeur et à l'art de négociier du Moyen Âge au début du XIXe siècle*, Rome: École française de Rome, 2015, online, available at: <<https://books.openedition.org/efr/2887>> (accessed 30 October 2018).
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- 50 For a different interpretation, see J. Watkins, 'Shakespeare's *1 Henry VI* and the tragedy of Renaissance diplomacy', in C. Levin and J. Watkins (eds), *Shakespeare's Foreign Worlds: National and Transnational Identities in the Elizabethan Age*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009, pp. 51–78.
- 51 In-text references are to W. Shakespeare, *King Henry VI, Part 1*, ed. A.S. Cairncross, London: Methuen, 1984.
- 52 See further in S. Broomhall, 'Catherine's tears: diplomatic corporeality and gender at the sixteenth-century French court', in A.M. Scott and M. Barbezat (eds), *Fluid Bodies and Bodily Fluids in Premodern Europe*, Kalamazoo, MI: ARC Humanities Press, forthcoming.
- 53 'Aquí le saltaron las lágrimas de los ojos, y cierto, aunque ella las da fácilmente', Álava to Philip II, 31 May 1565, *Negociaciones con Francia*, vol. 7, Madrid: Editorial Maestre, 1953, p. 365.
- 54 'la cual se metió en cólera conmigo, y yo con ella, para decir a Vuestra Majestad la verdad, porque no me respondía', Álava to Philip II, 29–30 November 1565, *Ibid.*, pp. 144–5.
- 55 'tomándola de improviso es grande su embarazo y sácase más de sus ánimos', Álava to Philip II, 16 March 1566, *Negociaciones con Francia*, vol. 8, Madrid: Editorial Maestre, 1954, p. 265.
- 56 G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1955; P. Gilli, 'La Fonction d'ambassadeurs dans les traités juridiques italiens du XV^e siècle: l'impossible représentation', *Mélanges de l'école française de Rome* 121:1, 2009, 173–87.
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- 61 *Ibid.*
- 62 *Ibid.*, 10 April 1533.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 15 April 1533.
- 64 *Ibid.*
- 65 Venice, 13 March 1535, Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, Liasse 1311, fol. 79, cited in R. Quatrefages, 'La Perception gouvernementale espagnole de l'alliance Franco-Turque au XVI^e siècle', *Revue internationale d'histoire militaire* 68, 1987, 71–84, 75: 'et si je l'avais en mon pouvoir, je ne laisserais pas de lui étirer un peu des bras pour qu'il dise la vérité et pour cela je ne crois pas condamner mon âme'.

- 66 Venice, 1535, Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, Liasse 1311, fol. 47, cited in Quatrefages, 'La Perception gouvernementale espagnole', p. 77: 'et moi je me ferais couper un doigt de la main pour le prendre en dehors de cet État et pour le remettre à V.M.'
- 67 R. Gibson (ed.), *Exchanges: Cross-Cultural Encounters in Australia and the Pacific*, Sydney: Historic House Trust of New South Wales, 1996; T. Ballatyne and A. Burton, 'Postscript: bodies, genders, empires: re-reimagining world histories', in A. Burton and T. Ballantyne (eds), *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005, pp. 405–23; S. Konishi, *The Aboriginal Male in the Enlightenment World*, London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012.
- 68 'por la amistad que tendrán tomado con los naturales, por que los mesmos naturales les ayudarán de manera que con grandísima dificultad, aunque hagan grandes costas y gastos, se podrían hechar; de mas que aunque los hechasen, los mismos yndios quedarian por nuestros enemigos': 'Memorial de Pero Menéndez de Aviles', in E. Ruidíaz y Caraviam (ed.), *La Florida: su conquista y colonización por Pedro Menéndez de Avilés: Apéndices*, vol. 2, Madrid: Hijos de J.A. Garcia, 1893, p. 322.
- 69 'gente luterana, que por ser los yndios y ellos casi de una ley, como tengo dicho, tendrán con gran facilidad amystad los unos con los otros', *ibid.*, p. 324.
- 70 'le dixo que le quería tomar por su hermano mayor, . . . que le quería dar por mujer une hermana que tenía, mayor que él, á quien quería mucho', *ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 156. See also E. Lyon, *The Enterprise of Florida: Pedro Menéndez de Avilas and Spanish Conquest of 1565–1568* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1976); and S.E. Reilly, 'Marriage of expedience: the Calusa indians and their relations with Pedro Menéndez de Aviles in Southwest Florida, 1566–1569', *Florida Historical Quarterly* 59:4, 1981, 395–421.
- 71 'la bautizasen é pusiesen nombre, é que el Adelantado durmiese con ella, porque sería este gran prencipio para que se confiasen dél é de los demás cristianos', Ruidíaz y Caraviam, *La Florida*, vol. 1, p. 165.
- 72 R. Wassing-Visser, *Royal Gifts from Indonesia; Historical Bonds with the House of Orange-Nassau, 1600–1938*, Zwolle: Waanders, 1995, p. 28.
- 73 Abel Jansz. *Tasman's Journal of the Discovery of Van Diemens Land and New Zealand in 1642*, ed. J.E. Heere and C.H. Coote (1898), Los Angeles, CA: Kovach, 1965, p. 134.
- 74 See S. Broomhall, 'Shipwrecks, sorrow, shame and the great Southland: the use of emotions in seventeenth-century Dutch East India Company communicative ritual', in M.L. Bailey and K. Barclay (eds), *Emotion, Ritual and Power in Europe, 1200–1900: Family, State and Church*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 83–102.

FEELING WHITE

Beneath and beyond

Giovanni Tarantino

Due to its being grounded in prejudice, racism – Benjamin Isaac noted – is made conspicuous by ‘an emotional and rigid attitude which it is difficult or impossible to modify by rational argument or practical experience’.¹ Frantz Fanon’s personal account is paradigmatic:

‘*Maman*, look, a Negro; I’m scared!’ . . . My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter’s day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is wicked, the Negro is ugly; look, a Negro . . .²

According to Samantha Vice, however much we might wish to disavow racial classifications because of the damage they have caused or out of a desire to achieve a non-racial future, we are stuck with them all the same, and even if race is not biologically real it undoubtedly remains a social reality.³ Race, not less than the nation, is an ‘imagined community’ that both ties and divides human beings, but – as Jonathan Burton and Ania Loomba persuasively noted –

to say that it is imagined is not to suggest that it can be washed away, for the historical imagining of racial communities and differences has resulted in the formation of social relations and institutions, as well as in structures of thought and feeling, which continue to shape our lives today.⁴

Racism essentially seeks to rationalize and systematize the irrational, trying to justify prejudice, fear, hatred and discrimination by analysing what are presented as empirical facts in a purportedly rational fashion (the statute of the 1297 Dublin Parliament, which disparages the Irish for their excitability, fickleness and emotional impulses in ‘rushing instantly to war’, is a good example of this).⁵ Premodern categories of difference are often regarded as more malleable than later ‘pseudobiological’ ones, as they are deemed to be more ‘cultural’. But as Étienne Balibar has pointed out, and as seems to be implied by the supposedly ongoing ‘clash of civilizations’, culture can function ‘like a nature’; in other words culture can also function as an unsurmountable barrier between ‘us’ and ‘them’.⁶ Equally significantly, evolutionary theory now

seems to be suggesting that inheritance might be about more than just the genetic system, and that the intergenerational transmission of information also takes place through the epigenetic, behavioural and symbolic inheritance systems.⁷

Race is a socially constructed concept, and as such is imbued with emotional meaning. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how we might uncover the pre- and early modern structures of feeling and cultural practices that lie at the foundation of the way in which racial stereotypes and prejudices were perpetuated and slowly internalized, taking account all the time of historical textual, visual and gestural specificities. In a seminal work that appeared in 2001, William Reddy argued that the emotions had previously been largely neglected by a logocentric historical discipline, a point reiterated more recently by Rob Boddice in a fine survey of the field, when he observed that talking about the history of emotions is hopeless if we focus exclusively on speech.⁸ As emotions are embedded deep within what Clifford Geertz called ‘webs of significance’, if we wish to historicize them it will be necessary to look at history with an anthropological gaze, viewing ‘the past as a foreign country’, which is why cultural history is so well-suited to the study of emotions.⁹ This chapter will look in various ways at how expressions, gestures, objects and positions were textually and visually depicted in the past in ever more patronizingly and divisively racialized (and sexualized) terms. Consideration will also be given to the emotional peculiarities of the strategic conflation of religion and skin colour by slave missionaries and similarly minded whites, and the enduring legacy of this practice. Given the capacity of emotions theory to extend across disciplinary boundaries, I will also reference developments in research regarding the psychology of racial cognition and how ‘whites’ can respond emotionally to their racial identity in responsible ways. Samantha Vice, for instance, has made the point that taking responsibility for one’s whiteness might reflect a willingness to address unpalatable emotions and, as a result of an enhanced understanding of the racial world and one’s position in it, to feel in new and perhaps disconcerting ways.¹⁰

‘Feeling white’: a conflation of classical othering, colour symbolism and Christian whitening

Just how much our characters and feelings are influenced by race may not be clear to us, and it may be that we either need to learn it for ourselves or to be ‘conscientized’ by others, which is what whiteness studies and black consciousness movements seek to do.

In a white supremacist world, the refusal of one’s white identity on the basis of not feeling white rather than anything else, and not considering being white to be significant as it has never been made an issue, is a clear sign of privilege, and a similarly carefree attitude is not available to the majority of black people.¹¹ Historical depth adds a significant dimension in helping to achieve a greater understanding of a racialized world and to consciously reconsider our emotional dispositions towards ourselves and others as black or white.

Around 1100 Europeans began to encounter new ethnic groups in various parts of the world (Southeast Asia, on the streets of Mediterranean cities, and elsewhere) and in various contexts (battlefields, trade circuits, missionary trails). In this same period foreign groups also began to be discussed in a more biological way: ‘inherent’ physical and mental traits were described with an emphasis that

perhaps contains traces of Greco-Roman ‘proto-racist’ sentiments and ideas that had been absent from Latin Christendom for a long time – the theory of environmental determinism (climate or geography), for instance, and the conviction that acquired traits were heritable and could not be altered by human will.¹² The rediscovery of classical works on biology, medicine and the environment by writers such as Hippocrates, Aristotle and Galen in particular also encouraged new types of emphasis and anxiety: the ‘naturalness’ of whiteness, the increasing importance of lineage, sexualized descriptions of black women, ‘scientific’ accounts of the prevalently melancholic humour in Jews’ bodies, conferring a kind of immutability on Jewishness. While the view that blackness and African slavery stemmed from Noah’s curse on his disobedient son was variously upheld by Christian, Jewish and Muslim commentaries from the fourth to the twelfth centuries (when black slavery became widespread in the region now known as the Middle East),¹³ early modern proto-ethnography and the reassessment of Aristotle’s claim that natural slaves should be defined by their psychological identity instead of by their legal status added fresh impetus to imperial ideologies and the incessant debate about hierarchy among human groups. The geographies of the period also charted a field of difference with regard to the broad designations of cardinal direction, ‘north’ and ‘south’. The seemingly fixed and reliable coordinates of cartography produced a conceptual grid that contributed to naturalizing pejorative assumptions about the ‘southern nations’ of the world and to validating imperialism. ‘Not only did Columbus sail west; he also sailed in a southerly direction, convinced that the southern parts of the world, where the heat was more intense and the inhabitants darker-skinned, were eminently exploitable’.¹⁴

In Western thought, the dualism of ‘white’ and ‘black’ had long implied a number of other dualisms, religious and cosmological opposites cast in a clear hierarchy: light/darkness, godly/ungodly, beautiful/ugly, being/non-being, pure/tainted. Being ‘white’ went hand in hand with an avowedly good, beautiful, true and pure moral and cosmological nature, as opposed to an evil, impure, unclean, unredeemed reality. In the context of this supposed higher nature – godly, moral, redeemed – there was an implied connection between ‘whiteness’ and Christ. Although the view that Christ had to ‘look’ and ‘be’ white in Christian thought and art may have started out as an ethnic convention, it then acquired a theological meaning.¹⁵

The physician Michele Savonarola (1385–1468) from Padua linked the description of the well-tempered person (a balanced combination of white and red colour, together with fine, lustrous skin) to an extensively disseminated thirteenth-century Latin text in which Christ’s countenance is described in physiognomic terms: a completely smooth unwrinkled face, straight, reddish hair and bright blue eyes.¹⁶ In early modern England, as socio-cultural historian Mark Dawson has pointed out, fervent Protestants not only imagined Jesus to be inherently ‘white’, but identified themselves in the same way (while for a long time – and not just in England – Saracens and Jews were depicted as metaphorically and often literally ‘black’). The tendency to conflate religion and skin colour in the early modern period (with the term ‘blackamoor’ being used in England to refer both to dark-skinned non-Muslims and all Muslims) – besides intersecting ethnos and eros, notably in gender reversals and ‘abnormal’ sexualities – persisted and on occasion was even reinforced. Notions of ‘whiteness’ thus became increasingly complicated and totalizing. Instead of assuming

that Christian universalism simply curbed the rise of racial discrimination, Dawson cogently argues that religious discourse sometimes acted as a catalyst for it.¹⁷

Conversely, black people had long been made an emotively charged metaphor infused with dark colour symbolism:¹⁸ 'blackness' was viewed as objectionable because it was associated with death, ill omen and sin, and so powerful that it was 'susceptible only to miraculous metamorphosis'. The encyclopaedic work *Cursor Mundi* (c. 1325) contains a collection of legends of the Holy Cross in which King David discovers three rods that have been blessed by Moses. These have the miraculous power to heal the sick and to transform monstrous blacks into flawless whites.¹⁹ As Robert Bartlett has observed, 'the two most consistent traditions of representing black Africans physiologically, with not only black skin but also full lips, broad nose and curly hair, originated in parts of Europe where Europeans were least likely to meet actual black Africans, namely in Germany and central Europe'. These representations had a theological intent, as they were designed to underline the universal mission of the Church.²⁰ Their aim was also to assuage any shame or remorse that might arise from the knowledge of being implicated in a causal chain leading to coercion, social exclusion, harm and subjection.

Assuaging guilt: missionaries' anxieties and emotional strategies

One crucial factor behind the emergence of the modern notion of race, according to science philosopher Justin E.H. Smith, was the erosion of a universalistic view of human nature, which had been propped up by a belief that the human soul was a transcendent essence. In the early modern age this belief gave way to the conception that humans were natural beings and as such could be taxonomically classified just like plants, animals or minerals.²¹ It is, however, debatable whether Christian humanistic and compassionate approaches somehow offset the proto-racist potential, because universalistic thought systems may actually have a tendency to smooth out difference by encompassing it.

From at least the early sixteenth century onwards, it would not have been uncommon to see African priests and pilgrims in the streets of Rome. They gravitated towards the church of St Stephen of the Abyssinians, where, instead of the strict Catholic mass, they were allowed to practise Ethiopian rituals.²² Leo Africanus (c. 1485–c. 1554) affirmed that priests who had been 'singed by the sun' were to be seen throughout Europe, especially in Rome: 'Da lei [i.e. from Ethiopia] vengono certi religiosi frati, i quali hanno i loro visi segnati col fuoco, e si veggono per tutta l'Europa e specialmente a Roma'.²³ Though relations with Ethiopia soured during the reign of Pope Paul V Borghese after the Ethiopian Emperor Susenyos I turned against Catholicism, close ties were forged between the Borghese papacy and the King of Kongo Álvaro II in the first decade of the seventeenth century. On 3 January 1608, after numerous detours and setbacks, the ambassador from Kongo, Antonio Manuele Nsaku ne Vunda, arrived in Rome with his retinue. A meeting between the pope and the African envoy was to have taken place shortly afterwards, and a commemorative medallion was commissioned to immortalize the occasion, but perhaps with undue haste. In fact, the ambassador was in such poor health when he arrived that the grandiose ceremony planned for his entry into the city had to be cancelled and he was immediately whisked off to his sickbed in the Vatican Palace. Less than a week later, the pope

himself administered the last rites to the ambassador, who died on 12 January.²⁴ In the Borghese fresco cycle decorating the Sala Paolina in the Vatican (1610–11), Paul V is shown giving the last rites to Antonio Manuele.²⁵ It is an intimate scene, in which the Kongolese ambassador and his retinue convey subservience to the church as they humbly receive the pope's blessing.

Clearly, things had worked out very differently from Pope Paul V's original plans. The entrance into Rome was to have been a grand occasion, with the Kongolese ambassador at the head of a spectacular procession through the streets of Rome on the Feast Day of the Epiphany, in much the same way as Balthasar is depicted in Magi iconography beginning in the fifteenth century. The sumptuous choreography was obviously intended to celebrate the universal primacy of the papacy above all else.²⁶ But it also lent legitimacy to the ambivalence of missionary work amongst the African peoples, insistently depicted as being naturally inclined to prostrate themselves before the powerful. While missionaries generally acknowledged the humanity of 'Negroes' – and their docility to Christian conversion – they also approved of their enslavement. Christian missions were both 'exploitative and ameliorative', denying corporeal freedom but guaranteeing spiritual freedom in what was an attempt to create a kind of middle ground.²⁷

Religious conversion was in principle a way of absorbing the 'Other' into the 'Self', thereby overcoming difference. In practice, however, this absorption aroused fears about identities on both sides, as the development of the blood laws in Inquisition Spain shows quite clearly. The Reformation, and the mass conversions that ensued, provoked an obsession with religious dissimulation that spread all over Europe. The Iberian concern with the inherent qualities of New Christians (conversos and moriscos) thus acquired further racist features, first becoming a European-wide issue – consider the expression 'to wash an Ethiop white', a well-worn turn of phrase used in the Renaissance to indicate impossibility – and then a global one, heightening fears of miscegenation and making it difficult to recruit Indigenous converts to the Catholic clergy in Africa, South Asia and Latin America (whereas the greater readiness to accept Japanese and Chinese into the clergy offers further proof that a racial hierarchy had been established in Western discourses concerning non-European peoples).²⁸

Christian Europeans had a big stake, both economically and ideologically, in promoting the idea that 'blacks' were emotionless. The aim of missionaries' pervasively lurid representations of African peoples, which amount to a kind of emotional strategy, was to ease any feelings of guilt that might have troubled European Christian readers, for whom Africa – except for North Africa (or Barbary), and a few islands and coastal strips – was still a largely unknown entity. These treatments stressed the Africans' presumed lack of humanity, or at any rate their child-like malleability. By converting and subjecting them they could be redeemed both from idolatry and from a violent, immoral way of life. Enslavement was seen as following on from their natural predisposition to serve, and at the same time as creating favourable conditions for their souls to be redeemed. There can be no doubt that representations of this kind contributed in no small measure to a collective internalization of racial difference in Europe, and they still impact significantly on the negative emotions that blacks direct against themselves today (indeed, it is not uncommon for blacks to become indirect agents of 'whiteness' themselves by conforming to white norms). Samantha Vice makes the compelling point that many whites have no idea how

they appear to non-whites, and that if whites are to accept responsibility for a world they might not have chosen but which they nonetheless contribute to maintaining, they will need to see themselves as others do, and acknowledge the justice of that viewpoint. Doing so would be a prelude to apologizing for their privileged position.²⁹

Emotional Orientalism: from sexual shock to affective encompassment

It was probably some time in the second half of the sixteenth century, and possibly in Florence, that the Flemish draftsman and painter Jan Van der Straet (1523–1605) executed his famous drawing of Amerigo Vespucci's encounter with an allegorical figure of 'America' (Figure 19.1). The drawing enjoyed wide circulation in early modern Europe, following the decision of the Antwerp-based engravers Theodore and Philippe Galle to include it in their *Nova Reperta* (New Discoveries), a twenty-print portfolio first published in 1580. The meeting between Europe and the New World, or America, is represented as one between a fully clothed man – who can be identified as Amerigo Vespucci from the astrolabe, standard and ships – and a nude woman reclining on a hammock.³⁰ A sword is discreetly visible under Vespucci's tunic. Studies have emphasized how gender and sexuality are employed in this artwork as metaphors for territorial exploration and conquest. These are expressed as a series of oppositions: female/male, naked/dressed, reclining/standing, nature/culture, enchantment/dismay.³¹ This gendered exchange is charged with cultural values, as can be seen from a comparison of the posture of the two figures: evidently privileged in the case of the European male, while the 'Indian' female is 'altogether too receptive, open, and empty'.³² But her denigration is most explicitly marked in the background, where three other Indians, also naked, are busy roasting a human leg on a spit over a fire. America's head and left arm partially encircle the scene, while the roasting leg and another one close to her pointing finger are somehow inverted versions of her own limb. A connection is thus made within the composition between the cannibalism scene and the allegorical figure of America, prompting Louis Montrose to suggest that these formal interrelationships point to a discursive connection in early modernity between women and the cruelly uncivil population of the Americas.³³ On the other hand, as Michael Schreffler has argued, the pictorial distinction between the figure of 'America' and the cannibalistic cooking scene perhaps evidences a change in European conceptualizations of the Americas and of early modern colonialism in general, 'in which the notion of "America" as a consumer of human flesh is minimized and subsequently recast as the object of European consumption'.³⁴

Even more pervasive was the eroticization of domination and the dehumanization of 'others' into beasts, when blackness was considered as a phenotypical signifier of racial difference, especially in view of polygenist claims that 'blacks', irrespective of gender, felt less pain than any other race because they had 'thickened' nerve endings and were presumed to be emotionless. Winthrop Jordan has noted that when describing Africans as beastly, an Englishman 'was frequently as much registering a sense of sexual shock as describing swinish manners'.³⁵ In the eyes of the white intruders, the dissolute character and 'beastly' disposition of the Africans was such that they required vigilant control at the very least. But fantasies often tell us more about the fantasizing subject than the object of the fantasy itself. When European



Figure 19.1 *The Discovery of America*. First plate from a print series entitled *Nova Reperta* (consisting of a title page and 19 plates, engraved by Jan Collaert I, after Jan van der Straet, called Stradanus (1523–1605), and published by Philippe Galle, c. 1600. Image © The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Image source: Art Resource, NY

male travel writers cast their gaze upon African men and women, they came face to face with their own titillation, and ‘proceeded to reduce human warmth and sexual intimacy between African males and females to unnatural animalistic and beastlike impulses’.³⁶ Africa served as a convenient screen onto which Europeans projected their own anxieties about themselves and the world they lived in. The European encounter with Africa came at a time when order, self-discipline, self-abnegation, sexual restraint and Christian integrity were regarded as core values and goals. These goals were also very ambitious, and the inability to live up to them, or indeed the urge to dispense with them entirely, caused serious inner tensions to which the contact with Africa provided ‘an emotional release’.³⁷ Put differently, Europeans projected onto Africa their own fears about what they themselves would be like if European institutions and conventions did not exercise a constraining influence. Christianity kept a watchful eye on the demarcation between man and animal, but the European imagination was troubled all the same by ancient myths representing man as part animal or animal as man. It was acceptable to conjure up such myths provided they were one step removed – which is why Africans were portrayed as ‘animalistic, violent, sexually lustful, lazy, and religiously unregenerate’.³⁸

In a discussion of the discursive production of social groups identified – in twenty-first-century white Australia – by base drives, a proximity to ‘nature’, eroticism and the absence of civilized manners, human geographer Kay Anderson urges historians to

unpick historical notions of ‘the racialised bestial’ by acknowledging ‘the human psyche’s drive to repress fears and desires surrounding bodily (“animal”) impulses such as sex and violence, and to elide such “impure” impulses with racialised others’.³⁹ Both Freud’s theorization of concealed primal instincts⁴⁰ and Edward Said’s concept that the Orient is a projection of the West’s ‘shadow self’ are obvious points of reference here. Indeed, it would perhaps not be inappropriate to speak of ‘emotional Orientalism’, as even Jean-Frédéric Bernard and Bernard Picart’s famous comparative work, *Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples du monde* (1723–37), often cited as a powerful humanistic manifesto for toleration of human diversity, ends up attributing Europeanized affective traits to Africans in its efforts to depict them as fully human (Figure 19.2).

By reading ‘behind’ texts and images, and examining how they work in tandem to create an affective readerly response, the projected message can be uncovered and unpicked. While Bernard and Picart appear empathetic, they are nonetheless speaking *for* Africans, accentuating what the postcolonial critic Gayatri Spivak would call their ‘subalternity’.⁴¹ Picart’s compassionate and sensitive depictions complicate prevailing prejudice and our (often received) understandings of ethnocentricity in the early modern world. At the same time, however, this mode of discourse paradoxically made whiteness the standard of humanity and emotional respectability. This facilitated the internalization of oppression, that is, the unexamined acceptance by the oppressed group itself of the prejudices justifying their subservience, which Picart was trying to counter.⁴² An important aspect of the blacks’ fight for liberation has been to comprehend and alter those negative self-directed emotions. It must be said, however, that colour consciousness and white supremacy appear to have become increasingly united, globalized, and commodified in recent years, as the worldwide multibillion-dollar skin-lightening industry attests.

Desensitized to racial injustice

The *Cérémonies* has been described as ‘the book that changed Europe’, because its popularity helped to promote a more receptive attitude to the religious ‘Other’.⁴³ European readers’ belief that they shared nothing in common with ‘savages’ in remote parts of the world was undermined by Bernard and Picart’s emphasis on the affinities between peoples distant in time and space, something that was further underlined by the mixing of European and non-European elements in Picart’s lavish illustrations. Oddly, the ‘African section’ of the *Cérémonies* (published in 1728) and its sources have attracted relatively little attention. In the section Bernard repeatedly states that travel accounts or missionary reports about Africa are not always accurate and not always disinterested, and so need to be approached with caution. In particular, he points out that the Italian Capuchin Giovanni Antonio Cavazzi da Montecuccolo (1621–1678) had seized on the supposed commonalities between devotion to the ‘sovereign pontiff’ of Kongo and devotion to the pope as a way of suggesting ‘that Nature dictates to the most barbarous nations the awful reverence and respect which is indisputably due to the Sovereign Pontiffs of all religions whatsoever’.⁴⁴ Bernard exposes Cavazzi’s biased representation of the alleged barbarity of Kongolese and Angolan natives with his sarcastic observations about scheming missionaries trying to impose ‘the whiteness of the God of the Christians, in opposition to their black Deity’ by making sure that blacks ‘exchanged their fetiches for crosses’.⁴⁵




Figure 19.2 Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses des peuples idolâtres; avec une explication historique, & quelques dissertations curieuses, Amsterdam: chez J.F. Bernard, 1723–1728, vol. 2 (1728), 'Dissertation sur la Religion des Africains'. Stiftung der Werke von C.G. Jung, Zürich, online, available at: <<http://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-11425>> / Public Domain Mark

Of the many different seventeenth-century European travel accounts of central Africa, Cavazzi's widely read *Istorica descrizione de' tre regni Congo, Matamba ed Angola*, in which Africans are routinely described as 'inhuman', must surely be regarded as one of the most negative.⁴⁶ Cavazzi's chief interests were history and religion, and the methodological ardour with which he went about collecting information on both has contributed greatly to our knowledge of seventeenth-century central Africa. Ironically, this usefulness was facilitated by his anti-African views. Distrustful of African conversions, and convinced that their religion was a manifestation of the devil, he examined local cosmology in minute detail with the avowed aim of uncovering the deceits of false Christians, or traces of local religious belief. He illustrated his manuscripts with watercolours (partially reproduced in the print version), which also provide accurate documentation of African traditions and musical instruments. The gruesome excesses described by Cavazzi – with cannibalism, infanticide and the actions of bloodthirsty mercenaries very much to the fore – evidently gave his white readers, always keen to seize on arguments that might assuage their consciences, an a priori justification for white supremacy, religious indoctrination and brutal slavery.

In 1728, Cavazzi's work was translated by the Dominican Jean-Baptiste Labat, who had already written a popular account of the daily lives of the slaves who toiled on his sugar plantation on Martinique, entitled *Nouveau voyage aux isles de l'Amérique*. What is of most interest for us here is his description of the inuring effect of exposure to African suffering. He writes:

Many *nègres* came aboard; they were wearing only simple cloth undergarments; some had a bonnet or a nasty hat. Many carried the marks of whippings they had received on their backs; this initially provoked compassion among those who were not yet accustomed to this, but one gets used to it.⁴⁷

At a later point in the book Labat turns to human bondage in the French Caribbean, and starts by saying that Louis XIII was initially reluctant to permit slavery in the colonies. According to Labat, the pious king only changed his mind when he realized that it was the sole 'unfailing way to inspire the Africans to worship the true God, to save them from idolatry, and to make them embrace and continue in the Christian faith until death'. Labat wrote from a planter's perspective, and had no hesitation in adding that, after being indoctrinated in the Christian faith, Africans became 'eminently tractable'. This was because, besides their life of servitude, they received the added benefit of being closer to God. Labat was also of the view that European Christian paternalism suited what he saw as the childlike mentality of slaves: 'All *nègres* have great respect for the aged', he sustained, and as the slave's gratitude was potentially boundless, he suggested to his fellow Caribbean masters that they should posit themselves as benevolent but stern patriarchs: 'Should one do good by them, and in good grace, they love their master infinitely, and will do anything, even at their own peril, to save his life'. Although he conceded that the slave system was unquestionably brutal, Labat presented an essentially reassuring view of slavery in the early eighteenth century, with discussion of the practical economic realities of the plantation system being interwoven with anecdotal examples of 'the potentially humane psychology of the slave owner'.⁴⁸

Conclusion: feeling equal

The word 'race' first appeared in the Middle Ages, when it was used as a synonym for caste and applied to the growing of plants and animal breeding. In the late Middle Ages it was employed to define noble lineage in Italy and France.⁴⁹ During the protracted conflict between Muslims and Christians on the Iberian peninsula, and the overseas expansion that followed, race took on an ethnic significance. Initially, it was used to refer to people of Jewish and Muslim descent, denoting a presumed impurity of the blood, but was later applied to Africans and Native Americans as well. In eighteenth-century theories of races the word was employed ambiguously to label subspecies, which, in the mid-nineteenth century, were to all intents and purposes transformed into species by scientific racialism.⁵⁰ The word 'black', in the inclusive political sense rendered standard in post-apartheid South African political and theoretical discourse, is used as a label to refer to a range of identities that have occupied an inferior racial position. Thus understood, as Samantha Vice says, the word 'black' can be applied to people of varying ethnic and national origins, including Africans, Afro-Caribbeans and South Asians in the UK, and African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Native Americans and Latinxs in the US, besides people of mixed race. Although the racial experiences of these particular identities may differ considerably, 'black' remains a powerful category, both politically and morally.⁵¹

In a study about the immense significance and continuing impact of 'systemic racism' in the United States, engendered by three hundred and fifty years of racial oppression, social theorist Joe Richard Feagin notes that the dominant cultural frame continues to be an overarching white worldview that encompasses 'a broad and persisting set of racial stereotypes, prejudices, ideologies, images, interpretations and narratives, emotions and reactions to language accents, as well as racialized inclinations to discriminate'.⁵² In the meantime, African-Americans have used the noun 'race' to give voice to their collective identity, and to transform what was once a derogatory word into something quite different. The well-known African-American novelist James Baldwin draws attention to the naturalization of whiteness in his non-fiction work *Notes of a Native Son* (1955), in which he vividly describes his anguishing experience as the only black person in a white community in Switzerland:

I thought of white men arriving for the first time in an African village, strangers there, as I am a stranger here, and tried to imagine the astounded populace touching their hair and marveling at the color of their skin. But there is a great difference between being the first white man to be seen by Africans and being the first black man to be seen by whites. The white man takes the astonishment as tribute, for he arrives to conquer and to convert the natives, whose inferiority in relation to himself is not even to be questioned; whereas I, without a thought of conquest, find myself among a people whose culture controls me, has even, in a sense, created me, people who have cost me more in anguish and rage than they will ever know, who yet do not even know of my existence. The astonishment with which I might

have greeted them, should they have stumbled into my African village a few hundred years ago, might have rejoiced their hearts. But the astonishment with which they greet me today can only poison mine.⁵³

The question of a ‘desire for race’ demands a re-evaluation of the notion of identity ‘as a relational perception of belonging that affects individuals, groups and communities over time as well as across locations, in a permanent process of construction and reconstruction’.⁵⁴ ‘Liberation Christologies’ have likewise been searching for socially transformative understandings of Christ, alternatives to those Christologies that underpin, whether implicitly or explicitly, the association of Christ with white European domination, and/or define redemption asocially in a way that encourages and perpetuates a passive attitude to oppression. ‘Christ must be understood as universal through being multi-particular, existing in the context of each people’s cultural and social particularity’.⁵⁵

As Janine Young Kim has observed, echoing Pierre-Félix Guattari, ‘inclusion is about more than even rights – it’s about desire: without engaging in the complex and sometimes messy world of racial emotions, we cannot cultivate the desire for otherness, the feeling of equality’. In trying to avoid emotions, the idea of equality ‘becomes docile and we end up speaking vaguely of things like tolerance, diversity, and multiculturalism that become drained of their intended energy’. The core principle of equality is a much higher and life-affirming ideal. It is also ‘the feeling of joy in belonging, love in fellowship, and hope for a better future’. To achieve genuine inclusion, it is not enough just to carry on talking about the material conditions of race, or about dignity and respect. ‘Part of *being* equal’, Kim concludes, ‘is *feeling* equal’.⁵⁶

Whenever embarking on a historical analysis of racial prejudices and discrimination practices, it is simply impossible to shunt emotions into the wings. Scholars also need to acknowledge their own racial status in their research. This will help them access emotions about race in the period under study.⁵⁷ Tellingly though, and not infrequently, the theorizing of culturally universal emotions has led to charges of ‘fascism’.⁵⁸ While remaining attentive to geographical, political and historical specificities, we might more constructively draw upon postcolonial and race theory to consider how ideas of mirroring and mimicry fed into early modern encounters between Europeans and Africans. At the same time, *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon’s seminal work on psychoanalysis and race (1952), is of great value in theorizing the emergence of a self-consciously white identity that is ‘felt’ as well as seen.

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Notes

- 1 B. Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 35.
- 2 F. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* [French original: *Peau noire, masques blancs*, Paris: Seuil, 1952)], as quoted from Richard Philcox's 2008 English translation in J.Y. Kim, 'Racial emotions and the feeling of equality', *University of Colorado Law Review* 87, 2016, 437–500 (p. 450).
- 3 S. Vice, in 'Race, luck, and the moral emotions', in P.C. Taylor, L. Alcoff and L. Anderson (eds), *The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Race*, New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 446–60 (p. 446). For an 'emotional theory of racism' see also L. Faucher, 'Negative emotions and racism', in C. Tappolet, F. Teroni and A. Konzelmann Ziv (eds), *Shadows of the Soul: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions* (2011), New York: Routledge, 2018, pp. 122–31.
- 4 J. Burton and A. Loomba (eds), *Race in Early Modern England: A Documentary Companion*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 1.
- 5 M. Eliav-Feldon, I. Benjamin and J. Ziegler (eds), *The Origins of Racism in the West*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 4.
- 6 É. Balibar, 'Is there a neo-racism?', in É. Balibar and I. Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, New York: Verso, 1991, p. 22. See Burton and Loomba, *Race in Early Modern England*, p. 27. The widely held view that medieval and early modern prejudices, together with discriminatory action, were shaped to a crucial degree by religion, while modern political action was influenced by the scientifically legitimated idea of a natural hierarchy of races, is accepted by George M. Fredrickson in his general history of racism in the Western world from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century, published in 2012. In a more recent study, Francisco Bethencourt has argued that there actually is a much more blurred distinction between religious and natural hierarchies than has generally been admitted. This is demonstrated, in his view, by the modern realities of racism, especially that directed at Armenians and Jews. See F. Bethencourt, *Racisms: From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014, p. 4.
- 7 E. Jablonka and M.J. Lamb, *Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005, pp. 76–8.
- 8 W.M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; R. Boddice, *The History of Emotions*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2018, p. 36.
- 9 Boddice, *History of Emotions*, p. 35; Boddice, 'The history of emotions', in S. Handley, R. McWilliam and L. Noakes (eds), *New Directions in Social and Cultural History*, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018, pp. 45–64 (p. 54); J. Lang, 'New histories of emotions', *History and Theory* 57:1, 2018, 104–20 (p. 113).
- 10 Vice, 'Race, luck, and the moral emotions', pp. 457–8. See also D.K. Nelkin, 'Moral luck', in E.N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Winter 2013 edition, online, available at: <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/moral-luck/>>.
- 11 Vice, 'Race, luck, and the moral emotions', p. 448 and passim.
- 12 B. Isaac, 'Racism: a rationalization of prejudice in Greece and Rome', in Eliav-Feldon et al., *The Origins of Racism in the West*, pp. 38–9; Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*, 'Introduction' and passim. The notion that the prejudices of the Greeks and Romans towards barbarians and black people were not natural but cultural, a view first proposed by Frank Snowden and which has earned considerable consensus, is contested by Benjamin Isaac, who points out that racism is not like ethnic or other group prejudices. This is because racial prejudice does not accept 'the possibility of change at an individual or collective level in principle'. However, it has been objected that what Isaac sees as a rigid and unchangeable Greek and Roman 'proto-racism' is challenged by ancient beliefs that political and social institutions were prime causal factors in the evolution of collective characteristics. Snowden's best-known works are *Blacks in Antiquity: Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970; and *Before Color Prejudice: The Ancient View of Blacks*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.

- 13 As Benjamin Braude has noted, 'neat and clear-cut continental divisions among Noah's three sons are not only completely alien to the biblical text, they are also incomprehensible to the ancient and medieval mind. [. . .] Just as the relationship between blacks and Ham evolved slowly over many centuries, so did the relationship between Jews and Shem'. See B. Braude, 'The sons of Noah and the construction of ethnic and geographical identities in the medieval and early modern periods', *William and Mary Quarterly* 54:1, 1997, 103–42 (pp. 109, 138).
- 14 Sandra Young, 'Race and the global south in early modern studies', *Shakespeare Quarterly* 67, 2016, 125–35 (p. 129).
- 15 R. Radford Ruether, 'Is Christ white?: racism and Christology', in G. Yancy (ed.), *Christology and Whiteness: What Would Jesus Do?*, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 101–13 (p. 105).
- 16 J. Ziegler, 'Physiognomy, science, and proto-racism 1200–1500', in Eliav-Feldon *et al.*, *The Origins of Racism in the West*, pp. 181–99 (p. 183).
- 17 M. Dawson, *Bodies Complexioned: Human Variation in Early Modern English Culture c. 1600–1750*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2018. See also M. Dawson, 'Humouring racial encounters in the Anglo-Atlantic, c. 1580–1720', in L. Bailey, L. Diggelmann and K.M. Phillips (eds), *Old Worlds, New Worlds: European Cultural Encounters, c. 1000–c. 1750*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2009, pp. 139–61.
- 18 David Goldenberg argues that it was not until the advent of Christian biblical exegesis from Origen onwards that black people started being regarded as real (the sinful Ethiopians) rather than abstract beings. See D. Goldenberg, 'Racism, color symbolism, and color prejudice', in Eliav-Feldon *et al.*, *The Origins of Racism in the West*, pp. 88–108.
- 19 T. Hahn, 'The difference the Middle Ages makes: color and race before the modern world', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31:1, 2001, 1–37 (p. 14).
- 20 R. Bartlett, 'Illustrating ethnicity in the Middle Ages', in Eliav-Feldon *et al.*, *The Origins of Racism in the West*, pp. 132–56. See also R. Bartlett, 'Medieval and modern concepts of race and ethnicity', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31:1, 2001, 39–56. It is telling that the crowned head of an African king (the *caput Aethiopum*) is one of three charges in the armorial bearings of Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, formerly the Archbishop of Freising. The head first appeared on the bearings of the old principality of Freising in 1316, during the reign of the Bishop of Freising, Prince Konrad III, and barely changed until the Church's estates in the region were 'secularized' in 1802–03. It has been on the episcopal coat of arms of the archbishops of Munich and Freising ever since. It has been interestingly suggested that the origins of the symbol may relate to the Egyptian legionary commander St Maurice, who was executed together with his Christian soldiers at the orders of Emperor Maximian in the third century CE after refusing to make sacrifices to the Roman gods. He was first depicted with what were thought to be African features in the sculptural program devised and executed for the newly erected cathedral of Magdeburg between 1240 and 1250. But as racial idealization became a growing ideological and emotional trend in the centuries that followed, Maurice was portrayed less frequently as a black saint. See Jean Devisse, 'A sanctified black: Maurice', in D. Bindman and H.L. Gates Jr (eds), *The Image of the Black in Western Art* (1979), vol. 2, pt 2, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010, pp. 139–40, 267–9; M. Ainsworth, S. Hindriks and P. Terjanian, 'Lucas Cranach's *Saint Maurice*', *Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin* 72:4, 2015, 1.
- 21 J.E.H. Smith, *Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015. It is a terrible irony, Smith points out, that 'natural history' developed in what was supposedly an age of natural rights, with the creation of natural differences resulting in a number of very unnatural inequalities. Ann Thomson has also observed that some nineteenth-century material anthropologists seized on Diderot's dropping of the distinction between humans and animals in order to downgrade certain human groups, deemed to be at the bottom of the heap, to the status of animals (A. Thomson, '(Why) does the Enlightenment matter?', *Diciottesimo Secolo* 1, 2016, 147–68 (pp. 160–1)). Thomson also notes that Diderot's reluctance to stress innate differences between humans can be explained by his opposition to slavery and colonial exploitation (*ibid.*, p. 165).

- 22 M. da Lionessa, *Santo Stefano Maggiore degli Abissini e le relazioni Romano-Etiopiche*, Vatican City: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1929, pp. 134–8.
- 23 G.B. Ramusio, *La descrizione dell’Africa di Giovan Lioni Africano*, in M. Milanesi (ed.), *Navigazioni e viaggi*, vol. 1, Turin: Einaudi, 1978, p. 21.
- 24 K. Lowe, “‘Representing’ Africa: ambassadors and princes from Christian Africa to Renaissance Italy and Portugal, 1402–1608”, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 17, 2007, 101–28; R. Gray, ‘A Kongo princess, the Kongo ambassadors and the Papacy’, in D. Maxwell and I. Lawrie (eds), *Christianity and the African Imagination: Essays in Honour of Adrian Hastings*, Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 25–40.
- 25 G.B. Ricci, *Pope Paul V and Antonio Manuele Nsaku Ne Vunda (1610–11)*, Vatican, Apostolic Palace, Sala Paolina.
- 26 Two sixteenth-century frescoes on the outside of private palaces in Rome’s city centre, situated in Via Giubbonari and Via del Pellegrino and only uncovered in the spring of 2010, appear to bear out this consistent attempt to visualize – if not yet to actually encourage – the inclusion of Africans in the Roman concept of Christianity. The iconography of the facade on Via Giubbonari is difficult to make out, but the face on the wall in Via del Pellegrino is definitely an African king, dressed in golden robes and wearing a large crown.
- 27 M. Anesko, ‘So discreet a zeal: slavery and the Anglican Church in Virginia, 1680–1730’, *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 93:3, 1985, 256–78; J. Turner, ‘John Locke, Christian mission, and colonial America’, *Modern Intellectual History* 8:2, 2011, 267–97.
- 28 R.P.-C. Hsia, ‘Religion and race: Protestant and Catholic discourses on Jewish conversions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’, in Eliav-Feldon *et al.*, *The Origins of Racism in the West*, pp. 265–75.
- 29 Vice, ‘Race, luck, and the moral emotions’, p. 459.
- 30 Michael J. Schreffler, ‘Vespucci rediscovers America: the pictorial rhetoric of cannibalism in early modern culture’, *Art History* 28:3, 2005, 295–310.
- 31 Margarita Zamora, *Reading Columbus*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 152–81.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 154.
- 33 Louis Montrose, ‘The work of gender in the discourse of discovery’, *Representations* 33, Winter 1991, 1–41.
- 34 Schreffler, ‘Vespucci rediscovers America’, p. 304.
- 35 W.D. Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (1968), Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012, p. 33.
- 36 L.A. Palmer, ‘The Politics of Loving Blackness in the UK’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2012, p. 51.
- 37 W.B. Cohen, *The French Encounter with Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530–1880*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980, p. 33.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 34.
- 39 K. Anderson, “‘The beast within’: Race, humanity, and animality”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 18:3, 2000, 301–20, here 302.
- 40 For more about the importance of psychohistory as a forerunner of the history of emotions, and the allegedly unjust way in which it was ‘killed off’, see Boddice, *The History of Emotions*, pp. 29–32.
- 41 G.C. Spivak, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’, in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1988, pp. 271–313.
- 42 G. Tarantino, ‘From labeling and ridicule to understanding: the legacy of Bernard and Picart’s religious comparativism’, to appear in G. Tarantino and P. von Wyss-Giacosa (eds), *Through Your Eyes: Religions and Beliefs as Intercultural Mirror (16th–18th Centuries)*, Leiden: Brill, forthcoming; Tarantino, ‘Cérémonies et coutumes religieuses de tous les peuples du monde (1723–43)’, in D. Thomas and J. Chesworth (eds), *Christian–Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History 1500–1900*, Leiden: Brill, 2019, pp. 616–28.
- 43 L. Hunt, M.C. Jacob and W. Mijnhardt, *The Book that Changed Europe: Picart and Bernard’s ‘Religious Ceremonies of the World’*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2010.

- 44 *The Ceremonies and Religious Customs of the Various Nations of the Known World*, 7 vols, London: printed by William Jackson for Claude Du Bosc, 1733–39, vol. 4, p. 461, note c.
- 45 Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 437, 439.
- 46 Probably written between 1663 and 1664, the *Istorica Descrizione* was only published in 1687, eight years after Cavazzi died, following considerable revision ordered by the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith and carried out by the Bolognese monk Fortunato Alamandini. The original manuscripts (containing fine watercolour illustrations by Cavazzi and made available online in English translation by John Thornton at <www.bu.edu/afam/faculty/john-thornton/cavazzi-missione-evangelica-2/>) are in a private collection in Modena, and can only readily be accessed in the copy microfilmed by Joseph C. Miller in 1977.
- 47 J.-B. Labat, *Nouveau voyage aux isles de l'Amérique* (1722), as quoted in English translation in A.S. Curran, *The Anatomy of Blackness: Science and Slavery in an Age of Enlightenment*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011, p. 58.
- 48 Curran, *Anatomy of Blackness*, pp. 60–1.
- 49 M.C. Horowitz and M. Cline, *Race, Gender, and Rank: Early Modern Ideas of Humanity*, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1992; C. de Miramon, 'Noble dogs, noble blood: invention of the concept of race in the late Middle Ages', in Eliav-Feldon *et al.*, *The Origins of Racism in the West*, pp. 200–16; M. Hendricks, 'Race: a Renaissance category?', in M. Hattaway (ed.), *A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture*, 2 vols, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, vol. 2, pp. 535–44.
- 50 P.J. Smith, *Representing the Other: 'Race', Text and Gender in Spanish and Spanish American Narrative*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992; G. Marcocci, 'Blackness and heathenism: color, theology, and race in the Portuguese world, c. 1450–1600', *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura* 43:2, 2016, 33–57; S. Sebastiani, 'Race as a construction of the Other: "Native Americans" and "Negroes" in the eighteenth-editions of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*', in B. Stråth (ed.), *Europe and the Other, Europe as the Other*, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2000, pp. 195–228; S. Iyengar, *Shades of Difference: Mythologies of Skin Color in Early Modern England*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005; I.M. Resnick, *Marks of Distinction: Christian Perceptions of Jews in the High Middle Ages*, Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012; F. Soyer, 'Racial othering – Jews', in S. Broomhall (ed.), *Early Modern Emotions. An Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 297–300. In Fredrickson's version of the behavioural account, as in the doxastic account, racialists do not become racists until their beliefs are used as grounds for demanding special privileges for those whom they regard as belonging to their own race, and for demeaning and harming those whom they regard as racially Other. G.M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 154. See also C. Taylor, 'Race and racism in Foucault's Collège de France lectures', *Philosophy Compass* 6:11, 2011, 746–56.
- 51 Vice, 'Race, luck, and the moral emotions', p. 447.
- 52 J.R. Feagin, *The White Racial Frame: Centuries of Racial Framing and Counter-Framing*, 2nd edn, New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 3.
- 53 James Baldwin, 'Stranger in the village', originally published in *Harper's Magazine* in 1953 and then in his collection of essays *Notes of a Native Son*, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1955. See also bell hooks, 'Representing whiteness in the black imagination', in R. Frankenberg (ed.), *Displacing Whiteness: Essays in Social and Cultural Criticism*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997, pp. 338–46.
- 54 Bethencourt, *Racisms*, pp. 6–7.
- 55 Ruether, 'Is Christ white?', p. 107.
- 56 Kim, 'Racial emotions and the feeling of equality', pp. 500, 499, 441. Equally suggestively, John Locke (1632–1704) argued that *true* civility does not just concern actions but dispositions as well, namely the 'disposition of the mind not to offend others'. See T.M. Bejan, *Mere Civility. Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.

- 57 'It is uncomfortable and probably inappropriate to make comments on how those in another racial position should feel, especially when I speak from a position of privilege. On the whole, therefore, I speak as a white person about whites' emotional responses, and when I make a claim about blacks' responses, I am calling on black writers': Vice, 'Race, luck, and the moral emotions', p. 447.
- 58 See J. Plamper, *The History of Emotions. An Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 166. This authoritative survey breaks new ground in its effort to go beyond the dichotomy of universalism and social constructivism. For a critical evaluation of the universalist approach, see R. Leys, *The Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and Critique*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017.

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND GLOBAL ENCOUNTERS

Robin Macdonald

In the ever-expanding field of emotions history, scholars are becoming increasingly aware of the discipline's Western focus. 'Emotions history', Susan J. Matt and Peter N. Stearns argue, 'needs to catch up with the increasingly global dimensions of the larger historical domain'.¹ In a recent *American Historical Review* Conversation on 'The Historical Study of Emotions', Eugenia Lean similarly expresses concern over emotions scholars' focus on 'change over time'. This focus, Lean argues, fails to consider place, and often results in the creation of 'Western' emotional genealogies that situate the 'West' as *the* normative space of investigation.²

The historiography of Christian missions has, in contrast, always been broad in geographical scope, but it is only recently that scholars have begun to consider missions as a 'global' phenomenon.³ Historians of early modern Catholicism, in particular, have stressed the importance of examining encounters of Europeans and peoples outside of Europe following the changes wrought by the Reformations and the 'renewal' of Catholicism in the years before and after the Council of Trent (1543–63). Many emphasize the necessity of shifting the historiographical focus from European missionaries to the myriad peoples and individuals these missionaries sought to convert.⁴ This not only involves examining the ways in which local communities around the world adopted, adapted or rejected Roman Catholic practices and objects, but also the ways in which these communities shaped Europe.⁵ People and information exchange not only occurred between the so-called 'Old World' and the 'New', but also between colonial communities.⁶ Missions thus provide scholars with fruitful opportunities to examine how wide-scale phenomena – for example, Roman Catholicism – were practised and shaped in different local contexts.⁷

Scholars of missions have long been interested in emotions (emotions and conversion are often viewed as inextricably linked), but it is only recently that emotions methodologies have been used explicitly in historical studies of missions.⁸ Although the term 'global encounters' is part of this chapter's title, it by no means pretends comprehensive coverage of emotions in the early modern world (an impossible task for one historian). Rather, it will examine the myriad ways in which scholars have explored the roles of emotions in conversion to Christianity and in its reception in a wide range of locales. Attending to the global outlook of missionary orders – and, in particular to the ways in which their practices and the responses to these practices varied – demonstrates the ways in which feelings are historically

and culturally situated (but not fixedly or determinedly so). As Claire McLisky and Karen Vallgård have argued, mission history can thus contribute to debates about the universality and/or particularity of emotions.⁹ While some scholars advocate the universal nature of emotions (Paul Ekman's research on facial expressions is often cited in support of this view) it is clear that emotions vary temporally, geographically and in countless other ways.¹⁰ Monique Scheer's work on 'emotional practices' (which draws on Pierre Bourdieu's theory of *habitus*) bridges the gap between dichotomies such as mind and body which are, Scheer argues, mutually 'embedded' with social relations.¹¹ Emotions, Scheer contends, are a 'form of practice': they are not simply responses to stimuli, but emerge through 'doing' (they are 'an action of a mindful body'). Furthermore, Scheer asserts that definitions of emotion 'must include the body and its functions, not in the sense of a universal, pristine, biological base, but as a locus for innate and learned capacities deeply shaped by habitual practices'.¹² Emotions, then, are historical not simply because of changes in language or norms, but because habitual practices (and bodies) change over time.¹³ A focus on emotional practices can thus be a useful mechanism for exploring the changing religious identities of medieval and early modern people as they moved through the world.

The movement of emotions can be difficult to trace.¹⁴ One of the main difficulties, as Lean sees it, is how space is conceptualized by scholars. Attending to the movement of people and things – both can traverse national and other boundaries – via colonial networks or trade routes, such as the Silk Road, demonstrates the ways in which emotions do not simply develop in a linear fashion within national boundaries, but in sometimes chaotic, unexpected ways.¹⁵ Sara Ahmed's argument that feelings 'do not reside in subjects or objects' – such as people and things – 'but are produced as effects of circulation' is helpful for examining how emotions might have moved through the premodern world, shaping identities as they did so.¹⁶ 'It is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others,' Ahmed writes, 'that surfaces and boundaries are made: the "I" and the "we" are shaped by, and even take the shape of, contact with others'. Emotions, Ahmed argues, are not 'in' individuals or collectives, but 'produce' the 'surfaces' and 'boundaries' that enable them to be delineated.¹⁷ Barbara H. Rosenwein's concept of 'emotional communities' (that is, communities of shared emotional values and vocabularies) has also been employed by scholars of conversion in order to describe communities spread across large geographical areas and national boundaries.¹⁸ As Jacqueline Van Gent argues, however, scholars employing this methodology should be mindful of the inequalities of power inherent in colonial societies, and the effects of these asymmetrical relations on emotional communities.¹⁹

This chapter examines methodological challenges and approaches to analysing emotional encounters in Christian missions. The opening section will examine the long history of the use of emotional rhetoric in discourses about European colonialism during the period under examination. The sections that follow will explore three interconnected themes: the first will discuss the ways in which language could shape feelings about religion; the second will examine how emotional practices could shape, and sometimes re-shape, emotional expressions of Catholicism; and the third and final section will discuss the forging of emotional identities through travel and movement (whether voluntary or forced).

Global missions and emotions in historical perspective

From the twelfth century until the end of the seventeenth century, Christians were evangelizing in numerous regions of the globe. At the beginning of the twelfth century, the First Crusade to the Holy Land (1095–99) had recently concluded with the Crusaders seizing Jerusalem. During the protracted era of crusading that followed, there were several attempts to convert Muslims in the Holy Land and Eastern Mediterranean (though how far – if at all – conversion was an aim of the Crusades is the subject of debate).²⁰ Whether or not scholars regard ‘crusade’ and ‘mission’ as complementary, opposing or sequential phenomena – with ‘mission’ usually regarded as superseding ‘crusade’ – the role of emotional rhetoric in the ‘justification’ of the Crusades has long been discussed.²¹ From the First Crusade onwards, as Jonathan Riley-Smith argues, senior churchmen maintained that participation in crusades demonstrated both an individual’s love of God and that of his neighbours (Christians in the East, as opposed to their Muslim ‘enemies’).²² In 1145, for instance, Pope Eugenius III proclaimed that those who had taken part in the First Crusade had been ‘fired by the ardour of charity’ (in theology, *caritas* or ‘charity’ referred to Christian love).²³ But *caritas*, as Susanna A. Throop has recently demonstrated through the exploration of emotional rhetoric in ‘crusading texts’ (texts of any genre related to Western European notions of crusading), might also require Christians to take vengeance for their fallen comrades.²⁴ Throop contests the view (espoused by Riley-Smith, amongst others) that it was only amongst the laity – and at the start of the First Crusade – that the notion of crusading as vengeance thrived.²⁵ This approach not only acknowledges the importance of vengeance in twelfth-century Christian discourses, but also challenges the historiographical notion that feud and violence were aspects of the ‘primitive’ or ‘barbaric’ early Middle Ages, demonstrating the necessity of interrogating historiographical biases that stress the emotional ‘simplicity’ of past societies (a concern that has been apparent since the beginnings of the ‘new’ history of emotions at the turn of the twenty-first century).²⁶

It was in the sixteenth century that the Latin term *missio* (‘mission’) began to be employed to describe co-ordinated efforts at evangelism in the Americas. The first use of the term was in 1523, when twelve Franciscan friars were sent by superior Francisco de Los Angeles de Quíñones to convert the subjects of the Aztec Empire following the Spanish conquest led by Hernán Cortés in 1521.²⁷ Historian John O’Malley credits the Society of Jesus or ‘Jesuits’ (founded by former soldier Ignatius of Loyola and approved by Pope Paul III in 1540) as being amongst the first to promote widespread usage of the term. The Society’s founding bull, *Regimini militantis ecclesiae*, initially described the order’s evangelizing aims as ‘propagation of the faith’, but further on in the document began to use the term ‘missions’; prior to this bull, ‘journeying to the infidel’ was amongst terms employed for proselytizing.²⁸ As with medieval churchmen, early modern colonizers often used religious rhetoric in support of colonialism. The title of Antonio Ruiz de Montoya’s 1639 *Conquista espiritual* (*The Spiritual Conquest*), an account of the strictly regulated mission settlements in Paraguay known as *reducciones* (‘reductions’) suggests the connection between violent military conquest and the evangelical activities which were used – in contemporary literature – to justify it.²⁹ The problematic assumptions underlying the historiographical use of this triumphalist term have in recent years been highlighted

by revisionist scholarship on evangelism in New Spain (Mexico). Drawing on Indigenous-language sources and employing critical readings of Spanish accounts, these scholars emphasize the roles of Indigenous aides in processes of evangelization, challenging the notion that conversion was swift and complete. Rather, they argue, that as with the so-called ‘military conquest’, conversion was a protracted and negotiated process which resulted in multiple forms of Catholicism.³⁰

During this period, Protestant missionaries were less frequently associated with European colonialism than their Catholic counterparts. The Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* or VOC) was active for almost two hundred years (1602–1798), but attempts to convert local populations were very rare (the early seventeenth-century mission to Formosa – now Taiwan – is a notable exception). This lack of proselytizing in Dutch colonial outposts was not, Leonard Blussé has argued, a result of national temperament; the stereotype of the ‘phlegmatic Dutch’ (sometimes played against the ‘ardent’ Iberians) can hardly be applied in a period when the Low Countries was engaged in a struggle for independence from Spanish rule over freedom to practise Protestantism. Rather, he asserts (following Charles Boxer), it was a result of institutional features of the VOC. Missionaries who did travel with the Company were employed by, and directly responsible to, the Company, rather than their own mission society.³¹ It is generally accepted that Protestant missions were not conducted on an organized ‘global’ scale (i.e. by centralized mission societies) until the eighteenth century, and scholars of global missions and emotion have thus tended to pay less attention to the period before 1700.³²

Recent works in emotions scholarship have nonetheless explored the roles of emotions in Protestant colonialism prior to the eighteenth century. Abram Van Engen has argued that the religious and political outlooks of Puritans in New England were shaped by a Calvinist theology of sympathy or ‘fellow feeling’ (an ‘emotional community’). Sympathy, Van Engen asserts, became a ‘sign of membership: the experience and expression of mutual affections helped determine who belonged with whom’.³³ Indeed, evangelization had been one of the principal arguments put forward in favour of emigration. The 1629 charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company stressed the importance of good conduct on the part of colonists, so that ‘their good life and orderlie conversation maie wynn and incite the natives of country to the knowledg and obedience of the onelie true God’.³⁴ This, Van Engen argues, was an ‘affective model of conversion’ that required colonists to lead by example and gain the *affections* of Algonquian peoples, rather than through active mission.³⁵ When colonists began to take a more proactive approach in the 1640s, emotions continued to play a prominent role. Algonquian converts not only had to perform their pious duties, but they also had to prove that they truly *felt* their conversion by moving others (through abundant and contagious tears, for instance).³⁶ Yet emotional communities that stressed ‘sympathy amongst the saints’ (to borrow Van Engen’s phrase) tended to be constrained by race and national or cultural boundaries: terms like ‘the poor Indians’ set Indigenous peoples apart from European colonizers.³⁷ Similarly, Laura M. Stevens’s *The Poor Indians* stresses the importance of understanding the ways in which ‘benevolence’ can effect literary erasure, particularly within colonial frameworks.³⁸ Stevens’s examination of English, and later British, missionary writings (1642–1776) demonstrates how these writings prompted readers to feel ‘pity’ for

Native Americans in order to elicit financial support for evangelism. This narrative, Stevens argues, contributed to the development of a belief in the virtue of large-scale philanthropic work, which had significant consequences for the emergence of British ‘national feeling’, and implied English (later British) ‘moral superiority’ over French and Spanish Catholic colonizers whose brutality was well known.³⁹ Yet, as Stevens argues, missionary writings which stressed the necessity for ‘pity’ created a distance between readers and Native American ‘others’: ‘They enunciated the distance between self and other and sought to bridge that distance through an intensive process of spiritual transformation and rigorous acculturation’.⁴⁰ Understanding these emotive processes, Stevens argues, is key to understanding the ways in which Native Americans and their experiences were (figuratively) erased from mission.⁴¹ The means by which language was used in texts and in practice in order to promote, challenge or shape evangelism are the subject of the next section of this chapter. Since Protestant mission societies were not ‘globally’ active until the eighteenth century, however, what follows will focus predominantly on Catholic evangelism.

Language

Although the quantity, variety and rich detail of mission sources have been recognized in histories of cultural encounters, the roles of emotions in these sources have rarely received sustained examination.⁴² Dictionaries of Indigenous languages, ethnographic accounts and letters can all shed light on the emotional values and practices of evangelizers, as well as the people they sought to convert. As Stevens’s above-cited work demonstrates, however, these sources are by no means unproblematic and their authors had their own colonialist agendas which continue to have damaging effects today. Many extant accounts were written by white missionary men, and uncovering the perspectives of those they sought to convert often requires ‘reading against the grain’ (i.e. reading meanings unintended by authors). Marie-Christine Pioffet’s careful textual analysis of Jesuit missionary Father Paul Le Jeune’s 1634 *Relation* (the annual Jesuit account of their mission in New France [Canada]) demonstrates the ways in which its author (a former teacher of rhetoric) exploits humour in order to engage his readers in France and to solicit donations for the mission (at one point, the missionary recounts how he had, on numerous occasions, rolled gleefully down snowy hills, laughing all the way).⁴³ As Pioffet demonstrates, however, reading laughter in this *Relation* also reveals the resistance of Innu people to evangelism.⁴⁴

Whilst most missionaries learned the languages of the peoples they sought to convert (with varying degrees of success), this was not an easy process, even for the most able linguists. Le Jeune’s initial attempts to speak the Innu language were met with hilarity. ‘The trouble is,’ the missionary wrote, ‘I only stutter, I take one word for another, I pronounce badly; and so everything usually passes off in laughter’.⁴⁵ As John E. Bishop points out, scholars have tended to focus on French-language texts such as the *Relations*, obscuring the fact that interactions between missionaries and the women and men they sought to convert often occurred in Indigenous languages and that missionaries wrote the texts they used for everyday evangelical activity (sacramental registers, religious texts, etc.) in both Indigenous languages and in Latin.⁴⁶ Missionaries were thus often reliant on Indigenous individuals to teach them local

languages and customs. Franciscan friar Bernardino de Sagahún's *Florentine Codex* (c. 1577–79), also known as the *Historia general de las cosas de nueva España* (*General History of the Things of New Spain*), a twelve-volume encyclopaedia of pre-conquest Nahua culture in Central Mexico, was composed between c. 1540 and 1578/9 with the assistance of Nahua aides and using information from elders and other informants.⁴⁷ Since most sermons and religious texts were composed in Nahuatl, sometimes by religiously-educated Nahua *fiscales* who were responsible for their communities in the absence of a priest, these could contain unorthodox teachings.⁴⁸

Linguistic difficulties aside, the translation of Christian concepts was no simple matter. Jesuits in New France only explained the full meaning of the Eucharist (as the fleshy incarnation of the body of Christ) to Wendat converts who had long proved their faith, fearing that the act of communion might be confounded with the ritual ingestion of human flesh that sometimes occurred in the context of Wendat executions.⁴⁹ The 'translation' of Christianity was also reliant on what Simon Ditchfield has called the 'physical translatability of the sacred', that is, the movement of relics and sacred objects, and even the almost universal adoption of some types of church furniture, notably the confession box, an innovation pioneered by the Milanese Counter-Reformation bishop Carlo Borromeo which became commonplace in churches throughout the Iberian empire.⁵⁰ Many ecclesiastics expressed concerns about the appropriateness of local languages for preaching the gospel. In late medieval Europe, scholars debated whether or not European vernacular languages had systematic structures that could be analyzed in the same manner as Latin (the language of scholarship and scripture).⁵¹ Antonio de Nebrija's *Gramática castellana* (1492) argued that Spanish grammar and syntax functioned in a similar manner to Latin.⁵² The following century, Dominican friar Domingo de Santo Tomás's Quechua lexicon (1560) described Quechua pronunciation as 'easy and sweet', but also, 'civilized and abundant, regular and ordered by the same precepts as Latin'.⁵³

Language could thus shape perceptions of peoples – and was a key factor in how missionaries interacted with them. Likely following Aristotle, Jesuit missionary José de Acosta's *De procuranda Indorum salute* (1589) identified three categories of what he viewed as 'barbarism'. At the top of this three-tiered hierarchy were peoples who had what the missionary viewed as a stable government, law and books (he named the Chinese in this category). Others, those whom he described as 'the savages similar to wild animals, who have hardly any *human feelings*', were placed at the bottom of the hierarchy (in this category he placed the Kalinago people of the Lesser Antilles, though he used the European term of the era, 'Caribes').⁵⁴

Missionaries in East Asia (notably, China and Japan) were unable to impose Christianity on local populations (their presence was a result of trade and diplomacy rather than military conquest) and they therefore had to tread carefully.⁵⁵ Alessandro Valignano, the Italian Jesuit who became Visitor of the *Índias Orientais* (East Indies) in 1673, is generally associated with the elaboration of the accommodation method (often described as *il modo soave* in Italian, or 'the gentle way' of conversion) in Japan.⁵⁶ Valignano, who arrived in Japan in 1579, was critical of the methods of the superior of the Japanese mission, Francisco Cabral. Cabral's harsh disciplinary methods and insistence that Japanese brothers be treated differently from Europeans, as well as his belief that it was the Japanese who should adapt to Europeans (rather than the other way around) caused, as Valignano saw it,

‘grandísima desunión y aversión’ (‘enormous disunity and aversion’) between the Japanese *dōjuku* (lay brothers) and missionaries.⁵⁷ The Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci, missionary to China, was another notable proponent of *il modo soave*: he learned to speak Chinese, immersed himself in Chinese literature, and dressed in the clothing of the Chinese literati (scholar-bureaucrats). Ricci’s first published work in Chinese was titled *Jiao you lun* (*On Friendship*, 1595).⁵⁸ Jesuits were therefore, as Mary Laven argues, reliant both on patronage (‘“friends” in high places’) and networks of male sociability in which they gave and received hospitality.⁵⁹ Their method of ‘conversion’ (there was no equivalent word in Chinese) was – by necessity – conversation.⁶⁰ By way of advice to new missionaries to China, one missionary wrote that Jesuit missionary Father Giulio Aleni (1582–1649), had won the confidence of his interlocutors through ‘his sweetness and affability in conversation’.⁶¹ Missionary methods were thus shaped by their circumstances.

Unpacking the complexities of language – as used by both missionaries and converts – has enabled scholars to explore the ways in which local cultures shaped Catholic practices. ‘[I]f one were to sing of god in a foreign tongue,’ Ananya Chakravarti asks in an important essay, ‘what emotions would such a song evoke?’⁶² The affective histories of cultural encounter, Chakravarti argues, are not simply about the reconstruction of the possible feelings of one group toward another, but instead involve the study of the ‘space of shared meaning’ generated by two parties.⁶³ As Chakravarti’s discussion of the *Discurso sobre a vinda de Jesu Christo* (*Discourse on the Coming of Christ*) (1617) demonstrates, texts written to elicit particular emotions in Catholic converts were shaped by the literary and linguistic traditions upon which they drew. Written in Marāṭhī by English Jesuit Thomas Stephens, the *Discurso* was composed in the literary tradition of Marāṭhī *bhakti*. In describing his text as a *purāṇa*, and in taking care to follow the genre’s distinguishing rules, Stephens’s *Discurso* displays a distinctly brahminic worldview.⁶⁴ Furthermore, Chakravarti argues, the quality of the poetry suggests the participation of Indigenous collaborators in its composition or co-authorship.⁶⁵ Language, then, could not only shape the ways in which missionaries approached conversion, and the ways European publics viewed peoples outside of Europe, but it can also reveal the ways in which Indigenous practices informed emotional experiences of Christianity. Most importantly, Chakravarti suggests that affect is a particularly important sphere of comparative study, since its examination ‘requires us to denature categories that seem transcultural or transtemporal’.⁶⁶

Emotional practices

While emotions-led approaches to mission historiography are relatively new, the importance of emotions in localized European religious practices has long been recognized. William A. Christian Jr’s 1982 article on ‘provoked’ religious weeping in early modern Spain began with the anthropologically informed assertion that ‘[t]he relative frequency and intensity of emotions and their public expression varies from culture to culture, and within cultures over time’.⁶⁷ Christian rejected Johan Huizinga’s earlier claim that intense weeping was indicative of the Middle Ages’ child-like character (‘every experience’, Huizinga wrote, ‘had that degree of directness and absoluteness that joy and sadness still have in the mind of a child’).⁶⁸ Drawing on examples from diverse cultures (the Tapirapé people of Brazil and ritual

mourners of southern Italy, amongst others), he argued that ‘provoked’ religious weeping was not always a ‘spontaneous’ emotional act, but could be more formal, a ritual, something that could be learned and carried out voluntarily, for particular purposes.⁶⁹ Although not framed explicitly as emotions or affect theory, Christian’s article – like Sara Ahmed’s more recent concept, ‘affective economies’ – conceives emotions as, to borrow Ahmed’s formulation, a ‘form of capital’.⁷⁰ In early modern Spain, Christian contended, weeping and its associated feelings of tenderness or sorrow were part of an ‘economy of sentiment’ that could move God. Conversely, God, the angels and devils could also provoke feelings – and, thus, action.⁷¹

When Spanish conquistadors invaded Mexico, many priests accompanying the conquering forces remarked on the central role of the heart (in Spanish, *corazón*) in the Aztecs’ spiritual teachings, thought and rhetoric. The heart was the ‘essence’ and most important part of a being (mountains had ‘hearts’ as did towns; at the ‘heart’ of social groups were important individuals).⁷² As Christian noted, the heart was viewed as the seat of feeling in sixteenth-century Spain: expressions such as ‘a change of heart’ or ‘hard-hearted’ implied a person’s openness (or lack thereof) to God.⁷³ Bernardino de Sahagún described the importance of speaking ‘from the heart’ in Aztec oratory.⁷⁴ The heart also played an important role during ritual sacrifice when a person would be stretched across the *momoxtli* (a stone altar which represented the *cemanahuac yollotli* or ‘heart of the cosmos’). Once the heart of the human sacrifice was removed it was placed in a *cuauhxicalli* (‘eagle-vessel’) which symbolically conveyed it by solar eagle to the heavens.⁷⁵ Following the Spanish conquest, human sacrifice was prohibited and Spanish friars were careful to represent Christ’s ‘sacrifice’ on the cross as an act that negated the need for further human sacrifice (parallels can be drawn here with Jesuits’ discussion of the Eucharist in New France). Yet pre-conquest Aztec conceptions of the heart – and its spiritual and emotional resonances – remained present in post-conquest art. Some crosses from the period have a *cuauhxicalli* attached to the base, to collect the heart of Christ.⁷⁶ Despite missionaries’ attempts to preach orthodoxy, then, it was inevitable that Catholic practices would be imbued with Aztec meanings.

Comparative analysis of geographically distinct missions demonstrates the ways in which (as Monique Scheer would argue) the *habitus* of different groups shaped emotional practices that had very particular meanings in Europe. Karin Vélez has recently re-examined the trope – prevalent in mission sources – of the effusively weeping convert on ‘mission frontiers’ (i.e. missions regarded by Europeans as being on the peripheries of the Catholic world). This trope, Vélez argues, not only ‘exceptionalizes’ Indigenous converts’ tears, but it also privileges Catholic symbolism (tears as a sign of sincere faith and compassion for Mary and the suffering Christ) over ‘lived experience’.⁷⁷ In New France, Jesuit missionary Isaac Jogues wept as he was tortured alongside Eustache Ahatsistari (a Wendat convert to Catholicism). Eustache told their Haudenosaunee captors that Jogues’ tears did not ‘proceed from weakness’ (lest they regard the missionary as lacking in courage), but instead from the missionary’s ‘love’ for Eustache and sadness at his friend’s suffering. Eustache’s words, Vélez argues, were a practical ‘real time’ reminder to Jogues of Iroquoian expectations of how to behave under torture.⁷⁸

Missionaries’ ‘sacrifice’ – or from their perspective ‘martyrdom’ – had very particular emotional components. In the early modern period, one of the requirements

for martyrdom was that an individual be killed *in odium fidei* ('in hatred of the Faith').⁷⁹ When French Jesuit Jean de Brébeuf was captured, ritually tortured and executed by warriors of the Haudenosaunee in 1649, mission superior Father Paul Ragueneau's account contrasted the missionaries' 'love' and 'sacrifice' for God with his Haudenosaunee captors' 'hatred' of Catholicism.⁸⁰ As Emma Anderson powerfully argues, the priest's apparent stoicism in the face of torture – he harangued his torturers, and encouraged his fellow captives to remain steadfast – was consistent both with Christian conceptions of defiant martyrdom and Iroquoian expectations that prisoners should show their courage by singing and insulting their captors.⁸¹ At the conclusion of Brébeuf's torture, his heart was extracted and ritually ingested by some of his captors (it was believed that through this process some of the deceased's courage could be acquired).⁸² The missionary's performance of steadfast suffering thus appealed to both Catholic and Iroquoian sensibilities.

The desire of many missionaries to 'suffer' for the faith was met with a variety of emotional responses. Analysis of the *Indipetae* (letters sent by aspiring missionaries to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus at Rome in order to petition for a mission posting) has demonstrated that a number of missionary hopefuls cited the death of Brébeuf (amongst others) as the reason for their ardent vocations for Canada.⁸³ Yet missionaries' desire – and enthusiasm – for death was off-putting to many of those they sought to convert. In the late 1630s, a Wendat man (unnamed in the primary source) had told Jean de Brébeuf that his people were 'not very well pleased' when missionaries asked the sick if they wanted to go to heaven or hell. '[W]e people', the man said, 'do not ask such questions for we will always hope that they will not die, and they will recover their heath'.⁸⁴

Emotional performances such as weeping, as Karin Vélez contends, were not always judged equally. How they were received depended on *who* was weeping.⁸⁵ The asymmetry of colonial power dynamics again comes into play here. Jesuit missionary Miguel de Yrigien, for instance, worried that converts at the Moxos mission in the Upper Amazon cried *too* loudly and *too* fervently, implying that their tears differed from those of their European counterparts.⁸⁶ Indeed, missionaries often acted paternalistically towards Indigenous converts. When Catherine Tekakwitha, a Mohawk convert at the mission of Kahnawake (in New France), wanted to establish a monastic community with several of her companions, Jesuit Father Jacques Frémin responded that they were 'too young in the faith' (a charge which, as Allan Greer points out, was commonly used in the Americas to justify the exclusion of Indigenous people from the clergy).⁸⁷ Catherine Tekakwitha's penitential practices drew on Iroquoian as well as European traditions, but after she became sick as a result of her severe asceticism, her confessor insisted that he regulate these practices, and that she should use European penitential devices, such as sackcloth, whip and iron belt, which he viewed as less dangerous than her own techniques – such as burning herself with hot coal – which drew on Mohawk torture practices.⁸⁸

Whatever missionaries' personal feelings about suffering on the mission terrain, some nonetheless recognized that severe asceticism was not always compatible with evangelism. As Seán Alexander Smith's recent essay on the Congregation of the Mission or 'Lazarists', founded by Vincent de Paul in Paris in 1625, demonstrates, geographical distance could severely strain, and sometimes necessitate the adaptation of, missionaries' emotional practices.⁸⁹ Amongst the Lazarists,

interior and exterior ascetic denial – control of passions and affections as well as mortification of the flesh – were encouraged in the metropole, but these were most frequently achieved through physical labour rather than harsh corporal punishment or extreme climate.⁹⁰ Despite difficult physical conditions in Madagascar, some missionaries were zealous in their mortifications. In a 1657 letter, Toussaint Bourdaise criticized the behaviour of two of his *confrères* who had died owing to what he saw as their excessive rigour: ‘They practised great austerity and sometimes ate only once a day. Had they moderated their zeal a little they would still be fully alive, working for the conversion of our poor Indians’.⁹¹ Local circumstances thus rendered standard missionary emotional practices (i.e. ascetism) at odds with their evangelical aims.⁹²

Conclusion: moving emotions / shaping identities

Historians of missions have often held a narrow view of *who* could be a missionary. They have thus tended to focus on European priests (who were, by necessity, men) often to the exclusion of lay brothers and Indigenous men and women who converted and who carried out evangelical activities.⁹³ As aforementioned scholarship has shown, however, converts, such as Eustache Ahatsistari in Canada, and the Nahua aides and *fiscales* who composed Nahuatl sermons in central Mexico, shaped the ways in which Catholicism was understood. Women evangelists (less numerous than their male counterparts) and converts have also tended to receive less attention in emotions scholarship for the period before 1700.⁹⁴ As we have seen, and as we shall see now, these are areas that scholars are beginning to address.

Most scholars now recognize that conversion can be a fragmented, often incomplete, process, and this widens the temporal parameters of investigation.⁹⁵ Since missionaries and converts frequently moved or were *forced* to move (and/or *forced* to convert), their emotions and identity were in constant flux. Susan Broomhall has recently examined the emotional experiences of Japanese Christians (partners and children of VOC officials) who were exiled to Batavia (now Jakarta, Indonesia) by edict of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1639.⁹⁶ Broomhall’s work is significant because it not only examines the emotional experiences of Japanese Christian women, but also highlights the complex emotional identities of people in exile. Broomhall asks, ‘[I]f emotional expression is shaped to a large extent by cultural contexts that provide the template for normative display of and rhetoric of emotion, what happens when individuals resided between or within multiple cultures?’⁹⁷ Letters and gift giving (often associated practices) were, Broomhall argues, expressions of exiled Japanese Christians’ multiple identities, forging connections, but also expressing difference.⁹⁸

Missions did not always take place *outside* of Europe. As David Gentilcore demonstrates for the early modern Neapolitan province of Terra d’Otranto, missionaries proselytizing in ‘peripheral’ areas (particularly in places where a parish structure was absent) faced similar challenges to those of their overseas colleagues. Missionaries often referred to these regions as ‘the Indies’ (owing to the locals’ ‘superstitions’) and implemented similar proselytizing strategies: they preached simple, easily understood messages and used affective language and gestures.⁹⁹ The European centre/colonial periphery trope is also challenged by the presence

of ‘others’ inside Europe.¹⁰⁰ In Spain and Portugal, Muslim converts were baptized in lavish public spectacles which, as François Soyer argues, were a means for the Catholic Church to impose an ‘emotional regime’ on those present.¹⁰¹ The emotional performance of Francisco Ignacio, an enslaved man from North Africa who was baptized shortly before his execution, moved the crowd so greatly that they shed tears of joy when his body was retrieved and buried solemnly in a chapel rather than a pauper’s grave.¹⁰² Through the crowd’s emotional participation in the ceremony, Soyer argues, they reaffirmed their membership of a triumphant Catholic ‘emotional community’ and the supposed ‘superiority’ of the Catholic faith over Islam. In a post-*Reconquista* era, such performances, Soyer asserts, provided a substitute for military victories.¹⁰³ It was not only Muslims that converted. As Eric Dursteler has shown through an examination of apostates brought before the Venetian Inquisition, converts to Islam (or ‘renegades’ as they were commonly called) routinely presented fear of violence or death as the principal motivating factor for their conversion, though many stressed that their ‘heart’ had remained Christian.¹⁰⁴ Dursteler cautions against reading the role of fear at face value, however, since, while there were undoubtedly forced conversions, there were also a great deal of voluntary or strategic ones: it is estimated that there were hundreds of thousands of conversions to Islam in the sixteenth century.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, following the work of Moulay Belhamissi, Dursteler points out that it is important to draw a distinction between ‘history’ and ‘hysteria’ – between what may have happened and what is recorded or projected onto history.¹⁰⁶ As with discussions of ‘spiritual conquest’, then, scholars must be wary of the emotional weight – and colonial assumptions – underlying language.

Analysing emotions in the period 1100–1700 is challenging, not least because of the methodological difficulties of examining emotions that were – like the people who were ‘doing’ them – constantly in flux. Yet understanding emotions ‘as a kind of practice’, as in Scheer’s formulation, allows for the exploration of cultural and historical practices that shaped emotions in diverse locales. This is clearly apparent when one missionary order, such as the Society of Jesus, was operating in numerous different places. But just as there was not one Jesuit approach to missions (the ‘way of proceeding’ varied), nor one European approach to missions, neither was there a single response from the many peoples that missionaries sought to convert. If, as Ahmed argues, emotions are created through the ‘circulation’ of people and things, the critical use of mission sources, coupled with the growing body of work on the diversity and mobility of missionaries and converts, can reveal the complexity, as well as the fluidity, of spiritual identities in the medieval and early modern world.

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MARITIME ENCOUNTERS AND GLOBAL HISTORY

Nicholas Dean Brodie

Two contact events, a generation or so either side of the period covered in this volume, mark key developments in the evolution of truly global history. The first involved the European entry into the Americas in the decades around the turn of the tenth and eleventh centuries, led by Scandinavian voyagers and colonizers. While fuller social, economic and cultural developments of this maritime meeting of continents came in later centuries, the Scandinavians unknowingly pointed to that future. The second contact event was the British entry into New Zealand and eastern Australia from the late eighteenth century under Captain James Cook's command, which heralded the integration of all inhabited continents into a global schema of interlinked economies and maritime empires.

While it is an obvious oversimplification to characterize this global phenomenon in purely European terms, it is also undoubtedly in part a process of European expansion and encounter. By sailing and rowing north and west or south and east the ships that carried these voyagers undoubtedly carried the emotional baggage of their homelands, and helped record hints of the emotional life of those inhabiting the lands they encountered. But such contacts were rarely straightforward. As Maria Nugent has pointed out with reference to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Pacific, 'contact situations could provoke a giddy array of emotions on both sides – and generated a good deal of second guessing about what inner states were expressed through certain bodily demeanours, gestures, stances, sounds, actions and reactions.'¹ This chapter offers an analytical foray into the methods by which we can examine emotional aspects of global maritime encounters in the medieval and early modern periods.

Medieval travel writing

The first and primary considerations concern the basic elements of a travel text. When was it written, who wrote it and for whom? Would the contemporary reader expect unvarnished narrative, or was there more to it than a recitation of what happened? Does the narrative match an established genre, or seem to be playing with convention? Is this a copy, or a copy of a copy? Such questions frame all good historical research, but they become especially acute when dealing with maritime encounters and the emotions they either generate or record.

Consider a figure who is perhaps the most famous traveller of the Middle Ages, Marco Polo. Although Polo's travels into Asia were largely land-based, following a network of Eurasian trade generally known as the Silk Road, Polo is also a significant maritime voyager. His sea-borne departure from Venice, and his entry into Asia, certainly capture the highly networked economies of the Mediterranean and Black seas in the late thirteenth century. But further afield, having visited China and reached the western Pacific Ocean, Polo personally entered and recorded a very different world at the very edge of the Eurasian known. Effectively voyaging homewards, on a foreign ship as part of a foreign mission, Polo nonetheless provides a record of what was potentially the first European entry into Sumatra:

This is how we spent our five months. We disembarked from our ships and for fear of these nasty and brutish folk who kill men for food we dug a big trench round our encampment, extending down to the shore of the harbour at either end. On the embankment of the trench we built five wooden towers or forts; and within these fortifications we lived for five months. There was no lack of timber. But the islanders used to trade with us for victuals and the like; for there was a compact between us.²

Here we have an extreme frontier of the European global maritime encounter, albeit facilitated by Chinese ships. Polo records being afraid of the indigenous inhabitants of that place, explicated in word and exhibited by deed. He also expressed revulsion at the people he encountered, giving cannibalism as an explanatory illustration. Yet despite fear and revulsion, there was commerce, apparently facilitated by some sort of agreement.

The indigenous Sumatrans were, at least by Polo's characterization, both different and similar. They were useful, but also dangerous. 'The people are idolaters and savages', he said, which perhaps put them beyond peoples who were familiarly different to his Mediterranean audience, the kind of stereotyped foreigner who was sufficiently well-known to be the subject of jokes in comedic performances.³ Such potential plays on greater and lesser difference, however, point to bigger questions regarding authorship, audience, expectations and mediation. Polo's emotional response is mixed, as fear and revulsion sit at the fore of the encounter, but he also introduced the description of his stay in Sumatra by referring to their 'wealthy and powerful king', possibly a statement of fact, but perhaps also intimating a measure of admiration. Such interpretive uncertainties are only furthered once Polo's text is more critically deconstructed. Most significantly, his story is not his own, but was improved prior to circulation by the compiler, Rustichello of Pisa, who was a writer of chivalric romances.⁴ Large parts of Polo's text are descriptive, and may derive as much from Rustichello's embellishments as Polo's information, and certain genre conventions can be expected to have crept in. Moreover, much of Polo's information is clearly drawn from second-hand information, which, while interesting and useful, is often difficult to tie in any explicit way to Polo's own travels or those of named informants. Fortunately, Polo's account of Sumatra belongs specifically to his own reported movements rather than descriptive discourse, so it is perhaps closer to the raw account of this experience than many of the work's sections – suggesting that these are more likely his emotional responses than Rustichello's – but clearly many

interpretive problems remain. The lesson here is that any exploratory or journeying text needs to be analysed in full, and within its own literary context, not merely mined for snippets of information about specific encounters.

Few authors typify the problematical nature of medieval travel literature so much as a text that covers some of the same geographical and ethnographical ground as Polo, *The Travels of Sir John Mandeville*. With uncertain authorship, variant texts, and apparently widespread popularity, Mandeville stands in for the European literary encounter with the wider world only a generation or so on from Polo. Inspired and influenced by the motivations and experiences of traders, crusaders and pilgrims, through Mandeville and characters like him medieval Europe looked to its east as a natural point of travel, visualizing itself at the edge of a world centred on Jerusalem. Unsurprisingly, then, certainty appears to relate directly to proximity. Take Mandeville's account of the Mediterranean island of Cyprus:

Cyprus is a fine island, and a big one; there are many good cities, but principally four. There are also three bishops and one archbishop. The Archbishop's See is at Nicosia. The principal city of Cyprus is Famagost; and there is the world's best harbour. Christians and heathen and men of all nations land there.⁵

This is pure description, a recitation of facts, largely devoid of emotion excepting perhaps a touch of wonder and admiration. Contrast this with the sense of mystery that Mandeville attaches to the island of Sri Lanka (Ceylon), situated further afield in the Indian Ocean, albeit also framed through seemingly straightforward description:

The circumference of it is eight hundred miles. A great part of this country is waste and wilderness, and uninhabited; therefore there are great numbers of dragons, crocodiles and other kinds of reptiles, so that men cannot live there.⁶

Like Cyprus, Sri Lanka was actually an important hub for global maritime trade routes, yet its distance from European commentators furthers an apparent aura of mystery in such geographical literature. Whereas Cyprus is a place that many peoples visit, Sri Lanka is seemingly underpopulated. In this, Sri Lanka is an object of curiosity and a locus for intellectual insecurity, both of which are emotionally charged intellectual orientations. This highlights how even when seeming to write in the blandest and most descriptive of terms, each commentator is balancing confidence with conditionality and observation with tradition.

In such blurry distance of space and time the accreted layers of legend and storytelling get very hard to sift through, but were and remain enticing sites of myth and memory. This goes some way to explaining the apparent contemporary and continuing popularity of such literature. This literary familiarity with the distant unfamiliar offered medieval peoples opportunity for affective emotional extension of their own frames of intellectual reference, what Jacqueline Van Gent has characterized in a slightly later context as 'spaces for emotional projections'.⁷ This comes through particularly clearly with reference to Christian salvation history. For instance, Mandeville tells of how

in that isle [Sri Lanka] there is a high mountain, and on the very top of it is a great loch full of water. Men of that land say that Adam and Eve wept for a hundred years on that hill after they were expelled from Paradise, and that that water collected from their tears.⁸

Suggestive of the strength of medieval European association of a Sri Lankan mountain with stories of Adam and Eve, Polo had similarly reported on a mountaintop monument, although he also recorded its contested religious meanings:

It is said that on the top of this mountain is the monument of Adam, our first parent. The Saracens say that it is Adam's grave, but the idolaters call it the monument of Sakyamuni Burkhan.⁹

Because of Polo and Mandeville's near contemporaneity, such similarities could potentially reflect common roots for this information, or they could be the simple result of one source having had sight of another. Yet, irrespective of its historical actuality, the presentation of such emotionally charged information to make a potential link with human creation was certainly not merely European scholastic pretension; it offered an affective connection through the Creator to a distant corner of the world. A similar phenomenon is observable in medieval Islamic travel literature, such as Ahmad ibn Fadlān's account of seeing the bones of a giant in northern Eurasia, which he and his informants connected with stories of Gog and Magog, thereby linking unfamiliar lands with Islamic beliefs about the end of history.¹⁰ All such connections serve as regular reminders that travellers often saw the worlds they wrote of and travelled in through the perspective of faith, and their own intellectual heritages, as well as through their own cultural mores.

From this brief discussion we can start to map out a basic matrix of issues that particularly affect the interpretation of maritime emotional encounters. We can see that there is often much ambiguity within even relatively straightforward personal accounts. Each encounter is inherently unique, even when conditioned by wider habits of behaviour, thought or genre. Because of such contextual influences, approaching any given event is rarely a straightforward exercise. As is true of all documentary history, there are complex issues around authorship, audience and reception. Few accounts of maritime encounters from these centuries have survived the ages without complex histories of textual mediation, translation and transmission. But while Mandeville and Polo make useful guides to introducing the multifaceted problems with exploring global history through the documentary lens of European voyages, it is at the extremes of our period, with very different bodies of literature, that the emotional aspects of such voyages and the encounters they produced and documented becomes much clearer.

Viking encounters

As we have already seen with Venice and Sumatra and Cyprus and Sri Lanka, islands play a particularly prominent role in the recorded history of global maritime encounters, if only because such events demand a voyage. Methodologically, islands also serve as a useful focal point, reminding us that there is a separation

between historical events as experienced and subsequently recorded and recited. Having focused on questions of text above, this section looks more closely at questions of transmission.

There is one island that performs a unique role, not only as a locus of encounter, but also as an important source and repository of documentary material. Few bodies of medieval European literature so regularly deal with the action and adventure of individual voyages as do the Icelandic sagas. As Eleanor Rosamund Barraclough has recently detailed in a significant study of the Scandinavian world revealed through this literature, these stories offer an excellent entry into both world and worldviews, and work as entries into both the centuries they cover and those in which they were composed.¹¹ The sagas are therefore also useful, if complicated, as sources for analysis of emotional marine encounters.

Written a generation or so before Polo left Venice for the east, and capturing stories of travels to the far west several generations beforehand, the saga of Erik the Red provides us with a window into one of the most extremely foreign human encounters in recorded history, albeit through a rather complex frame. The opening of the saga named for Erik helps set the scene in the late tenth-century northern Atlantic world.¹² Scandinavians conquer Dublin and large chunks of Scotland, sail to and settle on Iceland, and soon enough Erik is sighting, camping on and then colonizing part of western Greenland. This is a significant part of the expansionist story of the people now commonly called Vikings. Sailing to new lands, occupying isolated places for the duration of navigationally unfriendly winters, often then also settling and farming, these mobile maritime people were also relatively well-connected to their European homelands and conquered territories through trade and politics. In many respects they make good comparisons for the later age of overseas European imperial expansion in the early modern centuries. But unlike in that later period, much of this earlier Scandinavian activity can only be charted through the contemporary reports of their friends and victims, by investigation of their archaeological footprints, or by turning to the later sagas. Documenting traditions of and stories about an earlier world, because they generally post-date the events by several generations, the sagas need to be read through the lens of the approximate middle of the Middle Ages. In this case, Erik's story and the American adventure that followed referred to events between the 980s and 1020s, but were documented in the mid-thirteenth century. It is not exactly a first-hand record.

Yet even while the sagas are complicated by their narrative conventions, their occasional slippage into mythology, and the obvious fact that they were written in and for a later age, they were nonetheless essentially historical in outlook, which makes them unique sources among the main groups of voyaging literature. The saga writers often mentioned their forebears being pre-Christian, as is the case with some early material in Erik's saga, which is an interesting contrast with the tendency of their near-contemporaries like Polo and Mandeville to focus on non-Christian 'others'.¹³ Sagas were certainly the products of a Christian society, but the encounters they document did not necessarily reflect Christian concerns or prejudice, even if possibly later re-framed that way. Moreover, while travellers like Polo and Mandeville mostly purported to report their own journeys, and so were theoretically more likely to reflect their own emotional outlooks, the historical action of the sagas means the protagonists had emotional lives quite distinct from those of the authors. The sagas are always

second-hand, often enough making it explicit that they rely on second-hand reports. The emotions they record must therefore also always be at least second- or third-hand.

Because the sagas capture encounters that less directly conformed to wider European literature trends, however, there is scope for seeing their emotional repertoire as more culturally distinct from some of the other main bodies of voyaging documentation already seen and those discussed below. Being a relatively self-contained genre, with its own characteristics and subjects, if in a saga an encounter is distorted by literary convention, it is at least more likely to be a Scandinavian, saga-based one. While it would be foolish to dismiss outside influences entirely, whether antique or chivalric, the sagas do not suffer from an interpretive problem on the scale of a Rustichello of Pisa or a potentially fictional narrative device named Mandeville. For all their interpretive qualifications, they are quite distinctly their own thing. Besides, even if an event conforms to a twelfth- or thirteenth-century Scandinavian emotional positioning, that still tells us something about the maritime emotional encounter as experienced or constructed by medieval Icelanders.

So, turning to the extreme westward expansion of medieval European voyaging, as described in Erik's saga, we find an expeditioner named Karlsefni, who becomes our narrative guide to one of the most significant maritime encounters in European history.¹⁴ The saga recounts the departure of an expedition of 150 men, sailing for a few days from familiar territory, and making landfall at a series of spots in what we now know as northern North America. They kill a bear, butcher a whale, and squabble about religion. These events convey the internal emotional dynamics of the peculiar 'emotional community', to adopt Barbara H. Rosenwein's construction, that is a maritime expedition.¹⁵ Aboard, it is clear, are people of different or fluid religious positions. The prominent role of a couple of Scotsmen also highlights ethnic diversities, another factor to consider in the emotional mix. The Scandinavian expedition is a type of communal federation of emotional communities, both emotionally fragmented and a coherent emotional whole.

In fact, the internal dynamics of expedition actions drive much of the storytelling, and serve to contrive the structure in ways that are not just chronological and sequential. This is more than an account of a voyage from place to place. The narrative focuses on these internal tensions, culminating with the disappearance of one part of the expedition. This group is blown away to Ireland, shipwrecked, and the survivors enslaved, 'according to what traders have reported', leaving the narrative free to then return to and continue with those still in North America with Karlsefni.¹⁶ Finding a place with wheat, vines and fish, Karlsefni and his companions spend 'a fortnight enjoying themselves and noticed nothing strange'.¹⁷ After this period of joy and contentment, this happens:

[O]ne morning early, when they looked about them, they saw a multitude of skin-canoes, on which poles were being waved which sounded just like flails – and waved sunwise. 'What can this mean?' asked Karlsefni. 'Maybe it is a token of peace,' Snorri Thorbrandson told him, 'so let us take a white shield and put it out towards them.' They did this, and their visitors rowed towards them, and were astonished at what they found, then came ashore. They were dark, ugly men who wore their hair in an unpleasant fashion. They had big eyes and were broad in the cheeks. They stayed there for a while astonished at what they found, and afterwards rowed off south past the headland.¹⁸

The Europeans clearly express confusion, curiosity, optimism and revulsion. The indigenous Americans, by the European account, show signs of curiosity and astonishment, but their full emotional response is clearly masked by the one-sided nature of the report. This meeting of peoples, whose cultural frames of reference had been separate since at least the Pleistocene some tens of thousands of years previously, means that whatever happened was emotionally complex. Such a brief account can hardly be expected to do it full justice, especially when written a few centuries removed from the actual event. But, nonetheless, it broadly reveals genuine interest in the encountered other, and a tendency to project emotional attitudes through narrative based on outward action inflected by familiar frames of reference.

This initial peaceful encounter helps set up the second, when, after a winter camped in America, the expeditioners have another contact experience:

[W]hen spring came in they saw early one morning how a multitude of canoes came rowing from the south round the headland, so many that the bay looked as though sown with charcoal, and this time too poles were being waved from every boat. Karlsefni and his men raised their shields, and as soon as they met they began trading together.¹⁹

Mostly the exchanges were red cloth for local furs, with the Scandinavians thinking they were getting the better deal. Then the *Skrælings*, as these indigenous people were called in the saga, were frightened away by the sudden and noisy appearance of Karlsefni's bull. 'The *Skrælings* were terrified by this', the saga noted, 'raced out to their canoes, and then rowed south past the headland, and for three weeks running there was neither sight nor sound of them'.²⁰ This terrifying of the *Skrælings* then becomes an emotionally-charged causal shift. Emotions are, this reminds us, not just responses to encounters but rather integral parts of them.

When 'a great multitude of *Skræling* boats coming up like a stream from the south' returns, they wave their poles 'anti-sunwise' and 'were all yelling aloud'.²¹ These now familiar signs, when used differently, became signs of anger. So too, with red shields to the fore, Karlsefni and his men adopt an attitude of fighting, and clash with the traders-turned-attackers. In the fighting, however, one unfamiliar *Skræling* weapon 'made a hideous noise' and frightened the expedition's warriors greatly. Fearing also that they were outnumbered and outflanked, the expeditioners retreated upriver to 'some rocks' where they 'made a brave defence'. Yet this rather briefly described fear-filled response is partly a narrative foil for an act of individual bravery. A pregnant Scandinavian woman emerges from her hut, scolds the men for running away, and frightens the *Skræling* host into full flight by picking up a fallen man's sword and baring her breasts, upon which she 'slapped the naked sword'.²² Here again, the emotional elements of the encounter dictate the course of action, but also probably serve to entertain. While fighting women were not unfamiliar to Viking history, in this case a pregnant woman had echoed the fear-generating role of a great bull. As with any text, the events need to be understood in the context not only of historical encounter but also narrative intent and structure. Reading indigenous timidity into this action would be a mistake without first considering that the main objective is to highlight a lone woman's ferocious bravery. Among narratives of emotional communities encountering one another, the emotional individual sometimes stands out as foil or archetype.

Moreover, while it is tempting to seek historical and cultural particularity, there is much overlap that perhaps hints towards a narrative intent verging on the anthropological. As well as being collectively fearful, both sides of the encounter afterwards show signs of puzzlement. The Scandinavians are perplexed by the size and position of the forces that attacked them, and some Skrälings by the very nature of a metal axe. Contrary to a historian's predisposition to look for difference, the saga writers seemed to have mostly focused on some emotional commonalities, even if through elements of material difference. Despite the violent hiccup, curiosity about the other returns to the fore, and the feeling is apparently rather mutual. Nonetheless, emotion plays one final role in navigating away from the encounter:

It now seemed plain to Karlsefni and his men that though the quality of the land was admirable, there would always be fear and strife dogging them there on account of those who already inhabited it. So they made ready to leave, setting their hearts on their own country, and sailed north along the land . . .²³

The Scandinavians recognize their own fear, and empathize with that of the Skrälings, apparently experiencing an affective connection with the contacted 'other'.

In leaving the region Karlsefni and his companions killed five more Skrälings, and captured two Skräling boys who 'they kept with them, taught them their language, and had them baptized'.²⁴ Between these two last Skräling encounters with their terse account of significant moments in intercontinental human history is another strange meeting, which reminds us that these sources are at some remove from the action they describe, likely derive from multiple sources, and cannot always be taken too literally. The saga that documents one of the first great meetings between Europe and America also relates that on Karlsefni's way home a mythological one-legged creature known as a uniped shot one of Erik's sons with an arrow. Is this a corruption of the original oral account of the expedition, some sort of an improvement to the narrative, or just a case of too much scholarship by European geographers that connected Vinland with Africa where unipeds were traditionally thought to abide?²⁵

Maritime conquistadores

By now we can see that emotions are not merely reactive, but frequently have causal narrative roles. Emotion itself thereby becomes an element of the maritime encounter that, like text and transmission, is worth examining for a fuller understanding of events and their narration. Moreover, we have seen how outward expressions of emotion are especially important, whether narrated explicitly or revealed implicitly through gesture and supposition. As we move towards the later part of our period, we can see that these attributes of the maritime encounter make for a necessary mutuality. Maritime encounters become conduits for the examination of historical emotion, but emotion needs to be considered as a distinct element in the history of encounter.

In large part helping define the transition from medieval to early modern Europe, the pace of European maritime engagements with the wider world accelerated in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the scale increased. Christopher Columbus's famed voyage to the 'New World' in 1492 facilitated the

subsequent European exploratory and colonial entry into the Caribbean islands and then the continental Americas. Similarly, greater direct European engagement with cultures and peoples of both sub-Saharan Africa and south and eastern Eurasia can be conveniently marked from Vasco de Gama's 1497 voyage beyond the Cape of Africa into the Indian Ocean. While both voyages reflected parts of wider European maritime, economic and colonial trends, they collectively help anchor discourses of global maritime history. They serve as useful waypoints for explaining how and why European powers, particularly Spain and Portugal, became colonial powers in Africa, Asia and the Americas during the sixteenth century. Within a few decades European vessels had circumnavigated the globe. A Spanish expedition, under the leadership of the Portuguese seafarer Ferdinand Magellan, reached and named the Pacific Ocean by sailing from the Atlantic past the southernmost part of mainland South America. The explosive nature of this expansion, and the wealth and global power it helped bring Europe, is part of the reason names like Columbus and Magellan remain so familiar, themselves now subjects of emotional attachment and complex post-colonial discourse.

During this frenetic and expansionist period the number of emotional maritime encounters between European voyagers and other cultures vastly increased, not only in gross quantity of encounters as Europeans reached more areas of the globe and frequented them, but also in the documentary quality of these encounters. I have recently used this phenomenon of documentary encounter to chart a regional history of Australia and its near neighbours, for instance, where the arrival of European mariners and their various meetings with indigenous peoples facilitated the writing of a history that 'starts mid-scene . . . like a manuscript with the opening pages torn off'.²⁶ Through repeated encounters the documentary history of indigenous Australia emerges over time and, to an extent, historical clarity comes with colonization.

Just as exploratory narratives have been used to investigate what Driver calls the 'hidden histories' of exploration and encounter, the multiplication of such sources in the late early modern period facilitates richer emotional histories of encounter than the short and sparse medieval texts.²⁷ To better explicate some of the differences between medieval emotional encounters, like those of Polo and Karlsefni, and those normally characterized as early modern, it is worth pushing beyond the most famous 'first wave' voyages of European maritime expansion. Focusing on some of the secondary and tertiary expeditions that were part of the wider colonial advance highlights several aspects of the emotional encounters in the early modern Pacific, which can serve as useful referents for a wider consideration of such meetings in this period.

One such expedition was the second voyage of Alvaro de Mendaña, which departed Peru in early 1595, heading westwards across the Pacific Ocean. The chief pilot, Pedro Fernandez de Quiros, later wrote a detailed account of this journey.²⁸ Potentially drawn from a shipboard diary or log, de Quiros' text is, however, argumentative from the start, explicating 'disorders which took place', particularly internecine conflict among the expeditioners, again highlighting that narrative purpose and genre are crucial contexts when analysing the emotions of encounter. Far from being impartial, de Quiros seeks to explain events, not simply narrate them. From the start his narrative is emotionally charged, and the details it offers are geared towards explaining the failure of this minor colonial enterprise.

Indigenous people of the Pacific are met early in the narrative. The expedition encountered an inhabited island, and was greeted by a flotilla of about 'seventy small canoes' carrying some 'four hundred natives'. These people were, de Quiros detailed, 'almost white, and of very graceful shape, well-formed, robust, good legs and feet, hands with long fingers; good eyes, mouth, and teeth'.²⁹ While couched in such positive terms, the description could also have hinted at the economic potential of these people for the superiors reading his narrative. But even if interpreted with such a functionalist slant, de Quiros certainly appeared rather enamoured of their appearance, which tells us something of the affective experience of encounter. 'They had beautiful youths who, for a people barbarous and naked, it was certainly pleasant to see', he asserted, 'and they had much cause to praise their Creator'. Here too, however, is probably coded commentary for the reader. One young boy particularly attracted de Quiros's attention, who typified these physical characteristics, but also acted as a foil for his own emotional reflection: 'I never in my life felt such pain as when I thought that so fair a creature should be left to go to perdition.' Here de Quiros is explicitly feeling compassion for a fellow creature, and making a case for future conversion, a sort of affective justification for wanting to change what he encountered.

The structure of the meeting is at first amicable, with the islanders offering gifts of coconuts and water. There was reportedly general mirth. Some of the islanders laughed at the appearance of the strangers, and at one of their own people, when Mendaña dressed him with shirt and hat. The vignette likely reflects events, but also seems to serve to highlight the nudity of the islanders. After this, a large group boarded the ship, where the islanders supposedly exhibited much curiosity about the clothing and appearance of the soldiers, further continuing de Quiros's focus on physicality. As with the earlier medieval voyagers, appearance is the first point of emotional reference.

As de Quiros describes it, things then degenerated from mutual exchanges of gifts to a situation where islanders 'became more free in taking things they saw', including ship provisions, precipitating a breaking down in good relations. Mendaña 'made signs to them to go' and then 'ordered a gun to be fired' when they did not leave.³⁰ The blast resulted in the islanders showing 'great terror', clearly exhibited by jumping off the ship and fleeing. One islander, however, clung to the ship and was struck on the hand with a sword, apparently prompting the islanders to turn and attack the ship with stones and spears. The two sides fought, but when an old man who appeared to lead the islanders was killed, the remainder fled. Afterwards, three returned to the ship in a canoe, and 'held up a green branch, and something white in his hand, which appeared to be a sign of peace'. Although believing they were being invited 'to their port', Mendaña's expedition soon departed without further contact. With simple commerce, mutual curiosity, reports of terror, battle rage and signs of peace, the encounter displays a spectrum of behaviours and assumptions similar to those already seen in earlier centuries, other hemispheres and different oceans.

Yet despite the potential for a sort of anthropology of emotional maritime encounter to be drawn from such similarities across time and space, there are historical particularities that affected the conduct of the expeditioners and the eventual recording of the expedition. About three months into their voyage, Mendaña's expedition

anchored at an island they called Santa Cristina, and this site provided de Quiros with a means of contrasting a sensitive and religiously inspired colonial project with the brutality of the soldiery.³¹

On the day after the arrival, which was the 28th of July, the Adelantado [Mendaña] went on shore, with his wife and the greater part of the crew, to hear the first mass said by the Vicar. The natives knelt down in silence and attention, imitating all they saw the Christians do. A very beautiful native sat near Doña Isabel, with such red hair that Doña Isabel wished to cut off a few locks; but seeing that the native did not like it she desisted, not wishing to make her angry.³²

Hinting perhaps that these islanders understood and thereby imitated the reverence of the crew for the Mass, this moment of peace is broken almost immediately by what follows:

The General, in the name of His Majesty, took possession of all the four islands, walked through the village, sowed maize in presence of the natives; and, having had such intercourse as was possible with them, he went on board. The Camp Master remained on shore with all the soldiers, who in a short time began to quarrel among themselves. Then the natives threw many stones and lances, wounding one soldier in the foot, without doing any other harm. They then fled to the mountains with their women and children, our people following them, until they were all in the woods. Being fired at, the natives reached the summits of three high hills, where they entrenched themselves. In the mornings and afternoons they all, with one accord, made a resounding noise, which echoed through the ravines, and was replied to by shouts. They wished to do us harm, hurling stones and lances, but their efforts were in vain.³³

Ultimately failing to win the fighting, some of the islanders made signs of peace, and offered gifts of food. There are more conflicts, more attempts at peace, and more discord within the expedition. Again, the nature of the contact reveals emotion as central to the action, while emotional causality is central to its twists and turns.

Such emotional contact, however, also offers sites for emotional introspection on a wider cultural scale. At the edges of the world, the emotional community of the ship can stand in for the emotional community of a nation or empire, and the resulting encounter connects with more than the events on any given beach. This can be particularly seen here in the way that de Quiros regularly contrasted religious compassion with reactive violence. He was likely reflecting a paternalistic sort of colonial mindset, itself deriving from an epistemological reorientation within the Spanish empire to emphasize kindly treatment of indigenous peoples. After the violence and abusive nature of the colonial project in the Americas became better known in Europe, especially through the testimony of people like the Spanish colonist turned Dominican friar, Bartolomé de Las Casas, there was a strong focus on the nature of colonial encounters, and so it is to be expected that this plays out in texts like those of de Quiros.³⁴ In fact this phenomenon is expressed in a particularly interesting

way in de Quiros's own expedition a few years later in 1606, where on the island of Espiritu Santo (modern Vanuatu), he institutes a knightly order for the protection of the islanders.³⁵ But so too in that second voyage does the multiplicity of voices in the early modern become clearer, where several accounts that detailed the expedition survive, some quite hostile to de Quiros's leadership.³⁶ Overall, however, what becomes clear in the textually rich early modern period is the way that encounters capture not simply the emotions of the moment, but an array of emotional responses to circumstances, faith and ideals, strangers and comrades, and also reflect broader cultural expectations. No encounter is an island.

Towards Enlightenment

Finally, as we reach the very end of our period, some strange phenomena occur that are worth noting as relevant to the analysis of the emotional aspects of maritime encounter. Firstly, the other side of such encounters emerge more clearly, especially in Australasia and the Pacific, albeit still often mediated through European texts. Secondly, hindsight itself demonstrably distorts history.

As the early modern blurred into the modern, Pacific islanders themselves played increasingly important roles in facilitating global exploration and encounter, as did other indigenous peoples. Perhaps the most famous English navigator, Captain James Cook, could communicate with Māori people when he landed in New Zealand in 1769 through the agency of Tupaia the Tahitian.³⁷ After Tupaia joined Cook's expedition he helped the Englishman navigate both Pacific waters and customs. Through indigenous travellers like Tupaia, indigenous peoples became part of the process of documentary encounter. Indigenous names enter recorded history with greater frequency, and their characters can be seen in greater detail. With time, the frequency of human contact and increasing mutual intelligibility meant that emotional encounters had the potential to be better understood from both sides, at least in many cases. Yet some places and peoples remained beyond the developing horizons of cognizance, leaving room for the uncertainties of older types of encounter to continue, even well into 'modern' times. Highlighting this tension between an increasingly interconnected world and its unfamiliar corners is the figure of the Englishman William Dampier, who in the closing decades of the seventeenth century interacted with indigenous Australians on the western coast of New Holland. It was at once one of the most inconsequential and most significant encounters in the late early modern period, and that apparent irony cuts to the heart of the emotional complexity of Dampier's world.

In 1606, over three-quarters of a century before Dampier made Australian landfall, both Spanish and Dutch expeditions encountered indigenous Papuans, Torres Strait Islanders, and northern Australian Aboriginal people.³⁸ Their accounts, and those that followed, reveal a range of emotional aspects ranging across the spectrum of encounters already seen. On the indigenous side, they particularly reveal caution and aggressive hostility in addition to curiosity. Their emotional responses to incursions into their territory is likely part of the explanation for the relatively slow advance of South-East Asian and global colonial networks into this region. Yet, outside of the voyagers concerned, the officials who read their reports, and relatively vague rumours mentioned in other sources, these voyages had little in the way of

global cultural textual impact, at least on the European side within their own period. When Dampier landed in north-western Australia in 1688, however, his encounter entered the developing canon of geographical literature.

Spotting 'Men walking on the Shore', Dampier tried to make contact, but his targets ran off 'and hid themselves'.³⁹ Trying again at another location, the Englishmen were challenged. 'The Men at our first coming ashore', Dampier claimed, 'threatened us with their Lances and Swords'.⁴⁰ But Dampier resolved the stand-off by firing a gun, 'fired purposely to scare them'. As the voyagers marched into the Aboriginal camp, there was great distress and confusion, Dampier detailed, 'especially the Women and Children', the former 'howling', the latter 'squeaking and bawling'. The men, Dampier noted, 'stood still'. Here an apparent fear was wrought by a European novelty and interpreted from the behaviour of the encountered. In many ways the peculiar cultural specificities of Aboriginal Australia and seventeenth-century Englishmen could get lost in a familiar spectrum of encounter. This could be de Quiros and islanders, or, were it not for the firearms, possibly Vikings and Skraelings.

Yet through Dampier we can get a look at the individual moving through and curating history, inscribing their own story as well as that of the encounter, in a particularly instructive way. Dampier's narrative was published in London as a profile-raising and commercial venture, yet many of these details from this encounter are not recorded in his original journal, highlighting a division of public and private history, and perhaps therefore also of emotion.⁴¹ Were the additional details in the printed account drawn from memory, or were they embellishments for the reading public? As the period of intense scientific exploration and discovery develops, which Dampier in part heralds, we are left with the problems of the emotional life of the individual interacting with that of the other, and with texts, genre and convention, audiences and posterities. We know, for instance, that Cook read Dampier.⁴² But we are perhaps left wondering whether Dampier was not also his own Rustichello of Pisa.

Dampier's encounter in Australia is also significant for providing a characterization of Aboriginal people that echoed down subsequent ages, which serves as an analytical reminder that all historical texts are accessed in hindsight, and take on new emotional readings. It is a truism so obvious as to risk escaping proper attention. The later uses to which a text is put often influence the reading of it. When dealing with indigenous cultures it is particularly important to recognize this textual ambivalence, as such texts help illuminate pre-contact culture, but are of necessity contact documents generally read with the aid of post-contact syntheses. As a simple illustration, after some peace is restored in the Aboriginal camp and after trying to trade clothing for labour with some Aboriginal people, Dampier conveyed his annoyance by referring to the way that the Aboriginal men 'grinn'd like so many Monkeys'. While that is undoubtedly an extremely negative characterization, a post-Darwinian age reads the same comment through the lens of scientific racism and evolutionary theory, a paradigm unlikely at the forefront of Dampier's mind at the time. In fact, he was more likely thinking of antique traditions like Polo or Mandeville as he referred to the cowering Aboriginal people making 'a doleful noise, as if we had been coming to devour them', alluding to the long-standing belief in cannibal cultures in that part of the world. In this encounter Dampier echoes the prejudices of old, and lays the groundwork for new types to develop in later years with the

advent of scientific racism. Karlsefni's men may have seen the Skrælings as 'ugly', but Dampier characterized the Australians as 'the miserablest People in the World'. The former account saw the world in terms of difference, the latter in terms of hierarchy. It is an oversimplification to draw too much from comparing these two encounters, but they do point to a broader phenomenon: while medieval and early modern voyagers generally shared an assumption that encountered people were all children of God, some people in the period that followed came to wonder if perhaps some indigenous people were not. If the scale and scope of maritime encounters partly defines the shift from medieval to early modern, then a clearer shift in the emotional projections and characterizations of the encountered perhaps helps mark the transition from the European early modern to modern.

Affective causality

This foray into a selection of maritime encounters in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans spanning a period of several centuries points out several things. Firstly, and obviously, in the absence of mutually intelligible language, inter-cultural encounter was largely expressed and interpreted by gesture. Yet while the resulting documentary accounts are inherently one-sided, emotional extremes often come to the fore in encounters, especially fear and terror, apparently resulting from that interpretive reliance on action. Skrælings, Pacific Islanders, and Aboriginal Australians all exhibit fear through flight at some point in these accounts of encounters. Similarly, anger and rage often also come to the fore through hostilities, and curiosity and amity through trade and signs of mirth. These emotional extremities, the European accounts make clear, may arise from misunderstanding, but are not in themselves misunderstood. Such correspondences across time and space offer some confidence in the possibility of analysing historical emotions in maritime encounters. By focusing on elemental aspects of emotional encounter, like gesture and causality, we can anchor our approaches to a diversity of texts.

A close focus on narrative and textual context and transmission is also crucial. The encounters described above all derived from historical and textual specificity, but they also tended to match certain genres or traditions, which can help guide readers into the emotional structures of texts and the events they contain. Polo's text possibly sought to educate, Karlsefni's story to entertain, de Quiros's narrative to explain and Dampier's book to self-promote, but none simply gave an unvarnished account of what happened. In the different operation of voyagers, writers and readers, some emotional elements come through, and these can be used to triangulate understandings of a range of emotions. The key point is to cast a wide net, not simply fish for emotions on one encounter on one island from one perspective.

The other, non-European, side of these encounters remains perhaps the outstanding methodological issue, one which requires a nuanced approach to the source material and a willingness to recognize the limits of the historical method. Mining texts for bits of ethnographical detail, snipped from context and put on display, is a tempting but risky business. Yet, as the examples used in this methodological foray highlight, emotions were evidently an important causal element in determining the nature and outcome of encounters for all sides. Within narrative structures and historical events, the emotional elements of encounter were central to the phenomenon

of encounter. Emotions, therefore, are not merely responses to contact, but work as affective causal elements within the micro- and macro-histories of maritime global encounters in the medieval and early modern worlds and beyond. They are, thereby, also key drivers in the development and growth of global human history. To remember that is the biggest lesson of all.

Notes

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PART 6

CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS



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EMOTIONAL LITERATURES OF WAR

Andrew Lynch and Georgina Pitt

Defining warfare, delineating it from other forms of violence, is problematic for the period 1100–1700 CE. In the early Middle Ages, there was no concept of war as the sole prerogative of a sovereign body: that concept developed over time. This makes it much harder to analyse how contemporary sources classified armed conflicts. Maurice Keen suggests that warfare encompassed not only the great confrontations between rival regional political and religious authorities, but descended all the way down the scales of dominance and discord to small-scale armed conflicts between petty local lords jostling for political influence and temporary economic advantage.¹ Nor is it easy to categorize warfare in this period into, for example, wars about religion, wars of conquest or wars fought defensively. Sustained fighting on a substantial scale required greater resources than were available to most authorities on their own: that deficiency was frequently remedied by a series of ad hoc alliances with others of similar mind, or simply with their own self-interests to prosecute. This made it more difficult to obtain a lasting resolution to a conflict that resulted in warfare; while the original dispute might be settled, warfare might continue over what were originally extraneous matters. Quite often, therefore, underlying causes of warfare, such as rivalries over religious authority, political power and economic privileges became entangled.²

Unsurprisingly, war has a major place in the written record of the period 1100–1700. From these writings and from other evidence – especially art, architecture and material culture – we learn of varied emotional behaviours in wartime, and of the feelings expressed by those involved, attributed to them, expected of them, and prohibited. We cannot now separate a pure reality of the emotions of war from this written and material record, partly because we lack other access, partly because the past emotional experience and significance of war did not exist in a representational vacuum. It was formed and performed with reference to a broad repertoire of writings and other cultural models. Emotion was enjoined and infused in assessments of when and how to wage war, in concepts of good and bad war service, of the field of battle and the wider effects of war on individuals, societies and the environment, including historical analyses and memorials. These representations range from high-order philosophical and ethical understandings to literary and historiographical elaborations to more practical everyday accounts. Categorizing the source material is not easy: the modern divide between historical and literary sources is inapposite for most of this period. However, the bulk of our sources can be described as public

documents, material that circulated in the public domain, such as sermons and clerical writings, published narratives of campaigns, *vitae*, plays and poems, pamphlets and other polemical writings.

This study surveys how emotions relating to war are discursively and formally constructed in a variety of Western European genres, such as treatises, sermons, chronicles, histories, epics, romances, moral poems and plays from the period. It investigates changes in the register of war's emotions as social, political and technological changes occurred across this broad timespan, along with changes in literary genres and forms. The variation in the range and scale of warfare across this period, and the entanglement of different underlying causes of individual wars, make it difficult to assign specific emotions to particular wars or types of warfare. Moreover, as our mixed headings below – part thematic, part temporal – may suggest, the cultural resources for feeling war do not simply progress in tandem with its technologies, though both are always operative factors in the making of war's emotions. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern some broad distinctions in the recorded emotions of war between the earlier and the later part of the period canvassed in this chapter, both in the identity of those who wrote, and the identity of those written about. Thus, in the early period, those who wrote came from a tightly knit class of clerics and aristocrats, and reflect their worldviews and concerns. In the later period, technological changes and changes in cultural modes and methods of dissemination permitted a broader range of voices to be heard, and a greater diversity of values and experiences to be articulated. In the narratives of the Crusades, in the earlier period, the enemy was clearly 'Other'; both geographically external and culturally different. In the latter period, when civil wars raged within nation states, there was no such comfort; the enemy was within, both geographically and culturally. We do not suggest that these distinctions are binaries. They are no more than loosely delineated themes which emerge from the evidence, and their principal purpose is to assist in organizing and conceptualizing source material which defies rigid categorization.

The sources also establish two broad traditions that one might loosely call 'clerical' and 'chivalric' emotional evaluations of war. On the one hand are the intellectual forces that sought to control the emotions that led to war and were practised within it, and on the other are accounts centred more on the emotional attitudes, self-image and interests of soldiers, especially the elite. Despite huge changes in the technology and social organization of war over the period 1100–1700, and in the literary forms articulating war, these two evaluative impulses show a surprising continuity. Yet neither tradition, we argue, offers us a clear window onto an inner-world 'reality' of war emotions. They offer instead a variety of written attempts to 'do' things emotionally in relation to war. In the words of Nicole Eustace, referring to the work of William Reddy on a later period, these 'expressions of emotion inevitably served as the vector of social communication, for the assertion and contestation of status, never simply for the outer realization of inner consciousness'.³ They require treatment as literary products, situated and specifically addressed forms of writing, serving vested interests, but nevertheless making a major contribution to the feeling-potential through which war was inspired and waged, registered and experienced. Literature is part of the emotional technology of war. The emotional 'history' of war, 1110–1700 CE, is not a simple sequential development of changes in feeling in response to changing

historical circumstances. It is also one of developments in the available cultural means for feeling war, amongst which literature, broadly interpreted, occupied a dominant place.

War in 1100–1700 was not therefore emotionally contained by boundaries of time and place, nor restricted to combatants or particular social groups, nor was it simply a matter of conflict between clear ‘sides’. Its emotional reach extended beyond the battlefield and the profession of arms to affect social and cultural production at all levels; the fifteenth-century secular song, ‘L’homme armé doit on doubter’ (‘The armed man is to be feared’), received over forty known liturgical settings; in Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s nightmarish *The Triumph of Death* (c. 1562) war-as-death, or death-as-war, invades, terrifies and pollutes everyday scenes of civilian life. Cultural texts like these made up ‘wartime’, as Mary Favret has described it with reference to a later era – ‘an affective zone, a sense of time that cannot know its own borders’.⁴ There were medieval and early modern counterparts to this affective zone, as mediated by the distinctive literary genres of war in those periods, creating their own ‘wartimes’: ‘not a single temporal mode – the time of war’, but ‘many temporalities, each one . . . a structure of feeling with its own affective qualities, its own expressivity, its own silences’.⁵ Earlier literary genres varied widely in their provision of resources for feeling war within time: the abstracted and seemingly atemporal statements of clerics on ‘just war’; celebrations of past national ‘worthies’ and their conquests, with their obverse in ‘falls of princes’ narratives; the quasi-realist detail of ‘strokes’ in the ‘field’ that characterized much epic and ‘historical’ literature; emphasis on civilian atrocities in treatises and clerkly poetry calling for future peace or vengeance; patterns of romance ‘adventure’, vaguely situated in time or place, that associated individual military success with virtue and social utility; the timeless, quasi-allegorical ferocity of wars against archetypal enemies of God and Right. Through the differing terms of these genres, and others, the potential of ‘wartime’ as emotional experience was shaped, simultaneously enabled and disabled, encouraged and foreclosed. In what follows, we take the view that there was not only a literature *about* war’s emotions, but that varieties of literature played an important part in making war feel as it did.

The legacy from late antiquity

It appears from the sources that armed violence of some kind, at some level, was endemic in the early middle ages; as Guy Halsall puts it, ‘the simple absence of war did not constitute peace’.⁶ The Peace of God and Truce of God movements were an attempt from the late tenth century onwards to minimize the devastation experienced by local communities and the Church, caused by the frequent eruption of armed conflicts between local magnates and the ubiquitous raiding by landless knights and marginalized groups of men.⁷ The fact that this strategy was necessary, and that the movements continued until the thirteenth century, well into the period covered in this volume, suggests that most people either routinely experienced violence or perpetrated it. A consideration of warfare in this period must therefore take into account that violence was endemic in society, and that both secular and clerical authorities struggled to restrict and control its use, while practising it themselves.

Earlier views of the origins of war are important to later understandings of its relation to the emotions. Augustine of Hippo (354–430), whose statements remained influential up to and throughout our period, saw war as a misfortune that had to be endured in this world, something to be ‘render[ed] unto Caesar’ (Matthew 22:21). Peace was the goal of all conflicts, but peace could only be attained by forcefully correcting the iniquities of others by the use of violence to impose justice.⁸ The Augustinian justification for war was quite specific in its requirements: an act external to those who wished to wage war (unjust acts undertaken by others) and an internal will limited to the correction of such injustice. Emotions were an important part of the experience of war, because correct emotions demonstrated the propriety of an individual’s behaviour during warfare. Even the wise and the just, acting from the purest of Christian motives, should experience sorrow and anguish in prosecuting a war.⁹ The ruler who ordered war might be guilty, yet the soldier was bound to obey. What mattered most, thinking of the next world, was to conduct war with the correct will, and without sinful intentions or feelings: ‘The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power’.¹⁰

Augustine’s emphasis on individual motivation and sin calls for a warfare free of hostile emotions that it is rather hard to imagine operating in practice. Questions will arise. How does one win a war without inflicting damage, and how can it be inflicted without one’s desiring to do so? If sin is omnipresent and inevitable, can war be waged without it? Overall, Augustine’s influence and that of others gave war a double status in mainstream Western Christian thought – as something potentially either lawful and beneficial, or sinful and destructive. Maximus, bishop of Turin (c. 380–465), emphasized that even acting under orders did not count as an exculpation, if the motives and intentions of the soldier were wrong: if, for example, a soldier fought for a share of booty rather than in defence of the Christian empire.¹¹ If undertaken for the right reasons, then the individual bore no responsibility for killing an enemy during warfare. The individual merely acted as God’s instrument, ‘like the sword that aids its user’.¹² Isidore of Seville (c. 550–636), a long-enduring early medieval influence, would write similarly that ‘[a]n unjust war is one that is begun out of rage, and not for a lawful reason’.¹³ The theme was taken up later still by Gratian in his *Decretum* (c. 1150), which treats as illegitimate wars not begun and waged in a benevolent spirit and with the aim of a just peace. War must come from a love of justice, not a love of inflicting punishment.¹⁴

In effect, the same outcomes of war could be read quite differently in moral – and hence political – terms depending on the emotional disposition (the ‘love’) of those involved. In Augustine’s words, ‘it makes a good deal of difference when one man is killed by another, whether it happened through a desire of injuring him’.¹⁵ One widespread effect of that emphasis was to make the emotional character of the warrior, especially the ruler and war leader, a crucial matter, along with the circumstances in which war arose and the details of its prosecution. War necessarily becomes a narrative of situated emotional disposition as much as of practical actions. Or rather, actions in war are understood as inseparable from the emotions with which they are performed, and therefore as closely related to forms of literary representation and analysis, with their differing agendas and emphases. In turn, varieties of literary genre and form, with all their possibilities of ironic and hybrid deployment, serve to

construct and characterize an emotional typology of war and the warrior. These are supposedly coextensive with moral and political versions of the same kind, but there is always room for slippage and contradiction.

The early period: right and wrong emotions of war

The essential ambivalence in the Christian classification of warfare became more acute as the papacy became involved in sanctioning and directing campaigns of violence. Papal involvement in the planning of military campaigns provided legitimate authority, an unimpeachable guarantee of a just war, by drawing upon Augustinian notions of violence as a corrective, lovingly administered. Bishop Anselm II of Lucca's *Collectio Canonum*, compiled c. 1081–86, cited Old Testament examples such as Moses punishing his people with love rather than hatred.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the ecclesiastical authorities were aware that papal sanction of a campaign could not ensure that individual participants fought with the right intentions and emotions, and were at pains to articulate the correct way of undertaking warfare. Before granting remission of sins to the knights about to embark on one such campaign, Bishop Anselm stipulated to them the grounds upon which, and the intentions with which, they should fight, with remission being contingent upon their proper objectives and correct emotional state.¹⁷

Although clerical commentators on warfare wrote consistently within a framework of Christian morality, it does not follow that their representations of any given war were consistent. A comparison of the commentary on Duke William's conduct during the Norman conquest of England is instructive. The *Gesta Guillelmi*, by William's contemporary biographer, William of Poitiers (d. 1090), was a panegyric and an exercise in Norman legitimation.¹⁸ Significantly, William of Poitiers makes no mention of the harrying of the north, instead asserting that the duke 'preserved the land which he could have devastated utterly in a short time', yet the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle portrays just such devastation.¹⁹ The inference is that William of Poitiers chose to ignore behaviour that would not fit within the constraints of Christian warfare. Orderic of Vitalis (d. 1142) reworked William of Poitiers's biography in his treatment of King William in the *Historia Ecclesiastica*.²⁰ Orderic's revisions suggest that each author crafted his narrative differently, and highlighted different values, to suit their audiences.²¹ Orderic addresses the harrying of the north, and says that he cannot condone the starvation of thousands in that campaign, and adds that in eternity, King William would surely be punished for his actions.²²

There were other outlooks on war, emphasizing victory and glory without too many worries about emotional motivation: the literary status of 'pagan worthies' like Alexander and Julius Caesar comes to mind. Yet literature often described war within a moral rhetoric that made it a theatre of virtue and vice. Such a rhetoric was perhaps inevitable when the right to wage war at all was made a matter of desiring the good, and assumed the presence of an enemy whose cause was less just and so merited defeat and either punishment or reformation. There was both religious and philosophical support for the idea of the 'good warrior'. Medieval knights could claim that the hardships they suffered were actions meriting grace;²³ Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, influential from the thirteenth century, treated courageous deaths in war as worthy of the highest honour 'since they occur in the greatest and

finest danger'.²⁴ Even so, as will be indicated below, both the emotional and the moral cast of war writing – the two go closely together – are often more complex than might be expected. Simple ideological alignments easily become confused and conflicted over the course of long circumstantial narratives and expositions. War literature's evaluations of conduct often operated on a scale of 'too much' or 'too little', rather than, or alongside, one of absolute right or wrong, and emotions were involved in these judgements: examples could be cited from Byrhtnoth's *ofermod* ('overreadiness to fight', or perhaps 'arrogance') at Maldon in 991, to Roland's stubborn refusal to summon help at Roncesvalles, to Shakespeare's Hotspur's reckless dismissal of overwhelming odds at Shrewsbury: 'Doomsday is near; die all, die merrily' (*1 Henry IV*, 4.1.134).²⁵

To give a later medieval example of the centrality of emotional evaluation to the judgement of war conduct, in Malory's *Le Morte Darthur* (1469) Merlin praises Arthur's battle prowess but rebukes him for killing too many of the opposing army: "Hast thou nat done inow? . . . God ys wroth with the for thou woll never have done".²⁶ We see here, on a less abstract level, the concern that excessive aggression in warfare reflects badly on the motivation of the warrior in the sight of God, and may also damage the earthly credit of his cause. War writing of this period, as Catherine Nall shows, exhibits a variety of themes that relate judgements of emotion to practical political concerns: rulers must be seen to choose war as a last resort, not out of ferocity or immoderate ambition; military indiscipline and pillaging detract from the appearance of just and measured warfare; soldiers must be paid promptly to prevent this happening because being seen to control war effectively is vital to retaining emotional support for campaigns and for the ruling regime itself.²⁷

The early period: emotions in war against the external 'Other'

The largest body of material about the experience of warfare in the early part of our period stems from the Crusades. Significantly, Augustine's insistence on the importance of love as the motivating force behind legitimate violence, designed to correct and to punish, does not appear as a major motif in the sermons, correspondence and biographies relating to the Crusades. Riley-Smith has pointed out that for the crusaders, love was extended only to God and one's Christian neighbour; the enemy was unloved.²⁸ Love was demonstrated by fighting for oppressed Christian brethren, and the supreme act of charity was to lay down one's life in an act of fraternal love.²⁹ Riley-Smith argues that the polemicists and preachers who addressed lay audiences, potential crusaders and financial supporters deliberately forbore to preach the necessity of acting out of love for one's enemy because such a position would be fundamentally unpalatable to their courtly audiences.³⁰ He ascribes two reasons for this. First, lay audiences were more likely to be moved by a hatred of non-Christians, an emotion he argues is amply recorded in the vernacular poetry of the period. Second, crusading charity was presented in terms readily comprehensible by lay audiences, in metaphors involving familial love, with its undertones of almost feudal obligation.

Casting violence and warfare in terms of familial love and charity gave fresh legitimation to participation in warfare, a justification for war that the knightly class eagerly adopted; here was validation of their upbringing, their values and their skills

instead of the more usual clerical condemnation.³¹ This was an important shift in the characterization and self-conception of the warrior class, more used to being berated by the clergy for the sin inherent in their profession.³² Ralph of Caen's description of Tancred de Hauteville's response to sermons preaching the crusade is illuminating:

Frequently he burned with anxiety because the warfare he engaged in as a knight seemed to be contrary to the Lord's commands. The Lord, in fact, ordered him to offer the cheek that had been struck together with his other cheek to the striker; but secular knighthood did not spare the blood of relatives. The Lord urged him to give his tunic and his cloak as well to the man who would take them away; the needs of war impelled him to take from a man already despoiled of both whatever remained to him.³³

The ecclesiastical authorities did not intend to alter their theological position on warfare and the constraints on the legitimate use of violence. Crusading ideology was not articulated as a blanket justification for either the aristocratic worldly lifestyle or the pursuit of arms generally. The circumstances in which a warrior merited reward from God for his martial prowess remained tightly controlled, assessed according to the traditional clerical formulations of intention and emotion.³⁴ The crusader poet who exclaimed 'Behold, without renouncing our rich garments, our station in life, all that pleases and charms, we can obtain honour down here and joy in paradise' doubtless reflected that portion of the audience which chose what it wanted to hear.³⁵ However, casting the call to arms in worldly terms that could easily be understood and adopted by potential participants in the crusades meant that, inevitably, secular ideas of appropriate behaviour and emotion would permeate the standards and expectations of those fighting on crusade. Occasionally, the narratives of the Crusades demonstrate an apparent disjunction between secular and clerical values, which the chroniclers endeavour to reconcile. Walter the Chancellor, who chronicled the conflicts between Muslims and the Crusader-held principality of Antioch in the early twelfth century, saw no mismatch between piety and other emotional promptings to war: his hero Baldwin is 'motivated by a two-fold ardour: inwardly of his soul panting for revenge and outwardly of his knightly station inspiring him to chivalry' (II.9). Such feelings are apparently compatible with the statement that Baldwin was 'making no false claim of victory or human praise for himself, but entrusting all to God' (II.10).³⁶ Sin, repentance, revenge and renewed hope of divine favour can all form part of the one emotional scenario, if the balance is acceptable. Similarly, a chronicle of the Third Crusade is careful to say that Geoffrey de Lusignan was 'moved equally by the common cause of Christendom and by a personal desire to avenge his brother's injuries'.³⁷

The crusader narratives also correlated piety with an absence of fear of battle or fear of death, a correct emotional state.³⁸ Not all crusaders managed to banish fear: some of the chroniclers and correspondents were prepared to admit to severe attacks of panic and terror about imminent battle, and it appears that fear before or during battle did not attract trenchant criticism.³⁹ Desertion from the campaign was an impious act that drew great calumny, because it was both a violation of the pilgrim's oath and an abandonment of one's comrades to peril.⁴⁰ Here the values of the secular and clerical worlds aligned.

Occasionally, the disjunction between aristocratic worldly standards and the Christian values espoused by the authorities is stark. One example, on the cusp of our period, will suffice. Thomas de Marle was a crusader who repeatedly fought in the front line as part of an amorphous group of crusaders variously described as ‘iuvenes’ or ‘tyrones’, exhibiting extraordinary personal courage which was integral to success at some of the most notable battles.⁴¹ Their actions were commemorated in the poem, *Chanson d’Antioche*.⁴² These were men inspired by glory of the secular kind. Thomas’s behaviour once returned from crusade, which was characterized by contemporary clerical writers as deranged and devilish, suggests that the theological constraints of right intention and correct emotion played no role in his actions on crusade.⁴³

A further complexity was added to the emotions of crusaders when they suffered serious defeat, yet still believed, as taught, that their cause was just. In these cases, they could appeal to their own sinfulness as agents of the cause in order to excuse setbacks while still claiming divine support in general. The model is as old as the Hebrew scriptures, as in Joshua 7–8, where God punishes Israel for sin with a defeat by enemies, but rewards them with victory when they repent and atone. Walter the Chancellor’s *Antiochene Wars* (1114–15 and 1119–22) invoked similar ideas in his account of Christian campaigns against the ‘Turks’. He argues that failure in war is the result of sin, particularly pride in previous military successes.⁴⁴ Spiritual purity and a correct emotional state are necessary in leaders and common soldiers alike.⁴⁵ Fulcher of Chartres wrote in similar terms.⁴⁶

Another, less obvious, outcome of the command that fighting must be conducted without a culpable desire to injure can be seen in early romance narratives of chivalric ‘adventure’. These texts also reflect the preferred emotional self-image of elite warriors. The good romance knight does not ride out intending to kill anyone. He often has no deep motive at all, simply becoming caught up on his way in a chain of events leading to combats, without any ill will, no matter how bloody the results. In *Érec et Énide* (c. 1170), a seminal Arthurian romance by Chrétien de Troyes, the hero begins the series of events that leads him to marriage quite accidentally: an insulting dwarf crosses his path while he is out hunting. After marriage, needing to regain his reputation for prowess, Érec rides out ‘ne set ou, mes en aventure’ (‘he doesn’t know where, but in adventure’) with the beautiful Énide riding ahead of him, and he just happens to provoke numerous armed attacks.⁴⁷ Both the story and Érec need fights to prove his true knighthood, but Chrétien also exploits the comedy of the good knight’s equal need not to appear too bellicose.

In both epic and romance mode, deep motivations of envy and hatred belong to singularly bad knights, such as Ganelon the traitor in the *Chanson de Roland* (completed in the earlier twelfth century) and Mordred in Arthurian romances from the earlier thirteenth century. These are individual treacherous enemies from within the ranks of the Christian secular elite. War literature also identified entire religious and racial groups whom it was only right, and even loving, to hate and destroy. The basis for hostility to them was their status as ‘enemies of Christ’. Scripture taught that God had enemies on whom he often took vengeance: ‘Let God arise and his enemies be scattered’ (Psalms [Vulgate] 67:2). Such texts could be interpreted in a spiritual sense in which God’s enemies were one’s own sins, or the demons vanquished by the grace of Christ. But there were other readings. Augustine’s commentary on this psalm is:

Christ has risen up, who is over all things . . . and His enemies have been dispersed through all nations, to wit, the Jews, in that very place, where they practised their enmities Him taken captive they derided, Him hanging they mocked: and being soon conquered by that very Person against whom they swelled victorious, they vanished away.⁴⁸

Augustine is referring to the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in 70 CE. With incorporations of other stories, including the legend of St Veronica and the death of Pilate, medieval and early modern Christian writers made that event the basis of an extreme anti-Jewish literary tradition known as 'The Vengeance of Our Lord'. The tradition multiplied in many languages, versions and genres, including numerous staged versions from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries.⁴⁹ In its guise as a late fourteenth-century English alliterative poem, *The Siege of Jerusalem*, the story's emotional logic is clear: Jews stubbornly refused to accept Christ as saviour, had no pity on his torments, and savagely scorned him. Accordingly, they deserved a merciless annihilation, which was Christ's appropriate vengeance on them. To love Christ is to hate them. That emotional logic – to love Christ is to hate his perceived enemies – had had unintended practical consequences early in the crusading period. Casting the call to crusade in terms of familial obligation pushed the emotional register of combatants from a desire to correct injustice, with its implications of restrained emotional response and proportionality of violence, to an invitation to vendetta.⁵⁰

Encouragement to war against Islam became associated with the notion of 'enemies of the cross', popular from the time of Ambrose and Augustine to the High Middle Ages. In this case a motif (the cross) that had mainly symbolized 'the [four-fold] virtues necessary to lead a holy life and combat vices'⁵¹ later took on more pointed and aggressive meanings. After defeats in the Holy Land, late twelfth- and earlier thirteenth-century preaching of the cross 'turned decisively towards a call for holy war'.⁵² Much depended on which Pauline text was emphasized. In Ephesians 3:18, 'the depth and length and breadth and height' was read to mean the dimensions of the cross, allegorically considered. By contrast, Philippians 3:18, on 'the enemies of the cross of Christ', 'sharpens a hostile gaze outward as preachers identify . . . Jews, pagans, heretics and Muslims'.⁵³

We see a similar shift towards hostility in long-term changes in hagiography. The literary career of St Martin of Tours, a fourth-century bishop, gives a good example. His influential *vita* by Sulpicius Severus, a contemporary, represented war as 'fundamentally incompatible with sainthood', but the *vita* by Alcuin, in Charlemagne's pro-war environment, c. 800, emphasized Martin as a willing soldier of Christ.⁵⁴ The *South English Legendary* (c. 1300) is more militaristic still, showing the saint 'leading a charge with his drawn sword and inspiring fear in his foes'.⁵⁵ Later, English warrior kings incorporated St George into their iconographic programmes. Edward III re-dedicated the chapel at Windsor Castle, formerly named for the peaceful Edward the Confessor, to St George, whose legend now celebrated him as much as a knight as a martyr. Edward IV and his successors massively extended the chapel, and George remained a pre-eminent figure in the elite Order of the Garter. Meanwhile, at the other end of the documentary (and social) scale, contemporary petitions for relief made by disabled veterans, or their widows, show the very different registers of feeling in which common soldiers and their families communicated their experience of war.

The later period: the 'Other' is amongst us

In the latter part of the period covered by this chapter, the experience of war in Western Europe was further complicated by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, which added new zones of conflict and different ways of emotionally conceptualizing those conflicts to cultures in which war was already endemic. There are strands of similarity and difference between the experience of war in the early conflicts and these later conflicts. Religion is a consistent theme, but differently manifested. The enemy was still cast as the Anti-Christ, still the subject of vicious characterizations in propaganda; but the enemy was not Other, not living elsewhere, not of foreign custom, and not necessarily of different ethnicity.⁵⁶ The enemy was within, literally neighbours within a settlement or in the next town. These were intra-state as well as intra-European wars. Soldiers did not travel to some remote land to fight; instead, these wars witnessed a huge mobilization of soldiers, largely mercenary, often attached to local warbands rather than princely armies, and these mobs often were only dispersed when they were paid off by their civilian victims.⁵⁷ One estimate puts the number of combatants during the Thirty Years War (1618–48) as one million people.⁵⁸

There are also strands of similarity and difference in the theological conception of warfare. Luther's initial stance, in 1518, was that the Turks who had irrupted in central Europe were an instrument of God's wrath and should not be resisted.⁵⁹ During the following decade, he altered his position. Unless certain that a ruler was wrong (doubts were not sufficient), the Christian imperative was to fight when ordered to do so by the secular authorities.⁶⁰ The obligation was on the ruler, not the subject, to act with prudence and wisdom; to have the right intention, which was to correct injustice; and the right emotions, which were fear of God, the desire to protect, and love.⁶¹ However, Luther differed profoundly from the canonical traditions of the Catholic Church in his no-holds-barred approach to soldiers' conduct in a war rightly prosecuted by the authorities. Luther said that 'it is both Christian and an act of love to kill the enemy without hesitation, to plunder and burn and injure him by every method of warfare until he is defeated'.⁶² There is no measure of proportionality or restraint in this exhortation. Such urgings 'effectively loosened the hands of all whose job it was to fight'.⁶³ The only constraints were to avoid sins such as rape, and to extend mercy to an enemy once defeated.⁶⁴ Calvin, however, stayed much closer to the Catholic canonical traditions. In his *Institutio Christianae religionis*, Calvin's views reflect Augustinian precepts of war as a 'kind harshness', and he argues that violence can only be justified by right intention, when it is animated by love of those to be protected and those to be punished.⁶⁵ The distinction between Luther and Calvin seems to be that while both theologians applied quasi-Augustinian precepts to the rulers who decided to wage war, Luther expressly did not extend those precepts to those who actually fought.

The greater quantity and diversity of material on European wars in the latter centuries makes it possible to sample different aspects of the emotional experience of war in this part of the period. For example, Trim argues that English, Irish and Scottish soldiers who chose to fight in continental armies, Protestant and Catholic, in the seventeenth century were motivated not just by financial gain and the quest for glory, but also by 'kinship, culture and *mentalités*, especially religion'.⁶⁶ He argues

that these 'military emigrés' were closely connected by kinship and patronage ties, and that they shared a common sense of identity, an emotional community based upon their particular confessional stance, which heavily influenced their choice of army, leader, and indeed war.

At the same time, other narratives show that soldiers in these intra-European conflicts often failed to distinguish between those they were supposedly endeavouring to protect and the enemy. In the French Wars of Religion (1562–98), individual towns and local magnates took violent action, which Diefendorf likened to terrorist campaigns, blowing up bridges and plundering farms and food stores.⁶⁷ The narrative accounts of the Thirty Years War record a consistent pattern, particularly as the war lengthened, of troops who plundered, extorted and inflicted misery on communities of their own religious profession and ethnic identity.⁶⁸ Doubtless such actions sometimes stemmed from the failure of the authorities to provision and pay the troops adequately: this phenomenon has been called 'the plunder economy'.⁶⁹ The sources make it clear that the violence perpetrated by one's own troops was emotionally devastating for the victims, a point made as early as 1422 by Alain Chartier and soon translated for English readers.⁷⁰ Logically, the soldiers must also have paid an emotional price. As their behaviour deteriorated and they preyed on their own, it is unlikely that they did not recognize the loss of moral justification and sense of righteousness. The blurring of the distinction between civilian enemy and friend also had significant practical consequences for the soldiery, who became regarded as enemies. They were frequently denied access to fortified cities, and therefore supplies and assistance. They were also vulnerable to revenge attacks by peasants if found injured or alone, and just occasionally could face organized resistance from local communities who were supposed to billet and support them.⁷¹ In the Thirty Years War, soldiers generally survived only three years; the main causes of death were exhaustion, hunger and disease, not battle wounds.⁷² The circumstances allowed for no demarcation of a purely 'military' emotional sphere.

There were similar experiences of war across the Channel. Again, we can perceive similarities and differences. Augustinian precepts on war are echoed by the prominent Puritan minister William Gouge, who opined that war was made necessary by the iniquities of men, that war was a means of maintaining right, and that there was a 'just and right use of warre'.⁷³ Earlier chivalric ideals may be discerned in the emphasis on personal honour in the soldiers' unwritten code of conduct governing not just combat, but parole, the negotiation of surrender, and the exchange of prisoners, to which both sides of the conflict subscribed.⁷⁴ This was not a straightforward transplant of earlier norms, but arguably a common substrate.

As in the continental wars, the English Civil War involved large mobs of soldiers, poorly organized and badly provisioned. They were therefore both predatory and cruel, and the civilian population suffered. The English were acutely aware of the recent experience of war on the continent, and fearful of its horrors, described in one pamphlet as the 'sea of blood . . . and fury of fire'.⁷⁵ Propaganda was not confined to the written word: woodcuts dealing with the recent German conflicts graphically depicted acts of brutality perpetrated on defenceless civilians by soldiers consumed by bloodlust and greed.⁷⁶ The soldiers also suffered. Peters describes the emotional toll on the soldiers stemming from the internecine nature of the Civil War, the absence of an enemy readily identifiable and suitably 'Other', as 'a sense of

disorientation and paranoia'.⁷⁷ The inability to discern the enemy was akin to a visual and mental fog, disabling in its effect.

The narratives of the English Civil war are very different from the narratives of the Crusades in their treatment of the emotional states of participants and civilians. This may be because, by its very nature, a civil war is a war within a community. There is no external, stably constituted 'Other'. Both participants and non-combatants in a civil war were aware that the sources of both violence and succour were close to home, and could be unpredictable. Heightened and disordered emotional states are highlighted even in the titles of some pamphlets: William Covel's *A Declaration Unto the Parliament, Council of State and Army, Shewing Impartially the Causes of the Peoples Tumults, Madness and Confusions* (London, 1659), is an example. Following the Restoration, a number of published narratives focused on the damage to mind and psyche caused by the war. In his pamphlet *Vox vere Anglorum*, Sir Edmund Pierce refers to 'these vast frights, terrors, wasting divisions, and confusions which we dayly feel and suffer'.⁷⁸ Peters argues that the use of inclusive language and direct patterns of speech in such pamphlets meant that individual emotional responses were collectivized and transposed onto the national psyche.⁷⁹ A common metaphor in pamphlets focusing on the physical and psychological trauma of the Civil War was the diseased and ravaged body.⁸⁰

Anti-war and pro-war sentiment

War inspires discordant reactions generally: Chaucer satirized the literature of the Trojan War as a noisy, emotion-laden quarrel between books, each claiming sole authority but none achieving it.⁸¹ In literary circles throughout the later medieval and early modern periods, anti-war sentiment is often expressed, although outright pacifism is rare. Erasmus's *Dulce bellum inexpertis* – 'War is sweet to those who have not experienced it' – (1515) is a core example: war is bestial, unnatural to humans, unchristian, and also hopelessly inefficient by any cost-benefit analysis. Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) has mainly been read as a vision of ideal rule, but occasionally as satire on the two-facedness of the Utopians who 'truly detest and abhor' war but practise it all the same, in Augustinian mode: 'The wars fought by the Elect are not ordinary wars, and their ultimate aim is not to be found in the normal motivation for warfare: their wars are the wars of the righteous, acts of mercy and even salvation'.⁸² Shakespeare's Falstaff may have something similar in mind when he jokes: 'Well, God be thanked for these rebels, they offend none but the virtuous' (*1 Henry IV*, 3.3.189–90).⁸³ While he gratefully profits by the war through employment, pillaging and payroll fraud, Falstaff reminds the audience that Henry IV himself has quite recently been a 'rebel' against Richard II. 'Virtue' in war seems to be a perquisite of the powerful. In *Richard II*, immediately after Richard's murder on Henry's orders, Northumberland wishes 'all happiness' to the new king's 'sacred state' (*Richard II*, 5.6.6).⁸⁴ One emotional outcome of these sudden contrasts is liable to be a disgust with the rhetoric of royal authority. The form of the Shakespearean playhouse, with its sudden changes of scene and switches of speech register, disturbs notions of power as sacred, creating an emotional unease. The intense emotions of civil dissension and war experience could also change the fortunes of plays. Ben Jonson's *Catiline*, which had failed in 1611, found success in the 1630s and after the Restoration. It has been described as demonstrating how 'a nation so sharply divided over issues of

religion' might 'be torn brutally apart', and 'as prophesying the shape of things to come in England of the 1640s'.⁸⁵

Civil war was traditionally represented as a scandal. Thomas Hoccleve, in 1411–12, attacks the French in this vein: 'Thyself manaceth thyself for to dye. | Thyself destroie, and feeble is thy victorie'. He goes on to treat the Hundred Years War as a civil conflict between Christians that is causing 'irreparable' sorrow.⁸⁶ To John Lydgate, in *The Siege of Thebes* (c. 1421–22), Mars, the god of war, is a 'mad judge' of political right.⁸⁷ Only prudence and patient negotiation, not the furious rage of war, can save Thebes from destroying itself, but rage and pride win out. Thomas Malory's *Le Morte Darthur* (1469) laments the unnatural war between Arthur and his son Mordred: 'never syns was there seyne a more dolefuller batayle in no Crysten londe'.⁸⁸ It is hard not to think here of the bloody battles of the Wars of the Roses, which involved family members on opposing sides. Through the horrors of Shakespeare's Henry VI plays and well beyond, civil war brings sorrow, anguish and sterile waste. Andrew Marvell's 'Upon Appleton House' (1651) envisages a once paradisaical England having suffered a second Fall: 'What luckless apple did we taste, | To make us mortal, and thee waste?'.⁸⁹ Retirement from public strife to a private Stoic realm characterized many Royalist poems around this period, as part of various emotional strategies for the defeated.⁹⁰ In France, *Les Tragiques* (1615), an epic lamentation by the Protestant poet Agrippa d'Aubigné, gave the Wars of Religion an intensely emotional cast – 'O distressed France, O blood-soaked land. . . . O Mother, if it be a mother who betrays her children'⁹¹ – and promised a judgement of God on the Catholic monarchy: 'Babel, one day you will be ploughed into furrows, where bones and cinders will be seen, the only remnants of your palace and marble in ashes'.⁹² For all his horror at war, the solution d'Aubigné imagines is more war.

All this time, literature attaching highly positive emotions to war and military prowess continued throughout the period under our review, especially in relation to foreign campaigns. Adaptations of classical narratives, plays, histories, romances and their chapbook descendants, ballads and songs, religious works and secular eulogies kept up the special prestige of the good soldier. The *Laud Troy Book* (c. 1400) rates its heroes, Hector and Achilles, purely by the number of the enemy that they slew,⁹³ quite independently of the grief and destruction the story otherwise describes. Malory's basic tenet is that 'worshyp in armys may never be foyled [denigrated]'.⁹⁴ While Elizabethan theatre audiences were asked to lament civil war, a witness to Shakespeare's *1 Henry VI* wrote enthusiastically:

How would it have joyed brave Talbot, the terror of the French, to think that after he had lain two hundred years in his tomb, he should triumph again on the stage and have his bones new embalmed with the tears of ten thousand spectators at least.⁹⁵

Success in foreign war continued to be seen as glorious. From the later part of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, 'advice to a painter' war poetry became popular: 'the function of these poems was to recreate in verbal form an intense and emotionally-charged baroque idiom to glorify and celebrate both victory and the violence that it entailed'.⁹⁶ Centring war description on a superhuman heroic figure remained a literary possibility from Roland at Roncesvalles to Marlborough at

Blenheim and on to the time of Wellington and Napoleon. War literature's subsequent slow replacement of the god-like commander by the common soldier as hero marks perhaps a greater cultural change than any observable in the period we have reviewed here.

Conclusion: literature as a carrier of emotion

A comprehensive survey of the literatures of war in six centuries that saw such a plethora of heterogeneous wars, articulated in many differing genres and discourses, is beyond the reach of this chapter. Instead, we have endeavoured to sample different genres, from different centuries, dealing with a range of wars. Our sample has focused on documents circulating in the public domain, documents which are likely to have both reflected existing attitudes, and helped to shape those attitudes.

Comparing the emotional experience of warfare across the period is difficult, because the sources are not equivalent. In particular, a richer, more diverse range of materials in the latter part of the period permits a greater range of voices to be heard, not only the aristocratic and the monastic. However, two tentative conclusions may be reached. The first is that emotions consistently played a critical part in how war was both conducted and represented, and that emotions were value-laden, both in experience and in discourse. The second, as mentioned above, is the continuing presence of two different emotional evaluations of war, the 'clerical' (intellectual) and 'chivalric' (soldierly), which sometimes overlapped, and at other times violently conflicted.

In whatever form, past literary texts of war (like productions in other forms of cultural mediation) should be read as historical in themselves: they inform us of the emotional resources available to feel war in particular times and places, and can be studied as exemplars of the potential realization of these resources as emotional experience. The literary conceptions and forms in which feeling is encouraged, the characteristic image-repertoires, the prevalent discourses of emotion and affect, are important objects of study, because analysis of literary form gives an idea not only of the separate discursive components of emotion, but of their mobilization in specific narrative and poetic creations, and in patterns of emotional intersection: how pity in war relates to anger, shame to hope, or love to hatred. The emotional emphases and exclusions that particular literary forms and genres enacted – the exaggeration of epic heroism or idealizations of romance – may seem fanciful aberrations from the emotions appropriate to 'real' war, but they are also factors that permitted or encouraged real emotional responses to war. Writing the emotional history of war should therefore take into account the changing currency of literary forms of emotional mediation, wherever we can trace rises and falls in the popularity and prestige of particular forms and genres. It should also be noted that literary genres of war, or at least some aspects of their structures and discourses, may have a much longer life than other factors in war. These forms of emotional alignment can continue to make their presence felt even though they may seem very distant from actual war practice.

There was rarely only one set of emotional opportunities offered by war literature at any one time – we do not often find fully intact 'emotional regimes'⁹⁷ of war preserved in the broad written record. We find instead a variety of genres, forms and discourses of war competing for emotional attention, various 'temporalities' of war – shifting realms of emotional consciousness, which literature fashions, sets moving

and populates with detail. A reader or listener from our period might experience one set of emotional prompts about war through a sermon or saint's life, and others through a romance or *chanson de geste*, just as a modern Australian teenager might react with different emotions to reading Wilfred Owen in senior school, seeing *Dunkirk* at the cinema, and marching wearing his or her great-grandfather's medals on ANZAC Day. However the influences played out, in the medieval and early modern past, as now, literature was a prime 'carrier' of emotions about war, a major force making war available to consciousness as emotional experience.

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- 94 Malory, *Le Morte Darthur*, p. 841.
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- 96 A. Williams, '"Terrible delight": art, violence and power in early eighteenth-century war poems', in S. Downes, A. Lynch and K. O'Loughlin (eds), *Emotions and War: Medieval to Romantic Literature*, London: Palgrave, 2015, pp. 203–17 (p. 205).
- 97 See W.M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

THE CHANGING PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

Javier E. Díaz-Vera

Aims and scope

Over the last decade, we have seen a growing body of research on the history of happiness in Western cultures.¹ Broadly speaking, these studies have focused on the analysis of the profound changes that affected the concept of happiness in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. With the emphasis on subjective well-being, during this period happiness came to be considered a vital pursuit. This view is in clear contrast with the earlier concept of happiness as something unattainable on earth, which we inherited from our medieval ancestors.²

In this chapter, I will pay attention to the evolution of the cultural meanings of happiness in Western Europe from 1100 to 1700. In a difference from the studies on the history of happiness mentioned above, the general framework for this research will be Cognitive Linguistics. More specifically, I will propose here an analysis of some of the different ways happiness was conceptualized throughout this period by speakers of different historical varieties of the English language. My analysis will be based on the reconstruction of the processes of semantic extension (especially metaphor and metonymy) that affected the evolution of the lexical domain of happiness during this period. Thereafter, I will use the resulting semantic diachronic paths in order to detect changes in the cultural models for happiness existing in each historical sub-period (namely Old English (OE), Middle English (ME) and early Modern English (eModE)).

Cultural models and variations

The semantic space of happiness: a cross-cultural approach

In contemporary literature, happiness is described as a universal emotion valued more or less equally across different cultures.³ Not surprisingly, people all over the globe are likely to prefer the desirable over the undesirable and the pleasant over the unpleasant,⁴ but what exactly constitutes ‘happiness’ varies substantially across cultures.⁵ This being the case, considerable cross-cultural variation should be expected in:

- (1) meanings of happiness (i.e. what might constitute happiness),
- (2) motivations underlying happiness (i.e. what people might try to do to achieve happiness), and
- (3) predictors of happiness (i.e. what factors might predict happiness).⁶

Researchers have identified two distinct models of self and well-being, presenting strong evidence that the specific contents of the notions of well-being and happiness vary considerably across cultures.⁷ In a middle-class North American context,

the personal pursuit of happiness and the recognition of this pursuit by the self and others are defining of happiness itself . . . However, in many East Asian cultures, happiness assumes a different subjective form – it is a state that emerges when taking a critical and disciplined stance to the personal self and thus engaging the sympathy of others.⁸

Similarly, these researchers have proposed a contrastive analysis of happiness in two broad groups of cultures: European-American cultures and East Asian cultures. Based on their results, it can be argued that whereas ‘in European-American cultures happiness tends to be defined and experienced as personal achievement, in East Asian cultures it tends to be defined and experienced as a realization of social harmony’.⁹ Uchida and Kitayama analyse folk models of happiness and unhappiness in American and Japanese cultures with very similar results.¹⁰ Within their model of analysis, the two following dimensions of happiness are identified and used to develop a pancultural coding scheme:

- (1) The dimension of valence (horizontal dimension), where the positive, non-positive and negative features of happiness identified by informants from different cultures are represented.
- (2) The dimension of social orientation (vertical dimension), which includes the individual and social features related to happiness in different cultural contexts.

Within the resulting two-dimensional space, a series of clusters of meanings that form the semantic space of happiness can be distinguished. Broadly speaking, these clusters or dimensions indicate the different meanings or nuances attached to happiness in different cultures. Divergences in the relative weight and distribution of these clusters are used as indicators of cross-cultural differences. Their list of meaning clusters is composed of the following items:¹¹

- (1) The ‘positive hedonic experience’ cluster of meaning, which includes positive emotional experiences or states (such as good feelings, comfortable, warm, feeling rewarded).
- (2) The ‘personal achievement’ cluster of meaning, which includes the positive effects that happiness brings to personal domains such as motivations (e.g. happiness makes you try other things, gives meaning to life), optimism (e.g. makes you think positively, hopeful of a bright future), and cognitions (e.g. happiness makes you think positively, makes you witty).

- (3) The 'social harmony' cluster of meaning, which includes the conditions that involve positive interpersonal relational status (e.g. happiness is a state when you are in good relationship with others) and positive interpersonal consequences (e.g. happiness makes you want to help others, share with others).
- (4) The 'transcendental reappraisal' cluster of meaning, which includes transcendental realization (e.g. happiness is ambiguous, happiness is discovered within yourself), nihilism (e.g. happiness does not last) and impersonal definition of happiness (e.g. requires a certain level of income, a state that people want to maintain).
- (5) The 'negative functions' cluster of meaning, which includes the negative consequences for personal domains such as cognition (e.g. happiness makes you irrational, happiness makes it hard to focus) and motivation (e.g. makes you greedy).
- (6) The 'social disruption' cluster of meaning, which includes negative interpersonal consequences of happiness (e.g. relative deprivation, jealousy).

In their 2009 study, Uchida and Kitayama apply these principles to their contrastive study of the folk models of happiness in American and in Japanese cultures with very interesting results. As their study shows, there exist at least three main differences between these two cultures. To start with, in spite of the obvious positive character of happiness, a substantial proportion of features generated by their Japanese informants were either non-positive (transcendental reappraisal) or even negative (negative functions, social disruption). These three meaning clusters are nearly absent from their American data, indicating a much more positive cultural conceptualization of this emotion. Second, whereas the American model of happiness emphasizes the positive feeling state stemming from individual achievement, in Japanese culture happiness is more commonly associated with the realization of social harmony. Third, whereas the socially disruptive features of happiness were clearly identified by Japanese informants, they were very rarely reported by their American counterparts. In sum, Uchida and Kitayama's observations on the valence and social orientation of happiness provide extremely useful insights into the study of cultural models of happiness across cultures and, as will be argued here, across historical periods.

From meaning clusters to conceptual mappings

Within my linguistic approach to the history of emotions, I am especially interested in the reconstruction and description of changes in the conceptualization of happiness. Cognitive linguistics has stressed the importance of conceptual metaphor and metonymy as the two main types of cognitive models through which people comprehend abstract concepts.¹² Both conceptual metaphor and metonymy serve as a means of viewing one concept in terms of another concept, of finding coherence across unrelated events, and of providing conceptual schemata through which humans can understand the objective world.¹³ As Geeraerts puts it, we think about social reality in terms of cultural models.¹⁴ A cultural model is defined as a system of connected ideas about a domain in such a schema which is shared with other members of one's cultural group, and is inherently constituted by conceptual metonymy and conceptual metaphor.¹⁵

Table 23.1 Some frequent happiness metaphors in American English

HAPPY IS UP:	<i>We had to cheer him up.</i>
HAPPINESS IS BEING OFF THE GROUND:	<i>I am six feet off the ground. I was so happy my feet barely touched the ground.</i>
HAPPINESS IS BEING IN HEAVEN:	<i>That was heaven on earth.</i>
HAPPY IS LIGHT:	<i>She brightened up at the news.</i>
HAPPINESS IS VITALITY:	<i>He was alive with joy.</i>
HAPPY IS WARM:	<i>That warmed my spirits.</i>
HAPPINESS IS HEALTH:	<i>It made me feel great.</i>
A HAPPY PERSON IS AN ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL:	<i>He was happy as a pig in shit. He looks like the cat that got the cream.</i>
HAPPINESS IS A PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION:	<i>I was tickled pink.</i>
HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER:	<i>He was overflowing with joy.</i>
HAPPINESS IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL:	<i>His feelings of happiness broke loose. She couldn't hold back her feelings of happiness.</i>
HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE:	<i>He was knocked out! She was overcome by joy.</i>
HAPPINESS IS A RAPTURE/HIGH:	<i>I was drunk with joy.</i>
HAPPINESS IS INSANITY:	<i>They were crazy with happiness.</i>
HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE:	<i>He was swept off his feet</i>
TRYING TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS SEARCHING/HUNTING FOR HAPPINESS:	<i>To reach out towards happiness. To snatch at happiness.</i>
ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS FINDING/CAPTURING SOMETHING:	<i>Happiness seems within reach. She recaptured happiness.</i>
NOT BEING ABLE TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS INABILITY TO REACH SOMETHING:	<i>Choice stands in way of happiness for somebody.</i>
(POTENTIALLY) MAKING SOMEONE HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) GIVING SOMEONE HAPPINESS:	<i>The gift of happiness. To take happiness away from somebody.</i>
(POTENTIALLY) BECOMING HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) RECEIVING HAPPINESS:	<i>Right to happiness. Loss of happiness.</i>
BECOMING HAPPY IS BUYING HAPPINESS:	<i>Happiness is a shopping mall away. To buy one's way to happiness.</i>

For example, the above set of conceptual mappings (Table 23.1) constitutes the American cultural model of happiness, as described by the linguistic Zoltan Kövecses in his study of metaphorical expressions for basic emotions used by American English speakers.¹⁶

What I will argue here is that these linguistic expressions and the conceptual mappings that they illustrate can be used as informants of the relevance of the six meaning clusters defined by Uchida and Kitayama. In doing so, I will also try to confirm, from a linguistic perspective, their hypothesis of the highly personal and positive character of American happiness. As can be seen in Table 23.2 below, most of the conceptual mappings identified by Kövecses point towards the personal hedonic component of happiness (i.e. happiness is having good living conditions): this is the case for LIGHT, VITALITY, WARM, AN ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL and PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION. I have also included in this group the set of conceptual mappings for happiness that are directly related to the primary metaphor GOOD IS UP, namely MOTION UP, OFF THE GROUND and BEING IN HEAVEN. According to Kövecses, these conceptual mappings give happiness an 'upward orientation', making the concept of happiness coherent with other very positive concepts (such as light, virtue and control) and conferring on it a highly positive evaluation.¹⁷ The metaphors

that employ these concepts highlight the sensation of well-being (either physical or mental) that normally accompanies happiness. This concentration of conceptual mappings for happiness in the positive states area of the semantic space for this emotion is highly coherent with characterizations of Americans as ‘regarding happiness nearly exclusively in terms of positive hedonic experiences’.¹⁸

The metaphor *HAPPINESS IS HEALTH* highlights the personal achievement cluster of happiness, insofar as it makes the person experiencing happiness think more positively and feel more able to cope with the problems of life. The three mappings included under the *QUEST* model (i.e. moving towards an entity or location in order to experience an emotion, as in *TRYING TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS SEARCHING/HUNTING FOR HAPPINESS*, *ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS FINDING/CAPTURING SOMETHING*),¹⁹ and *NOT BEING ABLE TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS INABILITY TO REACH SOMETHING*),¹⁹ can also be aligned to the goal accomplishment feature (e.g. getting what one wants) in the cluster of personal achievement. Based on these three mappings, ‘happiness is an end result of personal pursuit, which in turn is grounded in personal goals and aspirations’.²⁰ Similarly, two of the conceptual mappings illustrating the *TRANSFER* model (i.e. receiving an emotion from somebody else, as in *(POTENTIALLY) MAKING SOMEONE HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) GIVING SOMEONE HAPPINESS* and *(POTENTIALLY) BECOMING HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) RECEIVING HAPPINESS*),²¹ represent happiness as a *TRANSFERABLE OBJECT* that can be granted, received, exchanged, shared or even stolen. These metaphorical mappings could be taken as indicators of a conceptualization of happiness as a factor of social harmony (social sharing of happiness). However, based on the examples provided by Stefanowitsch, it might be argued that speakers of American English place a lower emphasis on the reciprocal experiencing of this emotion than on its actual individual achievement.²² Happiness, in fact, is frequently construed as a *COMMODITY* that exists in limited amounts (so that giving a part of your own happiness to somebody else might imply a decrease in your amount of personal happiness). This view is strengthened by the relatively high proportion of examples of the metaphor *BECOMING HAPPY IS BUYING HAPPINESS* in the corpus of American English used by Stefanowitsch, which clearly implies the acquisition of happiness (or an amount of it) for personal purposes through a *COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION*.²³

As for the cluster of negative functions described above, some of the mappings listed above are characterized by the presence of an element of ‘loss of control’: this

Table 23.2 The American cultural model of happiness: from meaning clusters to conceptual metaphors

<i>Meaning cluster</i>	<i>HAPPINESS IS</i>
<i>Positive hedonic experience</i>	LIGHT, VITALITY, WARM, AN ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL, PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION, MOTION UP, BEING OFF THE GROUND, BEING IN HEAVEN
<i>Personal achievement</i>	HEALTH, QUEST, COMMODITY, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION
<i>Social harmony</i>	—
<i>Transcendental reappraisal</i>	—
<i>Negative functions</i>	FLUID IN A CONTAINER, CAPTIVE ANIMAL, OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE, RAPTURE/HIGH, INSANITY, NATURAL FORCE
<i>Social disruption</i>	—

is the case of FLUID IN A CONTAINER, CAPTIVE ANIMAL, OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE, RAPTURE/HIGH, INSANITY and NATURAL FORCE, all of which are frequently found in expressions of very intense emotions, both positive and negative.²⁴ In my view, these metaphors highlight the cluster of negative functions described by Uchida and Kitayama, where the personal negative consequences of happiness are included. As clearly shown by their study, in spite of their very peripheral position in the American model for this emotion, these negative features of happiness are not completely absent from the United States data.

Very interestingly, none of the happiness metaphors in American English included in Kövecses's (2000) and Stefanowitsch's (2004, 2006) lists highlight the social aspects (either positive or negative) of this emotional experience.²⁵ Based on these conceptual mappings, American happiness is presented as predominantly positive and personal, which confirms earlier experimental studies on cultural folk models of happiness across cultures.

Towards a history of happiness: methodology and aims of this study

Differences in the ways in which emotions are construed by people from different cultures are grounded in historical processes of ideological change and, especially, in religious ideas, which play a prominent role in the historical process of development of variation patterns in emotional experience. For example, the spread of Christianity to Northern Europe (eighth–eleventh centuries CE) implied a radical change in the way emotions such as shame and guilt were construed in that cultural area. As demonstrated by Díaz-Vera and Manrique-Antón on the basis of textual and visual data, whereas shame was conceived of as a social, public process in pre-Christian England and Scandinavia (where public punishment was frequently used as a powerful instrument of social control), the new cultural and social environment introduced with Christianization implied a progressive subjectification and individualization of this emotion.²⁶

Using verbal and visual data, in my earlier studies of fear, anger, shame and grief I have proposed reconstructions of some of the ways these negative emotions were construed in different historical periods and cultural contexts.²⁷ Broadly speaking, the evolution of these folk cultural models indicates a sociohistorical change towards the individualization of emotions, the kind of shift that would correspond with a slow transition towards the individual self-awareness that is traditionally attributed to the post-medieval period.

In this chapter, I am interested in the analysis of the evolution of Western cultural models of happiness from the medieval period until 1700. The data used for my study consists of a series of textual data, as well as historical dictionaries and thesauruses. I will pay special attention to the semantic evolution of a series of Old and Middle English key terms for happiness, including not only general terms but also more specific ones. Parallel data on words for happiness used in other Germanic and Romance languages during this period will also be used in this research. My interest in the analysis and description of the diachronic evolution of happiness words and expressions is threefold. To start with, and taking the vocabulary of Old and Middle English as my main focus of attention, I would like to reconstruct some of the different ways medieval authors talked about happiness in their texts. I am especially

interested in the identification and analysis of historical processes of semantic extension (such as metaphor and metonymy) and in the reconstruction of their consequences on the English vocabulary.

Second, I am interested in the description of some of the folk conceptualizations of happiness revealed by these words and expressions. Through the fine-grained analysis of happiness-related lexical networks and their manifestations, I will try to illustrate here some of the different ways authors across this period thought about this particular emotion.

Third, it will be my intention to explain some of the different ways in which happiness has changed over time. The evolution of the linguistic expressions under scrutiny here, I will argue in this research, are illustrative not only of the lexical and semantic history of the language itself, but also of the changes in the way the corresponding emotional experiences are felt by the community of speakers.

I believe that this research raises several important issues related to the study of the history of emotions in general, and of happiness in particular. I am especially interested in the study of the role of culture and its relation to figurative language. Traditionally, studies on the language of emotions have described figurative expressions as reflecting universally valid physiological processes. Since the focus has been on finding illustrations of similar metaphoric and metonymic mappings in as many different languages as possible, the study of the social and historical factors behind these expressions has been frequently neglected. Within the variationist approach proposed here, I will try to analyse how, in language history, new happiness expressions have been created by speakers, whereas old happiness expressions have fallen into disuse. In many cases, the new linguistic expressions represent completely new conceptual mappings between happiness and a variety of source fields, indicating changes in the way this emotion is conceptualized by speakers. These conceptual changes, I will argue here, are to be related to such social factors as cultural contact, scientific and technological innovation and social change, as well as to the subsequent processes of change in artefacts, customs, habits and beliefs.

Data

Old English HAPPINESS

According to the *Thesaurus of Old English* and the other Old English dictionaries used for this research, by the time of the Norman Conquest of England (1066) there existed at least 23 different nouns meaning ‘happiness’, most of which continued to be used in the English spoken during the Norman period.²⁸ Broadly speaking, these nouns can be classified into 15 expressions, and these expressions can be further classified into nine etymological themes. One of these etymological themes corresponds to literal expressions: that is, Old English happiness words derived from Proto-Indo-European or Proto-Germanic words meaning happiness, as in the case of OE *bliss*, OE *fēa* and OE *fægennes*. With more than 900 occurrences in the corpus, OE *bliss* is undoubtedly the most central happiness expression in the vocabulary of Old English. Derived from a Proto-Germanic root meaning ‘joy, kindness’, OE *bliss* covers the entire semantic space of happiness (worldly bliss, spiritual bliss, celebration of bliss, causes of bliss, etc.). Furthermore, this root shows the highest degree of

morphological productivity in the Anglo-Saxon vocabulary of happiness, confirming its high degree of prototypicality within this category.²⁹

The list of metonymic happiness expressions consists of six different etymological themes, namely HAPPINESS IS ENTERTAINMENT (MUSIC), HAPPINESS IS PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION, HAPPINESS IS KINDNESS, HAPPINESS IS PROSPERITY, HAPPINESS IS GOOD LUCK and HAPPINESS IS (JOYOUS) SOUND. As these etymological themes indicate, speakers of Old English tended to conceptualize happiness in terms of some of its causes or, less frequently, of its most typical psychosomatic reactions. In the second half of the twelfth century (notes to the Old English version of the *Heptateuch*; British Library, Cotton MS Claudius B. IV), the new metonymic mapping HAPPINESS IS BEING IN HEAVEN is added to this list of motifs of happiness with the introduction in the vocabulary of English of the noun OE *ēstnes* (derived from OE *ēst* ‘grace of God’) to render the traditional etymology of the Hebrew name for Eden. Based on this PLACE-FOR-EVENT metonymy, happiness is conceptualized in terms of the place where it actually resides according to scriptural authority. In spite of the very low relative weight of this mapping (one single occurrence in the corpus), it is important to note here that this is the earliest illustration of the lexicalization of the conceptual connection between happiness and the Christian idea of paradise in Old English (a connection widely exploited in later stages of the history of the English language).

Finally, the theme HAPPINESS IS LIGHT (as illustrated by OE *glæd*) could be considered either metonymic (‘light produces happiness’) or metaphoric (‘a happy person shines’). In any of the two cases, this mapping highlights the positive evaluation of happiness and its role as a vital source of personal well-being.

As shown by these etymological themes (Table 23.3), happiness is the prototypical positive emotion. Not surprisingly, numerous other languages have also derived new nouns for happiness from already existing words meaning such things as pleasure, prosperity or good fortune. However, some of the nouns listed above developed negative senses in Old English. For example, whereas Anglo-Saxon dictionaries include the meanings ‘frenzy, delirium’ for OE *dream* (illustrating the mapping HAPPINESS IS INSANITY), the lexical entries for OE *bliss*, *gamen* and *glīw* include ‘derision, mockery’ as secondary senses (as in HAPPINESS IS AGGRESSIVE SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR).

Table 23.3 Literal and figurative happiness expressions in Old English (before 1200)

THEME	OE expression	Semantics	N°	Sub-total
POSITIVE EMOTION	<i>bliss, fēa, fægennes</i>	literal	1658	1658
ENTERTAINMENT (MUSIC)	<i>dream, gamen, glīw, myrignes</i>	metonymy	416	
PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION	<i>wynn</i>	metonymy	102	
KINDNESS	<i>liss, bliss</i>	metonymy	40	
GOOD LUCK	<i>gesælignes, sǣlp</i>	metonymy	36	
PROSPERITY	<i>ēad</i>	metonymy	28	
(JOYOUS) SOUND	<i>rēot</i>	metonymy	5	
BEING IN HEAVEN	<i>ēstnes</i>	metonymy	1	638
LIGHT	<i>glæd</i>	metaphor	80	80

Table 23.4 The Old English cultural model of happiness

Meaning cluster	HAPPINESS IS
<i>Positive hedonic experience</i>	ENTERTAINMENT (MUSIC), PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION, (JOYOUS) SOUND, LIGHT
<i>Personal achievement</i>	BEING IN HEAVEN
<i>Social harmony</i>	KINDNESS
<i>Transcendental reappraisal</i>	PROSPERITY, GOOD LUCK
<i>Negative functions</i>	INSANITY
<i>Social disruption</i>	AGGRESSIVE SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

In Table 23.4 I propose a re-arrangement of these conceptual mappings into meaning clusters. As can be seen here, Old English happiness is both personal (positive hedonic experience, personal achievement) and social (social harmony, social disruption). Furthermore, Old English happiness appears as positive (positive hedonic experience, personal achievement, social harmony), non-positive (transcendental reappraisal) and even negative (negative functions, social disruption).

In terms of the social features of happiness, Old English happiness metaphors clearly indicate that happiness contributes to the development of desirable social traits and propensities (such as being kind to others) but, at the same time, it can be a source of socially negative behaviours (such as mockery and derision). Furthermore, the Old English expressions described above tend to highlight the transcendental reappraisal component of happiness in Anglo-Saxon culture. Broadly speaking, happiness is paralleled to earthly possessions (as in HAPPINESS IS PROSPERITY) and to fortune (as in HAPPINESS IS GOOD LUCK), both of which share in common a pessimistic conceptualization of happiness as something that does not last long. This idea is further reinforced by the use of such verbs as OE *hrēosan* ‘to perish’ with reference to happiness. Boethius’s *Consolation of Philosophy* illustrates very clearly the relevance of this transcendental reappraisal element of happiness in medieval Christian thought. This treatise, written in 523 CE and translated into Old English by King Alfred nearly five centuries later, assumes that earthly happiness is nothing but an illusion that should be avoided (‘Fortune deceives all her followers’); it is fragile and perishable, elusive and difficult to identify:

- (1) *Hu ne is þe nu genoh sweotole gesæd þ[æt] sio wyrd þe ne mæg nane gesælða sellan? forþæmþe ægþer is unfæst, ge seo wyrd ge seo gesælð; forþam sint swiðe tedre & swidre hreosende þas gesælþa.*

(Is it now clearly enough proved to you that fortune cannot give you any happiness? Because both fortune and happiness are insecure, for these goods are fragile and very perishable.) (Bo 11.25.30)³⁰

This is in clear contrast with the scriptural understanding of true happiness (as represented by the metonymy HAPPINESS IS BEING IN HEAVEN) described by Boethius, according to which this emotional experience is not to be sought in the external world but within oneself:

- (2) *Hwý sece ge þone ymbutan eow þa gesælða þe ge ninnan iow habbað þurh þa godcundan mieht geset? Ac ge nyton hwæt ge doo ge sint on gedwolan.*

(Why then do you look around you for happiness, which has been placed within yourself by the divine power? But you do not know what to do, you are in error.) (Bo 11.25.15)³¹

According to this view, heavenly happiness is construed as a vital goal, a personal achievement that is capable of filling life with such positive feelings as hope, motivation and optimism. In the next section, I will analyse the most important changes that affected the Anglo-Saxon cultural model of happiness inherited by speakers of Middle English (1200–1500). Following the same methodology sketched for the analysis of the Old English data, I will use a variety of lexicographic data in order to reconstruct these conceptual changes, as illustrated by the Middle English vocabulary.

Middle English HAPPINESS

The information provided by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) and the *Middle English Dictionary* (MED) indicates that, whereas only three of the happiness nouns included in Table 23.3 disappeared from the English language, a wide set of new expressions entered this semantic field. Broadly speaking, whereas some of the new nouns are French or Latin borrowings, some others are the result of a series of semantic extensions from other domains that affected the vocabulary inherited from Old English (or via Old Norse). The new set of literal expressions of happiness includes two words inherited from the preceding period, i.e. ME *bliss* (from OE *bliss*) and ME *fainnesse* (from OE *fægennes*). However, whereas the number of occurrences of ME *fainnesse* decreased dramatically during this period, ME *bliss* underwent a process of semantic specialization from ‘general happiness’ to ‘heavenly happiness’, i.e. the beatitude of the blessed in heaven. As will be seen later, as a consequence of this semantic change speakers of Middle English developed new lexical units for the general expression of this emotion, namely ME *happiness*. Furthermore, the new concept HAPPINESS (BEING BLESSED) illustrated by ME *bliss* favoured the introduction of new borrowings from Old French for the expression of this religious concept, such as ME *beatitude*, ME *benediccioun*, ME *benisouns* (both of which are used to refer to the blessing given by God).

To these literal expressions of happiness were added during the Middle English period several Romance nouns, such as ME *beneurte*, ME *delectacioun*, ME *iocunditē*, ME *joie* and ME *jolinesse*. Whereas most of these words are used in very few texts and disappeared from English very soon (for example ME *beneurte*, with one single occurrence dating back to *c.* 1475), some others (for example ME *joie*) became central elements within this lexical category.

As for the figurative expressions of happiness, in spite of the profound lexical changes that affected the vocabulary of English during this period, all the mappings indicated in Table 23.1 were preserved in the Middle English conceptualization of happiness. For example, the four Old English nouns that illustrated the metonymy HAPPINESS IS ENTERTAINMENT (MUSIC) maintained their two meanings, the literal entertainment meaning and the figurative happiness meaning, in ME *drēm*, ME *game*, ME *glē* and ME *mirinesse*. A new noun, ME *gal* (from OE *galan* ‘to sing’) was added to this list during the thirteenth century (the first recorded occurrence of the happiness sense dates back to *c.* 1275). It should be mentioned here that two of these

nouns, ME *game*, ME *glē*, preserved the secondary meaning ‘derision, mockery’ that they had developed during the Old English period (which, as in the previous case, is an indicator of the social disruption feature).

The mapping HAPPINESS IS A PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION is illustrated by the noun ME *win* (from OE *wynn*), to which three new nouns were added: ME *liking* (derived from OE *licung* ‘pleasure, gratification’), ME *lust* (derived from OE *lust* ‘pleasure, desire’) and ME *pleausaunce* (from OF *plaisance* ‘pleasure, delight’). As these three words indicate, the conceptual connection between happiness and sensuous desire was strongly reinforced during the Middle English period.

The mapping HAPPINESS IS KINDNESS is represented by ME *lisse* (from OE *liss*). Similarly, the two Old English nouns illustrating the mapping HAPPINESS IS GOOD LUCK were also preserved in Middle English. However, whereas ME *selinesse* (from OE *gesælignes*) lost its original meaning ‘good fortune’ and kept its happiness meaning until c. 1483, ME *selth* (from OE *sælp*) preserved both meanings until c. 1425. At the same time as these processes of lexical loss were taking place, speakers of Middle English created a new expression on the basis of the Old Norse borrowing ME *hap* ‘fortune’ and its derivative ModE *happiness* ‘good fortune, luck in life’, which started to be used with the meaning ‘happiness’ by the end of the sixteenth century (the first recorded occurrence of this sense dating from 1591) and soon became the most central member within this category.

In the case of the metonymy HAPPINESS IS PROSPERITY, the noun OE *ēadnis* (ME *eadnesse* ‘happiness, luxury’) and its derivatives were in use until the thirteenth century. It is precisely during this same period that two new nouns illustrating the conceptual link between happiness and richness entered the vocabulary of Middle English: ME *wele* (from OE *wela* ‘wealth, riches, possessions’) and its derivation ME *welthe* ‘happiness, prosperity’. The French borrowing ME *felicite* (meaning both ‘happiness’ and ‘prosperity’) joined this set of nouns by the end of the fourteenth century (first recorded use c. 1386). Finally, the mapping HAPPINESS IS A (JOYOUS) SOUND is represented in Middle English by the nouns ME *jolifté* (from OF *jolivete* ‘festivity, merry-making’, used in Middle English texts from the fourteenth century onwards to refer to the condition of being happy) and ME *revel* (from OF *revel* ‘rebellion, tumult, noisy mirth’, recorded by the end of the fourteenth century with the meaning ‘happiness’).

The two happiness metaphors included in Table 23.1 were also maintained in Middle English. Based on the growing number of lexical units that illustrated these metaphorical mappings, it can be assumed that the relative weight of these figurative expressions increased rapidly during this period. To start with, the metaphor HAPPINESS IS LIGHT is represented in the vocabulary of Middle English by the noun ME *gladnesse* (from OE *glæd*), which preserved its two meanings ‘happiness’ and ‘brightness’ (this second sense, however, is recorded only until after 1425). Another Old English light noun, OE *liht*, underwent a process of semantic extension from ‘light’ to ‘happiness’ during the Middle English period (the three single examples of the ‘happiness’ sense quoted in the MED date back to the fifteenth century). In a similar fashion, ME *lightnesse* is metaphorically used to indicate ‘happiness’ in two different medieval texts (fourteenth and fifteenth centuries).

The Anglo-Saxon PLACE-FOR-EVENT metonymy HAPPINESS IS BEING IN HEAVEN is represented in the corpus of Middle English texts by the noun ME *Eden* (first recorded occurrence after 1225), figuratively used in Middle English in order to

refer to a state of supreme happiness (in substitution of the lexical unit OE *ēstnes* referred to above). The resulting cultural model of heaven (up) and hell (down) is parallel to the orientational metaphors GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN, on the basis of which a wide variety of emotional experiences began to be expressed in terms of this polar opposition. The general metaphor HAPPINESS IS UP is represented by the lexical units ME *heighnesse* (HAPPINESS IS HIGH; one single occurrence of the ‘happiness’ meaning, dating after 1400), ME *loft* (HAPPINESS IS BEING OFF THE GROUND; in the phrase ME *on loft* ‘in heaven’) and the adverb ME *up*, frequently used in order to express metaphorical upward motion (to a happier or better state, as in HAPPINESS IS MOVING UPWARDS). However, in a difference from American English, these Middle English expressions can also connote such negative emotions as pride and arrogance, so that these medieval metaphors have both positive and negative values.³²

Besides the conceptual mappings inherited from Old English, the Middle English conceptualization of happiness was further enriched through the introduction and development of three more figurative expressions, all of which make reference to some of the causes of happiness in medieval society. The mapping HAPPINESS IS HAVING COURAGE is represented by the noun ME *belde* (from OE *byldu* ‘boldness’) which, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, developed a secondary meaning ‘comfort’ (and, hence, ‘happiness’). HAPPINESS IS HIGH SOCIAL RANK is illustrated by two Old French borrowings, namely ME *honour* (several occurrences of the ‘happiness’ sense in fifteenth-century texts) and ME *realte* (one occurrence from after 1500). Finally, the mapping HAPPINESS IS GOOD HEALTH is represented by ME *bote* (from OE *bōt* ‘relief, deliverance from physical hardship’), ME *hele* (from OE *hælu* ‘health, safety, salvation’) and ME *helthe* (from OE *hælp* ‘health, healing, cure’).

Table 23.5 summarizes these Middle English findings. As can be seen here, the structure of the concept of happiness in Middle English is relatively similar to the previous one. Broadly speaking, most of the figurative themes identified in the corpus of Old English were preserved well into the Middle English period. Furthermore, the number of lexical units illustrating each theme increased thanks to the introduction of new lexical units (either imports from French or Latin, or through processes of word formation). In either case, they demonstrate ongoing changes in this particular area of the core vocabulary of English.

Only two of the conceptual mappings described in the analysis of the vocabulary of Old English are missing from this list, namely KINDNESS and INSANITY. Interestingly, these are the three conceptual mappings that fit the definitions of the meaning clusters of, respectively, social harmony and negative functions. The resulting semantic space for happiness in Middle English is nearly entirely covered by individual features (positive hedonic experience, personal achievement, transcendental reappraisal), with a clear prevalence of positive features (positive hedonic experience and personal achievement) and, to a lesser extent, of non-positive (transcendental reappraisal) and negative features (social disruption). Based on this cultural construal of this emotion, it can be assumed that speakers of Middle English tended to conceptualize happiness as personally positive, albeit socially negative.

Of special interest for this study is the increase in the number of conceptual metaphors indicating features for personal achievement (see Table 23.6). The most important change in this regard is the process of semantic specialization undergone

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Table 23.5 Literal and figurative happiness expressions in Middle English (1200–1500)

<i>HAPPINESS IS</i>	<i>ME examples</i>
POSITIVE EMOTION	<i>beneurte, delectacioun, fainnesse, iocunditē, joie, jolinesse</i>
BEING BLESSED	<i>beatitude, benediccioun, benisouns, bliss</i>
ENTERTAINMENT (MUSIC)	<i>drēm, gal, game,, glē, mirinesse</i>
PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION	<i>liking, lisse, lust, pleausance, win</i>
GOOD LUCK	<i>selinesse, selth</i>
PROSPERITY	<i>eadnesse, felicitē, wele, welthe</i>
(JOYOUS) SOUND	<i>jolifté, revel</i>
LIGHT	<i>gladnesse, light, lightnesse</i>
MOTION UP	<i>up</i>
HIGH	<i>heighnesse</i>
BEING OFF THE GROUND	<i>loft</i>
BEING IN HEAVEN	<i>Eden</i>
HAVING COURAGE	<i>belde</i>
HIGH SOCIAL RANK	<i>honour, realté</i>
HEALTH	<i>bote, hele, helthe</i>
AGGRESSIVE SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR	<i>game, glē</i>

Table 23.6 The Middle English cultural model of happiness

<i>Meaning cluster</i>	<i>HAPPINESS IS</i>
<i>Positive hedonic experience</i>	ENTERTAINMENT (MUSIC), PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION, (JOYOUS) SOUND, LIGHT, MOTION UP, BEING OFF THE GROUND, HIGH
<i>Personal achievement</i>	BEING IN HEAVEN, BEING BLESSED, HEALTH, HAVING COURAGE, SOCIAL RANK
<i>Social harmony</i>	–
<i>Transcendental reappraisal</i>	PROSPERITY, GOOD LUCK
<i>Negative functions</i>	–
<i>Social disruption</i>	MOCKERY, PRIDE/ARROGANCE

by ME *bliss* (from ‘general happiness’ to ‘heavenly happiness’), a change frequently related to its phonological similitude with ME *bless* ‘divine favour’. As pointed out by Kövecses, the concept HAPPINESS (BEING BLESSED) clearly illustrates the Christian idea of happiness as a future goal or reward, to be achieved in eternal life:

The structure of the concept of happiness in the New Testament is very different from that of the previous ones. One can be blessed/happy now if we possess certain features now (‘those who have certain features X now are blessed/happy’). That is to say, to be blessed/happy requires the fulfilment of a set of preconditions. In addition, the source or cause of people’s happiness derives from certain future rewards (‘because they will receive rewards Y later on’). In this model, the cause follows the resulting state (of happiness) in time, whereas in all the other cases the cause precedes the state (of happiness).³³

Compared to present-day English, the Middle English concept of happiness is proleptic in nature: it is a happiness that takes place in the future, although the expectation for this heavenly reward is in itself an enjoyable experience (the ‘happiness of hope’, in Augustine’s words). Furthermore, heavenly happiness is entire and eternal, endless and complete.

Whereas the mapping HAPPINESS (BEING BLESSED) clearly refers to the ultimate happiness through the union with God, there existed in Middle English other conceptual metaphors that identified some of the ‘goods’ required to achieve worldly happiness. These goods include such things as virtue (as in HAVING COURAGE), recognition (as in SOCIAL RANK) and a general state of well-being (as in HEALTH). The medieval English cultural model reconstructed here shows, in sum, that transcendental happiness and earthly joy are harmonious parts of the holistic Christian vision of happiness described by medieval philosophers and theologians.³⁴

Modern English HAPPINESS

The early Modern English period (1500–1700) is frequently described as a period of very fast growth in the vocabulary of English, in absolute figures as well as in proportion to the total.³⁵ However, in spite of the lexical vitality that characterizes this historical stage, the vocabulary of happiness did not increase during this period. Quite to the contrary, many of the lexical units inherited from earlier periods fell into disuse, a process that had started already in medieval England. About 50 per cent of the happiness nouns listed in Table 23.5 above lost their happiness meaning between 1200 and 1700. Here are some examples (dates in brackets indicate the last recorded occurrence of the happiness sense, as described in the lexicographic tools used for this research):

eadness (c. 1200)

dream (c. 1205)

gale (c. 1315)

liss (1393)

highness (after 1400)

selth (c. 1425)

win (c. 1425)

boot (c. 1430)

light, lightness (after 1450)

aloft (c. 1450)

belde (c. 1450)

seeliness (c. 1470)

beneurte (c. 1475)

game (after 1500)*liking* (1548)*game* (1560)*glee* (after 1568)*wealth* (1596)*well* (c. 1600)*lust* (1607)

In some other cases, the literal meaning of a word was lost, so that the figurative meaning became a literal expression of happiness. For example, ME *meri* ‘merry’ and its derivations (such as ME *mirinesse*) lost their original meaning ‘pleasant sound, music’ in favour of the historically later happiness sense. Similarly, the ‘bright’ meaning of ME *gladnesse* is not recorded in early Modern English texts.

According to the *Historical Thesaurus of English*, only three new nouns meaning happiness entered the vocabulary of English between 1500 and 1700. One of these units, eModE *glee*, has been erroneously included in this list (as can be seen from Tables 23.3 and 23.5).³⁶ A second happiness word introduced during this period, eModE *faustity* (1656/81), is derived from the adjective Latin (L) *faustus* ‘fortunate, favourable, lucky’ (eModE *faust* ‘happy, lucky’ 1692–1732). In the same way as many other Latinisms used by seventeenth-century English authors, the number of occurrences of eModE *faustity* is very small and textually limited; furthermore, the lifespan of this noun was very short (last recorded occurrence from 1729). The third happiness noun listed in the thesaurus is eModE *happiness*, derived from ME *hap* ‘chance, fortune’. As has been said above, whereas the first recorded occurrence of the word happiness (meaning ‘good fortune or luck in life’) dates back to 1530, the first recorded occurrence of the figurative happiness meaning (i.e. ‘the state of pleasurable content of mind’) corresponds to 1591, indicating that the semantic shift from ‘good luck’ to ‘happiness’ was very fast.

The cultural model of happiness that emerges from the rearrangement of these conceptual mappings suggests that speakers of early Modern English conceptualized happiness as a personal emotion. The clusters of social harmony (positive social consequences of happiness) and social disruption (negative social consequences of

Table 23.7 Literal and figurative happiness expressions in early Modern English (1500–1700)

HAPPINESS IS	eModE examples
POSITIVE EMOTION	<i>delectation, fainness, jocundity, joy, jolliness, merriness, gladness</i>
BEING BLESSED	<i>beatitude, benediction, benison, bliss</i>
PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION	<i>pleasance</i>
GOOD LUCK	<i>happiness, felicity</i>
(JOYOUS) SOUND	<i>jollity, revel</i>
MOTION UP	<i>up</i>
BEING IN HEAVEN	<i>Eden, Paradise, heaven</i>

Table 23.8 The early Modern English cultural model of happiness

<i>Meaning cluster</i>	<i>HAPPINESS IS</i>
<i>Positive hedonic experience</i>	PLEASURABLE PHYSICAL SENSATION, (JOYOUS) SOUND, MOTION UP
<i>Personal achievement</i>	BEING IN HEAVEN, BEING BLESSED
<i>Social harmony</i>	–
<i>Transcendental reappraisal</i>	GOOD LUCK
<i>Negative functions</i>	–
<i>Social disruption</i>	–

happiness) are completely empty, in so far as none of the happiness nouns used during this period highlights any of these features. Similarly, none of these nouns refers to the potential negative personal consequences of happiness, since the connection between happiness and mockery was lost as a consequence of the semantic changes that affected eModE *game* and eModE *gale*. In sum, the early Modern English lexical evidence used here clearly suggests that happiness was considered strongly personal and positive.

As can be seen here, the meaning cluster of personal achievement is occupied by the metonymic mappings BEING IN HEAVEN and BEING BLESSED. Based on these changes, it can be assumed here that PLACE-FOR-EVENT metonymy represented by the Middle English expression HAPPINESS IS BEING IN HEAVEN was reinterpreted as a metaphor, following the well-known model EMOTIONS ARE LOCATIONS, so that figuratively BEING IN HEAVEN became an expression of worldly happiness. The development of this new metaphorical expression was undoubtedly favoured by the existence in English of the orientational metaphors HAPPINESS IS UP and HAPPINESS IS BEING OFF THE GROUND. Within this interpretation of the mapping HAPPINESS IS BEING IN HEAVEN, happiness is construed as a hedonic experience (e.g. feeling well in a place), much closer to the meaning cluster of positive experience than to the personal achievement feature (see Table 23.2 above).

Concluding remarks

This diachronic analysis of the lexical domain of happiness across different periods in the history of the English language has shown that in Old English (and, to a lesser extent, Middle English) happiness entailed a series of social functions (both positive and negative) that have been lost in later cultural models for this emotion. For example, being kind to others was an important source of happiness (as demonstrated by the recurring aspect of the semantic path KINDNESS > HAPPINESS), which produced not only personal well-being but also increased social harmony. Similarly, the personal pleasure that could be derived from deriding others (as in the semantic path MOCKERY > HAPPINESS) contributed to decreasing the level of social harmony. Medieval happiness, in fact, is highly ambivalent, and its potential negative consequences can affect not only social groups but also individuals experiencing this emotion (as in INSANITY > HAPPINESS).

During the Middle English period (1200–1500), the idea of heavenly happiness as a future reward for earthly virtue was accompanied by new types of personal achievements, based on which earthly happiness could be enjoyed through such things as

good health, courage or social rank. However, the socially negative effects of this type of happiness were emphasized through the development of the new conceptual mapping PRIDE/ARROGANCE IS HAPPINESS (i.e. the public enjoyment of earthly achievements is a potential source of social disruption).

Finally, the early Modern English period (1500–1700) will see an important series of religious changes in England (traditionally known as the English Reformation). These changes suggest new conceptualizations of the afterlife and of the heaven and hell dichotomy inherited from Christian tradition. A more complete understanding of this process requires further work on such things as the origin and later development of the QUEST and the TRANSFER models for happiness, with special attention to its evolution in North American varieties of English. With its emphasis on the pursuit of happiness, the United States Declaration of Independence (1776) represents the most famous example of this cultural process, through which happiness was construed as a DESIRED OBJECT that moves away from us (the pursuers) while we try to pursue it.³⁷

From a methodological point of view, in this research I have shown that conceptual metaphors and metonymies are a valid tool for the analysis of cultural models. One very important advantage of the usage of this cognitive linguistic approach used here is related to the fact that it permits insights into the cultural evolution of emotions, in spite of the more than obvious lack of living speakers. By combining this linguistic approach with some of the basic principles developed by cultural psychologists in their experimental studies of contemporary emotions (Uchida and Kitayama; Choi, Kim and Uchida),³⁸ I have tried to compensate for the shortcomings of historical research and investigation.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

- 1 See, for example, N.P. White, *A Brief History of Happiness*, London: Blackwell, 2006; D.M. McMahon, *Happiness: A History*, New York: Grove Press, 2006; P.N. Stearns, 'The history of happiness', *Harvard Business Review* 90:1–2, January–February 2012, 104–9; S. Oishi, J. Graham, S. Kesebir and I. Costa Galhina, 'Concepts of happiness across time and cultures', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 39:5, 2013, 559–77; R. Veenhoven, 'Happiness: history of a concept', in J. Wright (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd edn, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2015, pp. 521–5.
- 2 D. Appleby, "'Bodily need is a kind of speech": human dignity and bodily necessity according to Bernard of Clairvaux', in J.P. Bequette (ed.), *A Companion to Medieval Christian Humanism: Essays on Principal Thinkers*, Leiden: Brill, 2016, pp. 122–41 (p. 130).
- 3 See, for example, R.M. Ryan, K.M. Sheldon, T. Kasser and E.L. Deci, 'All goals are not created equal: an organismic perspective on the nature of goals and their regulation', in P.M. Gollwitzer and J.A. Bargh (eds), *The Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to Behavior*, New York: Guilford Press, 1996, pp. 7–26; C.D. Ryff and C.L.M. Keyes, 'The structure of psychological well-being revisited', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 69, 1995, 719–727; Stearns, 'The history of happiness'; R. Veenhoven, 'Does happiness differ across cultures?', in H. Selin and G. Davey (eds), *Happiness across Cultures: Views of Happiness and Quality of Life in non-Western Cultures*, London: Springer, 2012, pp. 451–72.

- 4 E.M. Diener and C. Diener, 'Factors predicting the subjective well-being of nations', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 69, 1995, 851–64.
- 5 E.M. Diener and E. Suh (eds), *Cultural and Subjective Well-Being*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000; S. Kitayama and H.R. Markus, 'Yin and yang of the Japanese self: the cultural psychology of personality coherence', in D. Cervone and Y. Shoda (eds), *The Coherence of Personality: Social Cognitive Bases of Personality Consistency, Variability, and Organization*, New York: Guilford Press, 2000, pp. 242–302.
- 6 For an in-depth analysis of these three factors, see Y. Uchida, V. Norasakkunkit and S. Kitayama, 'Cultural constructions of happiness: theory and empirical evidence', *Journal of Happiness Studies* 5, 2004, 223–38.
- 7 S. Kitayama and H.R. Markus, 'The pursuit of happiness and the realization of sympathy: cultural patterns of self, social relations, and well-being', in E. Diener and E. M. Suh (eds), *Cultural and Subjective Well-Being*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, 113–61.
- 8 Kitayama and Markus, 'The pursuit of happiness', pp. 113–14.
- 9 Uchida, Norasakkunkit and Kitayama, 'Cultural constructions of happiness', p. 234.
- 10 Y. Uchida and S. Kitayama, 'Happiness and unhappiness in East and West', *Emotion* 9:4, 2009, 441–56.
- 11 E. Choi, Y. Y. Kim and Y. Uchida, 'The folk psychology of happiness in Korea', *Korean Journal of Culture and Social Issues* 22:2, 2016, 173–4.
- 12 See R. Gibbs, *The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language and Understanding*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; R. Gibbs, 'Metaphor interpretation as embodied simulation', *Mind and Language* 21:3, 2006, 434–58; Z. Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; G. Lakoff and M. Turner, *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1989.
- 13 See G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980; G. Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- 14 D. Geeraerts, 'Cultural models of linguistic standardization', in R. Dirven, R. Frank and M. Pütz (eds), *Cognitive Models in Language and Thought: Ideology, Metaphors and Meaning*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003, pp. 25–68.
- 15 See Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*; Z. Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- 16 This list is based on the studies on happiness expressions proposed by Kövecses, *Metaphor and Emotion*, pp. 24–5; and A. Stefanowitsch, 'Words and their metaphors: a corpus-based approach', in A. Stefanowitsch and S. Gries (eds), *Corpus-based Approaches to Metaphor and Metonymy*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006, pp. 96–9.
- 17 Z. Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 85.
- 18 Uchida and Kitayama, 'Happiness and unhappiness in East and West', p. 443.
- 19 Stefanowitsch, 'Words and their metaphors', pp. 96–9.
- 20 Uchida and Kitayama, 'Happiness and unhappiness in East and West', p. 442.
- 21 Stefanowitsch, 'Words and their metaphors', pp. 96–9.
- 22 Here is a complete list of expressions illustrating this happiness metaphor: *bring happiness, give happiness, provide happiness, gift of happiness, giver of happiness, send happiness, add happiness to someone, take (away) happiness, spread happiness, share happiness, grant happiness, assure happiness, guarantee happiness, offer happiness*; A. Stefanowitsch, 'Happiness in English and German: a metaphorical-pattern analysis', in M. Achard and S. Kemmer (eds), *Language, Culture and Mind*, Stanford: CSLI, 2004, pp. 137–49 (p. 146).
- 23 Stefanowitsch, 'Happiness in English and German', p. 147.
- 24 Z. Kövecses, *Where Metaphors Come From: Reconsidering Context in Metaphor*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 164–5.
- 25 In her study of happiness metaphors in Korean, Türker identifies the mapping HAPPINESS IS SHARING, which emphasizes the social character of this emotion in Eastern cultures: E. Türker, 'A corpus-based approach to emotion metaphors in Korean: a case study of anger, happiness and sadness', *Review of Cognitive Linguistics* 11, 2013, 73–144. The examples proposed in her study highlight three different aspects of the target domain: first, it is supposed to be always shared; second, it should be experienced with others rather than

- alone; third, the reciprocal and collective experience of happiness contributes to social harmony. Once again, this metaphor confirms the existence of a straightforward connection between meaning clusters and conceptual metaphors.
- 26 See J.E. Díaz-Vera and T. Manrique-Antón, “‘Better shamed before one than shamed before all’: shaping SHAME in Old English and Old Norse texts”, in J.E. Díaz-Vera (ed.), *Metaphor and Metonymy across Time and Cultures: Perspectives on the Sociohistorical Linguistics of Figurative Language*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2015, pp. 225–65.
 - 27 See J.E. Díaz-Vera, ‘Reconstructing the Old English cultural model for FEAR’, *Atlantis* 33:1, 2011, 85–103; J.E. Díaz-Vera, ‘Woven emotions: towards an integrated account of visual and verbal manifestations of Old English metaphors’, *Review of Cognitive Linguistics* 11:2, 2013, 269–84; and J.E. Díaz-Vera, ‘From cognitive linguistics to historical sociolinguistics: the evolution of Old English expressions of “shame” and “guilt”’, *Cognitive Linguistic Studies* 1:1, 2014, 55–83.
 - 28 Some of these nouns are not recorded until the middle of the twelfth century: this is the case with OE *fægenness* and OE *ēstnes*.
 - 29 For a full discussion of the Lexical Iconicity Principle, the Lexical Derivational Principle and the Lexical Etymological Principle, and their applications to the study of lexical evolution, please see J.E. Díaz Vera, ‘The semantic architecture of the Old English verbal lexicon: a historical-lexicographical proposal’, in J.E. Díaz-Vera (ed.), *A Changing World of Words: Studies in English Historical Lexicography*, Lexicology and Semantics, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002, pp. 47–77.
 - 30 S. Fox, *King Alfred’s Anglo-Saxon Version of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy*, Cambridge, ON: In Parenthesis, 1999, p. 25.
 - 31 Ibid., p. 24.
 - 32 N. Yu (*The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor: A Perspective from Chinese*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1998, pp. 64–5) describes the conceptual metaphor PRIDE IS BEING OFF THE GROUND in Chinese. According to his interpretation of the linguistic evidence, being off the ground is seen as being out-of-control and, therefore, not socially acceptable.
 - 33 Kövecses, *Where Metaphors Come From*, p. 9.
 - 34 In this respect, see for example Jefferts Schori’s analysis of the works on happiness written by English Abbot Aelred of Rievaulx (1100–1166): K. Jefferts Schori, ‘The pursuit of happiness in the Christian tradition: goal and journey’, *Journal of Law and Religion* 29:1, 2014, 57–66.
 - 35 M. Görlach, *Introduction to Early Modern English*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 136.
 - 36 The entry ‘02.04.10.05 Happiness: Glee 1579–1588’ corresponds in fact to sense 3.c. in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, i.e. ‘A state of exaltation or prosperity’. The happiness meaning corresponds to 3.a. ‘Mirth, joy, rejoicing’.
 - 37 Kövecses, *Where Metaphors Come From*, p. 167.
 - 38 Uchida and Kitayama, ‘Happiness and unhappiness in East and West’; Choi, Kim and Uchida, ‘The folk psychology of happiness in Korea’.

MUSIC

Carol J. Williams

Introduction

The brief of this chapter is to interrogate the sharp rise over the last ten years or so in scholarship on the history of medieval and early modern music and emotions (1100–1700). The problem is that though there has been an escalation in scholarship in the area of music and emotions, most of it is cognitive and philosophical and has more to contribute to psychology, physiology and medicine than it has relevance to history. As Gouk and Hills point out, ‘The literature is overwhelmingly dominated by medical, ethical and philosophical publication in which emotions are often assumed to be natural entities amenable to scientific analysis. By comparison, history is practically invisible’.¹ Much of this scholarship is so strongly focused on the connection between music and emotion that it is separated, if not divorced, from its cultural and historical context. This makes the construction of a history of music and the emotions challenging, since there are few studies and these are distributed piecemeal over this extended timeline. These few are also hard to find, often buried as essays within broad thematic collections, or as poorly titled journal articles lacking precise and distinguishing key terms. There is no single study that examines the history of medieval and early modern music and emotions.

Titles like *From Sounds to Music and Emotions*,² *The Emotional Power of Music*,³ *Handbook of Music and Emotion: Theory, Research, Application*⁴ and *Emotion and Meaning in Music*,⁵ while examples of fine scholarship, offer very little to the historian. On the other hand, *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction*,⁶ though it does not mention music in the title, contains at least two very useful essays: ‘Music’, addressing sources,⁷ and ‘Baroque music’, considering the Baroque as an intellectual and cultural tradition.⁸ There is also *Performing Emotions in Early Europe*,⁹ which includes the essay ‘Emotion, time, and music at Cambrai Cathedral’.¹⁰ As well, there is a handful of new journals which specifically address emotions, but only one that foregrounds historical and cultural concerns – *Emotions: History, Culture, Society*, which in its first issue featured a case study of Monteverdi’s *Il Combattimento di Tancredi e Clorinda*¹¹ and in volume 2 included an article which considers the role of the arts in the history of the emotions, foregrounding aesthetic experience and emotion as method.¹² Given that the critical secondary material available is sparse and unevenly distributed over the period, I have filled out the picture by consulting the primary material of contemporary writing about music, mostly within the field of music theory. There is an astonishing amount of these now

readily available resources that examine the connection between music and the emotions, certainly enough to sketch an outline history of medieval and early modern music and emotions.

This chapter begins by surveying the path most usually travelled in addressing questions concerning the connection between emotions and music: that is, how it works. This includes linguistic, semiotic and philosophical methodologies developing the cognitive approach to music and emotions. The body of the chapter assumes the connection between music and emotion and looks at writings about music from a historical standpoint, focusing particularly on the Pythagorean Platonic tradition of music theory, with the linking of modes of music with ethics and the emotions. By taking this approach, what emerges is a cultural history of music and emotion that outlines the story of developmental change in the Pythagorean Platonic tradition, interrupted by several seismic shifts including the Aristotelian revolution of the thirteenth century, humanism in the fifteenth century and the rationalist thinking of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution.

Separation of emotion and reason

It is the separation of emotion and reason in modern academic discourse that hinders our understanding of the medieval and early modern integration of these in a range of intellectual endeavours, but particularly in music.¹³ The split between reason and emotion is one of the most familiar of philosophical conceptions. ‘[T]he advocacy of reason “controlling” unruly emotion, of rationality guiding responsible human action against the blindness of passion has a long and highly influential history’.¹⁴ Virginia Held develops this idea in a feminist context where Reason is male and Unreason is female, but this polarity is at the heart of the essential divide in the history of music and emotions. Thus, reason promotes cognitive and philosophical approaches, which aim dispassionately to make rational connections between music, the emotions and the human, whether composer, performer or auditor. In diagram it might be conceptualized like this:




Figure 24.1 Rational connections between music, the emotions and the human.

Here, the directionality between the three *loci* does not capture the three-dimensional nature of the human experience of the connection between music and the emotions. We might instead conceptualize the experience in the following way:




Figure 24.2 The threefold nested human experience of emotions from music.

Here the human experience is enveloped within the emotional sphere, itself generated by that of music. Unreason, to use Held's term, can happily clasp the slippery qualities of subjectivity and create something that resonates with the human experience of both music and the emotions.

It had long been the characteristic of musicology that an emotional response to music, while an inevitable part of the musical experience, operated as an obstacle to the required objectivity of musicological scholarship. This was a reaction against the intense sentimentalism of some late Romantic works and generated by the thinking of the critic Eduard Hanslick (1825–1904), who published his important work *On the Musically Beautiful* during the formative years of musicology.¹⁵ It was Hanslick's position that emotion cannot be present in music and is entirely dependent on the listener's interpretation. Thus it would be philosophically impossible to study emotion in music, since the value of music as an art form is independent of its expressive power. From this point on and throughout a large part of the twentieth century, the emphasis in music scholarship has been on maintaining a scientific, objective view of music.

On the other hand, Leo Tolstoy, almost a direct contemporary of Hanslick, put forward a much less forbidding theory in his *What is Art?* He said,

To evoke in oneself a feeling one has experienced . . . then by means of movements, lines, colours, sounds, or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others experience the same feeling – this is the activity of art. Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously by means of certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also experience them.¹⁶

So these ideas of whether music was expressive and whether or how it could evoke feelings or emotions were very much in the air at the end of the nineteenth century.

It was almost a century later that, with the emergence of the New Philology of the 1980s and 90s, subjectivity in scholarship was finally recognized and accepted. That medieval and early modern studies were at the forefront of this development is demonstrated by the New Philology issue of *Speculum* (1990). Though there was no essay here specifically addressing music, this expansion of subjectivities prompted musicologists and music historians to consider the role of past emotions on the creation and reception of music. This approach, called New Musicology, was characterized by an academic style emphasizing a broad-ranging study of music. It was a reaction against traditional historical musicology that had directed attention to the music object almost to the exclusion of the generating cultural context. Those of the New Musicology persuasion were more ready to see music as a product of a cultural context and use that context to illuminate the music.

More recent scholarship has deconstructed Hanslick's argument and proposed instead that music does indeed evoke emotion and can represent some extra-musical object of that emotion. Madell proposes that music is expressive by arousing emotions which are directed to musical events and features and are caused by tensions and relaxations in the melodic or harmonic progress of the music. The example of the resolution from discord to concord demonstrates this clearly. He suggests that what is evoked in the listener is a feeling of tension and a desire for resolution: 'And when that resolution is delayed what is evoked is a more intense form of that desire, something akin to longing or yearning'.¹⁷ So what is evoked by that resolution is an emotion and that emotion is directed to an object. Both the desire or yearning and the satisfaction or joy are emotions aroused by the music and having as their intentional object features of the music.

Over the last fifty years or so, the cognitive sciences have been attracting the attention of music aestheticians, perhaps as a way of finding substantiation for 'gut feelings' relating music and the emotions. Unfortunately, the cognitive science of music most usually examines rather low-level musical elements often related to musical structure or syntax; music aestheticians on the other hand are much more likely to want to consider the significance of complete works. Where the cognitive scientists and music aestheticians come together is in both focusing attention on the relationship between music and the emotions, in how music is expressive of emotions and in how music can arouse emotion.¹⁸

When the linking of emotions and music was taken up as an area of study, scholars approached emotions as the means to focus on the cognitive side of the understanding of music. One of the early works following this path was Leonard B. Meyer's *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (1961), one of the first works to outline the mechanics of musical expectations and bring it into line with information theory. He claimed that our stylistic expectations about music are manipulated by the composer arousing feelings of tension as expectations are raised or frustrated, and relief as they are finally satisfied.

Meyer considers that there are two kinds of meaning that music can possess. The first is absolute meaning and concerns only the patterns and relationships established within the work and the intrinsic nature of the processes within the work. The other meaning is referential and consists in the relation in which the work stands to any extramusical phenomena to which it refers. It is the first of these, the formalist position, for which Meyer is the trailblazer.¹⁹ Formalism maintains that the meaning of music is intellectual – the musical relationships contained within a musical work are grasped intellectually and provide intellectual interest and satisfaction. Meyer proposes that 'emotion is aroused when a tendency to respond is arrested or inhibited'.²⁰

Music in the history of the emotions

Of the arts, music is particularly powerful in creating emotional worlds for its audiences, and should be considered especially valuable in the unlocking of emotional histories.²¹ To reshape Collingwood's famous statement about the role of emotions within visual art, 'music is – quite simply – the expression of emotions'.²² Nonetheless historians have been cautious about including music as core source material in the history of emotions. Perhaps one of the reasons for this is a lack of confidence in dealing with music's formal features requiring notation reading skills and a specialist language specific to musicologists. There is also a pronounced reluctance to engage with the 'slippery qualities' of dealing with a temporal art which only exists in the moment of performance and hearing. However, in Erin Sullivan's words,

Given how deeply art makes so many of *us* feel, it seems a particularly good place to start; in giving it greater weight within the history of emotions as a field, we might also find that the affective experience of the scholar and the invaluable intellectual work that it does can come more fully into view.²³

Peter Burke offers a historiographical introduction to the study of the emotions into which music might be inserted. He poses a number of questions, the most significant of which is 'How can a historian gain access to the passions of the dead?'²⁴ One answer could be, by examining the production and reception of emotion expressive artworks which are the records of past emotion events. In part, this chapter attempts to provide some clues to how such an investigation might proceed to incorporate music into the history of the emotions.

The Pythagorean Platonic tradition: ethos, emotions and the modes

The basic trend in the history of music theory in this period is Pythagorean Platonic. This tradition gives to Pythagoras himself the honour of discovering the essential acoustic principles of music and provides the narrative of his visit to the blacksmith's shop, transmitted to the European Middle Ages mainly through the *De institutione musica* of Boethius (c. 480–524).²⁵ The division of *Musica* into three – *musica mundana*, *musica humana* and *musica instrumentalis* – is another essential characteristic of this tradition. The first of these is cosmic, and encompasses the music produced by the planets as they rotate, controlling the seasons and the elements. Human music is understood as the harmonious relationship between the parts of the body, between the body and soul, between the rational and the irrational. Finally, there is the kind of music found in instruments generated by tension, breath or percussion.²⁶ Characteristic also of the Pythagorean Platonic tradition is the explanation of the power of music as derived from the ancient understanding of ethics; this is often linked to the scalar structure of fundamental music theory, the modes.²⁷

According to Plato, music imitates character and has a direct effect on the soul, which is itself a *harmonia*.²⁸ Thus, good music results in good character, and conversely, inappropriate music leads to weak character. To achieve a good state some form of regulation must take place, the assumption being that if the right musical

rules are followed correctly this will result in morally sound citizens. This works through the process of mimesis, the reason behind the power of music. Mimesis in music is not simple imitation of things but rather is an imitation of life itself, capable of raising the soul once again to the *harmonia* of the universe. Through the processes of mimesis and habituation the ethical tradition of music operates on a level beyond volition and reason to achieve its outcomes.

Medieval music theory inherited from antiquity ethical ideas of music. The connection between the modes²⁹ and ethos³⁰ was an assumption that with its origins in the Pythagorean and then Platonic tradition was most often simply repeated as a mark of respect rather than seriously engaged with. One of the exceptions was John of Afflighem, who wrote about the connection between the modes and the emotions. Though he was using a framework established by Guido of Arezzo, his contribution to this history is refreshingly original. John of Afflighem's³¹ treatise *De musica cum tonario* (c. 1100) makes some very clear statements on the modes, providing possibly the most lucid and developed explanation of the emotional characteristics of the modes. The treatise has much material in common with Guido of Arezzo's *Micrologus* (c. 1024), and though he wrote many years later, John shares with Guido the aim of educating boys in the singing of plainchant. John ascribed ethical and emotional values to the modes and ventured even more deeply than Guido into the realm of aesthetics. Song had the power to move people to action, to soothe and uplift:

[C]hant has the great power of stirring the souls of its hearers, in that it delights the ears, uplifts the mind, arouses fighters to warfare, revives the prostrate and despairing, strengthens wayfarers, disarms bandits, assuages the wrathful, gladdens the sorrowful and distressed, pacifies those at strife, dispels idle thoughts, and allays the frenzy of the demented.³²

In a section of the treatise considering how different people are pleased by different modes John clearly articulates what seems to have been the accepted summary of distinct modal characteristics in the early twelfth century. He says:

[D]ifferent men are attracted by different modes. . . . Some are pleased by the slow and ceremonious peregrinations of the first, some are taken by the hoarse profundity of the second, some are delighted by the austere and almost haughty prancing of the third, some are attracted by the ingratiating sound of the fourth, some are stirred by the well-bred high spirits and the sudden fall to the final in the fifth, some are melted by the tearful voice of the sixth, some like to hear the spectacular leaps of the seventh, and some favour the staid and almost matronly strains of the eighth.³³

In considering the power of music John selects illustrations from the familiar stories of the possessed King Saul being soothed by David's singing to the harp; the madman being freed from insanity by the singing of the physician Aesclepiades, and Pythagoras calming the licentious youth by the ordered quality of music.³⁴ John continues: 'Music has different powers according to the different modes. Thus, you can by one kind of singing rouse someone to lustfulness and by another kind bring the same man as quickly as possible to repentance and recall him to himself'.³⁵

Bartholomeus Anglicus (c. 1200–1272), the English Franciscan theologian, with his *De proprietatibus rerum* (1240) was perhaps modelling himself on that other great encyclopedist, Isidore of Seville, since much of its material derives from the earlier scholar. Though he says little that is new on the connection between music and the emotions, *De proprietatibus rerum* is important if only because it was one of the most popular books in medieval times. The text was well known in university circles and also appeared in several vernacular translations, including that of John Trevisa into English.³⁶ The Platonic concept of the universe being composed from a harmony of sounds is introduced as a veiled reference to *musica humana* in the description of the internal pulsing of our veins linked through their musical rhythm to the power of harmony. The idea that music rouses the emotions is illustrated firstly by fighters being encouraged in their battles by the call of the trumpets and then by the use of song to exhort exhausted rowers to further labours. Music even has power over the beasts, calling serpents, birds and dolphins to listen. Bartholomew only deviates from Isidore's prototype by additionally calling on Old Testament support from Isaiah 51:3, which speaks about restoring worldly balance with the voice of melody.

Marchetto da Padova (fl. 1305–19) is remembered particularly for his *Pomerium in arte musice mensurate* (c. 1318–19) in which he developed a system that permitted duple as well as triple division of the breve, thus founding the mensural theory of the Italian Trecento. Nonetheless it was his *Lucidarium in arte musice plane*,³⁷ surveying the theory of *musica plana* and including a short section on the philosophy of music, which was to have the most enduring influence. In this work Marchetto questions the restraint of Pythagorean arithmetic that did not allow for the division of any superparticular³⁸ ratio, by proposing, instead, the division of the whole tone into five equal parts. In other respects, including the link between music and the emotions, he clearly follows the Platonic tradition. He alludes to the understanding that the first Pythagoreans passed on their mysteries by means of song, and used music to soothe a troubled mind to tranquillity. He quotes Boethius in saying that 'nothing is as characteristic of humanity than to be soothed by pleasant modes or disturbed by their opposites' and that all humanity experiences spontaneous emotion by way of the musical modes.³⁹ He refers to the popular story of David releasing Saul's evil spirits by the sweet playing of his harp and introduces the story of the prophet Elisha, who finding himself bereft of the spirit of prophesy rediscovered his talent by playing on the psaltery. The descriptions of warriors regaining their fighting spirit with the sound of the trumpet and animals being delighted by instrumental music are taken directly from Boethius's *De institutione musica*.⁴⁰

The Aristotelian revolution of the thirteenth century

There is one view which sees antiquity and the Renaissance as Platonic and the Middle Ages as Aristotelian. Though this may be true in part, music and the writing about music were slow to cast off their Platonic influence. While aspects of Aristotelianism began to appear in concerns of measure and general approach, a full-throated response is first seen in Johannes de Grocheio's *Ars musice*, where one of the traditional fathers of music theory, Boethius, is not only sidelined but mocked. Aristotle, while he said much of broad relevance to the arts, made direct reference

to music in only one of his works, the *Politics*, which was late to be translated and then never really taken up in music theory, with the exception perhaps of Grocheio.

When we consider the passions of the soul we move well beyond the rather direct thinking of ethics and enter the world of Aristotelian metaphysics. The Aristotelian theory of the soul operated on two levels, the sensory and the intellectual. The passions of the soul were the outcome of the various interactions of these parts.⁴¹ Music is received into the sensory soul through hearing and is modelled in the intellectual soul as abstract harmony or consonance. The correspondence between these two pathways facilitated the expression of emotion through music. Aristotle expressed views on the educational and social aspects of music in the *Politics*, where he confirms that music is included in the curriculum 'not as a necessity', 'nor as useful' but because it has a beneficial effect on the quality of character in the soul.⁴²

With the gathering speed of the Aristotelian revolution of the thirteenth century, Grocheio steps aside from the Platonic tradition of music theory and offers in his *Ars musice* (1270?) a unique statement on the role of music in society.⁴³ He declares his Aristotelian colours early in the prologue with a reference to Aristotle's *Physica* concerning music as the product of motion and another to *De anima* introducing the idea of the proper sensibles.⁴⁴ He refers throughout to a considerable number of Aristotle's works, including the *Analytica prior* in the Boethian translation, *De animalibus*, *De caelo*, *De generatione animalium*, *De partibus animalium* and the *Metaphysica*. He questions Boethius in a number of places, as for example on the distribution of consonances amongst the five species of proportion, where he says: 'And one must wonder why Boethius, who understood the opinion of Aristotle, based himself on such [notions]'.⁴⁵ The full assault against Boethius and the foundation of the Platonic tradition, however, occurs in a caustic critique of the *musica mundana*, *humana* and *instrumentalis* divisions. He says: 'But those who divide in this way either construct their claim or wish to submit to the Pythagoreans or others more than to the truth or are ignorant of nature and logic'. He reminds us that 'celestial bodies in movement do not make a sound, although the ancients believed this, nor do they plough through the orbs, according to Aristotle'. He continues: 'Nor is sound properly to be found in the human constitution, for who has heard a constitution sounding?'⁴⁶ As you might expect with such a thorough rejection of the Platonic, there is neither mention of the ethical basis of the power of music nor of the affective characteristics of the modes.

Grocheio's *Ars musice* does not rely on the Platonic understanding of the power of music to move body and soul through ethics, but neither does it participate in the Aristotelian explanation of the machinery of the passions of the soul. That he was influenced by the one Aristotelian work which addressed music specifically, the *Politics*, Book 8, is evident in that one of his aims was to determine how music corrects and improves the character of men in the life of the *civitas*. He says that 'music . . . is necessary for the use of citizens because it supports the moral health and preservation of the whole city'.⁴⁷

His take on the emotions is unique; while deeply Aristotelian, it seems to have been developed before the revival of thinking around the passions of the soul was set in train by Thomas Aquinas. Grocheio restricts his field of music to that current in Paris, and in discussing the music of the people states that the musical forms used there are ordained so that through their mediation the innate trials of humanity may

be softened. He fills out this idea with a detailed study of a number of musical forms, the *chanson de geste* for example, 'in which the deeds of heroes and the achievements of the ancient fathers are recited. This music ought to be provided for the aged and working citizens and ordinary people while they rest from their usual labour, so that, having heard about the miseries and disasters of others they may more easily bear their own'.⁴⁸ There are too many examples to consider here, but one particularly interesting one is his description of the *ductia*, a dance form, the performance of which 'draws the hearts of girls and young men and takes them away from vanity and is said to be effective against the passion which is called love sickness'.⁴⁹

Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274) developed the Aristotelian concept of passions of the soul and provided the Christian viewpoint. He explains that the soul has five powers, the vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, motive and intellective. Building on the Aristotelian scaffolding of the soul, Aquinas subdivides the appetitive power into two parts, the first of which is also in two parts, the will and free will. The second part of the appetitive power is 'sensitive' and is the home of the passions, which are again subdivided into the concupiscible and the irascible. All the passions of the appetitive power had a bodily component, while the intellective emotions were divorced from the body. Nonetheless Reason guided the passions, though not directly, since in the appetitive realm reason can only operate through the will.⁵⁰ There were eleven main passions, and of these the five principal emotions were love, pleasure, pain, desire and fear, with love the most important for Aquinas since it was the 'taproot of all the emotions'.⁵¹ Ultimately, though, for Aquinas the pleasures of reason and intellect were always preferable to those of the senses. Reason must control emotion.

Though Aquinas made some references to the sense of hearing and how music could operate for good or ill on the soul, it was his protégé Peter of Auvergne (d. 1304) who properly refined and developed them. As Master of Arts he produced numerous commentaries on Aristotle in the 1270s and 80s and also became Doctor of Theology in 1296, authoring six quodlibets before his appointment as Bishop of Clermont in 1302. He wrote the last of his quodlibets in 1301, and in this he addressed two questions about music; 'the first was whether musical harmonies may be persuasive of the passions, for example, rapture or of others of this kind; the second, was whether they might contribute to behaviour'.⁵² He states: 'since therefore passions follow through themselves any arrangements of prime qualities mixed according to a particular numerical proportion . . . if any musical harmony is in the same or adjacent proportion and sets spirits in motion in this way, the harmony will assimilate them to itself, and consequently cause or stir up a passion existing in a similar proportion according to what we perceive through the senses'.⁵³

Guy of Saint-Denis (fl. 1300–30), possibly in discussion with Peter of Auvergne, provided the technical detail to support these revolutionary ideas. With a cantor's understanding of the inner working of mode and an encyclopedic grasp of chant in the performance of liturgy, he constructed a theory that explained the mechanics of music expressivity. He develops this particularly in Chapter 4 of the first book of his *Tractatus* 'on the property and effect or power of the tones'. He explains with extraordinary lucidity an essential understanding of how music operates to provoke specific emotional states or passions of the soul. Guy also quotes extensively from Grocheio and Peter of Auvergne's commentary on Book 8 of the *Politics*, and borrows liberally from Peter's final quodlibet.

While Guy was writing for an audience familiar with a Platonic understanding of music as part of the structure of the universe, his personal preference was to follow Aristotle, as expounded by Peter of Auvergne. He was particularly interested in what Peter of Auvergne had to say about the soul's appetitive or desiring part as stimulated by the senses in the same way as the will follows the intellect.⁵⁴ The sensitive appetite varies in individual people according to their particular disposition of qualities. Just as some people are hotter, others colder in disposition, thus some are bold, some jealous and some wrathful. Similarly, through the various proportions making up different kinds of music, there is an impact on the differing constitutions of the human soul, mediated through varying moods.⁵⁵

Guy follows up the start that Peter of Auvergne had made in describing the passions according to their numeric proportion:

We also say that delight is the diffusion of spirit and heat, but sadness is their contraction and similarly with other passions of the soul. The aforesaid qualities are neither simple nor pure in the human body . . . but rather are composite and mixed . . . according to some numeric proportion. For the warmth of a living thing is not simple warmth but something less cold.⁵⁶

This quantification of warmth in contrast to cool needs a little explanation. If we were to understand the proportion of warmth to coolness as 3 is to 2, then there is more warmth than coolness and on balance the object is warm. The acoustic relevance of this proportion 3:2 sounds the perfect fifth, or, for example the interval between pitches C and G. In Guy's own words:

Harmonies or melodies and musical consonances consist in a certain mediating ratio and proportion of sounds . . . Therefore it remains that musical harmonies by moving and altering the spirits assimilate them to themselves . . . and change them by a harmony and proportion similar to themselves. Since therefore the passions of the soul follow certain distributions of first qualities mixed according to some numeric proportion, if any musical harmony is in the same or similar proportion and in this way acts on spirits it will assimilate them to itself and consequently cause an existing passion in a similar proportion.⁵⁷

This is the clearest explanation I have come across of the matching relationships between the passions and musical intervals.

Though this remarkable achievement would be enough to mark Guy as a brilliant theorist, his greatest contribution lay in his ability to find pathways between different and often conflicting theoretical positions. Though he has been presented here as a protagonist of an understanding of the power of music following Aristotle, Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne, he also had much to say on the Platonic ethical explanation of the power of music, and carefully explained how each of the classical demonstrations of the power of music could be understood through a form of reasoning linked to the passions of the soul. Though Guy of Saint-Denis does not emerge as a name of influence in the torrent of theoretical writing that flooded the early years of the fourteenth century, close reading of a number of these works is exposing the evidence of judicious borrowing from Guy's careful foundations.

Jean Gerson, *Doctor Christianissimus* (1363–1429), can be compared to Thomas Aquinas in his writing on the passions.⁵⁸ He wrote on music within two traditions, the philosophical and mystical in which he followed Aquinas, and the music theoretical where he was traditionally orthodox in following Boethius. In the first of these he proposed a view of music in which ‘Christ is the heavenly cantor in the harmony of creation’.⁵⁹ He was most interested in emotions of the heart which he saw as expressing the free will of reason. These emotions, the *Canticordum*, were ‘sung’ silently, though he noted the sounds, silences, physical symptoms and gestures that betrayed emotions. His most important work on the passions was the *Tractatus de canticis* (*Treatise on Songs*) (c. 1423–29).⁶⁰

Humanism in the fifteenth century

In the early modern era, the major intellectual current was humanism, where the ancient ethical ideas of music were revived and restored to a central position. Musical humanists, dissatisfied with the music of their own day, sought a revival of the Golden Age when music properly served to guide human activity. The cosmic harmony of the spheres which Plato’s *Timaeus* projected prompted theorists and philosophers to rediscover its rational and emotional effects. Though the revival of ancient learning was difficult to achieve in music, given that nothing but the descriptions and theory of ancient music remained, the claim that music was being restored to its ancient dignity was heard clearly in the sixteenth-century academies.

As Kristeller observes, Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), the founder and leader of the Florentine Academy, has rarely been studied for his contributions to the understanding of music. Yet he justifies his unusual combination of medicine, music and theology with the statement that music is as important for the intermediary ‘spirit’ as medicine is for the body and theology for the soul. It was also his view that the human soul acquires through the bodily ears ‘a memory of that divine music which is found first in the eternal mind of God, and second in the order and movements of the heavens’.⁶¹ As part of the Harmony of the Spheres thinking proposed in Plato’s *Timaeus*, Ficino provided a discussion of the astronomical and astrological causes of consonance in his commentary. He also comments on the use Plato makes of musical proportions in the composition of the soul, thus justifying the effect of music on the soul of the listener.⁶²

Platonic thinking about music and its ethical value remained important, and specific connections between mode and ethos were taken very seriously, not just by music theorists but by humanists across the board. Thomas More, for example, has this to say in the *Utopia* (1516) on Utopian music:

In one respect, however, they are beyond doubt far ahead of us, because all their music, both vocal and instrumental, renders and expresses natural feelings, and perfectly matches the sound to the subject. Whether the words of the prayer are supplicatory, cheerful, serene, troubled, mournful or angry, the music represents the meaning through the contour of the melody so admirably that it stirs up, penetrates and inflames the minds of the hearers.⁶³

Towards the end of the sixteenth century, John Case (*c.* 1539–*c.* 1599), an Oxford intellectual, wrote the *Apologia musices tam vocalis quam instrumentalis et mixtae* in defence of music against Puritan attack. In the course of this work he argues not only that the role of music in church services is legitimate, but that complex contrapuntal music and instrumental music had a lawful and legitimate role to play in church music. Fundamental to this argument is the view that music has a unique ability to act directly on the mind, allowing it to elevate the listener's thoughts to higher things. He proposes that

in this life the soul is limitlessly captivated by musical tones since music conveys to the soul in the body a memory of that music of which it was aware in heaven, and which it is destined to know after its separation from the body. For this is the end of music (but particularly of the Dorian) in this life, that, as a spirit speaks to a spirit through visions rather than words, so by various movements and sounds music declares to the mind many secrets of future and celestial harmony (whence it has taken its origin) . . . Thus true harmony speaks to the mind, thus it instructs the inner mind.⁶⁴

Rationalist thinking of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution

During the seventeenth century a series of changes in thought, knowledge and beliefs generated a cultural transformation. One of the outcomes of this scientific revolution was a thoroughgoing examination of people and human affairs operating within the natural world, not limited by the restraints of the church. René Descartes (1596–1650), the French philosopher and mathematician, was responsible in large part for the seventeenth-century revival of interest in the passions of the soul. The polymath also contributed to the history of music theory with his *Compendium musicae*,⁶⁵ written in 1618 and published in 1650. This work, a product of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, can be seen as occupying the middle ground between ancient music theory that was being revived by the musical humanists in the Renaissance and the rationalist thinking of the eighteenth century. 'The work is noteworthy as an early experiment in the application of an empirical, deductive, scientific approach to the study of sensory perception and as being among the earliest attempts to define the dual relationship between the physical and psychological phenomena in music'.⁶⁶ While Descartes described the process of sensory perception as being autonomous, self-regulating and measurable, he considered the impact of sound on a listener's emotions or soul to be subjective and irrational and therefore incapable of being scientifically measured. This distinction he drew between sound as a physical phenomenon and sound as received by the senses allowed him to set the foundation for a philosophy of the affections as is presaged in his treatise *Les Passions de l'âme* (*The Passions of the Soul*) (1649).⁶⁷ Other works that consider music and the emotions include the *Compendium musicae* (1618)⁶⁸ and his *Philosophical Letters*.⁶⁹

Conclusion

Presenting a history of medieval and early modern music and emotion as a consistent narrative makes clear the dominance of the rationale of the Platonic tradition, and suggests that the powerful connection between music and the emotions

based on the ancient theory of ethics was quite broadly understood and accepted. I admit to being surprised by the wealth of primary material available to support this history, and though this is perhaps merely finding the right question to ask of the sources, there are enough answers to prompt some fresh interpretations. For example, it allows us to see the Aristotelian revolution of the thirteenth century as a particularly vehement interruption in the default Platonic tradition rather than the charting of a new pathway. It allows us to see humanism, at least as it is refracted through the prism of music theory, as a change of pace rather than of direction, in that it was essentially refreshed and revived Platonism. Even the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as represented here in the work of Descartes, can be seen as a rejection of Aristotelianism and a refocusing of Platonic principles.

There is still considerable work to be done with primary sources before we can develop a synthetic view of the trends in the history of emotions and music. Nonetheless it is the historical awareness of the powerful connection between music and emotion that allows us to view in a new light those historical moments when music operated on a broader stage. It helps to explain the sharply reactionary tone of Pope John XXII's 1324 bull *Docta sanctorum patrum* against the use of innovative polyphonic styles in the church. He understood very well that music had the power to corrupt because it could stir the passions and move the soul. It was the deep understanding of the power of music to move spirits for good or ill that prompted Martin Luther (1483–1546) to use music as a joyful instrument of preaching, and Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531) to dismantle church organs and discourage congregational singing. It was the same rationale that supported the edicts on music in worship issuing from the Council of Trent (1545). Much has been done over the last ten years or so in finding appropriate primary sources and analysing them to contribute to the narrative of the history of music and emotions. There is still much more to do.

Notes

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- 25 Boethius, *Fundamentals of Music*, ed. C.V. Palisca, trans. C.M. Bower, Music Theory Translation Series, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.
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- 28 *Harmonia* is a broad philosophical term that has nothing to do with the modern concept of chord relationships.
- 29 Modes, sometimes called tones or tropes in the early treatises, are types of musical scales with sets of characteristic melodic behaviours. They were inspired by the theory of ancient Greek music. See H.S. Powers, Frans Wiering, James Porter, James Cowdery, Richard Widdess, Ruth Davis, Marc Perlman *et al.*, 'Mode', in *Grove Music Online*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, online, available at: <www.oxfordmusiconline.com/grovemusic>.
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- 31 There is considerable confusion about John's identity; he is known as both John Cotton and Johannes Afflighemensis. For a summary of the confusion see *Hucbald, Guido, and John on Music: Three Medieval Treatises*, ed. C.V. Palisca, trans. W. Babb, Music Theory Translation Series, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 87–94.
- 32 Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido and John*, p. 136. 'Sed nec hoc reticeri oportet, quod magnam vim commovendi auditorum animos musicus cantus habet, siquidem aures mulcet, mentem erigit, praeliatores ad bella incitat, lapsos et desperantes revocat, viatores confortat, latrones exarmat, iracundos mitigat, tristes et anxios laetificat, discordes pacificat, vanas cogitationes eliminat, phreneticorum rabiem temperat': *Johannes Afflighemensis: De musica cum tonario*, ed. J. Smits van Waesberghe, Corpus Scriptorum de Musica, vol. 1. Rome: American Institute of Musicology, 1950, p. 136.
- 33 Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido and John*, p. 133. 'quod diversi diversis delectantur modis. . . . Alios namque morosa et curialis vagatio primi delectat, alios rauca secundi gravitas capit, alios severa et quasi indignans tertii persultatio iuvat, alios adulatorius quarti sonus attrahit, alii modesta quinti petulantia ac subitaneo ad finalem casu moventur, alii lacrimosa sexti voce mulcentur, alii mimicos septimi saltus libenter audiunt, alii decentem et quasi matronalem octavi canorem diligunt': Smits van Waesberghe, *De musica cum tonario*, p. 109.

- 34 These three stories are probably derived from their rendition by Guido of Arezzo in the *Micrologus*. See Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido and John*, p. 68.
- 35 Palisca and Babb, *Hucbald, Guido and John*, p. 136. 'Habet autem musica secundum diversos modos diversas potentias. Sic enim per unum canendi genus poteris aliquem ad luxuriam provocare, eundemque per aliud quantocius poenitentia ductum revocare': Smits Van Waesberghe, *De musica cum tonario*, p. 114.
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- 37 Marchetto of Padua, *The Lucidarium*, ed. and trans. J.W. Herlinger, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- 38 In Pythagorean mathematics, a superparticular ratio is the ratio of two consecutive integer numbers as, for example 9:8, which in acoustic terms sounds the whole tone.
- 39 'Nichil enim est tam proprium humanitati quam remitti dulcibus modis, astringe contrariis; et id non modo in singulis vel studiis vel etatibus tenet, verum per cuncta diffunditur studia, et infantes ac iuvenes necnon et senes ita naturaliter modis musicis affectu quidem spontaneo adiunguntur': Marchetto, *Lucidarium*, pp. 76–8.
- 40 Boethius, *Fundamentals of Music*.
- 41 Dominik Perler, 'Emotions and cognitions: fourteenth-century discussions on the passions of the soul', *Vivarium* 43:2, 2005, 250–74.
- 42 See Aristotle, *Politics*, 1338a 9–37, ed. and trans. H. Rackham, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1944.
- 43 Johannes de Grocheio, *Ars Musice*, ed. and trans. C.J. Mews, J.N. Crossley, C. Jeffreys, L. McKinnon and C.J. Williams, TEAMS Varia, Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2011.
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- 47 Ibid., 22.5, p. 93.
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- 50 E. Booth and S. Gallagher, 'Aquinas, Thomas', in *Grove Music Online*.
- 51 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, IaIIae.6.1: 'amor enim est prima radix omnium passionum'; and IaIIae.41.2 ad 1: 'Omnes passionnes animae derivantur ex uno principio, scilicet ex amore, in quo habent ad invicem connexionem'. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, ed. Leo, in *Opera Omnia*, vols 4–12, Rome: various imprints, 1888–1905.
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- 53 Ibid., p. 415: 'Cum igitur passionnes sequantur per se dispositiones aliquas primarum qualitatum commixtas secundum aliquam proportionem numeralem, . . . si aliqua harmonia musica sit in eadem proportionem vel propinqua et agat in spiritus secundum quod huiusmodi, eos assimilabit sibi, et per consequens causabit vel excitabit passionem existentem in simili proportionem, secundum quod nos videmus ad sensum', English translation mine.
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LITERATURE

The solicitation of the passions

Peter Holbrook

The first word of European literature is ‘wrath’ – Achilles’s μῆνις – in *The Iliad*, which is the source of so much chaos and suffering (‘The wrath, sing, O goddess. . .’). Literature’s investment in the emotions is foundational. Imaginative writing itself could be defined as ‘preoccupation with feeling’ (writers’, readers’, characters’). As Nietzsche expresses it, ‘[T]he poets . . . are enamoured of the passions as such’.¹ The Fall of Troy, the deaths of the supreme warriors Hector and Patroclus, along with those of so many others, are at least partly caused by Achilles’s rage towards Agamemnon. Would Patroclus have been killed had Achilles fought with the Greeks from the outset, rather than sulked in his tent, furious at Agamemnon for stealing his slave girl? The *Iliad*’s subject is nothing other than pathos: ‘and with them, all unwilling, went the woman. But Achilles burst into tears and drew apart from his comrades, and sat down on the shore of the gray sea, looking out over the wine-dark deep’.²

The poem delights in this material. The combatants’ heroic deeds and high, intense emotions are intended to inspire admiration, awe. Here is the well-known paradox of tragedy, pungently brought out by that most literary-minded of philosophers, Nietzsche. The events of the *Iliad*, on Nietzsche’s reading, are dreadful, but, precisely because they are so extreme and terrible, so out of the ordinary course of things, they enhance life on earth. Existence is more meaningful because such moving events as the fall of great warriors can happen. The world is more exciting, more vivid and memorable – in a word, more poetic – for such occurrences. As Nietzsche famously (or notoriously) declared, it is ‘only as an *aesthetic phenomenon* [that] existence and the world [are] eternally *justified*’.³ It is *because* the world is magnificent (rather than fair) that all its suffering and mayhem can be endured.

For the English Romantic critic William Hazlitt, poetry spurned the average and insipid. Art loves glamour, charisma. ‘A lion hunting a flock of sheep or a herd of wild asses is a more poetical object than they’, he observed mordantly. ‘The language of poetry naturally falls in with the language of power’.⁴ Hazlitt’s demoralizing view of literature is identical to Nietzsche’s – though art’s complicity with power perturbed Hazlitt, as it notably did not Nietzsche. Shakespeare’s Henry V is ‘a very amiable monster, a very splendid pageant’. We understandably take ‘poetical delight’ in this war-monger’s ‘boasts and feats’. But we are better off for their being ‘confined’ to ‘the stage and . . . lines of ten syllables’, where they can’t

produce actual carnage – children ‘butchered’ and ‘bodies . . . piled on heaps’.⁵ Nevertheless, Hazlitt acknowledges, we prefer to read about this ‘monster’ rather than bland, humdrum figures. Literature trades in excitement. That makes its relation to morality vexed, to say the least.

The present chapter sketches some ways in which the passions have been depicted in European literature, across a vast stretch of time. Literature, I suggest, tends to *indulge* the passions – the irrational, non- or even anti-philosophic side of our nature. Much of my sketch concerns the erotic drives, often understood in the texts in question as the strongest we humans are subject to, but the argument applies, of course, to a host of other feelings. Moreover, hostility to poetry’s supposed capacity to solicit the passions is virtually contemporaneous with philosophy’s foundation as a systematic activity, and that is the background to the story told here. Both Plato and Aristotle concerned themselves with art’s relation to the passions: while Plato banished poetry from his ideal society (with the exception of some morally and socially edifying genres, such as hymns to gods and heroes), Aristotle for his part advanced a utilitarian defence of art, as a sort of therapeutic outlet for unwanted feelings.⁶ Nietzsche and Plato are philosophical opponents, but they agree that nothing is more central to literature than emotion. The long quarrel between literature and philosophy has many dimensions, but the different valuation placed on the emotions by each is at the bottom of it.

One aspect of this quarrel has been disagreement about the epistemic status of the particular and general. ‘Nothing can please many, and please long’, wrote Samuel Johnson in his celebrated ‘Preface to Shakespeare’ (1765), ‘but just representations of general nature’ – that is, accurate depictions of universal human types.⁷ Literature’s value, Johnson supposed, was that it conveyed *knowledge* – dealt not with one-off, transitory phenomena but permanent and universal types. (It was only thus that literature could count as knowledge.) Aristotle had argued similarly: poetry is more philosophical than history ‘since its statements are of the nature of universals, whereas those of history are singulars’ – poetry shows what an Alcibiades-type figure would probably do in such and such a situation rather than what Alcibiades himself actually did.⁸ Of course literature’s mimetic quality guarantees its regard for the particular, individual case. But the matter goes beyond this. There is something stubbornly ‘untheoretical’ and actual about literature and art, something that won’t lend itself to edification. We can put it like this: *By depicting the passions in all their specificity and existential force, literature inevitably grants their interest and importance.* Another way of making this point is to say that literature loves the exceptional – the heroic, strange, sublime, powerful, odd . . . – rather than the normal or conventional. As Hazlitt and Nietzsche saw, the stand-out, in all its allure and singularity, is the natural material of poetry. In taking such care for the outlier, literature allows for the possibility that there are arenas of life to which normal rules don’t apply. Focusing on the exceptional is already to take the crucial step on the path to a wider, more complex conception of the ethical – even to a full-blown moral antinomianism. The very notion of a ‘hero’ calls into question universal moral norms. What norm applies to Antigone, Oedipus, Hamlet?

What follows takes its orientation from a number of diverse twentieth-century thinkers for whom the value of the literary, and the aesthetic more generally, lies in its challenge to rationalistic, normative thought: these include Isaiah Berlin,

Michael Oakeshott, Ernest Gellner, Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty. Although they differ significantly in political orientation and intellectual approach, these figures share a suspicion of the universalizing, and thus imperial, uses of reason. Their work is symptomatic of a broader, cultural shift that goes some way towards explaining why the emotions have become such a central topic in recent humanistic inquiry, and why they have been accorded a certain epistemic and even ethical value in contemporary intellectual life. This turn to the emotions in recent work in the humanities and social sciences is, argues Ruth Leys, premised upon a conviction that ‘most philosophers . . . in the past . . . have overvalued the role of reason and rationality in politics, ethics, and aesthetics’, and have neglected our nature as ‘corporeal creatures imbued with subliminal affective intensities and resonances’.⁹ The thinkers I invoke here can be seen as contributing to scepticism about the claim that reason is the most important capacity we humans possess, and that its job is to direct or discipline the emotions. Each sees reason as a vital, but not a sufficient, category. Berlin, for instance, opposed what he saw as an overweening rationalism that vainly supposed that contradiction can be banished from life because all objective values are ultimately reconcilable. The ‘naive craving for unity and symmetry at the expense of experience’ was to be distrusted – there was a connection between the ideal of ‘rational self-direction’ and various forms of political authoritarianism, which purport to know what human beings really (i.e. rationally) want.¹⁰ A scepticism about the pretensions of reason animates too the work of the political philosopher Michael Oakeshott, who deplored the emergence of a modern mindset for which ‘there is no knowledge which is not technical knowledge’, that is, knowledge expressible in ‘rules, principles, directions, maxims’, to be applied irrespective of circumstances. For Oakeshott, the antithesis of rationalism is experience: ‘Like Midas, the Rationalist is always in the unfortunate position of not being able to touch anything, without transforming it into an abstraction; he can never get a square meal of experience’.¹¹ For Gellner, the distant origin of such rationalism, which seeks to free human beings from the contingencies of history, custom, experience, lay in the philosophy of Descartes, who equated the human with a thinking abstracted from all cultural context. ‘The classical rationalists preferred the cool, “rational” state of mind, which in their view favoured cognitive endeavour, and did not hamper thought by over-exciting it. . . . Descartes’s identification of the self with the thinking substance encouraged our identification with our intellectual faculties, rather than with our darker passions’.¹² Martha Nussbaum argues for the epistemic utility of emotions – far from being a distorting force, emotions tell us something vital about ethical and political problems; they are forms of cognition and of appraisal.¹³ And Richard Rorty accords a new dignity to literature and art, as cultivators of empathy. Rorty would prefer that our liberal culture was ‘poeticized’ rather than ‘rationalized’ or ‘scientized’ – rather than hoping to replace ‘passion’ with ‘reason’, we should instead aim to live in a society where each and every person will have an opportunity to fulfil his or her ‘idiosyncratic fantasies’.¹⁴ For Rorty, reasoning is not the most important faculty human beings possess: our capacity to empathize and feel solidarity with others, to understand their experience via literary and artistic representations of it, is at least as important as our ability to reason. Feeling, for Rorty, was key. As he wrote in a lecture of 1993: ‘We are now in a good position to put aside the last vestiges of the idea that

human beings are distinguished by the capacity to know rather than by the capacities for friendship and intermarriage, distinguished by rigorous rationality rather than by flexible sentimentality'.¹⁵ Adorno and Horkheimer's enormously influential *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944) needs also to be mentioned here, as one of the most forceful and influential assaults on the dangers of an exclusively rationalistic, or mathematized, way of understanding experience: 'For the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is suspect. . . . That which does not reduce to numbers . . . becomes illusion; modern positivism writes it off as literature'. The politics of this anti-literary outlook Adorno and Horkheimer name 'totalitarian'.¹⁶ Finally we must mention the phenomenological movement in philosophy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which reconceived knowledge via a consideration of embodiment and experience. For Heidegger and other such phenomenologists, knowing is not merely a matter of cognition, but of a complete, sensuous, feeling engagement with the world. Thus, for instance, Heidegger breaks with Descartes's mathematical mode of understanding such fundamental categories as 'above', 'below', or 'behind'; each of these concepts needs to be understood experientially rather than abstractly – that is, in terms of its actual 'everyday associations'. The true meaning of 'behind' is 'what is at the door'; of 'above', that which is 'on the ceiling'. The 'observational measurement of space' does not capture these qualities of ordinary association (and, by implication, of feeling – one's sense of the concept 'behind' depends on what person or thing is actually at the door at this very moment).¹⁷ All of these thinkers, then, are conscious of a radical split between experience and rationalistic or abstract attempts to order experience. And literature is important to all of them, because literature, along with art in general, *honours* experience, in a way that philosophic, normative modes of thought commonly do not. The poet shows us what the world feels like, what it is experientially. In a nutshell: literature is *on the side* of experience. How could it not be? As a form of imitation, its raw material *is* experience, including passional life.¹⁸ In particular, it gravitates towards experience that is exceptional, that stands out. Any form of art, after all, is an appeal for attention: This is interesting! This matters! This is not like everything else! But that means that literature is essentially non-normative, dedicated to singularity (of some kind). The notion that literature could concern itself simply with the banal, the uninteresting, is hardly imaginable (which is not to say that literature does not regularly *revalue* the apparently banal or ordinary as in fact significant – the works of Wordsworth, Joyce, Woolf come to mind). All of this is to restate Nietzsche's lesson that art's value lies in its dealing with the exceptional, with those who stand out, for good and ill, from the many.

All of the writers touched upon in this chapter can be said to be committed to a view of life that regards the embodied, affective dimension of experience as central – and, implicitly, valuable. Aspirations to purity, to the shedding of bodily and emotional attachments, otherworldliness of any kind, are foreign to Chaucer, Dante, Shakespeare, Montaigne, Cervantes and Johnson. The concrete rather than the allegorical; the actual rather than ideal; the entangled, empirical, and contingent rather than the perfect or spiritualized; the relative rather than the absolute; the felt rather than the thought: these are the imaginative orientations of the writers touched upon here. They treat passional, embodied life sympathetically. They assert this life of ours on earth is significant and valuable.

At this point a brief remark on disciplinary specificity is necessary. The turn to the emotions Leys speaks of as characteristic of humanities and social science scholarship in recent times has an unavoidable awkwardness if we think about in relation to literary study, as well as (I would wager) in relation to the study of the arts in general. For the emotions have *never* been absent from thinking about literature, from the time of Plato and Aristotle to the present. As Joshua Landy puts it, the ‘affective’ approach to the literary – the preoccupation with ‘what fiction does to or for our emotions’ – has been a principal concern of poetic and rhetorical culture since their beginnings, from Horace’s ‘If you would have me weep, you must first feel grief yourself’ (‘si vis me flere, dolendum est | primum ipsi tibi’) to Eliot’s theory of the ‘objective correlative’, that is, that ‘set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion’ which the author is trying to express.¹⁹ In other words, the literary has *always* been committed to the exploration of emotion, although in one sense this commitment is very often only a *starting point* for what literature does – after all, it hardly gets one very far to say that *King Lear* is ‘about’ anger, *Othello* ‘about’ jealousy. To focus on literary works for what they have to say about ‘the emotions’ as such is to look down the telescope the wrong way – *every* literary or artistic work has a particular emotional colouring (its mood or tone), deals with experiences (the artist’s, characters’) that have specific affects. What the study of literary or artistic works is routinely interested in is describing the formal means by which affect is produced; and, of course, with the ways in which these works *deploy* affect to shape our views of any number of other matters (social, political, cultural, psychological, etc.) This is simply a way of saying that the arts, merely by virtue of their concern to represent experience, necessarily deal with the emotions. But the larger, and much more contentious, point I wish to make is that the literary is at some fundamental level *committed* to the passions, in particular erotic desire.²⁰ In other words, I agree with Jonathan Dollimore’s statement that Plato was in fact right to hold that ‘Art appeals to the passions’ and ‘all that is disruptive in human desire’.²¹

Dante’s famous recounting, in Canto V of *Inferno*, of the adulterous desire of Paolo and Francesca, connects literary representation itself with illicit passion. Poetry and story-telling are complicit with the passions. Francesca, after all, claims that it was a bawd of a book, a ‘Galeotto’ (5.137) – that is, the tale of Launcelot who, persuaded by Galehaut (in the Italian, ‘Galeotto’), confesses his love to Guinevere – that prompted her and Paolo to begin their adulterous liaison.²² They had been perusing the book together, and, alighting upon that very scene with Guinevere and Launcelot, Paolo kissed her – and ‘quel giorno più non vi leggemmo avante’ (5.138): ‘that day we read no further’. What fascinates is the contingency of their encounter – had they not read together that particular passage, on that day, who can know whether they would have fallen? The naughty book itself solicits their passion. Dante asks Francesca how it was that ‘Amore’ led them to ‘i dubbiosi disiri’ (5.120) – ‘dubious desires’. He wants to know how and why (‘a che e come’) Love led them to sin (5.119). The focus is on the concrete contingency of desire – how passion came about, how and under what circumstances it emerged. And Dante’s compassion (‘pietade’) for the lovers quite overcomes him at the end of their tale: ‘e caddi come corpo morto cade’ (‘I fell as a dead body falls’ – (5.140, 142)). *Tout comprendre, c’est tout pardonner* – it is Dante’s learning of the actual circumstances behind Paolo and Francesca’s adulterous affair that leads him to pity them. And note again that it is the literary imagination itself,

that bawd of a book, that seduces them. What Canto V does *not* give us is an abstract discursive rationalistic account of adultery. Instead, we read a sort of ‘thick description’ of it, how and why it came about; and to know this experience, in all its everyday concreteness, is no longer to be able to judge it from afar, unfeelingly. This is what literature does, the episode reminds us: produce emotion (Paolo and Francesca’s love) and show us the actual experience of it, in such a way that we cannot simply place it as an easily graspable concept (for example, that of ‘adulterous desire’). Adultery is a sin, Dante knows that, and we must of course be on our guard against a sentimental and anachronistic account of the episode – as Lino Pertile writes of it: ‘There is no good that love, unrestrained by reason, does not destroy. We begin by yielding to passion, and we end betraying and murdering Caesar and Christ; this is the story of humanity and the map of Dante’s Hell’.²³ Nevertheless, what Paolo and Francesca undergo, in all its delicacy, force and tenderness, does not *feel* like sin, not at this moment in the story anyway. Hence Dante’s being overcome by compassion at the end of the canto, the sudden strange faint. The point of the visit to this circle of Hell was to drive home a moral lesson: lechery is sinful. But something different takes place. We see human desire as understandable and, if not completely forgivable, at least as possessing a sad and fallen beauty.

At the opening of *The Canterbury Tales* Chaucer begs the reader’s ‘curteisye’ (I.725): that is, forbearance.²⁴ He will have to relate his pilgrims’ stories exactly as they recounted them – even if they speak ‘never so rudelich and large’ (I.734), that is, rudely and broadly. Chaucer is concerned with truth, accuracy of representation – he must avoid telling these tales ‘untrewe’ (I.735), that is, inaccurately – and the emphasis on concreteness, on experience, takes precedence over any other aim. The very same solicitude for actuality is manifest in the Miller’s Prologue. All the pilgrims agree that the high-minded Knight’s Tale, which has just been related, was ‘a noble storie’, worthy of remembrance (I.3111, 3112). But when the drunken loutish Miller straightaway insists on telling *his* tale, Chaucer, with tongue firmly in cheek, avows his own innocence in rehearsing it. He admits the Miller’s is a ‘cherles tale’ (I.3169). But that he cannot help, he protests, and begs, once again, the reader’s patience:

And therefore every gentil wight I preye,
For Goddes love, demeth nat that I seye
Of yvel entente, but for I moot reherce
Hir tales alle, be they bettre or werse,
Or elles falsen som of my mateere.

(I.3171–5)

Of course all of this is an elaborate game on Chaucer’s part: we know, and he knows, that the tale is told because it entertains. Nevertheless, telling it allows Chaucer to assert the need for an art that is true to life – one that honours experience. What matters, it turns out, is accuracy. There are plenty of other tales in the collection ‘that toucheth gentillesse, | And eek moralitee and hoolynesse’ (I.3179–80); readers can always skip the present tale and seek out them. But Chaucer must not ‘falsen’ his subject-matter, even at the cost of propriety. What follows is a tale of unabashed and easy-going sexual desire, in which the Oxford student Nicholas bluntly seduces the Miller’s wife, the irresistible young Alison. No moralizing view of the material is taken:

desire is accepted as a given. And what licenses this bawdy is, again, Chaucer's insistence on the priority of concrete representation – the truth of the Miller's 'mateere'. It is respect for this so-called 'mateere' – what Chaucer would have us understand as something like the raw material of experience – that makes acceptable this story of sexual passion. Art is dedicated to experience – all of it – and experience has its own authority, over and beyond that of 'moralitee'.

Boccaccio's *Decameron* makes the connection between literature and desire as explicit as possible. As in *The Canterbury Tales*, a frame device – a band of noble Florentines entertaining each other with stories – ensures that we are made aware of audience response, either of merriment or compassion, to each tale. 'If the earlier stories had saddened the fair ladies' hearts, this last one . . . caused so much merriment . . . it drove away the melancholy engendered by the others' (Conclusion to the Fourth Day, p. 362); summary comments like this one appear throughout.²⁵ The stories are meant to work upon the auditors' emotions, to divert, enliven, cheer, move them. There is no suggestion that the stories are edifying; their purpose is entertainment, or, more precisely, the stimulation of feeling among the little group. And this is of a piece with their remarkably forgiving and casual attitude to sex. Chastity is a worthy ideal but 'it is not always possible for us to observe this precept to the full on account of our [i.e. women's] frailty'. The 'woman who strays from the path of virtue for monetary gain deserves to be burnt alive, but the one who yields to the forces of Love, knowing how powerful they are, deserves a lenient judge who will order her acquittal' (Eighth Day, First Story, p. 552). A remarkable speech occurring in the Eighth Story of the Second Day is typical of Boccaccio's relaxed treatment of desire. The speaker is an adulteress. Much later, towards the end of her life, she repents of her sins, but at this point in her career the voice is refined, elegant and easy-going, in keeping with the indulgent spirit of the whole collection:

Men and women are remarkably frail, and . . . for a variety of reasons, some are frailer than others. . . . I consider, then, that circumstances . . . must go a long way towards excusing any woman who allows herself to be enmeshed in the toils of love. . . . The fact is that I am unable, in my husband's absence, to withstand the promptings of the flesh and the powers of Love, which are so irresistible that even the strongest of men, not to mention frail women like myself, have often succumbed to them in the past and will always continue to do so.

(Second Day, Eighth Story, p. 150)

Boccaccio's world is indeed one of 'circumstances'. These comprise the 'frailty' of human beings and the complex situations they find themselves in. But 'circumstances', or experience, are the province of literature: what matters are the specifics and actualities of life, rather than generalities and bloodless maxims. Of course the Horatian precept that poetry's proper aim is to blend the useful and edifying with the delightful, or, as Sidney put it, to permit 'Mistress Philosophy [to] borrow the masking raiment of Poesy', works against this idea; but the theorization of literature is not uncommonly at odds with its actual practice or experience.²⁶ Again, to represent vice vividly and compellingly, or to understand *how* it comes about, is often enough to be half-way towards excusing it.

Experience exceeds rational conceptualizations, normative judgements. This is the truth, known to art, that Montaigne so often captures in his free-wheeling, anti-doctrinaire essays. In 'On Repenting' he insists on the mercurial quality of life – reality is a process of becoming, not a state of being, and it eludes philosophers' attempts to pin it down:

The world is but a perennial see-saw. Everything in it – the land, the mountains of the Caucasus, the pyramids of Egypt – all waver with a common motion and their own. Constancy itself is nothing but a more languid rocking to and fro. . . . I am not portraying being but becoming ['Je ne peins pas l'être, je peins le passage'].

(III.2; p. 907)²⁷

Montaigne is the most literary of early modern thinkers: there is nothing in experience that his essays decline to explore, not least the body and its unreasoning or shameful drives. He has no time for sages who ungratefully despise ordinary physical existence as beneath their dignity. In 'On Experience' he scorns those so dedicated to mind that they are incapable of appreciating ordinary pleasures. He insists on the irreducibly *variegated* character of existence: difference and specificity are of its essence. 'When collating objects', he notes, 'no quality is so universal as diversity and variety'. To the discerning eye, no two things are completely identical: 'there was a man of Delphi . . . who recognized the signs of difference between eggs and never mistook one for another' (III.13; p. 1207). It is this specificity and concreteness that philosophy, with its obsession with abstractions, rules and norms, fails to capture. Life and nature simply *are* difference: 'Likeness does not make things "one" as much as unlikeness makes them "other": Nature has bound herself to make nothing "other" which is not unlike' (III.13; p. 1208). Montaigne's emphasis on, and love of, natural variety underlies his impatience with transcendentalizing thinkers, who avert their eyes from how the world actually is. Such philosophers 'want to escape from their humanity'; but 'humours soaring to transcendence terrify' Montaigne (III.13; p. 1268). Everywhere he urges a natural way of life, one allowing for, and forgiving, our less-than-rational constitution. 'I loathe that inhuman wisdom ['cette inhumaine sapience'] which seeks to render us disdainful and hostile towards the care of our bodies ['dédaigneux et ennemis de la culture du corps']', he declares (III.13; p. 1256).²⁸ The key thing is to follow nature, which requires accepting that we are neither just body, or soul, but an unstable mixture of both – and each must have its due (III.13; p. 1258). Montaigne scorns unnatural attempts to extirpate our non-rational impulses: far better gently to moderate them. 'Temperance' is not pleasure's 'chastisement but its relish' (III.13; p. 1262). We should allow ourselves to go with the flow of the moment, be emotionally responsive to experience rather than set ourselves against it in the name of some unworldly philosophic principle:

When I dance, I dance. When I sleep, I sleep; and when I am strolling alone through a beautiful orchard, although part of the time my thoughts are occupied by other things, for part of the time too I bring them back to the walk, to the orchard, to the delight of being alone there, and to me. Mother-like, Nature has provided that such actions as she has imposed on us as necessities

should also be pleasurable [‘aussi voluptueuses’], urging us towards them not only by reason but by desire [‘non seulement par la raison, mais aussi par l’appétit’]. To corrupt her laws is wrong.

(III.13; p. 1258)²⁹

Montaigne’s conclusion is remarkable. Impatient with abstract, axiomatic modes of thought, he insists on the irreducibly concrete, embodied, circumstantial character of human life. ‘Desire’, *l’appétit*, is, it turns out, part of Nature’s ‘laws’; following, rather than suppressing, it is the true way of Nature. This turns on its head a view of human life – inherited from many ancient thinkers – as ideally governed by an imperialistic Reason, one that understands its responsibility as the rigorous control of irrational desires.³⁰

Montaigne’s impatience with philosophers is echoed in the English writer who read him with such appreciation and enthusiasm, Shakespeare (who quoted him in *The Tempest*). ‘I pray thee peace’, cries out Leonato in *Much Ado about Nothing* when his brother Antonio tries, with some well-turned moral counsel, to assuage his distress at the accusation that his daughter Hero has played her lover Claudio false. ‘I will be flesh and blood’, insists Leonato instead,

For there was never yet philosopher
That could endure the toothache patiently,
However they have writ the style of gods,
And made a push at chance and sufferance.
(5.1.34–8).³¹

For Leonato, experience trumps ‘counsel’ (5.1.5). All will advise ‘patience’ (5.1.10, 19, 27) to someone enduring a ‘grief’, especially if it is one ‘Which they themselves not feel’. But ‘tasting it, | Their counsel’ soon ‘turns to passion’ (5.1.21–3). The authors of moral treatises are mere ‘candle-wasters’ (5.1.18) – wiseacres whose lofty-sounding counsel evaporates in the face of actual feeling and experience. Indeed it is entirely to the credit of Antonio that, when the flippant and supercilious Claudio, along with his ally Don Pedro, turn up after Hero’s putative death, he immediately abandons his own advice to Leonato to practise stoic equanimity and instead falls into a towering rage (such that even Leonato tries to talk him down): ‘God knows I lov’d my niece’, fulminates Antonio, ‘And she is dead, slander’d to death by villains, |. . . | Boys, apes, braggarts, Jacks, milksops!’ (5.1.87–91). Overall the play takes a decidedly negative view of ‘philosophic’ coolness. It is passionate *attachment*, their love for Hero, that indicates the sound moral character of Leonato and Antonio. The deception practised upon Claudio is clever, and his repudiation of Hero at the wedding is not without tragic seriousness – Shakespeare is endlessly fascinated by such moments of profound male disillusion, as in *Othello*, *King Lear*, *Hamlet*, *The Winter’s Tale*, *Troilus and Cressida*. But what appals about Claudio in this encounter with Hero’s grief-stricken father and uncle is how quickly he seems to have shrugged off her death. Indeed, passion in this play is itself a good. When the loyal cousin of Hero, Beatrice, tells Benedick that the necessary response to Hero’s death is ‘Kill Claudio’ (4.1.289) we are both alarmed and delighted: how obviously right, how characteristic, of the full-hearted Beatrice to take the generous, the spontaneous, the naturally passionate response to the crisis!

The relation between literature and reality or experience is Cervantes's overarching concern in *Don Quixote*. The absurd and fantastical romances beloved of the old knight are contrasted with the actuality of his life, with the bareness of everyday existence in rural Spain generally. The extended joke of the book depends on the mismatch between Don Quixote's romance-fantasy life and the empirical world in which these fantasies actually play out. Cervantes is explicit about his commitment to the real (which is what underlies the frequent comparison of his genius to Shakespeare's). The canon's long attack on books of chivalric romance towards the end of Part I express Cervantes's own allegiance to 'verisimilitude and imitation' in art, the conviction that 'the perfection of all writing consists in these two qualities'.³² The canon's strictures are reinforced by those of the priest, for whom drama should be 'a mirror of human life' and 'exemplar of truth'.³³ Cervantes's orientation towards the empirical requires, in particular, that it is realistic about the body and its functions (hence the novel's inclusion of all sorts of low material, such as Sancho and Quixote vomiting over each other).³⁴ So why then does Don Quixote, who endures countless humiliations, and is a laughing-stock to so many persons about him, emerge nevertheless as a hero? He is continually taken advantage of, mocked, beaten. The only answer to this question can be that what makes him finally of interest to us, what ennobles him, is desire itself. Cervantes takes the unprecedented step of justifying a figure who has nothing other to recommend himself than his desire to be greater than what in fact he is and will remain. *Don Quixote* is a story that glorifies and dignifies desire even as it acknowledges its absurdity. Or, to put it another way, the novel traces over many pages what it is *actually like* to want to be a knight out of romance in the real world. It is Don Quixote's interior imaginative life, the pathos of knighthood, that finally trumps reason and social norms.

Milton's *Paradise Lost* champions the control of reason over the passions – indeed, Satan himself is depicted as a chaos of such emotions as envy, ambition and malice. 'Rational liberty' is Milton's ethical ideal, that psycho-political state in which the affections are governed by reason (which is true freedom – Satan is enslaved to himself, to his own basest desires, as Abdiel points out: 'Thyself not free, but to thyself enthralled' (6.181)).³⁵ Yet Milton is alive to the way in which there is something profoundly right about Adam's determination not to abandon Eve to her punishment but to eat of the Tree of Knowledge and join her in damnation. Adam's language at this crucial moment is not frenzied but noble and feeling: 'if death | Consort with thee, death is to me as life' (9.953–4). He is 'not deceived, | But fondly overcome with female charm' (9.998–9): he eats out of a profound sense of love and desire for her. 'Fondly' here has not merely the suggestion of foolishness but, just as importantly, that of tenderness or love. The speech in which he throws his lot in with hers is one of the most moving in the entire poem, despite its being delivered in what Milton significantly describes as a 'calm mood' (9.920):

So forcible within my heart I feel
The bond of nature draw me to my own,
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine;
Our state cannot be severed; we are one,
One flesh; to lose thee were to lose myself.
(9.955–9)

This is neither deluded nor corrupt, but the language of authentic love. Milton is quite capable of indicating corruption of sentiment and feeling: and indeed, immediately after eating the fruit Adam's speech does turn lubricious and over-sophisticated: 'Eve, now I see thou art exact of taste, | And elegant, of sapience no small part' (9.1017–18). He has fallen into the mode of the dissolute Cavalier, a son of Belial. But 'To lose thee were to lose myself' is simple and heartfelt; and to be drawn by 'The bond of nature' is no contemptible impulse. What is dramatized here is love – Adam 'feel[s]' this bond to Eve 'forcibl[y]' in his 'heart' – a love that is unseeing and misguided, but love nonetheless. It is important to make this point, because we ought to resist the temptation to smooth out the unevennesses of the poem in favour of some monological and 'official' understanding of it (and the history of differing responses to Satan, from Blake to Empson to Lewis, surely tells us that this is a gloriously unsettled text). The truth is that we, and Milton, would think *less* of Adam here if he were to abandon his partner and preserve himself out of some unfeeling, and basely prudent, 'virtue'. It is Adam's selflessness that is to the fore here ('we are one, | One flesh'); and such feeling is the antithesis of Satanic egoism, however catastrophic its result. Indeed, it is Adam's heroic and fully aware *self-sacrifice* (he is 'not deceived') that bodes well for the future of the human race: there are reserves of nobility and heroism even in fallen humanity that will eventually play a role in its redemption.

Samuel Johnson's 'Preface to Shakespeare' falls somewhat outside my period but is a remarkable document that sums up much of what I have been saying. Johnson's literary criticism, with its cautious receptivity to Shakespeare's departure from neoclassical norms of rationality and regularity (both aesthetic and moral), constitutes an opening from the Age of Reason to the new Romantic era and its cult of feeling. Shakespeare's achievement lies in its commitment to mimesis: his drama shows the world as it is – Shakespeare is 'the poet of nature' – and as such reveals the passions as they are, not as they ought to be. He 'holds up to his readers a faithful mirrour of manners and of life', giving us 'human sentiments in human language', in 'scenes' which are so faithful to reality that from them 'a hermit may estimate the transactions of the world, and a confessor predict the progress of the passions'.³⁶ But this fidelity to experience often entails that Shakespeare 'seems to write without any moral purpose'³⁷ – mimesis, the commitment to experience itself, outgoes morality. Although as we have seen Johnson stresses the general over the particular as the defining concern of literature, it is Shakespeare's mimetic fidelity that is stressed again and again. To be an artist, for Johnson, is to dedicate oneself to 'sublunary nature', in all its complexity, not to an ideal rationalization of experience – so Shakespeare's plays do not respect the purity and decorum of genre, but rather 'express . . . the course of the world, in which the loss of one is the gain of another; in which, at the same time, the reveller is hasting to his wine, and the mourner burying his friend'.³⁸ It is this reconciliation of art to the world, its embrace of the world as against critical or philosophic or theological repudiations of it, that ensures that art remains faithful to the passions. For the passions *are* the world, as seen by art. For the artist, there is nothing in the world that is not passional, not shot through with feeling.

Notes

- 1 F. Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* (1881), ed. M. Clark and B. Leiter, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 243.
- 2 Homer, *The Iliad*, 1.348-350, ed. and trans. A.T. Murray, rev. W.F. Wyatt, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. For further examples of extreme passion in the *Iliad*, see Plato's discussion in *The Republic*, Book 3, 388a-d, in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 632-3.
- 3 F. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), in *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, ed. R. Geuss and R. Speirs, trans. R. Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 33.
- 4 W. Hazlitt, 'Coriolanus', in *Characters of Shakespear's Plays* (1817), reprinted in *Selected Writings of William Hazlitt*, ed. D. Wu, London: Pickering & Chatto, 1998, vol. 1, pp. 126, 125.
- 5 W. Hazlitt, 'Henry V', in *Characters of Shakespear's Plays*; see *The Romantics on Shakespeare*, ed. J. Bate, London: Penguin, 1992, p. 365.
- 6 See *Poetics*, Ch. 6, 1449b25, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, vol. 2, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 2320: 'incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish . . . catharsis of such emotions'; and Plato, *Republic*, Book 3, 387b-89b (discussion of need to prevent poets from depicting 'men of note' being overcome by grief or laughter) in *The Collected Dialogues*, pp. 632-3.
- 7 S. Johnson, 'Preface to Shakespeare', in *Criticism: The Major Texts*, ed. W.J. Bate, New York: Harcourt, 1970, p. 208.
- 8 Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451b5-11; p. 2323.
- 9 See R. Leys, 'The turn to affect: a critique', *Critical Inquiry* 37:3, Spring 2011, 434-72 (p. 436).
- 10 See 'Historical inevitability' (1953), in I. Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind*, ed. H. Hardy, London: Pimlico, 1998, p. 121; and 'Two concepts of liberty' (1958), in *The Proper Study of Mankind*, pp. 216-26 (p. 216).
- 11 See M. Oakeshott, 'Rationalism in politics' (1947), in his *'Rationalism in Politics' and Other Essays* (1962), Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1991, pp. 14, 15, 31, n. 30.
- 12 See E. Gellner, *Reason and Culture: The Historic Role of Rationality and Rationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, p. 67.
- 13 See M. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- 14 See R. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 53.
- 15 R. Rorty, 'Human rights, rationality, and sentimentality', in his *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 3: *Truth and Progress*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 183.
- 16 M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. J. Cumming, New York: Continuum, 1987, pp. 6, 7.
- 17 See M. Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1927), trans. J. Stambaugh, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, p. 96.
- 18 Virginia Woolf's words apply not just to modern novels but to literature in general: "The proper stuff of fiction" does not exist; everything is the proper stuff of fiction, every feeling, every thought; every quality of brain and spirit is drawn upon; no perception comes amiss': 'Modern Fiction' (1919), in *Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism: A Reader*, ed. D. Lodge, London: Longman, 1972, p. 91.
- 19 See J. Landy, *How to Do Things with Fictions*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 4; Horace, *Ars Poetica*, lines 102-3, in *Horace: Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica*, ed. and trans. H.R. Fairclough, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926, repr. 1936; T.S. Eliot, 'The Objective Correlative', excerpt from his 1919 essay on *Hamlet*, in *The Modern Tradition: Backgrounds of Modern Literature*, ed. R. Ellman and C. Feidelson, Jr, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 134.
- 20 My thinking on this matter is partly influenced by Denis de Rougemont's important study of the Western literary tradition and its obsession with erotic, in particular adulterous,

- passion. For de Rougemont, European literature and culture since *Tristan and Iseult* has displayed a morbid (and irreligious) fascination with the allure of adulterous desire: 'Without adultery, what would happen to imaginative writing?': see D. de Rougemont, *Passion and Society*, trans. M. Belgion, London: Faber, 1950; second edn 1956, p. 16.
- 21 J. Dollimore, *Sex, Literature, and Censorship*, Cambridge: Polity, 2001, p. 151.
 - 22 Quotations referenced in-text by canto and line number are from the translation of Dante, *Inferno* by Robin Kirkpatrick, London: Penguin, 2006.
 - 23 'Introduction to *Inferno*', in R. Jacoff (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Dante*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 72.
 - 24 Quotations are referenced in-text by fragment and line number from G. Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales*, ed. A.C. Cawley, London: Dent, 1975.
 - 25 Quotations, referenced in-text by page number, are from G. Boccaccio, *The Decameron*, trans. G.H. McWilliam, 2nd edn, London: Penguin, 1995.
 - 26 P. Sidney, *Defense of Poesie*, in A.H. Gilbert (ed.), *Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden*, Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1962, p. 428.
 - 27 Quotations of Montaigne, referenced in-text by book, chapter, and page number, are from *The Complete Essays*, trans. M.A. Screech, London: Penguin, 1991. For the French text, I have used *Les Essais*, ed. D. Bjaï, Bénédicte Boudou, Jean Céard and Isabelle Pantin, 3 vols, Paris: Livre de Poche, 2002; here, vol. 3, p. 33.
 - 28 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 523.
 - 29 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 526.
 - 30 As Pierre Hadot has shown, the practice of attention to one's self, issuing in rational management of the passions, was common to many ancient philosophical schools, in particular the Platonists and Stoics, as well to writers of the early church. Such 'attention', Hadot writes, 'was the fundamental attitude of the Stoics, and of the NeoPlatonists' and 'translates into self-mastery and self-control', or 'the triumph of reason over the passions, pushed as far as their complete extirpation': see P. Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?* (1995), trans. M. Chase, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 242, 244. Compare Marcus Aurelius: 'Therefore the Mind, unmastered by passions, is a very citadel [διὰ τοῦτο ἀκρόπολις ἐστὶν ἡ ἐλευθέρα παθῶν διάνοια], for a man has no fortress more impregnable wherein to find refuge and be untaken for ever': *Meditations*, 8.48, ed. and trans. C.R. Haines, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916.
 - 31 Quotations from *Much Ado About Nothing* are from *The Riverside Shakespeare*, ed. G.B. Evans, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1974.
 - 32 M. de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, Pt 1, Ch. 47, trans. J. Rutherford, London: Penguin, 2003, p. 440.
 - 33 Ibid., Pt 1, Ch. 48, p. 444.
 - 34 Ibid., Pt 1, Ch. 18, pp. 143–4.
 - 35 Quotations from *Paradise Lost* are from J. Milton, *Poetical Works*, ed. D. Bush, London: Oxford University Press, 1966.
 - 36 Johnson, 'Preface to Shakespeare', pp. 208, 209–10; 'his drama is the mirrour of life': p. 209.
 - 37 Ibid., p. 212.
 - 38 Ibid., p. 210.

THE THEATRE OF WONDER

*Kathryn Prince***Introduction**

In this chapter, I approach the emotional experience of wonder in medieval and early modern English drama from the perspective of the philosopher Jane Bennett's useful distinction between awe and fascination. In her work on an emotional response that she describes as 'secular enchantment', Bennett separates her own subject from what she calls 'fall-to-your-knees awe'.¹ Secular enchantment, she argues, is a 'state of interactive fascination', an 'active engagement' with the object of that fascination.² Since medieval and early modern drama is often concerned with both awe and enchantment, and with the boundary between religious and secular matters, Bennett's distinction is a productive way of approaching wonder, which is a more capacious term than awe or fascination, embracing both the passive, fall-to-your-knees response and the active, engaged one.

An apparently significant distinction that scholars have made between medieval and early modern English drama is the presence of religious matter in the former and its absence, by law, in the latter.³ Wonder in medieval drama is connected to faith, whereas in early modern drama it is a form of Bennett's secular enchantment. Bennett argues in *The Enchantment of Modern Life* that 'enchantment never really left the world but only changed its forms', elicited now by technology, science and the arts.⁴ Bennett, like others working in the interdisciplinary field of contemporary spirituality, is interested in disentangling the emotional experience of wonder from organized religion, a separation also useful for considering the ongoing role of wonder in early modern drama.⁵ The recognizably religious elements of medieval drama may be absent from early modern secular plays, but the enchantment that accompanies Christianity persists after Christianity is evacuated from the drama. While censors in early modern England and critics today have expended energy searching for vestiges or allegories of organized religion in early modern plays – seeking crypto-Catholicism, for example – a central element of religion, enchantment, has attracted less attention.⁶ Enchantment separated from religion was not within the scope of early modern censorship, although in late medieval anti-theatrical thought there is evidence of some caution about what was already emerging as the separation of religion and wonder.

In order to demonstrate that the medieval dramaturgy of wonder associated with religion survives to serve secular ends in early modern drama, and as a case study in the afterlife of medieval emotional dramaturgy, this chapter focuses on objects of wonder at a moment of transition between medieval and early modern English

drama, reading a number of wondrous stage objects ranging chronologically from the empty tomb of *The Resurrection of Our Lord* (c. 1540) to the speaking brass head in *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay* (c. 1589), the living statue in *The Winter's Tale* (c. 1610), and the manipulated corpse of *The Second Maiden's Tragedy* (c. 1611). It compares England to Spain and France, where the relationship between drama and religion proceeded along somewhat different paths. It contends that even while wonder was emerging as a scandalous, unruly and potentially heretical emotion in early modern England, suspended between affective piety and the dangerous, illusion-breaking curiosity of the scientific revolution, the dramaturgical structures that scaffolded moments of medieval wonder persisted in early modern secular plays.

I begin my analysis of these playtexts with an approach drawing on Caroline Walker Bynum's productive identification of medieval wonder's semantic field, which surveys the clusters of words surrounding wonder in a range of medieval texts (1997).⁷ One way of beginning to consider the continuities and contrasts between medieval and early modern dramatic depictions of theatrical wonder is to consider the words that appear in conjunction with this term, or in opposition to it: wonder's shifting semantic field. This is Bynum's approach in her analysis of non-dramatic medieval examples, which finds that

for theologians and natural philosophers, the opposite of *admiratio* was in some sense the *scientia*, or knowledge, to which it led; but wonder was also associated with *diversitas* (diversity), and its opposite was *solitum*, the usual, or even in some sense the general. In the religious discourse of sermon and hagiography, the most frequent opposite of *admiratio* was *imitatio* (imitation), less frequently *curiositas* (curiosity) or *disputatio* (disputatiousness). Readers and audiences for saints' lives, whether Latin or vernacular, were urged to wonder at, not imitate, the power and extravagant asceticism of holy men and women. Wonder was moreover associated with paradox, coincidence of opposites; one finds *mira* (wondrous) again and again in the texts alongside *mixta* (mixed or composite things), a word that evokes the hybrids and monsters also found in the literature of entertainment. In this entertainment literature, which is the third discourse I treat, *admirari* (to wonder at) is sometimes contrasted to *rimari* (to pry into), although it is sometimes seen as an inducement to such prying.⁸

The semantic field occupied by wonder in drama is broadly consistent with Bynum's findings that wonder appears in proximity to words exhorting the beholder to favour passive responses: the beholder should be amazed, should marvel, should have faith; should not seek to investigate, imitate, or pry into; should not exhibit curiosity. As Barbara Benedict has argued in her book *Curiosity: A Cultural History of Early Modern Inquiry* (2001),⁹ curiosity was a largely pejorative term in this period, only taking on its more familiar positive connotations with the scientific revolution; René Descartes's identification of wonder as 'the first of all the passions' in *Les Passions de l'âme* (*The Passions of the Soul*, 1649) might serve as the signpost of a shift.¹⁰ However, since drama often depicts and describes emotional states rather than naming them, and sometimes even seeks to elicit them in its spectators, wonder, in all its religious

and secular variants, is not adequately accounted for in semantic analysis. Wonder is discernible in the dramatic action of plays even when the word itself is absent from their texts. My analysis therefore searches for signs of wonder beyond semantics to consider how wonder is displayed, described and even, at times, perhaps, created for the spectator through both semantics, the language of words, and semiotics, the language of signs.

My approach to the semiotics of wonder is beholden to Tzvetan Todorov's important theorization of the fantastic, the uncanny, and the marvellous in *Introduction à la littérature fantastique* (1970; translated as *The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to Literary Genre*, 1973).¹¹ Todorov distinguishes between the uncanny, those apparently supernatural elements that later come to be explained as natural, and the marvellous, those elements that remain supernatural or unexplained. The fantastic occurs in the reader's hesitation between the uncanny and the marvellous: it is inherent in the dramatic pause that accompanies wonder onstage. The sign of wonder on stage is often a momentary pause while the fantastic resolves itself into the uncanny or the marvellous; sometimes, as in *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay*, the moment is introduced with a *coup de théâtre*; sometimes, as in *The Winter's Tale*, it is stretched and sustained; in *The Resurrection of Our Lord*, a play that belongs to a genre that influenced both Greene's and Shakespeare's depictions of wonder, both techniques are present. As much as Aristotle's catharsis accounts for the pleasurable spectatorial experience of tragedy, so, I argue, Todorov's fantastic accounts for the pleasurable spectatorial experience of wonder.

Miraclis pleyinge

The experience of playgoing might be pleasurable, but in the context of religious drama it was also perceived to be risky. The most detailed extant commentary on medieval theatre's wondrous effects is an anonymous manuscript from the late fifteenth century, *A Tretise of Miraclis Pleyinge*. The *Tretise* focuses much of its attention on the dangers of wonder in the theatre and suggests some theories about the purpose of playgoing. Proponents, the *Tretise* suggests, may view it as a harmless or even beneficial activity. The *Tretise* summarizes some of the earlier arguments, such as those in *Dives and Pauper*, a dialogue between a rich man and a poor man written at the beginning of the fifteenth century that discusses the issue of spectatorship in the context of whether amusement is permissible on holy days. Like *Dives and Pauper*, the *Tretise* concedes that performing scenes of biblical events can focus the spectators on holy matters, even acknowledging their powerful emotional responses: it describes 'men and wymmen, seinge the passioun of Crist and of his seintis, ben movyd to compassion and devicion, wepinge bitere teris'.¹² It is precisely this type of serious, apparently beneficial playgoing resulting in an emotional outpouring at which the *Tretise* takes aim.

The *Tretise* fits within a medieval tradition that examines the virtues and value of entertainment, though unlike earlier examples it is unusually harsh in its conclusions about what are often considered the positive aspects of performance. The *Tretise* is not quite as anti-theatrical as Gerhoh of Reichersberg's *De investigatione Antichristi* (1161), which characterizes the performance of plays in church as the work of the

Antichrist.¹³ The *Tretise* acknowledges that plays can serve to remind spectators of biblical wonders and to help them experience beneficial emotions associated with religious faith. At stake, where wonder is concerned, is the value of the emotional experience of wonder when it arises from the performance of feigned miracles. While the *Tretise* views playgoing in general as a waste of time, wonder is among the aspects that are worse than wasteful: potentially, this kind of wonder endangers the spectator's soul. The danger is not only that the less-than-reverent performance of biblical stories risks undermining them, a concern raised, for example, by Pope Innocent III in his 1207 prohibition of theatrical performance in churches. The emotional experience of wonder in response to false miracles may also, according to the *Tretise*, subvert faith and imperil the wonderer's soul. There is a perception of danger, in the *Tretise*, when passive wonder leads to active curiosity, or to comparison and generalization.

The *Tretise*, unlike earlier works, argues that 'no man shulde usen in bourde and pleye the miraclis and werkis that Crist so ernystfully wrought to oure helthe'.¹⁴ Performing 'miraclis', even in this convincing manner that leads to an outpouring of bitter tears, is irreverent because it takes lightly something that should be serious; it is presumptuous because it claims for human amusement something properly belonging to God;¹⁵ it gratifies the 'lustis of the fleyssh and mirthe of the body' at the expense of the soul.¹⁶ The problem, according to the *Tretise*, is not the degree of seriousness or reverence in 'miraclis', but the very performance of 'miraclis' at all.

There has been some debate about what exactly the term 'miraclis' signifies in the *Tretise*, since it is not quite clear whether it means miracle plays or, as Lawrence Clopper has suggested, a category of dramatic and non-dramatic 'tricks intended to delight and amuse people and which, in many cases, led people to devalue the truth of God's miracles'.¹⁷ Whether or not Clopper is correct about the genre, stage effects, 'tricks', were certainly seen as a threat to faith well before Elizabeth's 1559 proclamation prohibiting religious matter on stage. While the range of plays included by the term 'miraclis' is ambiguous in the *Tretise*, its views on the perils of witnessing 'miraclis' are clear.

The semantic and semiotic fields of resurrection

During the Reformation, drama had a role to play in the acceptance of doctrinal changes. Not all parishes responded in the same way to shifts in doctrine, but there is evidence that some, at least, hired the medieval version of script doctors to adapt existing plays, as Alexandra Johnston and Sally-Beth MacLean have demonstrated.¹⁸ *The Resurrection of Our Lord* fits within this context, a manuscript play fragment at one time attributed to the curate John Bale but now considered, like the Catholic plays it resembles, anonymous, perhaps even the product of community or collaborative authorship. Parish plays like this were vehicles for incorporating Church of England doctrine into existing religious practices, relying on those practices to integrate the novel with the familiar, acknowledged as such in the 1534 *Act for the Advancement of True Religion*, which stated that

it shalbe lawfull to all and everye persone and persones to set foorth the songes, plaies and enterludes, to be used and exercised within this Realme

and other the Kinges Domynions, for the rebuking and reproching of vices, and the setting foorth of vertue; so allwaies the saide songes plaies or enterludes meddle not with interpretacions of Scripture contrarye to the doctrine set foorth or to be sett furthe by the Kinges Majestie.¹⁹

In this context, *The Resurrection of Our Lord* can be seen working hand in glove with authority, its attitude towards wonder consistent with prevailing views. It is interesting, in this context, that wonder is associated with a lack of faith. The characters who express wonder do so because they lack faith in the miracle of the resurrected Christ. On the first extant page, already some way in to the play, wonder is associated with Pilate, whose response to an account of the Crucifixion is ‘*If yt be thus Centuriane, you make me to wonder*’.²⁰ Concluding his account, the Centurion remarks that Pilate ‘wondered att yt’ and Pilate confirms ‘*I wondered att yt*’.²¹

Wonder’s next appearance is in the mouths of the soldiers who witness the resurrection. The stage direction describes the theatrical effect and the soldiers’ physical responses to it:

*here they fall down as deade in hearing the gones shott of & thunder Iesus riseth throwynge
off Death & the Angell>*
The · j [first] · Souldier after his astonishment
*What a wonder, we shoulde be stricken with such fear and dreade
that we coulde not stande, but fell downe like as deade.*²²

The first soldier’s response is suggestive of Bennett’s ‘fall-to-your-knees awe’, and indicates, as Bynum’s analysis predicts, that its accompanying emotion is fear. The other soldiers indicate fear as well (at lines 211 and 220), and suggest that this is the appropriate response:

The · iij [third] · Souldier
*And howe did the vayle of ye temple teare a sunder
that ys made even ye Priestes, them selves all to wonder*
The · ij [second] · Souldier
*Att his death I sawe, great breakinge of stones
att his risynge I feared the breakinge of all my bones
yf he be soe terrible, as he hath shewed here
I woulde ye Bishoppes, had felte some part of our feare.*²³

Like many parish plays, *The Resurrection of Our Lord* is designed to be performed over multiple days. The first day’s play ends with the character of Appendix, a narrator, preparing the audience for reactions as news of the resurrection spreads:

*Nowe conferre the messengers, of Christes resurrection
Marie, and the souldiers, and lett vs tast the mysterye
Marie, told the Apostles, which toke yt for a delusion.*²⁴

After some missing pages, the manuscript has moved on to the second day’s play, a scene of Christ comforting Peter at the sepulchre. In the next scene, Luke and

Cleophas ‘marvayle’ at Christ’s mistreatment but dismiss the ‘phantasticalle follye’ of Peter and the ‘foolishe wemen’ who have reported his resurrection.²⁵ After a long conversation during which a disguised Christ explains Christian doctrine to them, he disappears. They ‘make gestures of wounder awhile’, the stage directions tell us, as they realize that their interlocutor has been no disciple; they describe a kind of ‘ravishment’ that held them ‘rapt’ as he spoke and that replaced what the Appendix describes as ‘doubtfull hope’ with ‘faith’.²⁶

The Resurrection of Our Lord, then, is a sustained depiction of human emotional responses to a confirmed wonder, the resurrection of Christ. Characters express fear, doubt, rapture and ravishment in relation to this miracle, in ways that, despite doctrinal shifts in other matters, share similarities with pre-Reformation parish plays.

Wonder and iconophobia in *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay*

While plays like *The Resurrection of Our Lord* were seen as potential allies of the new Church of England, in 1559 that role for drama ended with Elizabeth’s proclamation that

wherein either matters of religion or the governance of the estate of the commonwealth shall be handled or treated, being no meet matters to be written or treated upon but by men of authority, learning and wisdom, nor to be handled before any audience but of grave and discreet persons: all which parts of this proclamation her majesty chargeth to be inviolably kept.²⁷

Wonder, with its accompanying emotions, was not evacuated from drama with this announcement, but it was separated from religion. Robert Greene’s *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay* (c. 1589) depicts both medieval and early modern attitudes to wonder, and responses to wonder including the uncanny and the marvellous, in its attempt to recapture, for its early modern audience, a medieval attitude, reflecting both Greene’s early modern emotions towards the play’s magical brass head and his emotions towards medieval attitudes that he imagines to be different from his own.

Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay is a Renaissance reimagining of events in the life of the medieval alchemist and scholar, Roger Bacon, ‘doctor mirabilis’, whose *Opus Majus* was an important influence on the development of European science. Among other wonders, the *Opus Majus* discusses resurrection in ways that Todorov might frame as an attempt to shift it from the marvellous to the uncanny.²⁸ In Greene’s play, Bacon is a relatively benign sorcerer whose greatest achievement is the creation of a talking brass head animated by demonic forces. As Mark Dahlquist has argued, sympathetic readings of Bacon’s magic ignore the transgressive nature of this triumph, his creation of an idol to be worshipped.²⁹

An episode in Scene 11 shows both the brass head’s animation and its destruction, with a stage direction that recalls *The Resurrection of Our Lord* and dialogue suggestive of Bynum’s semantic analysis even though this is not a medieval text but an early modern depiction of medieval people:

The Head speakes

HEAD Time is.

MILES Time is. Why, Master Brazen-head, haue you such a capitall nose, and answer you with sillables, Time is? is this all my masters cunning, to spend seuen yeeres studie about Time is? Well, sir, it may be, we shall haue some orations of it anon; well, Ile watch you as narrowly as euer you were watcht, and Ile play with you as the Nightingale with the Slow-worme, Ile set a pricke against my brest; now rest there, *Miles*, Lord haue mercy vpon me, I haue almost kild my selfe: vp, *Miles*, list how they rumble.

HEAD Time was.

MILES Well, Frier *Bacon*, you haue spent your seuen yeeres study well, that can make your Head speake but two words at once, Time was: yea mary, time was when my Master was a wise man, but that was before he began to make the Brazen-head. You shall lye while you arse ake, and your Head speake no better: well, I will watch and walke vp and downe, and be a Peripatetian and a Philosopher of *Aristotles* stampe. What, a fresh noyse? Take thy Pistols in hand, *Miles*.

Here the Head speakes, and a lightning flasheth forth and a hand appeares that breaketh downe the Head with a hammer.

HEAD Time is past.

MILES Master, master, vp, hell's broken loose, your head speakes, and there's such a thunder and lightning, that I warrant, all Oxford is vp in armes; out of your bed, take a browne bill in your hand, the latter day is come.³⁰

Miles's evocation of 'the latter day' suggests that he knows the origins of the hand that wields the hammer, even though Elizabeth's proclamation prohibits Greene from naming it. Greene's dodge is artful, as is his exploration of emotional contingency relating to idolatry, drawing on the real Bacon's writings to create a medieval character, Miles, who responds with early modern sophistication to the animation of the brazen head but then with medieval fall-on-your-knees awe to the divine hammer. Miles can separate true miracles from false.

The play is more fully early modern in its ideas about the contaminating effects of an individual's idolatry on the community. Friar Bacon, by taking upon himself the creation of an idol, is not only guilty of hubris; in creating a miraculous object, he is also guilty of sacrilege, which is, Dahlquist suggests, contagious:

a historicized account of iconophobic discourse reveals a concept of idolatry that assumes that the presence of an idol produces a contaminating effect on the whole community – even those not in the presence of the idol itself. . . . [S]ince the logic of iconophobia postulates that authentic and Godly human community is impossible in the presence of material idols – and the idolatry they inspire – it is significant that the close-knit community of Fressingfield remains torn, even after the destruction of Bacon's creation, until Friar Bacon completes the play's iconoclastic action through a second, interiorized, iconoclastic act.³¹

The emotional community created around Bacon's idol includes not only Fressingfield but also the spectators who have been amused and enticed by the stage effect that has allowed it both to talk and, in a literal *coup de théâtre* that is also an act of iconoclasm, to be smashed. The contagious emotional effect of these experiences on the spectator is an issue of concern right through the period covered by this essay, as Jonas Barish demonstrated in his influential *The Antitheatrical Prejudice* (1981);³² Michael O'Connell has articulated this anti-theatricalism specifically in relation to iconoclasm in *The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theater in Early-Modern England* (2000).³³

Comedia in Golden Age Spain and comedy in neoclassical France

These examples from England give the sense of what I have been arguing is the continuation of religious awe in the dramaturgy of secular enchantment. In early modern Spain and France, the main issue affecting the dramatization of wonder was not secularization but neoclassicism.

In his 1615 play *El rufián dichoso* (*The Fortunate Ruffian*), the Spanish playwright Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra engages with the ideas articulated in Lope de Vega's *Arte nuevo de hacer comedias en este tempo* (1609) about the relationship between Spanish *comedia* and neoclassical ideals.³⁴ Cervantes's play very clearly departs from those ideals, abandoning the unities of action, time and place by depicting events in the life of Cristobal de la Cruz, who rises from humble beginnings through a youth of petty crime in Seville to become a Dominican friar and quasi-saint in Mexico. Decorum is abandoned from the outset thanks to a cast of prostitutes, ruffians and even a blind beggar, but the play's relationship to the neoclassical value of verisimilitude, in the context of a dramaturgy founded in religious faith, invites a more complex discussion. While there are hints of enchantment even in the long and lively first act depicting Cristobal with his criminal companions, which concludes with an angel celebrating Cristobal's spiritual awakening, in Acts 2 and 3 the play introduces wonder in the form of Cristobal's struggles with God and the Devil, including his affliction with leprosy which is part of a bargain he makes with God to save the soul of a beautiful sinner, Doña Ana. Cervantes insists, in his stage directions relating to Cristobal's vision of demonic temptation, that this is strictly factual, suggesting that for him verisimilitude is not threatened by elements that, for a secular modern audience, would be farfetched, and for an early modern English audience criminal. Similarly, Cristobal's promise to cure Doña Ana by exchanging her sins for his virtues gains retroactive verisimilitude when it is shown to have been fulfilled; Doña Ana goes to heaven surrounded by 11,000 virgins, Cristobal is instantly afflicted with leprosy, and two demons, complaining that he has deprived them of her corrupt soul, are driven away by Cristobal's intervention, returning later with Lucifer himself.

The onstage hinge between Cristobal's secular, criminal youth in Seville depicted in a more earthy fashion and his spiritual, blessed maturity in the New World replete with wonders comes between the first and second acts of the play, in the form of a conversation between the characters of Comedia and Curiosidad. Curiosidad almost fails to recognize Comedia, who explains that she has changed with the times. Their dialogue is often considered Cervantes's articulation of his dramatic theory and

comparable to Lope's *Arte nuevo*. As Bynum's semantic analysis suggests, curiosity was, at least in the medieval period, the enemy of wonder. Curiosity seeks explanations where wonder does not seek at all, but merely beholds. It is fitting, then, that Comedia triumphs over Curiosidad, and the wonders of the second and third acts occur without further incursions of curiosity.

French drama, too, changed with the times, but not without a struggle. Molière's *Tartuffe*, performed once at Versailles in 1664 and immediately targeted by religious groups who succeeded in pressuring Louis XIV to ban it until 1669, when it returned to the stage in a revised form, was collateral damage in a struggle between two opposing views of the relationship between religion and the stage. A more worldly sort of Catholicism, the kind that in Spain could countenance a play about a criminal-saint even as its inquisitors tortured supposed heretics, vied with a more rigid view that demanded theatre's reverence; rigidity gained the upper hand in the *Tartuffe* controversy, which Julia Prest, in her monograph *Controversy in French Drama: Molière's Tartuffe and the Struggle for Influence*, characterizes as the 'most important controversy in the history of French theatre'.³⁵ Much of the debate focused on the play's depiction of Tartuffe, a religious hypocrite whose downfall might, the play's detractors argued, undermine faith in the priesthood. This aspect of the debate, like the concern expressed in the *Tretise of Miraclis Pleyinge* that spectators might lose their faith in real miracles from exposure to false ones, focuses on spectators' propensity to apply lessons from the stage to sermons from the pulpit.

Tartuffe does not contain any wondrous scenes until the conclusion, a *deus ex machina* in the form of an officer who saves Orgon's family from disaster with his announcement that the King has been in control of events all along:

Officer: You, sir [to Orgon], recover from your hot alarm.
 Our prince is not a friend to double dealing,
 His eyes can read men's inmost hearts, and all
 The art of hypocrites cannot deceive him.
 His sharp discernment sees things clear and true;
 His mind cannot too easily be swayed,
 For reason always holds the balance even.
 He honours and exalts true piety
 But knows the false, and views it with disgust.
 This fellow was by no means apt to fool him;
 Far subtler snares have failed against his wisdom,
 And his quick insight pierced immediately
 The hidden baseness of this tortuous heart.
 Accusing you, the knave betrayed himself,
 And by true recompense of Heaven's justice
 He stood revealed before our monarch's eyes
 A scoundrel known before by other names,
 Whose horrid crimes, detailed at length, might fill
 A long-drawn history of many volumes.
 Our monarch – to resolve you in a word –
 Detesting his ingratitude and baseness,
 Added this horror to his other crimes,

And sent me hither under his direction
 To see his insolence out-top itself,
 And force him then to give you satisfaction.³⁶

As the play suggests, a happy ending, one beyond even the hopes of the pious characters in the play, can come to pass. 'Our prince' is not a *deus*, but in the France of Louis XIV he could be, and was believed to be, an instrument of God. More generally, wonder, in comedy, emerges in connection with Providence, the string of coincidences that lead to a happy ending, or, as in *Tartuffe*, the surprise twist that rewards the virtuous and punishes the vicious. These two forms of Providence, the string of coincidences and the surprise twist, draw on two different forms of dramaturgy: the former fits within neoclassical ideas of verisimilitude, a kind of internal logic of cause and effect, while the latter is a *coup de théâtre*.

Resurrection and comedy in Shakespeare's Romances

The *coup de théâtre* of 'gonnes shott of & thunder' specified in the stage direction for *The Resurrection of Our Lord*³⁷ is not unique to this play: there is some evidence that other parish plays included a very theatrical effect to accompany Christ's resurrection, such as a blinding flash of light created with gunpowder or another flammable material, suggested by parish acquisitions of these materials for their Easter plays.³⁸ The *coup de théâtre* is also evident in early modern resurrection scenes, such as those in Shakespeare's late tragicomic plays also known as his Romances.³⁹ Drawing on the earlier discussion of resurrections, semantics and semiotics, and Providence in comedy, I hope here to show that these Romances can be understood as manifestations of secular enchantment.

Shakespeare's Romances share comedy's emphasis on the wondrousness of a happy ending, a concept that might have providential undertones, but they also resurrect an earlier form of wonder that feels religious and that has led to interpretations of these plays as inherently Christian, an odd term to use for plays with pagan settings. As I have been arguing, secular enchantment replaces the feeling of religious wonder; Shakespeare's Romances prepare their audiences to experience wonder and offer partial or ambiguous explanations, stretching Todorov's fantastical moment, none more so than *The Winter's Tale*.

'Wonder' is used most often in Shakespeare⁴⁰ alongside imagery associated with strange creatures: mermaids and sirens,⁴¹ witches,⁴² monsters⁴³ and the mystical phoenix.⁴⁴ As these examples suggest, Shakespeare deploys wonders throughout his career, not just in the Romances written towards its end. Even Shakespeare's interest in resurrections is discernible throughout his career, in comedies and tragedies alike, whether as Hero's faked death and false resurrection in the comedy *Much Ado About Nothing* or as Juliet and Desdemona's temporary revivals in *Romeo and Juliet* and *Othello*, each followed by death. The semantic field surrounding Shakespeare's pseudo-resurrections is littered with wonders and marvels, and with gods but not, by law, God.

Shakespeare's Romances frame wonder in highly staged – and stagey – ways, and convey unusually precise instructions to the actors and to the audience. These include an onstage audience to model appropriate responses: deviating from Shakespeare's

usual habit of depicting rather than naming emotions, characters in these scenes tend to narrate the emotions that they are experiencing. Wonder, in Shakespeare, is an over-determined and therefore highly-charged site. In *The Winter's Tale*, the resurrected Hermione is initially presented to Leontes and the other spectators not as a corpse but as a monument: a statue such as one might find adorning a tomb or commemorating a lost queen. Hermione's resurrection is an ambiguous moment, a perfect illustration of Todorov's fantastical: is this the living Hermione, disguised as a statue in Paulina's plot to inspire Leontes' repentance (the uncanny) or is she a statue brought miraculously to life through some combination of art and faith (the marvellous)? Readers and spectators – and editors and directors – resolve this question in their own ways, but the play defers that resolution and stretches the moment of fantastic uncertainty.

PAULINA Either forbear,

Quit presently the chapel, or resolve you
For more amazement. If you can behold it,
I'll make the statue move indeed, descend
And take you by the hand; but then you'll think –
Which I protest against – I am assisted
By wicked powers.

LEONTES What you can make her do,

I am content to look on: what to speak,
I am content to hear; for 'tis as easy
To make her speak as move.

PAULINA It is required

You do awake your faith. Then all stand still;
On: those that think it is unlawful business
I am about, let them depart.

LEONTES Proceed:

No foot shall stir.

PAULINA Music, awake her; strike!

Music

'Tis time; descend; be stone no more; approach;
Strike all that look upon with marvel. Come,
I'll fill your grave up: stir, nay, come away,
Bequeath to death your numbness, for from him
Dear life redeems you. You perceive she stirs:

HERMIONE comes down

Start not; her actions shall be holy as
You hear my spell is lawful: do not shun her
Until you see her die again; for then
You kill her double.

(*Winter's Tale*, 5.3.104–30)

In a play thematically concerned with nature and art, Hermione's statue is also linked to wonder in Bynum's sense that it accompanies as a category violation. The statue commemorates Hermione and represents her, but does it become her, or is the

stone transubstantiated into something else? Is Hermione now an inanimate object brought to life, like the brazen head in *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay*? A resurrected corpse, like Christ? The wonder of her resurrection exists as long as she remains uncategorizable, and the play defers that categorization, but once the nature of her reappearance in the play is resolved so is the wonder.

Wonder in drama is often associated with a pause in the dramatic action, reflecting what I have been arguing is an inherent passivity in the wonder response and creating, often, the effect of a *tableau vivant* on stage, not only apparent in Hermione's statue but in the worshipful pose her daughter Perdita strikes at its feet. An odd offshoot of this might be dubbed the *tableau mort*, an onstage corpse treated as if it were alive. This may be a feature of Shakespeare's lost play *Cardenio*, written with John Fletcher and thought to be based on Cervantes's *Don Quixote*, performed by the King's Men in 1613. In a play of the same period based on the same source material, the anonymous manuscript play known as *The Second Maiden's Tragedy* (c. 1611, also known by the alternative titles *The Lady's Tragedy* or *The Maiden's Tragedy*), the Luscinda character, called the Lady, dies but is resurrected twice, in a fashion. She is exhumed in Act 4, Scene 3 by the Tyrant, who embraces her in a necrophiliac passion and crowns her corpse his queen. In Act 4, Scene 4 she appears as a ghost to announce that she is not in her tomb.

The echoes of resurrection plays are apparent in this both episodes. In Act 4, Scene 3, the Tyrant responds to the tomb and the corpse with reverence and the awed pause that we have seen in relation to wonder. In the opening lines of the scene, he urges the soldiers:

Softly, softly!

Let's give this place the peace that it requires. . .

. . .

The monument woos me; I must run and kiss it. (4.3.1–2, 9)⁴⁵

'Oh, blessed object!' he responds to her corpse, urging the soldiers to treat it 'with reverence'. The momentary pause that signifies wonder is evident in his reaction:

O, the moon rises! What reflection

Is thrown about this sanctified building,

E'en in a twinkling! How the monuments glister,

As if death's palaces were all massy silver

And scorned the name of marble!

[*He receives the Lady's body from them*]

Art thou cold?

I have no faith in't yet; I believe none.

Madam! 'Tis I, sweet lady, prithee speak!

'Tis thy love calls on thee, thy king thy servant.

No? Not a word? All prisoners to pale silence?

I'll prove a kiss. (4.3.82–91)

Govianus, the Cardenio character, approaches the tomb reverently as well, in a stage direction indicating '*Govianus kneels at the tomb wondrous passionately*' (4.4.13s.d.). In

an inversion of the liturgical *quem quaeritis*, it is Govianus who asks the questions after a voice from the grave intones ‘I am not here’:

GOVIANUS What’s that? Who is not here? I’m forced to question it. (4.4.41)

The answer is a *coup de théâtre* described in the stage directions, and recognizable from the resurrection plays:

On a sudden in a kind of noise like a wind, the doors clattering, the tombstone flies open, and a great light appears in the midst of the tomb; his Lady, as went out, standing just before him all in white, stuck with jewels and a great crucifix on her breast.
(4.4.42s.d.)

Shakespeare, too, introduces a ghost in *The Winter’s Tale*, but as a reported visitation rather than a *coup de théâtre*. Antigonus, who will soon experience his own *coup de théâtre* when he is required to ‘exit, pursued by a bear’,⁴⁶ never to be seen again, tells the infant Perdita that he saw her mother’s spirit, who instructed him to name the baby Perdita and abandon her in Bohemia. This ghostly visitation serves the play later, as a means of prolonging the fantastical moment when Hermione’s statue comes to life, holding in abeyance the explanation that she has been alive all this time, hidden by Paulina, which would shift the play from fantastical to uncanny. After all, how could Hermione appear to Antigonus as a ghost if she had never been dead? When Antigonus relates the vision there is no reason to doubt its veracity, so Hermione’s death becomes an established fact that the play only later destabilizes when this becomes dramaturgically effective.

The dramaturgy of wonder

There is a strong association between wonder and early modern tragicomedy, perhaps a vestige of a medieval way of thinking about wonder, since, as Bynum suggests, wonder often appears, semantically, around words connoting mixing or mingling.⁴⁷ One of the primary drivers of medieval wonder, according to Bynum, is a particular kind of object that transcends normal categories: metamorphoses and hybrids, especially those that, like corpses and living statues, cross the barrier between human and non-human.⁴⁸

Drama mobilizes wonder in ways that are particular to performance, some of them resonating with religious practices that have been collectively described as ‘affective piety’. The connections between religious contemplation, drama and the emotions are captured in Sarah McNamer’s description, in her book *Affective Piety and the Invention of Medieval Compassion*, of a body of ‘richly emotional, script-like texts that ask their readers to imagine themselves present at scenes of Christ’s suffering and to perform compassion for that suffering victim in a private drama of the heart’.⁴⁹ Some early modern tragedies and tragicomedies might certainly be described in similar terms. The deferral of catharsis in tragicomedy is an important element to consider, connecting, as it does, to the combination of affective piety and wonder in plays like *The Resurrection of Our Lord*. Affective piety comes from the contemplation of Christ’s suffering, and wonder from witnessing his miraculous resurrection. Similarly, while catharsis comes from pity and fear, wonder, at least in the kind of comedy I have

been considering, arises when the tragic resolution is deferred by a providential intervention.

In both *Tartuffe* and *The Winter's Tale*, that intervention is through a human intermediary: the all-seeing king and his officer in the former, Paulina and the 'rare Italian master' Julio Romano in the latter. The role of human intervention in the production of the wondrous is significant within the context of the enforcedly secular drama of post-Reformation England, reifying the late medieval dissolution of 'wonders' into the distinct categories of the miraculous and the marvellous.

That dissolution is not, as the *Tretise* feared, entirely detrimental to wonder, at least in Bennett's sense of secular enchantment. The result of onstage wonders is often, rather, that lesser elements become imbued with wonder as well; thus is secular enchantment engendered. In *The Tempest*, Miranda's wonder at the unwonderful sailors who wash up on the island can seem simply naïve, the credulity of an ingenue played for laughs, but after witnessing the wonders of Prospero's island even Gonzalo, certainly no ingenu, is prepared to credit reports of other wonders that he has not seen with his own eyes. On an island ruled by Prospero's magic, what wonders are not possible?

Conclusions

Wonder, along with the related emotions of piety, awe, curiosity and shock, is the emotional response associated with *coups de théâtre*, surprising onstage events that create a momentary pause in the dramatic action – behold the corpse revived, the statue reanimated, the brass head talking, the devils dancing. While wonder is oriented towards predominantly religious ends in medieval drama, or at least to ends that are religious as well as secularly spectacular, the dramaturgical tools forged for this purpose serve the later secular drama as well.

In English drama, wonder retains some of its religious overtones, associated with the triumph of faith over doubt, even after Elizabeth's royal proclamation in 1559 prohibiting religious matter on the public stage. The plays of Shakespeare and his contemporaries mobilize wonder in ways that are often consistent with medieval dramaturgy, while separating that wonder from religious faith. The result is, in early modern English drama, an emotional alternative to Aristotle's notion of catharsis, Christianity's message of redemption, and Enlightenment rationalism.

There is a strong continuity between certain aspects of wonder in medieval and early modern drama, even if these are not always apparent through textual and semantic analysis. Dramaturgical analysis, which focuses on both the dialogue and the explicit and implicit stage directions, reveals the persistence of wonder through techniques such as the *coup de théâtre* and the *tableau vivant*. While the miracles of medieval mysteries are apparently evacuated from the plot and language of the early modern secular stage, early modern marvels draw on many of the same dramaturgical techniques, substituting human for divine agency. Even when the stage directions are imprecise about the means and materials that create shock, awe, terror, delight and the other reactions associated with wonder, and even when a complete absence of records makes it impossible to know whether these responses were elicited in the audience, these playtexts record the persistence of techniques forged in medieval religious dramaturgy. Despite Elizabeth's prohibition of religious matter on the public stage, on the English stage in this period wonders never cease.

Notes

- 1 J. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 5.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Major scholarship on early modern drama and censorship includes J. Clare, 'Art made tongue-tied by authority': *Elizabethan and Jacobean Dramatic Censorship*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990; and J. Clare, 'Historicism and the question of censorship in the Renaissance', *English Literary Renaissance* 27:2, 1997, 155–76., online, available at: <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6757.1997.tb01104.x>>; R. Dutton, *Mastering the Revels: The Regulation and Censorship of English Renaissance Drama*, Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1991; R. Dutton, *Licensing, Censorship, and Authorship in Early Modern England*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000; A. Hadfield (ed.), *Literature and Censorship in Renaissance England*, New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- 4 J. Bennett, *The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 91.
- 5 On secular enchantment within the field of contemporary spirituality, see, for example, A. Bilgrami, *Secularism, Identity, and Enchantment*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014; G. Levine (ed.), *The Joy of Secularism*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011; and W.D. Mignolo, 'Enduring enchantment: secularism and the epistemic privileges of modernity', in P. Bilimoria and A.B. Irvine (eds), *Postcolonial Philosophy of Religion*, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009, pp. 273–92.
- 6 On religion in early modern drama, see, for example, R.H Blackburn, *Biblical Drama under the Tudors*, The Hague: Mouton, 1971; J.H. Degenhardt and E. Williamson (eds), *Religion and Drama in Early Modern England*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011; B. Groves, *Texts and Traditions: Religion in Shakespeare, 1592–1604*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007; R. McCoy, *Faith in Shakespeare*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; E. Williamson, *The Materiality of Religion in Early Modern Drama*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009.
- 7 C.W. Bynum, 'Wonder', *American Historical Review* 102:1, 1997, 1–26.
- 8 Ibid., p. 7.
- 9 B. Benedict, *Curiosity: A Cultural History of Early Modern Inquiry*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- 10 R. Descartes, *Les Passions de l'âme*, Paris: Louis Elzevir, 1649. For an English translation, see *The Passions of the Soul*, trans. S. Voss, Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 1989; the quotation is from Voss, p. 52.
- 11 T. Todorov, *Introduction à la littérature fantastique*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1970.
- 12 *A Tretise of Miraclis Pleyinge*, London, British Library, MS Add. 24,202. All line references are to Clifford Davidson's revised, corrected and expanded edition, Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute, 1993: lines 162–5.
- 13 See Bernard McGinn, *Antichrist: Two Thousand Years of the Human Fascination with Evil*, San Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1994.
- 14 *A Tretise*, lines 23–5.
- 15 Ibid., lines 30–56.
- 16 Ibid., lines 112–15.
- 17 L. Clopper, 'Miracula and *The Tretise of Miraclis Pleyinge*', *Speculum* 65:4, 1990, 878–905 (p. 902).
- 18 A. Johnston and S. MacLean, 'Reformation and resistance in Thames/Severn parishes: the dramatic witness', in K.L. French, G.G. Gibbs and B.A. Kümin (eds), *The Parish in English Life, 1400–1600*, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 178–200.
- 19 The citation is from *Statutes of the Realm*, vol. 3 (1817), ed. Alexander Luders, T.E. Tomlins, John France, W.E. Taunton and John Raithby, repr. London: Dawsons, 1963, p. 895.
- 20 Anon., *The Resurrection of Our Lord* (c. 1540), Washington, DC, Folger Library MS V. b. 192. All citations are from K.E. Sawyer, 'The Resurrection of Our Lord: a study and dual-text edition', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 2001, online, available at: <<http://hdl.handle.net/1807/16493>> (accessed 7 November 2018): *Resurrection*, line 8.
- 21 Ibid., lines 47, 48.

- 22 Ibid., lines 207–8.
- 23 Ibid., lines 217–22.
- 24 Ibid., lines 432–34.
- 25 Ibid., lines 542, 562, 560.
- 26 Ibid., lines 881, 915, 917, 922, 935, 937.
- 27 The citation is from P.L. Hughes and J.F. Larkin (eds), *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, vol. 2, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969, p. 115.
- 28 R. Bacon, *Opus Majus*, 6.2, trans. R.B. Burke, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1928, pp. 617–25. On Bacon's theories pertaining to resurrection, see Z. Matus, 'Resurrected bodies and Roger Bacon's elixir', *Ambix* 60:4, 2013, 323–40, online, available at: <<https://doi.org/10.1179/0002698013Z.00000000037>>.
- 29 M. Dahlquist, 'Love and technological iconoclasm in Robert Greene's *Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay*', *ELH* 78:1, 2011, 51–77.
- 30 R. Greene, *The honorable historie of Frier Bacon, and Frier Bongay* (c. 1589), London: Elizabeth Alide, 1630, sig. G1.
- 31 Dahlquist, 'Love and technological iconoclasm', pp. 65, 70.
- 32 J. Barish, *The Antitheatrical Prejudice*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981.
- 33 M. O'Connell, *The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theater in Early-Modern England*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- 34 M. de Cervantes, *El rufián dichoso*, Madrid: widow of Alonso Martín, 1615; L. de Vega, *Arte nuevo de hacer comedias en este tempo*, in *Rimas, ahora añadidas, con el Nuevo arte de hacer comedias de este tiempo*, Madrid: Alonso Martín, 1609.
- 35 J. Prest, *Controversy in French Drama: Molière's Tartuffe and the Struggle for Influence*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 2.
- 36 Molière (J.-B. Poquelin), *Tartuffe*, trans. C.H. Page, New York: Putnam, 1908.
- 37 *Resurrection*, line 206s.d.
- 38 Sawyer, 'The Resurrection of Our Lord', p. 81.
- 39 Wonder in Shakespeare is almost its own sub-field, often connected to the Romances. Significant studies include T.G. Bishop, *Shakespeare and the Theatre of Wonder*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; M.T. Burnett, *Constructing Monsters in Shakespeare's Drama and Early Modern England*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; A.M. Cohen, *Wonder in Shakespeare*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; J.V. Cunningham, *Woe or Wonder: The Emotional Effect of Shakespearean Tragedy*, Denver, CO: University of Denver Press, 1951; A.F. Johnston, 'The emerging pattern of the English resurrection play', *Medieval English Theatre* 20, 1998, 3–23; P.G. Platt, *Reason Diminished: Shakespeare and the Marvellous*, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997; R.S. White, *Let Wonder Seem Familiar: Endings in Shakespeare's Romance Vision*, London: Athlone Press, 1985; P. Yachnin, 'Magical properties: vision, possession, and wonder in *Othello*', *Theatre Journal* 48:2, 1996, 197–208.
- 40 All Shakespearean references are to W. Shakespeare, *Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard, Katharine Eisaman Maus, Gordon McMullan and Suzanne Gossett, 3rd edn, New York: Norton, 2015.
- 41 Shakespeare, *Comedy of Errors*, 3.2.
- 42 Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, 1.5.
- 43 Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, 3.2.
- 44 Shakespeare, *Henry VIII*, 5.5.
- 45 Anon., *The Second Mayden's Tragedy*, London, British Library, Lansdowne MS 807/2. Edited as *The Lady's Tragedy*, ed. Julia Briggs, in *Thomas Middleton: Collected Works*, ed. Gary Taylor et al., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 833–906. I have cited from this edition without taking a position on the attribution of authorship, which is not relevant to my argument here.
- 46 Shakespeare, *The Winter's Tale*, 3.3.64s.d.
- 47 Bynum, 'Wonder', p. 7.
- 48 Ibid., p. 16.
- 49 S. McNamer, *Affective Piety and the Invention of Medieval Compassion*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, p. 1.

MIND OVER MADNESS

The development of the topos of
the melancholic artist*Laurinda S. Dixon*

Albrecht Dürer's cryptic engraving *Melencolia I* (1514) is one of the major monuments of art history (Figure 27.1). Its virtuosic chiaroscuro effects and dazzling intaglio technique mark it as the pinnacle of the artist's output. However, it is the print's elusive subject that fascinates us even more than its superb technical qualities. Dürer supplied a title in the words *Melencolia I*, splayed across the wings of a flying bat in the upper left corner. But the main figure is an angelic muse, seated on the ground in a pose that suggests weariness or dejection – perhaps also frustration. With darkly shaded eyes and knitted brow, she gazes upward, a pair of dividers poised in her right hand and a latched book in her lap. As if to mock her mental and physical inertia, an industrious putto, seated precariously atop a millstone, works busily at something – we know not what. Other objects, many of which are associated with time and measure, share the space. A blazing comet, bound by the overarching curve of a rainbow, streaks across the sky above, providing an element of celestial drama to the scene.

The cryptic symbols in Dürer's scene, with their references to philosophy, geometry, astrology, alchemy and medicine, have inspired diverse and sometimes fantastic explanations.¹ However, most writers agree that the engraving was intended as a manifesto in support of the Renaissance phenomenon of the 'artist genius'.² As such, *Melencolia I* marks a turning point in history, when the conventional medieval perception of art as a predominantly manual craft was augmented by the belief that artists possess unique intellectual and creative gifts. Dürer's audacious print began a revolution among artists, who began to depict themselves as melancholic from this point on.³ They understood melancholy not as a psychological mood, as we do today, but as a means of valorizing their profession and gaining respect for their creative and intellectual accomplishments.⁴

Before examining selective evidence of this phenomenon in art, we must first survey the philosophical, medical, social and religious contexts of melancholia from its earliest beginnings in ancient Greek philosophy to its culmination as a rhetorical convention in the early modern era.⁵ The modern perception of melancholia, associated with the emotion of sorrow or depression, is only vaguely related to its Renaissance reality. Before the Freudian revolution of the late nineteenth century, medical authorities recognized no separation between mental and physical illness. The concept of 'personality', as we now call it, was tied to a visual and descriptive way



Figure 27.1 Albrecht Dürer, *Melencolia I*, 1514. Engraving, 239 × 185 mm. The British Museum, London. © Trustees of the British Museum

of thinking that associated the state of one's soul inexorably with the outward appearance of the body. Dürer's view of melancholia was defined by centuries of scholarly debate, centred around the ancient paradigm of humoral theory.⁶ Within this system, everything in the universe, including the human body, was believed to contain four

qualities (hot, cold, wet, dry). These, in turn, characterized four elements: fire (hot and dry), air (hot and wet), water (cold and wet) and earth (cold and dry). The elements were represented in the body by four humours, or bodily fluids: yellow bile, phlegm, blood and black bile. The humours were linked, in turn, to four temperaments, the choleric, phlegmatic, sanguine and melancholic.

A fifteenth-century German woodcut illustrates these interrelationships (Figure 27.2). Here, the temperaments appear as four human figures on horseback. The accompanying descriptive texts describe the specific qualities, elements and dominant humour associated with each. The youthful sanguine figure gallops amid fluffy clouds of air, indicating the qualities of warmth and moisture. Containing blood as their dominant humour, sanguine folk tended to be attractive, easygoing and popular. The choleric figure, signified by flames, brandishes a sword. Naturally hot and dry, with yellow bile prevailing, such people were generally ruddy-faced, red haired and easily angered. The phlegmatic rides through waves of water, indicative of the qualities of coldness and moisture and the humour of phlegm. Cold, dry, earth and black bile characterize the melancholic figure, who treads on dry ground. Humoral tradition accepted such folk as dejected, eccentric and misanthropic.

Astrology, a mainstay of Renaissance science, designated places for planets and zodiac signs in the humoral system. Each planet possessed a temperament, a 'personality' of sorts, associated with its native zodiac signs. People born under the influence



Figure 27.2 Anon., German, *The Four Temperaments*, c. 1480–1490. Woodcut, 383 × 530 mm. The British Museum, London. © Trustees of the British Museum

of a specific planet tended to possess certain personalities naturally.⁷ Melancholics were ruled by the ponderous planet Saturn, the furthest away and slowest in its orbit around the earth in the geocentric universe. Saturn ruled the passage of time, the element of earth, black bile, sorrow, death, decay, poverty and darkness. People born under this planet, and its zodiac signs Capricorn and Aquarius, fell naturally into the occupations of hermit, farmer, gravedigger and criminal.⁸ They sought dark places, and favoured the colours brown and black, in sympathy with their native humour black bile. Drawn to the element of earth and away from people, melancholics tended to be sombre and solitary – pale, anxious and eccentric.

Though melancholia was ruled by black bile, which was cold by nature, the condition could also manifest as hot. The opposing qualities of heat and cold produced the conflicting psychic symptoms of misery and elation, activity and listlessness, caused by humoral fires within the body. Inevitably, these conflagrations yielded to debilitating, polluted clouds of black vapours. The smoky remains of burned humours were deposited on the outer body, which accounted for the wasted, pale appearance of melancholics. The hot, active phase of melancholia, in which creativity and inspiration occurred, was always followed by cold lethargy and depression. Melancholia could arise naturally or accidentally.⁹ Natural melancholia occurred as the result of one or more unavoidable life events: date and time of birth (born under Saturn); heredity (born of melancholic parents); or race (a Moor, Jew or Negro). Accidental, spontaneous melancholia was instigated by the unforeseen happenings (accidents), activities and emotions, that are part of every human life. Among the events implicated in accidental melancholy were disappointment in love, fear, overwork, unfortunate marriage, poverty, imprisonment, envy, hatred, ambition, shame, death of friends and family, hunger, solitude and intense study.

The emotions, also called ‘affections’ or ‘passions’, were often implicated in disease, especially melancholia.¹⁰ Any imbalance in bodily humours could engender fierce passions, and the opposite was also true; uncontrolled, spontaneous emotions could cause physical illness. Aristotle recognized two basic passions – pleasure and pain. Eventually, many more joined the roster, including joy, wrath, love, jealousy, anger, sorrow and fear.¹¹ The passions, like all things in the humoral system, contained the qualities of heat, dryness, moisture and cold in varying degrees. Cold passions, such as sorrow and fear, extinguished the body’s natural heat, chilling, dilating and even breaking the heart. Hot passions, like erotic love and anger, caused the natural moisture of the heart to be depleted. In either case, the sensitive heart reacted both psychically and physically.

Early modern theorists placed their trust in the unshakable authority of the ancients when diagnosing and healing melancholia and its various permutations. Ancient writers, such as Hippocrates, Plato, Galen and Aristotle, formed the core of the Western European medical curriculum until the Enlightenment, and their works inspired centuries of debate and commentary.¹² However, the first mention of melancholia as a privileged condition, suffered by men of genius, appears in the pseudo-Aristotelian ‘Problem 30’ (third century BCE), which posed the question, ‘Why are all outstanding men in philosophy or politics or literature or in the arts obvious melancholics, and in fact some of them to the extent that they have succumbed to the symptoms which arise from black bile?’¹³

The precarious balance between debilitating misanthropy and exalted genius, typical of pseudo-Aristotle's melancholic genius, was maintained over two thousand years of discourse, recurring in Arabic astrology, Christian morality, medieval chivalry and Renaissance Neoplatonism.¹⁴ The perception of melancholia as both a privilege and a torment was ultimately consolidated and popularized in Robert Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, first published in 1615. Still the most familiar authority on melancholia, Burton defined three distinct melancholic types: religious, erotic and scholarly.¹⁵ Each was distinguished by the typical Saturnine physiognomy and personality, and all three were instigated by internal humoral conflagrations. Eventually, these three types merged into a fourth, the melancholic artist, which combined the attributes of piety, passion and learning in a new professional identity.

Religious melancholy

Before Renaissance philosophy and science invented secular models of melancholia, the saturnine qualities of passion, privilege and intellect were associated with extreme piety.¹⁶ Christianity derived the concept of the pious melancholic holy man from Aristotle, who linked creative genius and prophecy with the state of *enthousiasmos* (possession, or divine inspiration). He coined the Greek term *ekstasis* to describe how the divine spirit enters the body of such men, causing their souls to become detached in a prolonged state of intense bliss. Their fevered brains, heated by divine enthusiasm, and thrown into a state of ecstasy, were subject to the cold, dry aftermath of inspirational humoral fires, like pseudo-Aristotle's intellectual geniuses.¹⁷ In acknowledgment of the misanthropy and poverty caused by their isolation, hermits and monks appeared among the various miscreants and earth workers in calendar pages devoted to the planets and their zodiac signs.

A widespread Renaissance cult of the intellectual developed around Saint Jerome (c. 341–420). This renewed interest corresponded to an increased fascination with melancholia in humanist circles, which was paralleled in art.¹⁸ The legend of the hermit-scholar-saint, who translated the Bible into Latin, contains most of the saturnine attributes applied to pseudo-Aristotle's creative genius.¹⁹ In his youth, Jerome had been a devoted scholar, but a serious illness caused him to retire to the desert, where he did penance in solitude for several years. Upon his return to the active world, Jerome devoted his life to the service of the church, eventually becoming as famous for his scholarship as for his sanctity. Christianized Galenic medical theory placed both phases of Jerome's legend within the sphere of Saturn. As a model of studiousness, Jerome was the foremost example of an inspired intellectual within the church hierarchy, and the patron saint of scholars. As a hermit, he embodied the misanthropic saturnine personality. Depictions of Jerome apart from the other three church fathers (Ambrose, Gregory and Augustine) with whom he had previously appeared were inspired by the writings of the Bolognese humanist Giovanni d'Andrea, published in 1511, and by Erasmus's publication in 1516 of a complete edition of Jerome's works.²⁰

Artists from both Italy and northern Europe depicted Jerome traditionally in two ways: as a hermit alone in the desert, or as a pensive savant in his study. Dürer, more than any other artist, was fascinated by the person and legend of Jerome, portraying him at least ten times between 1492 and 1521. His most familiar rendering is the

large engraving *St Jerome in His Study* (1514), produced around the same time as *Melencolia I*, which shows the holy man bent over his desk, surrounded by symbols of saturnine melancholia. However, Dürer's drypoint rendition of *St Jerome Seated Near a Pollard Willow* (Figure 27.3) (c. 1512) is perhaps his most original version of the saint's legend. He depicts the holy man alone in the wilderness, working at a desk comprised of a rough plank suspended between stone supports. Jerome prays fervently toward a crucifix, as his trusty companion, the lion, rests placidly at his feet.

The physical and spiritual torments of religious melancholia are embodied in the gnarled, leaning willow tree, silhouetted against the sky in the upper right background. The tree, deformed by extreme pruning (pollarding) is the botanical equivalent of the tormented saint's physical and psychic condition. The process of



Figure 27.3 Albrecht Dürer, *St Jerome Seated Near a Pollard Willow*, c. 1512. Drypoint, 211 × 184 mm. The British Museum, London. © Trustees of the British Museum

pollarding, done to control a tree's growth, involves drastically cutting back branches to the main trunk. This results in dense growth at the cutting point, which becomes bulbous and gnarled. Throughout the process, the disfigured, amputated willow struggles to stay alive, despite the obstacles to its growth.²¹ Like the stunted tree, which shares his desert sanctuary, Jerome endures continual suffering, becoming stronger through continuous 'pruning' of his carnal desires. He endures the hardships of the ascetic life, even as he demonstrates the discipline and piety required to withstand its rigours. Dürer emphasizes the saint's connection with the saturnine element of earth by enclosing him in an outcropping of rocky turf. Jerome's body is visually fused with his stone sanctuary, an edifice that also serves as shelter, throne and makeshift desk. In this image, Dürer powerfully combines the two traditional iconographic contexts of Jerome's legend – hermit and scholar – in a single image. Seventeenth-century Dutch masters, such as Gerrit Dou and Rembrandt van Rijn, perpetuated Dürer's innovation by including pollarded trees in their paintings of melancholy hermit saints.²²

Love melancholy

Like chaste holy men, lovers also suffered the consequences of internal humoral fires, but for quite different reasons. Unlike modern evocations of romantic love as an idyllic state, love melancholy, or 'erotomania', was once considered an illness requiring a cure.²³ The fashionable young men and women in Renaissance miniature portraits express a sort of delicious misery, as if revelling in their melancholia.²⁴ They are a study in contrasts – wretched yet ecstatic; heated by the internal flames of passion, yet pale and cold to the touch; morose yet appealing. The disease of love, like religious enthusiasm, was contradictory, embodying in a single condition the opposing aspects of heat and cold. Love's victims endured both the tumultuous heat of desire and its inevitable cold, sooty aftermath. The association of love, or 'heroic', melancholy with nobility was omnipresent in the chivalric tradition, which exalted the concept of romantic fervour.²⁵ In reality, however, the notion of privilege grew from a mistransliteration of the Greek word 'eros' into 'hereos'.²⁶ Thus, the ideas of eroticism and knightly virtue were conjoined through misuse into a single definition. Fashionable lovers were men of sensitivity and depth, who displayed their humoral imbalance as a badge of privilege. By the seventeenth century, love melancholy was fully accepted as a disease of fashion, denoting high social status, sensitivity and privilege.²⁷ The character of the melancholic lover was omnipresent in art, literature and music.²⁸

Small, elegant miniature portraits, which were worn around the neck in covered locket, were expensive objects of contemplation that recorded the unique appearance of an individual. However, they were also active instigators of what could be termed a type of consensual visual sex, involving the viewer and the portrait subject.²⁹ The very act of looking was considered capable of kindling the mutual fires of love by reinforcing the appearance of the beloved in memory and instigating physical release. The startling emotional immediacy and intensity of these portraits therefore fulfils their function as provokers and fortifiers of passion. The response that these intimate portraits instigated was intended not for strangers, but for one person only, the lover.

Love melancholia as a sign of high social status and aristocratic breeding appears most consistently in the English portrait tradition. Isaac Oliver's *Edward Herbert, First Baron Herbert of Cherbury* (c. 1610–14) (Figure 27.4) is an elegant example. The likeness of the young lord reinforces his distinctive qualities of beauty, wealth and learning. Herbert reclines in a woodland setting, his head resting on his hand, in the time-honoured pose of melancholia. His demeanour and costume are calculated to evoke the qualities of exquisite sadness and desire. He gazes wistfully outward, boldly locking his gaze with ours. The concepts of medieval knightly lover and noble courtier merge to form the picture of a young man who is miserable, yet appealing. In the right background, a plumed horse and squire allude to knightly melancholia as a badge of impeccable breeding.

A heart engulfed in flames is emblazoned on Herbert's shield, alluding to the inner heat of ardent love.³⁰ The effect of heated erotic desire on the human heart was part of common wisdom in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as it is today.³¹ The heart, home of the vital spirits, bred, dispersed and governed the passions. Indeed, the fine nerve strings, thought to sustain the heart, were placed under great stress when challenged by heated passion. The emotion of erotic love could cause the heartstrings to snap, owing to contraction and expansion caused by



Figure 27.4 Isaac Oliver, *Edward Herbert, First Baron Herbert of Cherbury*, c. 1610–1614. Watercolour on vellum, 17.78 x 22.86 cm. Private collection

heat – hence the designation ‘broken hearted’. Heated and wounded by emotions, the vulnerable heart it is omnipresent in medieval chivalric song, verse and art.

Portraits allowed the loved one to be always present in the mind, even if absent and unattainable in reality. Images kept passion alive by initiating the process of reminiscence and continually reinforcing obsessive thoughts about the beloved.³² The tangible power of an absent lover’s gaze, so intensely recorded in these remarkable portraits, exerted an active, potent force.

Scholarly melancholia

The books and writing implements of St Jerome’s study reappear in paintings that suggest the temporal realms of scholarship and study. The enervated posture and hollow-eyed pallor of melancholic lovers became markers of both the mental exhaustion of student life and the depletion of physical and mental energy of old age and impending death. The signs of scholarly melancholia, specifically its burned-out aftermath, came to be associated with both youthful subjects at the beginning of their scholarly careers and elderly thinkers at the end of theirs. Students attracted the influence of Saturn through their choice of activity, whereas mature scholars were subject to its planetary influence by both the nature of their work and their advanced age. In art, the earthly environs of scholarly melancholia are inhabited by pale, lethargic students and dour, aged sages.³³ When depicting the scholar’s habitat, painters employed the limited colour scheme of melancholy earth, shutting out the light of day to suggest Saturn’s perpetual night.

Several factors contributed to the evolution of this third melancholic type, the man of learning. Apart from the fact that prolonged study could encourage melancholia, even if one were not born under Saturn, the lives of early modern independent scholars were especially difficult.³⁴ Like their artist colleagues, academics were caught between the decay of the patronage system and inadequately developed commercial outlets for their talents. As a result, a surplus of well-educated young men burst upon a world that was incapable of employing them. Degradation and poverty exacerbated the influence of Saturn. In 1489 the Florentine Neoplatonic philosopher and physician Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) published his important *De vita libri tres* (*Three Books on Life*), the first serious treatise designed as a manual for students and scholars battling the influence of Saturn and black bile.³⁵ Within its pages are descriptions, symptoms and cures for melancholia.

Paintings of melancholic students, musing in dark, impoverished surroundings, became popular in the years following the publication of Ficino’s treatise. Pieter Codde’s *Young Scholar in His Study* (c. 1630) (Figure 27.5) attests to the belief that melancholia was an occupational hazard among scholars. Here, a young student slouches at his desk, legs akimbo – his head resting heavily in his hand. On the desk before him is a large open book, supported against a daunting pile of other reading material. The dreary room is rendered in the same delicate earth tones as his costume, hair and flesh. The young man’s collar is untied and doublet unbuttoned, reflecting traditional medieval emblematic descriptions of ‘melancholy’ as a dishevelled, unkempt figure.³⁶ The youth’s brown face, which lacks even the slightest tinge of blush on lips or cheeks, brings to mind Burton’s exhortation, ‘Why lose the colour of our youthful age | By constant bending o’er the stupid page?’³⁷



Figure 27.5 Pieter Codde, *Young Scholar in His Study*, c. 1630. Oil on panel, 46 × 34 cm.
Palais des Beaux-Arts de Lille

Art historians have approached this painting without reference to its psychological ambience, seeing it as an allusion to the wise man's contentment with little.³⁸ But an interpretation of this work in the context of humoral and astrological traditions enlarges our understanding. Codde's student holds a pipe in one hand, an important component of seventeenth-century student life, and also a powerful symbol of

Saturn.³⁹ The habit of smoking, which produced dark, thick vapours, akin to those already clouding the bodies and minds of melancholics, qualified tobacco and pipes as new additions to the realm of saturnine symbols. To bodies already cooled and dried by humoral fires, tobacco acted as a poison, intensifying and increasing melancholia. Tobacco smoke clouded the brain, obscured vision, and coloured the body brown. Thus, the effects of tobacco, or 'yellow henbane' as it was called, were indistinguishable from those of black bile.⁴⁰ Moralists claimed that tobacco irreparably injured the mental faculties, increasing the vertigo, lethargy and dullness already characteristic of melancholia in its cold dry incarnation.⁴¹ With the addition of his pipe, Codde's youth appears as the quintessential scholarly melancholic. Brown face, dishevelled clothing, books, hat and pipe were all telltale signs of black bile's bitter influence. Despite the presence of these saturnine elements, however, it is the emotion communicated by the young man's pose and expression that most eloquently bespeaks the physical fatigue and spiritual malaise of melancholia. The power of the image compels even the most objective modern viewer to react empathically. Codde's student is a worthy descendant of Dürer's muse.

Artists and melancholia

The distinguishing signs of melancholia, evident in representations of extreme piety, immoderate desire and intense studiousness, are omnipresent in artists' self-portraits.⁴² Inspired by Dürer, artists claimed melancholia as a means of valorizing their profession. But in order to join the elite saturnine fraternity, they had to contrive humoral and astrological justifications for their membership. Within the existing system, in place for centuries, Mercury ruled artists, not Saturn.⁴³ Like the mythological messenger of the gods, the quick minds and physical dexterity of Mercury's children enabled them to accomplish tasks requiring skill and energy. Medieval artists shared this planetary realm with goldsmiths, clockmakers, musicians and scribes. Within this astrological system, deep thinkers, scholars and teachers belonged to the realm of Jupiter. Though they were responsible and grave, they were not known for their creativity. The minds of Saturn's children were neither nimble nor intelligent, and furthermore included the misanthropes of the world. Nonetheless, the new breed of Renaissance artist embraced Saturn's depth, even as they identified with Mercury's cleverness and Jupiter's trustworthiness.⁴⁴

It was Marsilio Ficino who displaced intellectuals from Jupiter's realm into Saturn's. Though he excluded artists from the realm of Saturn, Ficino opened the door by claiming that both Saturn and Mercury were responsible in the formation of creative genius.⁴⁵ Citing ancient authority, Ficino attributed the psychic highs and lows of melancholia to a sudden combustion of black bile in the body, a 'fire of inspiration'. Unmitigated, Saturn produced arid, dry theorists, devoid of originality or creativity. But Mercury, agent of agility and cleverness, invited Saturn's participation in the creative process. Mercury still ruled the discipline and craft of art, but it was melancholy Saturn who made that craft extraordinary. Together, the two planets produced the ambivalent traits of sociopathy and brilliance that heralded a new breed of exalted, miserable genius. It remained for artists, already mercurial by definition, to declare the depth of their creativity by calling on Saturn.

In the centuries after Dürer's *Melancholia I*, many artists produced emblematic images of saturnine muses surrounded by symbolic objects. A small painting by Adam

Elsheimer (c. 1600–05), titled *Minerva as Patroness of Arts and Sciences*, now housed in the Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge, is one of the first works to exhibit the full acceptance of artists as intellectuals, suggested by Dürer.⁴⁶ Because Wenceslaus Hollar's etching after Elsheimer's painting (1646) (Figure 27.6) more clearly delineates objects that are obscured in the murky dark tones of the original painting, it is the version illustrated here. In this image, Saturn's sunless realm is dominated by a melancholic muse, seated in the familiar head-in-hand pose. Darkness pervades the scene, broken only by spotlights of artificial illumination from candles and glowing embers. Here are Saturn's children at work. An astronomer studies a celestial globe, and three scholars pore over books and papers in a well-furnished study. A lute and astrolabe hang on the back wall. One of the figures, seated head in hand, body darkened by shadow, works a pair of dividers. All of these elements belong to Saturn's realm of time and measurement and the astrolabe further denotes the liberal art of astronomy assigned to Saturn. In the foreground, an owl perches near a crucible, which is nestled in a dish of smouldering coals. Both the crucible and the owl, bird of wisdom and Minerva's pet creature, are time-honoured symbols of alchemy. The dusky environs in which Elsheimer's scholars toil are a fitting parallel to the processes of early chemistry, a science that based its principles on the transmutation of material and spiritual elements through piety, study and personal suffering. Sharing equal space in the centre of the composition is a painter who, seated at his easel, contemplates a male model. Busy at his task, the artist participates fully in both the curse and the miracle of creative inspiration. Elsheimer's dark, melancholic scene represents a culture of erudition, now finally shared by painters and scholars alike.




Figure 27.6 Wenceslaus Hollar, after Adam Elsheimer, *Pallas*, 1646. Etching, 93 × 148 mm. The British Museum, London. © Trustees of the British Museum



Figure 27.7 Rembrandt van Rijn, *Self-Portrait in a Cap and Scarf with the Face Dark*, 1633. Etching, 133 × 104 mm. The British Museum, London. © Trustees of the British Museum

Artists' self-portraits represent their subjects as men of solid intellect, precarious inner fantasy and shady glamour. Rembrandt's etching titled *Self-Portrait in a Cap and Scarf with the Face Dark* (1633) (Figure 27.7) is typical of the many self-portraits created by the artist in the 1620s and '30s.⁴⁷ Here, as in many other examples, the

artist shows his face obscured by darkness, his features barely visible in the shadows. Medical authority maintained that melancholics saw things not as they actually are, but as they appear through a tangible veil of darkness interposed between the brain and the eyes – the remnants of the sooty fires of inspiration.⁴⁸ Drawing on ancient accounts, Robert Burton attributed the compromised sight of melancholics to ‘the spirits being darkened, and the substance of the brain cloudy and dark’; hence, ‘the mind itself, by those dark, obscure, gross fumes, ascending from black humours, is in continual darkness, fear and sorrow’.⁴⁹ According to the physician Thomas Willis, the most celebrated seventeenth-century authority on melancholia, the brains of melancholics ‘represent the images of things, as it were in shadow, or covered with darkness’.⁵⁰ Even in broad daylight, melancholics perceived themselves as submerged in perpetual night.

We know quite a bit about Rembrandt’s eventful life, which was marked by both fame and tragedy.⁵¹ He also maintained friendships with some of the leading intellectuals of his time in the university city of Leiden. Rembrandt was undoubtedly deeply involved in prevailing debates about the nature of creative inspiration and melancholia, which preoccupied the international scholarly community there.⁵² By veiling his face in darkness, Rembrandt allows us to share his privileged view of the world, seen through his own infected, exhausted imagination, literally clouded by the sooty dregs of inspired creativity. He shows himself as a martyr to his own genius, bearing the solitude, sadness, hardship and pain shared by the gifted few. By manipulating stylistic elements and iconography, Rembrandt appealed to an early modern audience, whose gaze was trained to discern the invisible internal self by means of external appearances and allusions.

The remarkable expressiveness of Rembrandt’s self-portraits and those of his many contemporaries speaks eloquently to the Renaissance spirit of initiative and individuality. Such self-portraits suggest a self-consciousness that is paralleled by the first biographies of artists by Giorgio Vasari and Karel Van Mander.⁵³ The context of melancholia both reinforces and expands this view. Eventually, facts derived from empirical investigation and discovery replaced the Aristotelian paradigms in support of humoral theory. In a larger sense, the pervasive imagery of melancholia reflects society’s evolution from a medieval mindset to a modern one.⁵⁴ Today the melancholic persona persists as an embodiment of withdrawn, introverted genius, though the remnants of astrology and humoral medicine have been relegated to the world of fantasy and superstition.

Notes

- 1 For an extensive discussion of the reception history of Dürer’s *Melencolia I*, see P.-K. Schuster, ‘Das Bild der Bilder: zur Wirkungsgeschichte von Dürers Melancholickupferstick’, *Idea: Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunsthalle* 1, 1982, 73–134.
- 2 The definitive contextual study of Dürer’s *Melencolia I* is R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art*, New York: Basic Books, 1964.
- 3 For the tradition of the artist’s self-portrait, see J.L. Koerner, *The Moment of Self-Portraiture in German Renaissance Art*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993; and H.-J. Raupp, *Untersuchungen zu Künstlerbildnis und Künstlerdarstellung in den Niederlanden im 17. Jahrhundert*, Hildesheim: Olms, 1984.

- 4 For melancholia's association with artists from Dürer onward, see L.S. Dixon, *The Dark Side of Genius: The Melancholic Persona in Art, ca. 1500–1700*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013.
- 5 The bibliography of primary and secondary writings devoted to melancholia is vast, and would fill several volumes. For excellent surveys of the concept of melancholia as it developed from ancient times to the present day, see A. Kleinman and B. Good (eds), *Culture and Depression: Studies in the Anthropology and Cross-Cultural Psychiatry of Affect and Disorder*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985; and S.W. Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression: From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.
- 6 The earliest formal explanation of humoral theory is generally credited to Hippocrates (c. 460–322 BCE). See *On the Nature of Man*, in Hippocrates, *Works*, ed. and trans. W.H.S. Jones and E.T. Withington, 4 vols, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923–31, vol. 1, pp. 13–14.
- 7 The ability of birth horoscopes to predict a person's ideal occupation is embodied in the illustrative 'children of the planets' tradition, which was popularized in a series of images, each devoted to one of the seven known planets and their zodiac sign(s). For the application of this tradition to specific planets and zodiac signs, see F. Lippman, *The Seven Planets*, trans. F. Simmonds, London: Asher, 1895.
- 8 For discussion of the mythological and astrological components of the planet Saturn, see Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy*, pp. 127–95; and Dixon, *Dark Side*, pp. 11–30.
- 9 Rufus of Ephesus (98–117 CE) first made the distinction between natural and accidental melancholy. See Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression*, pp. 29–43, for ancient theories of melancholia, including the Hippocratic school (fifth and fourth centuries BCE), Aristotle (384–322 BCE), Celsus (fl. c. 30 CE), Soranus of Ephesus (fl. c. 98–138 CE), Rufus of Ephesus (98–117 CE), Aretaeus (fl. c. 150 CE), and Galen (131–201 CE).
- 10 The qualities of the passions are explained in many primary medical texts. See R. Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, 1.3.1.3, ed. H. Jackson, 3 vols, New York: Dutton, 1932, repr. New York: New York Review of Books, 2002), vol. 1, pp. 398–403. For evolving views of the passions throughout history, see S. Gaukroger (ed.), *The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century*, London: Routledge, 2000; and G.K. Paster, K. Rowe and M. Floyd-Wilson (eds), *Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
- 11 For early theories of the emotions, see Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression*, pp. 14–25.
- 12 Melancholia and its variants were topics of great scholarly interest in early modern medical schools. See Dixon, *Dark Side of Genius*, 'Appendix', pp. 191–8, which lists doctoral dissertations devoted to the topic originating in European universities from c. 1590 to 1750.
- 13 The pseudo-Aristotelian 'Problem 30', now attributed to Theophrastus (c. 371–287 BCE), quoted in Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression*, p. 31.
- 14 See especially M. Ciavolella and A.A. Iannucci (eds), *Saturn from Antiquity to the Renaissance*, Ottawa: Dovehouse, 1992.
- 15 M.W. Dols, *Majnun: The Madman in Medieval Islamic Society*, ed. D.E. Immisch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), traces these three melancholic prototypes to Arabic medical theory, which was absorbed by medieval Christian science.
- 16 For Christianized and other medieval theories of melancholia, including Oribasius of Pergamon (323–403), Alexander of Tralles (525–605), Paul of Aegina (625–690), Constantinus Africanus (1020–1087), Avicenna (980–1037) and Christian moralists, see Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression*, pp. 46–77, 330–41.
- 17 On the controversial topic of 'enthusiasm', see M. Heyd, 'Robert Burton's sources on enthusiasm and melancholy: from a medical tradition to religious controversy', *History of European Ideas* 5, 1984, 17–44.
- 18 For the subject of Saint Jerome in art, see L.S. Dixon, 'An occupational hazard: Saint Jerome, melancholia, and the scholarly life', in L.S. Dixon (ed.), *In Detail: New Studies in Northern Renaissance Art in Honor of Walter S. Gibson*, Turnhout: Brepols, 1998, pp. 69–82; H. Friedmann, *A Bestiary for Saint Jerome: Animal Symbolism in European Religious Art*, Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1980; and B. Ridderbos, *Saint and Symbol: Images of Saint Jerome in Early Italian Art*, trans. P. de Waard-Dekking, Groningen: Bouma's Boekhuis, 1984.

- 19 For the legend of Saint Jerome, see Jacobus de Voragine, *The Golden Legend*, trans. and ed. G. Ryan and H. Ripperger, New York: Arno, 1969, p. 10.
- 20 For the humanist revival of Saint Jerome, see P.G. Bietenholz, 'Erasmus von Rotterdam und der Kult des heiligen Hieronymus', in S. Füssel, J. Knappe and D. Wuttke (eds), *Poesis et Pictura: Studien zum Verhältnis von Text und Bild in Handschriften und alten Drucken*, Baden-Baden: Koerner, 1989, pp. 191–220; and E.F. Rice Jr, *Saint Jerome in the Renaissance*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
- 21 On pollarding, see Minnesota Tree Care Advisors, 'Pollarding: what was old is new again', online, available at: <www.mntca.org/Newsletter/pollarding.htm>.
- 22 On Rembrandt's emulation of Dürer, see C.B. Scallen, 'Rembrandt, emulation, and the northern print tradition', in Dixon, *In Detail*, pp. 135–50. On the significance of the pollarded willow in the iconography of religious melancholia, see Dixon, *Dark Side of Genius*, pp. 51–3.
- 23 Love melancholy is the topic of Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, 3.2; and J. Ferrand, *Erotomania, or A Treatise Discoursing of the Essence, Causes, Symptoms, Prognostics, and Care of Love, or Erotique Melancholy*, trans. E. Chilmead, Oxford: L. Lichfield, 1640. These early modern authors relied on ancient and Arabic precedents in their presentations of love melancholy, citing Plato, Plutarch, Plotinus, Avicenna, Xenophon and Theophrastus, among others. For modern discussions, see D.A. Beecher and M. Ciavolella (eds), *Eros and Anteros: The Medical Traditions of Love in the Renaissance*, Ottawa: Dovehouse, 1992; K.R. Bartlett, K. Eisenbichler and J. Liedl (eds), *Love and Death in the Renaissance*, Ottawa: Dovehouse, 1991; and M.-P. Duminil, 'La Mélancolie amoureuse dans l'antiquité', in J. Céard (ed.), *La Folie et le corps*, Paris: Presses de l'École Normale Supérieure, 1985, pp. 91–109.
- 24 On English Renaissance miniature portraits, see the many books by Roy Strong, especially *The Elizabethan Image: Painting in England, 1540–1620*, exhibition catalogue, London: Tate Gallery, 1969; and *The English Icon: Elizabethan and Jacobean Portraiture*, London: Paul Mellon Foundation for British Art, 1969.
- 25 On love melancholy and the medieval chivalric tradition, see M. Camille, *The Medieval Art of Love: Objects and Subjects of Desire*, New York: Abrams, 1998; D.E. Stewart, *The Arrow of Love: Optics, Gender, and Subjectivity in Medieval Love Poetry*, Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2003; and M.F. Wack, *Lovesickness in the Middle Ages: The 'Viaticum' and Its Commentaries*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990.
- 26 For knightly 'heroic melancholy', see J.L. Lowes, 'The loveres maladye of hereos', *Modern Philology* 11, 1914, 491–546.
- 27 For 'fashionable melancholy', see L. Babb, 'Melancholy and the Elizabethan man of letters', *Huntington Library Quarterly* 4, 1941, 247–61.
- 28 Love melancholy is prominent in the plays of William Shakespeare (1564–1616) (especially *As You Like It*, *Hamlet*, *Love's Labour's Lost*, *Two Gentlemen of Verona*) and in the songs of John Dowland (c. 1563–1626). See L. Babb, 'Love melancholy in the Elizabethan and early Stuart drama', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 13, 1943, 117–32; and R.H. Wells, 'John Dowland and Elizabethan melancholy', *Early Music* 13, 1985, 514–28.
- 29 See L.S. Dixon, 'The eyes, heart, and brain of the beholder: experiencing English Renaissance miniature portraits', *Explorations in Renaissance Culture* 36:1, 2010, 1–10.
- 30 For the imagery of the human heart in the context of romantic love, see Camille, *Medieval Art of Love*; and E. Jager, *The Book of the Heart*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
- 31 For the effect of love on the human heart, see G.K. Paster, *Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean State*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 77–134.
- 32 For the complex interplay of qualities, temperaments and emotions and their effects on the human body and soul, see R.L. Anderson, *Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare's Plays*, Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1928; J.K. Gardiner, 'Elizabethan psychology and Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 38, 1977, 373–88; and Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression*, pp. 10–20, 352–72.
- 33 For the imagery of the scholar's study, see D. Thornton, *The Scholar in His Study: Ownership and Experience in Renaissance Italy*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997. For the scholar's study as a locus for melancholia, see Dixon, *Dark Side of Genius*, pp. 81–114.
- 34 Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, 1.2.3.15, vol. 1, pp. 305–8, devotes several pages to the 'martyrdom' of university life. Historians view the early modern era as a time of 'cosmic

- madness', defined by an apocalyptic sense of anxiety and urgency. Economic collapse, recurring plagues, famine and constant warfare provided a breeding ground for the low spirits and bodily imbalances of melancholia. See T.H. Aston (ed.), *Crisis in Europe, 1550–1660*, New York: Basic Books, 1965; and G. Rosen, *Madness in Society: Chapters in the Historical Sociology of Mental Illness*, New York: Harper and Row, 1969.
- 35 M. Ficino, *De vita libri tres*, Florence: A. de Bartolommeo Miscomini, 1489.
 - 36 An unkempt appearance was a symptom of melancholia, and noted by Shakespeare in such plays as *As You Like It*, which exhorts lovers in a passion to dress with 'your sleeve unbuttoned, your shoe untied, and everything about you demonstrating a careless desolation': W. Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, 3.2.369–71, ed. A. Latham, London: Methuen, 1975.
 - 37 Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, 1.2.3.15, vol. 1, p. 312.
 - 38 P. Sutton, *Masters of Seventeenth-Century Genre Painting*, exhibition catalogue, Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1984, pp. 174–5.
 - 39 For smoking in art, associated with lowlifes, see I. Gaskell, 'Tobacco, social deviance, and Dutch art in the seventeenth century', in W. Franits (ed.), *Looking at Seventeenth-Century Dutch Art: Realism Reconsidered*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 68–77.
 - 40 For 'yellow henbane', see R. Dodoens, *Cruydeboeck*, Antwerp: Jan van der Loe, 1554.
 - 41 According to S. Butler, *Hudibras*, London: J. G., 1663, second part, canto 3, p. 163; and J. Deacon, *Tobacco Tortured, or The Filthie Fume of Tobacco Refined*, London: Richard Field, 1616, sig. K4.
 - 42 For the imagery of the artist/scholar, see Dixon, *Dark Side of Genius*, pp. 115–63.
 - 43 For artists as children of Mercury, see A.P. de Mirimonde, *Astrologie et musique*, Geneva: Éditions Minkoff, pp. 49–55.
 - 44 See Jackson, *Melancholia and Depression*, pp. 78–103; and D.P. Walker, *Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975, for Renaissance theories of melancholia, including those of Ficino, Paracelsus (1493–1541), Thomas Elyot (1490–1546), Andrew Boorde (1490–1549), Timothy Bright (1550?–1615), André Du Laurens (1560?–1609), Felix Platter (1536–1614) and Robert Burton (1557–1640).
 - 45 Ficino, *De vita*, p. 113.
 - 46 This painting, in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, is one of three representing the sensual, active and contemplative realms, ruled respectively by Venus, Juno and Minerva. See R. Klessmann, E.E.S. Gordenker and C.T. Seifert, *Adam Elsheimer, 1578–1610*, exhibition catalogue, Edinburgh: National Gallery of Scotland, 2006, pp. 160–3.
 - 47 For Rembrandt's self-portraits, see H.P. Chapman, *Rembrandt's Self-Portraits: A Study in Seventeenth-Century Identity*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
 - 48 The obscured vision of melancholics is noted in many medical texts. See especially A. du Laurens (Laurentius), *A Discourse on the Preservation of the Sight: of Melancholike Diseases, of Rheumes, and of Old Age*, trans. R. Surphlet, London: Felix Kingston, 1599.
 - 49 Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, 1.3.3, vol. 2, p. 419.
 - 50 T. Willis, *Two Discourses Concerning the Soul of Brutes which is that of the Vital and Sensitive of Man*, trans. S. Pordage (London: Thomas Dring, 1683), p. 189.
 - 51 On Rembrandt's life, see G. Schwartz, *Rembrandt, His Life, His Paintings*, New York: Viking, 1985.
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